LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL NEQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: $\Box(\mathbf{n})$ 0 11 CON'T L 6 0 5 10 10 10 13 2 7 0 0 9 1 1 8 3 8 0 9 2 5 8 3 REPORT 10 0 1 SOURCE DUCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) With unit 1 in mode 4 (0% Rx power, 300 degrees F, 600 psig) at 0439 CDT on 09/11/83 0 2 both trains of automatic actuation logic for reactor trip were made incperable when 03 the reactor trip breakers' undervoltage coils were jumpered out with the breakers 0 4 closed and the control rods capable of withdrawal. The unit complied with LCO 0 5 3.0.3. There was no effect upon public health and safety. Previous occurrences 0 6 none. 0 7 0 8 COMP SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE VALVE COMPONENT CODE CODE CODE SUSCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE (11 ZZ A DI Z (1) Z Z (16 019 10 18 OCCURRENCE REVISION SEQUENTIAL REPORT EVENT YEAR LODE REPORT NO. TYPE NO. LER/AO 0 1 REPORT 11 12 T 3 0 NUMBER 28 30 31 32 NPDD-4 COMPONEN TAKEN PRIME COMP. ACTION METHOU SUBMITTED HOURS (22) FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTUR G (18) Z 0 0 0 0 N (24) Z (20 Y (23 Z 25 9 9 9 Z (21 43 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) During performance of SI-93 (Manual Reactor Trip Functional Test), It was noted that 10 the procedure called for the placing of the jumpers to the UV coils and closing of 1 1 the reactor trip breakers. This is a procedural error causing the removal of both 1 2 trains of automatic reactor trip logic. Testing was already complete at the time 1 3 The procedure has been revised to prevent recurrence. of event discovery. 14 9 FA1.1111 ε METHOD OF OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (3.2) STATU S POWER DISCOVENY B 31 Surveillance testing G (28) 0 0 0 29 NA 51 12 13 46 CONTENT ACTIVITY AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 3 Z 3 NA NA G 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (33) 0 0 0 (J) Z (38) NA 7 80 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) 8 0 0 0 (40) NA LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION TYPE 9 Z (42) NA 8309300225 830923 10 NAC USE ONLY PURLICITY PDR ADOCK 05000327 DESCRIPTION (45) ISSUED PDR 11111 LN (1) 0 NA 10 Phone: (615) 870-6422 /M. R. Harding Name of Preparer: H. R. Rogers

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SORO-50-327/83112 Technical Specification Involved: 3.3.1.1 and 3.0.3

Signation of the

Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.12.b

Date of Occurrence: 09/11/83 Time of Occurrence: 0436 CDT

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

While unit 1 was in hot shutdown (mode 4) with all control rods fully inserted, manual reactor trip channel tests were performed from 0436 CDT to 0500 CDT on 09/11/83. During this period, both trains of solid state protection system (SSPS) automatic actuation logic were disabled. This could have prevented an automatic reactor trip in the unlikely event of uncontrolled rod withdrawal with the reactor subcritical. This is a failure to meet the requirements of LCO 3.3.1.1, and the unit complied with LCO 3.0.3.

*Note: This report describes the event originally telecopied to the NRC as SQR0-50-327/83111 on 09/12/83 (L53 830912 998). The LER number was in error. Please change your records to note this.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 in mode 4, 0% Rx power, 300 degrees F, 600 psig. Unit 2 in mode 6, 0% Rx power, 100 degrees F, 0 psig.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

A review of the event indicates that the procedure (IMI-99, FT-18) was incorrect in that it allowed for the disabling of both trains of the automatic trip logic when the reactor trip breakers were closed and the control rods capable of being withdrawn. This constitutes an inadequate procedure.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The procedure (IMI-99, FT-18) instructed the instrument mechanics to install a jumper in both trains of the SSPS cabinets from the energized 48V bus bar to the UV coil relays. This was done to ensure that the reactor trip breakers tripped from the trip (shunt) coil instead of the UV coil, thus independently testing this trip mechanism as recommended by I&E Circular 81-12 dated July 22, 1981. The installed jumpers caused the UV coil to remain energized, preventing any automatic trip actuation.

Further investigation into the history of the procedure shows that in March 1980 the procedure was revised from RO to RI which added the jumpers to allow for independent testing of the shunt coil. The error in the procedure was undetected in the review process and in the subsequent performance of the test for the past three years. At no time during this period did the testing exceed one hour and the plant was at all times in compliance with LCO 3.0.3.

Corrective Action:

At the time of event discovery, the manual reactor trip channel tests were already complete. To prevent recurrence, IMI-99, FT-18 has been revised to open the MG set load breakers to ensure that the rods are deenergized prior to closing the reactor trip breakers.

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Failure Data:

None.

USNRO RE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 1750 Chestnut Street Tower 11 83 SEP 27 A8: 55

September 23, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT 50-327/83112

The enclosed report provides details concerning the simultaneous removal of both trains of automatic actuation logic for reactor trip function from service. This report is submitted in accordance with Sequoyat. unit 1 Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.b.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. Greek Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure cc (Enclosure): Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

> Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Sequoyah

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