

LEV's

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region V - Palo Verde RECEIVED

Palmer Nuclear Generating Station

Wintersburg, Ar 1283 SEP 19 AM 10:12

REGION VIII

RECEIVED TRANSMISSION

WABEUT

Transmission Sheet

115/943-8005

115/943-8005

Trans. Information

8402140022 831220
PDR FOIA
BERNABE83-598 PDR

#1

RECEIVED
1953

Summary of Civil Inspection Items - L.F.V.

1953 SEP 19 11:10:10

1. Aluminum Frame Section of Concrete

RECEIVED

Acetylene Building

2 Floor Tests - BPSI A Pump Room and Pipeway

3 Wall Tests - BPSI A Pump Room and Pipeway

Control Room Building

2 Floor Tests - Bayonet at 80 ft. Elevation

Control Building

3 Floor Tests - Battery A Charging Room - 100 ft. Elevation

2 Floor Tests - Battery A Room - 100 ft. Elevation

1 Floor Tests - Battery C Room - 700 ft. Elevation

1 Floor Tests - Front of Wall Tests A - 4160 volt breaker

Control Room

Control Room Building

Control Room Building

Control Room Building

Control Room Building

1 Floor Tests - 1) measured for embed depth - 8 torqued

2 Floor Tests - 2 torqued and measured for embed depth

Control Room Building

1 Floor Tests - 3 torqued and measured for embed depth

Control Room Building

1 Floor Tests - 6 torqued and measured for embed depth

Results

All tests satisfactory. One item of noncompliance: No evidence of required licensee approval for Maxi - Bolts in Contract 2, 170mg.

1. Anchor Bolts

Approximately 30 embed plates were ultrasonically tested in Control, Auxiliary and Containment Buildings for plate thickness, anchor bolt presence, length and thread engagement.

Findings

All findings satisfactory except thread engagement found to be less than specified for 1 or 2 bolts ^{each} on 9 of the ₁₁ plates which were examined.

2. Welded Steel

2.1 Max. Spacing

2.1.1 Control and Pipe Corridor at 40 ft. elevation ---
Welds and joints were checked against framing plans. Attempt was made to verify qualification of welders.

Findings

Welds found to be as specified. Welder identification numbers and steel was painted, hence welder qualification cannot be verified.

Bechtel Power Corporation

Engineers — Constructors

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station

P.O. Box 49

Palo Verde, Arizona 85343

September 29, 1983

B/ANPP-K-11865-G

FLN 18401



Arizona Nuclear Power Project

P.O. Box 49

Palo Verde, Arizona 85343

Attention: Mr. D. B. Fasnacht
Nuclear Construction Manager

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
Bechtel Job 10407
Reinspection of Nuclear Pipe Hangers (Q Class)
File: K.38.02

Dear Mr. Fasnacht:


The following is the program for the reinspection of nuclear class pipe supports in conjunction with CIP #543.0:

1. Inspect all Nuclear Class I supports
2. Inspect all pipe supports installed and inspected prior to June, 1980.
3. Inspect all supports that were a part of the ISI program.
4. Inspect (3) Nuclear Class II system and (3) Nuclear Class III systems. These will be selected on the basis of systems having the greatest amount of welded attachment; and in addition to the systems listed above.

Note: If the line is supported by a rack, the complete rack will be inspected and not just the support.

Very truly yours,

BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION


W. J. Stubblefield
Field Construction Manager

WJS:ph

attachment

cc: E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

W. H. Wilson



#2



REV. 2

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 1, 2, & 3
CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION PLANNING FOR
JOB NO. 10407

SPECIAL

CIP NO.

