

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQRO-50-327/83112 Technical Specification Involved: 3.3.1.1 and 3.0.3

Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.12.b

Date of Occurrence: 09/11/83 Time of Occurrence: 0436 CDT

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

While unit 1 was in hot shutdown (mode 4) with all control rods fully inserted, manual reactor trip channel tests were performed from 0436 CDT to 0500 CDT on 09/11/83. During this period, both trains of solid state protection system (SSPS) automatic actuation logic were disabled. This could have prevented an automatic reactor trip in the unlikely event of uncontrolled rod withdrawal with the reactor subcritical. This is a failure to meet the requirements of LCO 3.3.1.1, and the unit complied with LCO 3.0.3.

*Note: This report describes the event originally telecopied to the NRC as SQRO-50-327/83111 on 09/12/83 (L53 830912 998). The LER number was in error. Please change your records to note this.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 in mode 4, 0% Rx power, 300 degrees F, 600 psig.
Unit 2 in mode 6, 0% Rx power, 100 degrees F, 0 psig.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

A review of the event indicates that the procedure (IMI-99, FT-18) was incorrect in that it allowed for the disabling of both trains of the automatic trip logic when the reactor trip breakers were closed and the control rods capable of being withdrawn. This constitutes an inadequate procedure.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The procedure (IMI-99, FT-18) instructed the instrument mechanics to install a jumper in both trains of the SSPS cabinets from the energized 48V bus bar to the UV coil relays. This was done to ensure that the reactor trip breakers tripped from the trip (shunt) coil instead of the UV coil, thus independently testing this trip mechanism as recommended by I&E Circular 81-12 dated July 22, 1981. The installed jumpers caused the UV coil to remain energized, preventing any automatic trip actuation.

Further investigation into the history of the procedure shows that in March 1980 the procedure was revised from R0 to R1 which added the jumpers to allow for independent testing of the shunt coil. The error in the procedure was undetected in the review process and in the subsequent performance of the test for the past three years. At no time during this period did the testing exceed one hour and the plant was at all times in compliance with LCO 3.0.3.

Corrective Action:

At the time of event discovery, the manual reactor trip channel tests were already complete. To prevent recurrence, IMI-99, FT-18 has been revised to open the MG set load breakers to ensure that the rods are deenergized prior to closing the reactor trip breakers.

Failure Data:

None.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

1750 Chestnut Street Tower 11

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

83 SEP 27 48:55

September 23, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT 50-327/83112

The enclosed report provides details concerning the simultaneous removal
of both trains of automatic actuation logic for reactor trip function
from service. This report is submitted in accordance with Sequoyah
unit 1 Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.b.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

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NRC Inspector, Sequoyah

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