

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 1415

DEC 1 2 1991

Robert Hamilton c/o The New London Day P.O. Box 1231 New London, CT 06320

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

I am responding to a phone conversation you had with Mr. Gene Kelly of my staff on December 4, 1991. During that conversation, you stated that you have received concerns from several individuals regarding inadequate documentation supporting the design and construction of unspecified welds and seismic brackets at the Millstone Nuclear Station, Unit 3.

The information that you provided was vague and too general for the NRC to pursue at that time. We would request that you recontact these individuals to gain additional information. The NRC is concerned with the potential nuclear safety significance of this matter, and needs that information in order to determine whether we must promptly address this concern. We have previously inspected similar design and construction issues at Unit 3. However, in the absence of additional information, the NRC can not further pursue this concern.

We appreciate you informing us of these concerns and request that you provide us with additional specific information in this matter. Should you receive additional information or have any further questions in this matter, please call me collect at (215) 337-5225.

Sincerely,

Edward Wenzinger, Chief

5/286

Reactor Projects Branch 4

SEXMANS SELLS TEMBS ESVO.) OT 3.23 FINAL STATES THAT SERVICE WITH THE DATE TOWN WITH THE

9503010387 940809 PDR FOIA HUBBARD92-162 PDR

12/26/91 from the desk of Teleran with Robert Houlton of the New London Day REF: VAllegation 91-A-315 2) 12/12/91/Trenavladgement Letter Mr. Howlow returne a call to me regarding additional in to on the subject allegation. As per a conversition I had on 12/18 with his seleton, he has recontacted his "sauce", a former OCIAIpacter, to get are detail. His source saw Bet he would be an contact with the NRC; Mr. Hamilton committee & make sure that this would happen. He als state that - if it doesn't - he would give me the name & number of the OCinspatu. ce Jinkinggin, Ed Warzaga, Rey tubi menta

GENE KELLY

Ref: File 91-0315

An insportances cenderaled by Jun tropp and Herb Kaplan in December 1991 (IR 91-27) for Chrit 3.

to inspect (suce there was not lived he spenficition art 91-315), related issues on Service Water System supports to restraint, and Cale certification were found to be satisfactory.

Strek.

ALLEGATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

ALLEGATION NUMBER - RI-91-A-0315

RUN DATE: 12/17/91

DOCK TIFACILITY/UNIT: 05000423 / MILLSTONE 3

DOCKST/FACILITY/UNIT:

DOCKET/FACILITY/UNIT:

DOCKET/FACILITY/UNIT:

ACTIVITY TYPES - REACTOR

MATERIAL LICENSES .

FUNCTIONAL AREAS . CONSTRUCTION

DESCRIPTION - NEWSPAPER REPORTER INFORMED BY SEVERAL SOURCES THAT NUMEROUS DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS EXISTED WITH WELDS AND SEISMIC SUP-PORTS (ONE SOURCE WAS IN QC). NO SPECIFICS WERE AVAILABLE A ABOUT COMPONENTS, TIMEFRAME, OR SYSTEM INVOLVED BUT STATED CONCERNS -"COULD BE GENERIC TO CONSTRUCTION OF PLANT". ALSO WAS TOLD THAT NU BUILT THE PLANT AND THEN WENT OUT AND DESIGNED IT.

SOUPCE " NEW LONDON DAY NEWSPAPER

CONFIDENT - NO

RECEIVED - 911204 BY . EM KELLY

/ PI

ACTION OFFICE CONTACT - EM KELLY

STATUS -. OPEN SCHED COMPLETION - 920531 DATE CLOSED -


ALLEGATION SUBSTANTIATED .

ALLEGER NOTIFIED -

DI ACTION -OI REPORT NUMBER -REMARKS - INFORMATION RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE IN REGIONAL OFFICE. PANEL MET 11DEC91. INSUFFICIENT DETAIL TO FOLLOWUP, ALLEGER WAS ASKED TO CONTACT SOURCES TO DEVELOP SPECIFICS WHERE POSSIBLE DRS TEAM ON-SITE LOOKING AT SW SYSTEM NOTIFIED OF CONCERN.

> SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-4A____SAC ACTION PENDING: CONTACT ALLEGER (DRP) (25DEC91) DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED:__4DEC91 REFERENCE:

KEYWORD: DESIGN, SEISMIC, DOCUMENTATION ENTERED SYSTEM - 911216 CLOSED SYSTEM -RECORD CHANGED - 911216



November 12, 1991 E0-91-G-079

TO:

All NE&O Employees

FROM:

J. F. Opeka (Ext. 5323)

SUBJECT:

Nuclear Concerns

I am sure that by now you are aware that on Friday, November 8, 1991, two employees were removed from their jobs at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, and their employment at NU terminated. This memo briefly explains the bases for these actions on the part of NU management, and, more importantly, emphasizes the importance I place on the free expression of nuclear safety issues.

The employment of these two individuals was terminated because there had been an irreconcilable and detrimental breakdown in their working relationships with others at the site as a result of their behavior. Although we tried repeatedly to reestablish harmonious working relationships, we were not successful in these attempts and it was clear that further attempts would be futile. Trust and confidence are required in any working relationship, particularly where people must work together to safely operate a nuclear power plant. This matter had degenerated to the point where it was negatively affecting the trust and confidence of coworkers and supervisors, introducing adverse impacts on nuclear safety.

It must be emphasized that the employment of these individuals was terminated because they made it clear that they did not trust, or have confidence in, station management, and were either unwilling or unable to work with management toward mending fences. This action is not the result of these employees having filed allegations with state and federal regulatory agencies. NU continues to strongly encourage employees to bring nuclear safety concerns to their supervision or to organizations within and outside the company, including state and federal regulatory agencies, established to receive such concerns. NU is committed to resolving all employee concerns quickly and thoroughly, and remains committed to maintaining and improving the various options and program enhancements that have been established over the years to address employee concerns. The continued success of our nuclear program is dependent upon your insights in identifying nuclear safety issues, and expressing them promptly to your management or through the other vehicles we have established and described in NE&O 2.15, Nuclear Safety Concerns Program.

RECORD OF ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

c) - KELLY ord (SAC) EASLICK
ord (SAC) EASURE
ord (SAC) EASUICK
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes (No)
RESP ECD
+ FILE (SAC 12-LO.
-205/6)
DLE MISSELL AVECUA
OLE MY'S CELL ANEOUS C: News PATER
ic: News FATER

5/29/

ALLEGATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

ALLEGATION NUMBER - RI-91-A-0316

RUN DATE: 12/17/91

DOCKET/FACILITY/UNIT: 05000336 / MILLSTONE 2

DOCKET/FACILITY/UNIT: DOCKET/FACILITY/UNIT:

1

1 2

ACTIVITY TYPES - REACTOR '

DOCKET/FACILITY/UNIT:

MATERIAL LICENSES .

"UNCTIONAL AREAS " OPERATIONS

DESCRIPTION - ANONYMOUS LETTER WITH FOUR ISSUES:

1) NUCLEAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE HAS DEGRADED

2) CAREER MAY BE THREATENED IF SAFETY CONCERNS APE RAISED

CONCERNS - 3) CONFIDENTIALITY OF NUCLEAR SAFETY CONCERNS PROGRAM

4 4) SUPPORTS DISCHARGE OF TECHNICIANS AS TROUBLEMAKERS

SOURCE - ANDNYMOUS

CONFIDENT - NO

RECEIVED - 911205 BY - RS BARKLEY

/ RI

ACTION OFFICE CONTACT - EM KELLY

STATUS - OPEN SCHED COMPLETION - 920630 DATE CLOSED -

ALLEGATION SUBSTANTIATED -

ALLEGER NOTIFIED -

DI ACTION " DI REPORT NUMBER ".

REMARKS - LETTER PECEIVED IN REGION. PANEL MET 11DEC91. DECISION WAS
TO TRANSFER INFORMATION TO RI-91-4-0304 AND CLOSE.

SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-4A

ACTION PENDING: CLOSEOUT (SAC) (20DEC91)

DOCUMENTATION:

ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: N/A

REFERENCE:

KEYWORD: H&ID

ENTERED SYSTEM - 911213 CLOSED SYSTEM .

RECORD CHANGED - 911213

MEMORANDUM FOR:

File

THRU:

E.M. Kelly, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 4A & MKelly E.C. Wenzinger, Chief, Projects Proje

FROM:

R.L. Fuhrmeister, Senior Allegation Coordinator

SUBJECT:

CLOSEOUT OF ALLEGATION NO. RI-91-A-0316 AT

MILLSTONE

This allegation is closed. This allegation was an anonymous letter to Tim Martin regarding the whistle blowers and their actions at Millstone.