543.0

PG 1 OF 4

1. EQUIPMENT NAME Nuclear Pipe Hangers & Supports 2. QUALITY CLASS Q 3. CIP REV. 0
4. UNIT NO. 1 5. DWG. NO (S). N/A REV. N/A DCN N/A FCN N/A FCR N/A

TASK	INSPECTION CRITERIA	INSPECTION METHOD	REFERENCE	FE		QCE	
				INITIAL	DATE	STAMP	DATE
	<u>INSPECTION CRITERIA/REFERENCE</u>						
	1. WPP/QCI No. 201.1						
	2. Pipe Hanger/Support Drawing, Latest Rev.						
	3. Spec. 13-PM-204						
	4. Welding Inspection Handbook						
	a. Sect. 2 - Measurement of Fillet Welds						
	b. Sect. 3 - Use of Insp. Gages						
	c. Sect. 4 - Groove Welds						
	d. Sect. 6 - Acceptance Criteria						
	5. System 38						
1.0	Enter system <u>Nuclear Class</u>	Record	2,5				



REV. 2

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 1, 2, & 3
CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION PLANNING FOR (CONTINUATION SHEET)
JOB NO. 10407

SPECIAL

CINQ
543.0

PG 2 OF 4

TASK	INSPECTION CRITERIA	INSPECTION METHOD	REFERENCE	FE		QCE	
				INITIAL	DATE	STAMP	DATE
2.0	<u>DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS</u>						
2.1	Obtain a System 38 computer printout for each system to be reinspected.	Verify	5				
3.0	<u>INSPECTION INSTRUCTIONS</u>						
3.1	QCE to perform a re-inspection for Task No's as specified on Exhibit 543.0-1.	Visual/ Verify	1,2,3,4	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			
		Tape/ Scale					
3.2	QC stamp and date the computer printout adjacent to each accepted pipe hanger and/or support.	Record	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			
3.3	Non-conforming condition(s) detected during reinspection, shall require a review of previously written NCR's for similar condition(s). If the non-conforming condition(s) have not been previously dispositioned "Use as is", an NCR shall be initiated. The NCR number (either previous or current) shall be entered on the computer printout adjacent to the affected pipe hanger and/or support.	Review/ Record	WPP/QCI No. 5.0	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			



REV. 2


PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 1, 2, & 3
CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION PLANNING FOR (CONTINUATION SHEET)
JOB NO. 10407

SPECIAL

CIP NO.
543.0

PG 3 OF 4

TASK	INSPECTION CRITERIA	INSPECTION METHOD	REFERENCE	FE		QCE	
				INITIAL	DATE	STAMP	DATE
	<u>INSPECTION INSTRUCTIONS (con't)</u>						
	NOTE: One (1) NCR may be used for each subsystem.						
4.0	<u>INSULATION REMOVAL</u>						
4.1	Insulation pipe hangers and/or supports requiring	Visual/ Record	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX				
	reinspection shall have an Insulation Removal Request						
	(IRR) prepared for insulation removal.						
	NOTE: Reinstallation of removed insulation shall be in						
	accordance with WPP/QCI No. 204.0.						
	<u>EXCEPTIONS</u>						
	1. Paint need not be removed unless requested by the						
	inspector.						
	2. Required NDE need not be performed unless request by						
	the inspector.						



JOB NO. 10407

54.50C

PG 4 OF 4

PF 3402 (10407) 11/80

CAT Team Inspection - Narbut

APS Documents Required

9/20/83

Hgr SI-176 H004 Pipe Clamp has welded skim

Need ① Hgr CIP

② N-S Data report which shows welded skims (Grinnells)

Hgr SI 100-H003 ① Copy of Dispositioned NCR PA-7141

Hgr SI 089-H008 • Copy of NCR on rubber penetration seal material on slide plate

SI-100 H005 Copy of FCR 27,697-P

SI-100 H012 Need Copy of ED or IP procedure which states that non-safety hanger loads should be included in safety hanger calculations

Hgr SI 100 H015 Need NCR 7155 of 9/13/83

SI 100 H034 - Need current NCR written on undersize lug weld

- Need NCR 7151 of 9/13/83 (Subject not known)

Hgr SI 102 H008 - Need NCR written

- Need Hgr buy of CIP

- Need Weld inspection records

Hgr SI 176 H001

Hgr SI 176 H003

{ Need NCR's, CIP's, Weld Inspection Docs on hgr

Hgr SI 176 H001 - Need NCR, CIP, Welding Inspection Paper

Hgr SI 176 H003 - Need NCR CIP Welding paper

Appendix A

A.

