Commonwealth Edison Company
LaSalle Generating Station
2601 North 21st Road
Marseilles, IL 61341-9757
Tel 815-357-6761

ComEd

February 24, 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #95-003-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).

D. J. Ray
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

DJR/ICM/lja
Enclosure
cc: NRC Region III Administrator
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
INPO - Records Center
IDNS Resident Inspector
IDNS Senior Reactor Analyst
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

IE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 3.0

Facility Name (1)	Docket Number (2)	
LaSalle County Station Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 3	1 of 0 3

Title (4)

Potential Traversing In-Core Probe Containment Isolation Design Concern

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)				Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	///	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
0 1	2 7	9 5	9 5	---	0 0 3	0 0	0 2	2 4	9 5	LaSalle Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4

OPERATING MODE (9)	1
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	X	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Ian Missien, Nuclear Engineer, Extension 2249	AREA CODE 8 1 5 3 5 7 - 6 7 6 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	///	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	///
				N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO		0 3	0 9	9 6

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 27, 1995, containment isolation valves in the Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) System at LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 were determined to be potentially outside their design bases and, consequently, inoperable. Under certain system configurations, these valves could automatically reopen when a Group VII Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) signal is reset. LaSalle County Station (LSCS) Updated Final Safety Analysis Review (UFSAR) specifies that PCIS valves will fully close upon receipt of a Group VII PCIS signal and not reopen automatically upon reset of a PCIS signal.

The consequence of these valves automatically reopening is a possible loss of primary containment when it is required to be isolated under certain post-accident scenarios. This would affect up to five separate 3/8" lines on each unit.

Interim administrative controls were put in place to ensure that the containment isolation functions of the TIP System are not compromised.

This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) due to a condition outside the design bases of the plant.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 1/2 Event Date: 01/27/95 Event Time: 1530 Hours

Reactor Mode(s): 1/1 Modes(s) Name: Run/Run Power Level(s): 100/100

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On January 27, 1995, an apparent discrepancy between the LaSalle County Station (LSCS) design basis (Updated Final Safety Analysis Report - UFSAR) and the actual design of the Traversing In-Core Probes (TIP, NR)[IG] Ball Valves was discovered. The LSCS UFSAR states that once an automatic containment isolation signal is initiated, automatic isolation action must go to completion. It also states that return to normal operation after an automatic signal requires deliberate operator action. At LSCS, the TIP System isolates when a Group VII Primary Containment (PC)[NH] Isolation signal is received (Low Reactor Water Level 3, +12.5"; High Drywell Pressure, 1.69 psig). If an isolation signal is received while running TIPs, the TIPs would begin to retract. If the isolation signal cleared and was reset prior to the TIPs reaching their respective shields, the TIPs would not continue to retract to their shields and the Ball Valves would not close to complete the isolation. In addition, if the manual valve control switch for the Ball Valve(s) was in the OPEN position when an isolation signal was received, the Ball Valve(s) would go closed (after the TIPs reached their shields). However, if the signal cleared and was reset, the Ball Valve would reopen without deliberate operator action.

This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) due to a condition outside the design basis of the plant.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

In October 1980, all Three Mile Island (TMI) related items approved for implementation by the NRC were published as NUREG 0737. Item II.E.4.2 of this document required deliberate operator action to return systems to normal operation after the reset of a containment isolation signal. LSCS provided the following justification for nonconformance to the cited criteria, "The TIP drive line isolation valves are not provided with direct, automatic isolation signals. TIP lines are considered instrument lines, the normal provisions of 10CFR50 Criterion 56 are not applicable. The TIPs are normally withdrawn and the ball valves closed. Should an

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT (Continued)

event occur while the TIP is inserted into the core, and should the TIP fail to retract, the shear valve can be manually operated to provide the necessary containment isolation." Based on this response, LSCS considered the issue closed. When the ball valve issue was revisited by other Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), LSCS conservatively declared the Ball Valves inoperable until further investigation could be performed.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The safety consequences are minimal. The TIP Shear Valves are designed to affect containment isolation should the TIP ball valves fail to function. This design capability was unaffected by this event.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Upon determining the TIP Ball Valves were not functioning specifically as described in the UFSAR, a one hour non-emergency phone notification was made to the NRC as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). The Tip Ball Valves were declared inoperable and taken Out of Service (OOS). An engineering review determined that although the basis for excluding the Tip Ball Valves from the requirements of NUREG 0737, Item II.E.4.2 was sound, we should reevaluate our previous position against current industry standards. It was concluded that a modification should be installed to bring the Tip Ball Valves into conformance with NUREG 0737, Item II.E.4.2. Such a modification will be included in our integrated prioritization process. In the interim, a temporary modification is being used to maintain the isolation logic function in accordance with the NUREG 0737, Item II.E.4.2 criteria.

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS

None.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

This event did not involve any component failures.