An Allegation Panel met on December 11, 1991 and determined that this issue should be added to the multitude of considerations included in RI-91-A-0304.

With the closure of RI-91-A-0304, this issue is being transferred to file RI-91-A-0291, as it makes specific reference to the individual involved in that case.

Roy L. Fuhrmeister

Senior Allegation Coordinator

cc:

RI-91-A-0316 RI-91-A-0291

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Completed 11/9/79

1-61-79

PLANT DESIGN CHANCE REQUEST

	(NO	- 0	ATTO MEDICAL METERS
E	TITLE	: INSTA	UMENT	AIR SUPPLU	1 MODIFICA	TION 8 / VAL	VES 1-1	AC-78.9	AND 10
	PLANT:	UNITI	\$YS	STEW INSTRUI	MENT AIR	COMBONENT	AIR OPE	AIR OPERATORS AND RSPREAM PIPING FOR	
						_ COMPONENT	VALVES	PRIMARENT	9, AND 10

PROPOSED CHANGE INSTALL AN AIR FILTER, REGULATOR,

LUBRICATOR, AND CORROSION RESISTANT PIPING.

TEMPORARY

AND VALVES IN THE INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY LINE

'UPSTREAM OF THE AIR OPERATORS FOR VALVES 1-AC-7, 1-AC-8,

1-AC-9, AND 1-AC-10 (ATMOSPHERIC CONTROL SYSTEM).

REAL I FOR CHANGE RO. # 80-78 I.AC-9, DOCUMENTS VALVE STICKING PROBLEM

FOR VALUE 1-AC-9. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION OF VALVE OPERATORS FOR VALVES 1-AC-9 AND 1-AC-7 REVEALS SIGNIFICANT RUST AND SCALE CARRYOVER PROM INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY AS PROBABLE CAUSE OF VALVE STICKING.

2. INSTALLATION OF AN AIR FILTER UPSTREAM OF AIR OPERATORS FOR

1-AC 7,89, AND ID WILL PREVENT RUST AND SCALE CARRYOVER TO OPERATORS.

CORROSION RESISTANT PIPING AND VALVES WILL BE INSTALLED TO ELIMINATE

POSSIBLE CORROSION OF PIPING BETWEEN THE FILTER AND OPERATORS. AN

AIR LUBRICATOR, WILL BE INSTALLED DOWNSTREAM OF THE ARR FILTER TO

PROVIDE CANTINITIES LUBRICATION TO OPERATORS PER MANUFACTURER'S RECOMME

ATIONS. PRESSURE INDICATION WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE BIR REGULATOR. SEE

PROVER MITTACKED.

3. THE ABOVE FIX SHOULD IMPROVE VALVE RELIABILITY AND

Prepared by Clifferd O achten Date 5/30/19

(_) Surtien .. That

Dept. Head Approval Mikeuce

Date 6/179


Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the freedom of Information Act, exemptions


FOIA 72-162

SF-327 Rev. 0 Date: 9/1/78 Page 1 of 2

	LO ENGINEERING REVIEW		
	Responsible Engineer _ (C. 954702)		
	Design by NNECe/HUSSO/Other		
	EWR/Other reference		
	Category I Design Change - [] YES [1] NO		
	Design Verification by	×	
	SAFETY EVALUATION		
	 Increase probability of occurrence or consequences of FSAR accident? 	[] YES	[TNO
•	2. Possible accident different than FSAR?	[] YES	[V] NO
	3. Reduce safety margin of Technical Specification bases?	[] YES	
	ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION	,	
	Design Change affects environment - [] YES [NO Significant environmental impact - [] YES [NO Bases:		
	Engineering Supervisor [P.O. Abuse]	te 6/8/	hi
4.	SORC/PORC APPROVAL (CAT. I, Affect Environment Only) Meeting No. 79-68		
5.	STATION SUPT. SUPT. COMPANY DAY	te	2 15

SF-327 Rev. 0 Date: 9/1/78 Page 2 of 2





	symi	B0L5	
M	GATE WALVE		FILTER
\bowtie	GIOSE WILVE	Stro.	REGULATOR
E-	PIPE CAP	日	LUBRICATOR
1	TWREADED CONNECTION	U	
CU	CUTPER CARBON STEEL		

NOTICE OF DESIGN CHANGE COMPLETION

Distribute to:	Operations Supervisor, Unit	
	Training Supervisor.	
	Other	
As of 11/9/	79	

Description of design change:

AC-9 VALVE, THE 2" BYPASS AROUND THE EIGHTEEN INCH VENTILATION EXHAUST LINE FROM THE DRYWELL, HAS FAILED TO OPERATE PROPERTY A NUMBER OF TIMES. CORROSION TYPE DEBRIS WAS FOUND IN THE SOLENOIND VALVE AND OPERATOR.