10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion 5 requires in part that activities affecting quality ~~shall~~ be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures and drawings and ~~shall~~ be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.

~~WPP/QCI~~ Procedure WPP/QCI 201.1 ^{18y} Revision dated ^{May 25, 1983} ~~5/25/83~~, "Nuclear Pipe Hangers and Supports Installation", Appendix I requires ~~the~~ ^{the} QC Engineer to verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pipe Supports" ST

~~Task 1.0 has an inspection requirement on the CIP~~
~~certain tasks are as follows~~

for "Task 1" is to verify the support assembly correct per approved engineering drawings and specifications
November 20, 1981.

This is a Severity Level _____ Violation

B. ~~IOCFR-50~~

IOCFR 50 Appendix B Criterion 5 requires in part that activities affecting quality ~~must~~ be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures and drawings and ~~must~~ be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.

~~The~~ ~~WPP/QCI~~ Procedure WPP/QCI 201.1 Revision 18
dated ^{May 25, 1983} ~~5/25/83~~, "Nuclear Pipe Hangers and

Supports Installation", Appendix I requires the ~~QC~~ QC Engineer to verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pipe Supports"

"CIP"
The inspection requirements for Task 8 require

the Welding QC Engineer to verify field welding is complete. For Task 9 he is to ~~verify the~~ ^{check the} vendor welding ~~was~~ ~~checked~~ for size and length.

^{Additional} instructions to the ^{Welding} QC Engineer in Appendix I instruct ^{him} ~~the~~ ^{To} verify ^{welding} acceptability.

(over)

C. 10CFR50

10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion 5 requires in part that activities affecting quality ~~shall~~ be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures and drawings and ~~shall~~ be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.

Specification 13-PM-204 Revision 12 dated 4/7/93 Paragraph 12.1.2 states the design and location of all pipe supports shall be the responsibility of project engineering. Paragraph 12.1.4 states pipe supports designed by engineering will be shown on drawings and all design details will be shown including miscellaneous steel. (over)

This is a Severity Level _____ Violation

2 Persons Contacted

a. Arizona Public Service Company APS

W.E. Ide Construction QA/QC Manager

P. Moore QA Engineer

T. Love QA Engineer

R.J. Kennel Field Engineer Supervisor

G. Pankonin Startup QA/QC Manager

b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

T. F. Hawkinson, Project QA Manager

J. White Lead Pipe Support QCE

G. Slam Weld Engineering Supervisor

J. Sabol Lead Pipe Support Engineer

D. Keith Bechtel, Downey

IV. 4. Hangers and Supports including Snubbers and Restraints

a. Areas Examined

(1) Hardware: The ^{examined} inspector ^{pipe} all hangers, supports, snubber and restraints on the HPSI ^{start of the} piping system from the suction line SIA-008-GCBC-10" through the discharge lines SIA-100-CCBA-4" and SIA-106 CCBA-3" ~~up to the~~ throughout ~~the~~ the 40 foot elevation, up through the vertical pipe chase to the 89 foot elevation pipe chase. At this junction one of the five ^{injection} branch lines,

SIA-176-CCBA-3" was followed to the injection point and all ~~other~~ pipe supports, hangers, snubbers and restraints were examined. Additionally miscellaneous branch lines ^{from the HPSI discharge path} were examined for supports (to the first isolation valve ^{on the branch}). ~~the~~

Additionally, a few supports not involved in the ^{line} description above were examined if a condition was noted which warranted followup.

