

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 0	PAGE (3) 1 OF 012
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TITLE (4)
Reactor Scram Due to Operator Error During Surveillance Testing

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (8)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	1	2	1	8	4	8	4	0	0	2	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 9 1 4	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)					
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)					
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME David L. Smith	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 2 0 5 7 1 2 9 1 - 0 8 1 6 1 5
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During performance of routine surveillance testing, the unit operator did not insure "B" channel primary containment isolation system was reset before testing "C" channel. (Channels "A" and "C" are in trip system "A", channels "B" and "D" are in trip system "B.") The surveillance instruction states to check panel lights in the control room and auxiliary instrument room. Only the control room lights were verified. The operator was preoccupied with several alarms which occurred at the time he began resetting the "B" channel. As a result of "B" channel not being reset and testing of "C" channel, the main steam isolation valves shut, scrambling the reactor. All required safety systems operated as required. Main steam relief valves were manually operated and main turbine was manually tripped.

The operator involved in this incident was strongly counseled to always follow written procedures to perform any type testing.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
					0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 21, 1984, while unit 1 was operating at 64 percent, unit 2 at 94 percent, and unit 3 in a refueling outage, the unit 2 operator (licensed reactor operator) was performing routing testing in accordance with Surveillance Instruction 4.1.A-10. During this testing, several control room alarms momentarily distracted the operator at the time he was resetting channel "B" of the primary containment isolation system (JM). Both control room and auxiliary instrument room are to be checked for proper channel reset verification. The operator did not send his assistant to the auxiliary instrument room location. Therefore, the total verification of channel reset prior to "tripping" the other channel was not followed as instructions require. As a result, channel "B" was not totally reset and when channel "C" was tripped (channels "A" and "C" comprise trip system "A", channels "B" and "D" comprise trip system "B"), the reactor scrambled due to main steam isolation valves (ISV) closing. Under these circumstances, the reactor (RCT) scram was the normal result.

Scram occurred at 0556. Main steam isolation valve closure at this power level is an analyzed event in the FSAR and all systems responded as expected (except as described below). There were no safety implications.

High pressure coolant injection (BJ), and reactor core isolation cooling (BN) initiated on low-low reactor water level. "B" recirculation system (AD) pump (P) also tripped by the low-low reactor water level signal. The low-low reactor water level switches (71) have a +/- 3 percent accuracy that allowed "A" recirculation pump's sensing switches to be on the low end of the accuracy band. "A" recirculation pump never tripped. This was discovered by the operator during the scram recovery. Subsequent testing of "A" recirculation pumps low water level sensing switches revealed existing trip setting to be within required accuracy range. Therefore, it is apparent that the reactor water level reached the "B" recirculation pump trip setpoint without reaching that of "A."

The individual operator was strongly counseled by the Operations Supervisor to always perform testing to the instructions in an exact and precise manner.

Responsible Plant Section:

Operations

Previous Occurrences

Since initial startup of units 1, 2, and 3, there have been approximately 25 scrams with similar causes (personnel error during testing). However, this is the first such event since 1981.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

February 8, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET
NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BPRO-50-260/84002

The enclosed report provides details concerning reactor scram due to
operator error during surveillance testing. This report is submitted in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



G. T. Jones
Power Plant Superintendent
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30303

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

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