NRC FORM 366 (12-81) 10 CFR 50

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB 3150-0011

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | C A S O S 2 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)
LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 (7) | 0 8 2 1 8 3 (8) | 0 9 0 7 8 3 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 While Unit 2 was in Mode 1 and Unit 3 was in Mode 3, Train B Emergency Chiller
0 3 E-335 failed to start and was declared inoperable at 1415. Loss of a chiller
0 4 renders all equipment inoperable in rooms in both units where chilled water is
0 5 provided to cool ambient air. Several Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO's)
0 6 govern plant operation in this situation. The most restrictive LCO for a loss
0 7 of the chiller is LCO 3.8.3.1. See attachment.
0 8

0 9

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
A A (11)	E (12)	A (13)	C K T B R K (14)	X (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 3	—	1 1 0	/	0 1	T	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
A (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	X 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The failure of the chiller E-335 to start was due to a fuse failure.
1 1 Investigation revealed that the fuse failed at the cap rather than the middle.
1 2 This suggests that a defect existed in the fuse which eventually led to a
1 3 thermal fatique failure. Additionally, the failed fuse was a 2-amp fuse,
1 4 whereas, the design required it to be a 3-amp fuse. See attachment.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	B (28)	0 8 0 (29)	NA	A (31)	Operator Observation

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
2 0	N (44)	NA

NRC USE ONLY

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-110
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
UNIT NO. 2, DOCKET NO. 50-361

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

The loss of Train B Emergency chiller renders two inverters inoperable in each unit. Since LCO 3.8.3.1. requires all four inverters and their associated busses to be operable in Mode 1 through 4 in each unit and since the associated Action Statement only addresses the loss of one such inverter and its associated bus, LCO 3.0.3 was invoked at 1415.

Public health and safety were not affected as a result of this event. See also LER 83-048 (Unit 3).

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The correct size fuse was installed and the chiller declared operable, at 1514 restoring operability to the two inverters in each Unit and associated A. C. vital busses, and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. As a precaution the fuse in the other chiller E-336 (Train A) was checked and verified to be of the correct size. Since: (1) use of the correct fuse is provided by replacement of failed fuses with like kind fuses, (2) verification with design requirements is periodically accomplished when post maintenance testing (which includes validation with design drawings) is performed, and (3) this is the first discovery of an incorrectly sized fuse, no further corrective action is considered necessary.