All supports examined are listed in

Table 1.

~~XXXX~~ In most cases pipe insulation was ~~required to be~~ removed for inspection. In those cases where a support was only partially examined Table 1 so notes. These cases generally fall into the following conditions:

- Insulation not removed. This condition precluded examining pipe lug welds only. The hanger members and welds are not covered by insulation and ^{can be thoroughly inspected.}
- Lug welds only. In these cases the inspector examined only the lug welds to increase the sample of lug welds ^{by inspecting supports} ~~which~~ ~~which~~ which were not on the selected branch line but were part of HPSI-A.
- One aspect only (e.g. "base plate only")
In these cases the support was not included in the lines selected but was partially examined because a condition warranting followup was noted.

- Location and configuration only In These cases involved a series of replicate supports in a horizontal run. The location of the support and the configuration were checked against drawing requirements and support member sizes and weld sizes were checked by visual examination rather than by measurement. ~~This was~~

^{other} All supports were examined ^{fully} ~~in minute detail,~~
~~support member sizes and welds verified by measurement~~

The inspector ~~verified~~ ^{examined the supports to determine that:} ~~the~~

- All supports shown on the piping isometric drawings were installed
- No additional supports were installed
- The support configuration was as shown ~~on~~ ^{on the support drawing}
- The ^{support} member sizes were ~~correct~~ ^{and drawing.} per the
- The support member material was per the drawing.
- The welds on the support were the correct size and met the applicable code and standard requirements.

- The welded attachments to piping were per drawing
- The ~~welded~~ attachment welds to pipe ~~were~~ were per drawing and met code and standard requirements.
- Mechanical snubbers and restraints were installed where required by drawing
- The ~~snubber~~ snubber and restraints were the proper size (load rating)
- The snubbers and restraints had the proper cold setting shown on the drawing.
- The supports were ^{properly} located per the drawing relative to the piping and the structure
- ~~Clearances, when specified, were proper.~~

There are a total of 116 pipe supports involved in all of the HPSI-A system. The inspector examined 68 supports or about 60%. Of the 68 supports examined 14 supports had one or more problems. ~~xxx~~ This is about a 20% reject rate. The problems

identified are discussed ~~below~~ in the
"Findings" section below.

(2) Drawings, specifications and procedures.

The inspector gathered and reviewed the applicable piping drawings, hanger drawings, specifications, work and inspection procedures, and pertinent vendor information.

^{safety related} Other documentation, ~~which~~ including documents authorizing deviations from the drawings, records of ^{hanger} inspection by GC, non-destructive examination records, welding inspection records, non conformance reports, vendor certification records, code reports, ^{and} piping spool fabrication records were reviewed as they were identified in the pursuit of questions raised on a particular support's apparent anomalies

The inspector ^{also} reviewed the FSAR and ASME codes for applicable requirements.

The ~~above~~ ^{discussed above} documents will be listed and

specifically addressed only as they apply to findings, discussed in the ~~findings~~ findings section below

(3) Tools The inspection was conducted utilizing unaided visual exams, tape measure, weld gages, angle finder, and adequate lighting. Safety equipment was utilized as required.

No NRC independent ~~examination~~ ~~examination~~ non-destructive examination was performed on the pipe supports due to other priorities.

In the one case where the visual ~~inspection~~ inspection indicated a possible weld defect, the inspector requested the licensee ~~contractor~~ reexamine the weld using liquid penetrant examination. The inspector observed the entire performance of the examination

b. Findings

Table 1 lists all supports inspected and shows which supports were found unsatisfactory and provides a brief description of the problem(s) found.

The problems found group into 3 areas which are considered ^{apparent} violations of NRC regulations. Each problem identified in Table 1 is explained more fully below.

- (1) Failure of ^{the pipe support} QC ^{personnel} to identify ^{support} conditions which are not in accordance with drawing ^{or specification} requirements.

10CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion 5 requires in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures and drawings and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.

The licensee's procedure WPP/QCI 201.1 Revision 18 dated 5/25/83, "Nuclear Pipe Hangers and Supports Installation", Appendix I requires the Piping QC Engineer to verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pipe Support's"

~~Task 1.0~~ ^{The} has an inspection requirements ~~as the CR~~
~~ertain tasks are as follows~~

for Task 1 is to verify the support assembly correct per approved engineering drawings and specifications

~~Task 3~~ ~~Verify the correct pipe support location~~

- Support SI-089-H008 was found with rubber seal material injected in the space by the Flourogold slides plates Items 54 and 55 on the drawing. The drawing does not show rubber sealant material. It is probable that the material was inadvertently injected ^{on 11/20/79} after the support inspection but the material had been neatly trimmed away and the edges painted in the area painting.
- Support SI-100-H003 was found with a loose ^{PIPE} clamp and installed at an angle of $4\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ from vertical. WPP/GCI 201.1 paragraph 8.9 requires the clamp to be snug on the pipe. The WPP/GCI ~~201.1~~ paragraph 9.2.7.1 requires the angle to be no greater than 2° . The support was accepted by QC on 11/20/81.

- Support SI-100-H005 was found with the drawing specified dimension of $3\frac{3}{4}$ inches between the centerline of the pipe stanchion and the centerline of the insert plate to be actually $7\frac{1}{2}$ inches. This difference exceeds the tolerances of ± 2 inches paragraph 9.3.12 of the WPP/QCI. The support was accepted by QC on 11/13/81

~~Support SI-100-H015 was found with a clearance between item 31 and ^{the two} items E of $\frac{3}{16}$ inch and $\frac{1}{8}$ inch respectively. The drawing requires $\frac{1}{16}$ inch. The WPP/QCI~~

- Support SI-100-H036 was found in a condition which did not match the hanger drawing and modifying Field Change Request ^(FCR) 15,123P. Item D of the FCR was not installed. The support was accepted by QC on 10/22/81 to the drawing and FCR.

- Support SI-101-H00A was found with a loose jam nut on Item 61, the sway strut assembly. The support was accepted by QC on 10/2/81

- Support SI-106 H001 was found the ^{2" long} pipe lugs, Item 38, bearing on the supporting steel for only $\frac{3}{16}$ inch and $\frac{7}{16}$ inch respectively. Paragraph 94.1 of the WPP/QCI ^{should be provided} indicates full bearing surface as indicated on the support drawing. The support was accepted by QC on 5/23/80.

~~Support SI-106~~

The failure of pipe support QC personnel to identify pipe support conditions were were not in accordance with drawing or specification requirements is an apparent violation of NRC regulations (Enforcement item 50-528/83-34/xx)

(2) Failure of the welding QC ~~personnel~~ to identify weld conditions which are not in accordance with the drawing or the welding code requirements (eight examples)

10CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion 5 requires in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures and drawings and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.

The licensee's procedure WPP/QCI 201.1 Revision 15 dated 5/25/83, "Nuclear Pipe Hangers and Supports Installation", Appendix I requires the Piping QC Engineer to verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pipe Supports"

The inspection requirements for Task 8 require the welding QCE to verify field welding is complete. For Task 9 ~~has~~ is to verify the vendor welding was checked for size and length. The instructions to the QCE in Appendix I instruct the QCE ~~to~~ ^{to} verify ^{welding} acceptability.

