



Southern California Edison Company

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February 24, 1995

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Subject: Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362
Diesel Generator Annual Report - 1994
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 2 and 3

The purpose of this letter is to provide the Emergency Diesel Generator Annual Report for 1994. The report is required by Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.1 of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Facility Licenses NPF-10 and NPF-15 for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, respectively. The report, provided as Enclosure 1, includes the seven items requested in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.108 as revised by Generic Letter (GL) 84-15 for one invalid test failure that occurred in 1994.

If you require any additional information, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

cc: L. J. Callan, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV
A. B. Beach, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region IV
K. E. Perkins, Jr., Director, Walnut Creek Field Office, NRC Region IV
M. B. Fields, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3
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Emergency Diesel Generator Report
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
Units 2 and 3, Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362

Introduction

The following information is provided in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.3 and Regulatory Position C.3.b. of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.108 as revised by Generic Letter (GL) 84-15. RG 1.108 requested information on seven items for each valid or invalid test failure.

Event Date: July 27, 1994

1. This event was an invalid failure of the San Onofre Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 3G002.
2. This was an invalid failure, as such no additions were made to the failure statistics.
3. The EDG was manually stopped shortly after reaching full load by control room operators after observing smoke emanating from behind the EDG control panel. A small fire, which was immediately extinguished, and the resultant smoke were caused by a short circuit in the non-safety-related indicating circuitry for the EDG. The short circuit was caused by a broken terminal bolt on a roto test switch. The cause of the bolt fracture is believed to be due to an unusual mechanical shock.

The failed circuitry would not have caused damage to the EDG had it not been stopped nor would it have prevented the EDG from fulfilling its engineered safety feature functions if called upon.

4. The failed and/or damaged components were replaced and tested. A satisfactory surveillance was performed on EDG following the repairs. In addition to the component repairs, the three other EDG were inspected to ensure a similar condition did not exist.
5. The EDG was unavailable for 68 hours and 10 minutes.
6. EDG 3G002 was in a 31 day testing mode during this time period.
7. The surveillance test interval was in accordance with the schedule of Technical Specification Table 4.8-1.