TO ELIMINATE THIS DEBRIS PROBLEM A FILTER/
REGULATOR/LUBRICATOR HAS BEEN INSTALLED IN THE AIR HEADER FEEDING VALVES AC-7.8,9,10.

Responsible Person 1/9/79
Responsible Person 1/9/79
Responsible Person

1-61-19 has been completed.

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21
DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation occurred when one of the six main steam safety/relief valves was found to be inoperable.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to the occurrence, the unit was being returned to service following a planned refueling outage. Reactor power was less than one (1) percent of rated power; reactor pressure was 67 psig.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On April 18, 1981, at 0445 hours while performing routine surveillance, Manual Operation of Relief Valves When Reactor Is At Low Pressure, when of the serveives, Details of the serveives, The test was repeated with reactor pressure at 90 psig and 110 psig, but the valve still did not operate. At 0705 hours, after verifying integrity of the electrical circuitry, the solenoid was exercised several times in rapid succession using the valve manual control switch, and the valve operated properly.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

in the area during the refueling outage. It is that this manner that the solenoid was exercised.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem are a back-up to the FWCI subsystem. They enable the core spray or LPCI to provide protection against the small pipe break in the event of FWCI failure, by depressurizing the reactor vessel rapidly enough to actuate the core sprays or LPCI.

(1, -5- ; ,

Failure of the valve in question to open on the first actuation signal did not result in a condition that had not been previously analyzed. All emergency core cooling subsystems including the remaining safety/relief valves were operable and would have provided the required action upon receipt of the appropriate initiation signals. The transfer of the constructed within the time the

CORRECTIVE ACTION

When the valve did not operate initially, writing of the electrical material succession and the valve operated properly. The make was subsequently operated succession and the valve operated properly. The make was subsequently operated successions, one of this materials and the valve operated and inspected, revealing particulate continuation in the solenoid was disassembled and inspected, revealing particulate continuation in the solenoid. The solenoid was placed, revealing particulate continuation in the solenoid. The solenoid was placed, revealing particulate continuation in the solenoid was placed. Although there were no problems encountered with the remaining safety/relief valves, their continuation will be also as a solenoid of the sole

:) LA LO LO . IPLIAGE PRINT ON THE DE RECOURTE MA COMMENTANT
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALTORT IL CO 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 75 RELIGAT DATE
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSCIOUENCES TO Derforming routine surveillance, Manual
When Peactor Is At Low Fressor
Tailed to open (T.S. 4.D.l.b). The solenoid was exercised several times in rapid Tailed to open (T.S. 4.D.l.b). The solenoid was exercised several times in rapid
failed to open (T.S. 4.D.T.D). The succession and the valve operated properly. There were no consequences. See
succession and the valve operated property
attachment.
20
NASVE
SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SU
S F 10 X (12) Z (13) LY IN 18 19 20 REVISION NO.
LER/RO EVENTYEAR 1 1010171 1 1013 1 1 1013
(17) REPORT 8 1 26 26 27 28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TAKEN ACTION 017 120 1 Z 121 10 10 10 10 1 (23)
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Subsequent inspection revealed particulate contamination in the valve solenoid which
Subsequent inspection revealed particulates [10] Subsequent inspection revealed particulates [11] temporarily impaired operation. The solenoid was cleaned and satisfactorily bench-
T12 L tested. See attachment.
STATUS & POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
5 C 36 10 10 10 139 MA
RELEASED OF RELEASE NA
TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) 100. AND DESCRIPTION (39) NA
9 PERSONNEL WATER
101010101 NA
EDES OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
NRC USE ONLY
68 69 (203) 447-1791
10 LNC/L (203) 44,74,7



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

475 ALLENDALE BOAD KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19408-1415

DEC 1 2 1991

Robert Hamilton c/n The New London Day P.O. Box 1231 New London, CT 06320

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

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Sincerely.

Edward Wenzinger, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 4

5/28

9503010387-218

bcc:

Allegation File: RI-91-A-0315 M. Conner

W. Raymond/T. Shedlosky Contractor's Office Files (Barkley)