- Support SI-100-H005 was found with an underfill condition in the stanchion, Item 30, to pipe weld. The weld is required to be a $\frac{5}{16}$ inch fillet weld. The actual fill was measured to be $\frac{1}{4}$ inch. The weld was accepted on the field weld check list on 11/9/81

- Support SI-100-H010 was observed to have an apparent lap in the weld of item 33 to the pipe. This was a vendor weld. Minor slag was also present in the toe of the weld. ~~The licensee~~ These conditions would have precluded a satisfactory ~~liquid penetrant~~ liquid penetrant examination by the vendor. The vendor records show the weld was liquid penetrant examined and accepted on 12/4/77 (Job 2810, ~~SI~~ Piece 1-SI-100-S-009, "F" No 261) ~~The vendor~~ ^{visual indication on the} The NRC inspector had the weld re-examined by licensee personnel by liquid penetrant examination in his presence. The liquid penetrant examination resulted in an ^{unacceptable linear} indication.

The ^{vendor} weld had been last inspected by site ^{QC} personnel ^{per Task B} on 6/17/81 and was accepted.

- Support SI-100-H015 ~~was found~~ ^{has} with the lug item 39A, field welded to the pipe. The weld was ~~approximately~~ $\frac{1}{32}$ undersize. The welds were originally accepted on 1/22/79 and were accepted again during ~~the~~ ^{the} support inspection on 10/28/81.
- Support SI-100-H034 was found with one undersize ^{vendor} lug weld (item 38 to the pipe). The weld was required to be a $\frac{1}{4}$ ^{inch} fillet and measured to be $\frac{3}{16}$ inch. The vendor welds were checked by site QC for size and accepted on 9/11/82.
- Support SI-102-H00B was found with several weld problems. The vendor weld of item E to item B was required to be a $\frac{3}{16}$ inch fillet but was $\frac{1}{8}$ inch on 3 sides. Additionally there was rollover (or laps) at the corners. The field weld of item C to existing structure was required to have 1 inch

end returns on the welds and did not.

The vendor weld was accepted by site ^{original} GC on 8/18/81. The field weld was accepted on 10/14/80 and was accepted again on 8/18/81.

- Support SI 106 H011 was found with the pipe lug welds (items 38 and 38A to pipe) ~~within~~ closer than 1 inch to the ~~adj~~ adjacent pipe-to-pipe circumferential weld. The actual distance was $\frac{3}{4}$ ~~in~~ inch.

Specification 13-PM-204 "Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems", paragraph 12.2.9 states that ~~the~~ welded attachments shall not be ~~located~~ installed within 10 inch of existing circumferential welds.

The field lug welds were originally accepted on 2/12/79 and again during final support acceptance on 10/2/80.

Support


• SI-176 H001 was found with an undimensioned weld on the drawing, therefore the proper size of the weld could not be verified by the NRC inspector. The ^{3" long} ^{field} fillet welds of item B4 to item B are not dimensioned on the ~~B~~ support drawing 13-SI-176-H001 Revision 1. The welds were ^{originally} accepted on 12/13/80 and were accepted again on 9/15/82.

- Support SI-176-H003 was found to have an undersize weld. The skewed (120°) fillet weld of item A to the containment insert measured $\frac{1}{4}$ inch rather than the required $\frac{5}{16}$ inch. The support weld was accepted on 7/14/80.

Further discussions with the Lead QC Engineer for Pipe Supports and the Lead Welding Engineer disclosed that the Welding Engineer had given verbal instructions to the QC Engineer that were contrary to the AWS D.1.1 code requirements for measuring the size of skewed fillet welds. Hence this undersize weld may be considered caused by

improper engineering information. It follows that all skewed fillet welds may require reinspection to the proper criteria.

The AWS D.1.1 Code 1974 shows in Figure 2.7.1 that skewed fillet welds are measured thus



At Palo Verde the QC Engineer states welds are "measured" ^{as shown below} ~~there~~ (it is not clear how this is "measured" since there is no access to ^{one of} the ~~the~~ measurement points):



~~It is clear that~~ To "measure" by the Palo Verde method to a given size (e.g. $\frac{5}{16}$ inch on a 120° weld) will result in an undersize weld by the Code definition (in this case by $\frac{3}{64}$ inch)



Nonetheless QC inspectors are required by ^{WPP/}QCI 201.1 to inspect to AWS D.1.1 criteria for this weld. The AWS D.1.1 criteria are clear and are not superseded by verbal instructions from engineering.

The failure of welding QC to identify pipe support weld conditions which are not in accordance with the drawing or welding code requirements is an apparent violation of NRC regulation (Enforcement item 50-526/93-34/1x)

SI-100-11-012

(3) Failure of engineering to include^a non-safety loads in a safe related pipe support calculation (one example)

10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion 5 requires in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures and drawings and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.

Specification 13-PM-2.04 Revision 12 dated 4/7/93

Paragraph 12.1.2 states the design and location of all pipe supports shall be the responsibility of project engineering. Paragraph 12.1.4 states pipe supports designed by engineering will be shown on drawings and all design details will be shown including miscellaneous steel.

• Support SI-100-11-012 was found with a miscellaneous steel member installed which was used as a support for an Instrument Air line. The miscellaneous steel was not shown on the pipe support

drawing 13 SI-100-H-012 Revision 1.

The drawing does show the engineering design loads used in the analysis of the ^{pipe} support and the applicable calculation - number (Problem No 513-E, point number 293)

Engineering was contacted by telephone, and the responsible engineer stated that the loads from the miscellaneous steel member used as an instrument air support (IA-116-H2) were not included in the design load for the ~~SI-100-H-012~~ pipe support SI-100-H-012

The engineer stated the loads were inconsequential (29 lbs) and the instrument air ~~drawing~~ had calculation had been annotated to state attachment to the Safety Injection support was satisfactory. None the less he stated the procedure requires the safety injection support calculation be amended ^{to} to include such loads.

The failure of engineering to include a non-safety design load in a safety related

pipe support calculation is considered an
apparent violation of NRC regulations.
(Enforcement Item 50-520/83-34/XX)

c. Conclusions

(1) QC Inspections Based on the number of unacceptable ~~condition~~ pipe support conditions found, the conclusion that QC inspections are not adequate must be drawn. The underlying causes were not determined, that is whether the inadequate inspections were due to inadequate training or inadequate supervision or another cause was not determined.

• Technical significance Based on the minor nature of the items found and based on the usual pipe support design margins, the inspector considers that the probable ^{result of the} ~~technical~~ technical analysis will show that ~~if~~ if the defects were left undiscovered and uncorrected the technical consequences would have been nil. That is, the supports would have functioned satisfactorily. The technical resolution of the nonconformances generated by the licensee during

the inspection, as a result of the NRC findings, ~~we~~ tended to confirm this opinion in that all that were technically resolved during the inspection were resolved as ~~insufficient~~. ~~The~~ The actual technical significance of the defects noted will be verified through followup of the licensee's actions in response to the violations.

- Management significance The findings on pipe supports are disturbing from the standpoint of management significance since the undersize findings are repetitive, ~~the~~ ^{ie.} problem with ^{the} inspection of pipe support ^{welds} had been identified previously.

Initially in June 1979, the NRC ^{on Pipe supports} identified undersize welds ~~as~~ as a potential problem. A violation was

issued in September 1979 and the licensee's ~~actions~~ expanded actions resulted in a reportable item in January

of 1980. ~~The~~ Corrective actions ^{was} taken

including ~~the~~ ~~the~~ procedure changes, ~~and~~ personnel

training ~~and followup audits were performed~~
~~by licensee QA as late as~~

and a complete reinspection of supports.

It ^{appears} the actions and management followup were
not effective in precluding repetition.

Table 1

Support	Type	Finding	Penetration Description	Degree of Inspection
1. SI 00B H001	S	Sat		Full
2. SI 00B H002	SS	Sat		Full
3. SI 00B H003	S	Sat		Full
4. SI 00B H004	SNB	Sat	Under small pipe not identified Clamp on Gate Plate	Full
5. SI 00B H005	S	Sat		Full
6. SI 00B H006 (Partial Inspection)	S	Unsat	Penetration Seal Material on Slide Plate	Slide Plate only
7. SI 00B H001	SNB	Sat		Full
8. SI 00B H002	S	Sat		Full
9. SI 100 H001	S	Sat	Partial inspection through penetration seal boot	Presence only - seal boot on
10. SI 100 H002	S	Sat		Full
11. SI 100 H003	S	Unsat	Loose clamp @ excessive angle	Full
12. SI 100 H004	S	Sat		Full
13. SI 100 H005	S	Unsat	Location dimension varies more than allowed @ Lack of fill on slanchion to pipe weld	Full
14. SI 100 H006	S	Sat	Partial inspection (Pipe Insulated)	All hot leg welds
15. SI 100 H007	SNB	Sat		Full
16. SI 100 H008	S	Sat		Full
17. SI 100 H009	S	Sat	Partial (Pipe Insulated)	All but leg welds
18. SI 100 H010	S	Unsat	Penetration Seal Material under leg weld	Full
19. SI 100 H011	S	Sat		Full
20. SI 100 H012	S	Unsat	Non-safety hanger loads not included	Full

Support	Type	Findings	Problem Description or NRC Concern	Degree of Inspection
21 SI 100 H013	S	Sat		Full
22 SI 100 H015	S	Unsat	Lug weld size	Full
23 SI 100 H016	S	Sat		Full
24 SI 100 H 017	S	Sat		Full
25 SI 100 H018	S	Sat		Full
26 SI 100 H019	S	Sat		Full
27 SI 100 H020	SNB	Sat		Full
28 SI 100 H021	S	Sat		Full
29 SI 100 H022	S	Sat	Inspected for Location/Configuration/Clearances only	Location/Configuration/Clearances only
30 SI 100 H023	S	Sat	"	"
31 SI 100 H024	S	Sat	"	"
32 SI 100 H025	S	Sat	"	"
33 SI 100 H026	S	Sat	"	"
34 SI 100 H027	S	Sat	"	"
35 SI 100 H028	S	Sat		Full
36 SI 100 H029	S	Sat	Partial (Piping insulated)	All but pipe lugs
37 SI 100 H031	S	Sat	Lug welds only	Lug welds only
38 SI 100 H032	S	Sat	Lug welds only	Lug welds only
39 SI 100 H034	S	Unsat	Under size lug weld	Full
40 SI 100 H035	S	Sat	Lug welds only	Lug welds only
41 SI 100 H036	S	Unsat	Configuration differs from drawing	Full

Support	Type	Finding	Problem Description or NPC action	Discrepancy of Inspection
42 SI 101-H00A Partial Insulation	SS	Unsat	Loose Locknut	Locknut only
43 SI 102 H00A	S	Sat		Full
44 SI 102 H00B	S	Unsat	Weld deficient (Undersize weld, rollover, no end returns)	Full
45 SI 105 H00B	S	Sat		Full
46 SI 105 H00C	S	Sat		Full
47 SI 105 H00D	S	Sat		Full
48 SI 105 H00E	S	Sat		Full
49 SI 106 H001	S	Unsat	Lack of Lug Contact area with support members	Full
50 SI 106 H002	S	Sat		Full
51 SI 106 H003	S	Sat		Full
52 SI 106 H004	S	Sat		Full
53 SI 106 H005	S	Sat		Full
54 SI 106 H006	S	Sat		Full
55 SI 106 H007	S	Sat		Full
56 SI 106 H008	SNB	Sat		Full
56 SI 106 H009	S	Sat		Full
57 SI 106 H010	S	Sat	Partial (Pipe Insulated)	All but pipe lugs
(58) SI 106 H011	S	Unsat	Pipe lug weld w/in 1" of circumferential weld	Full
59 SI 106 H012	S	Sat	Partial (Pipe Insulated)	All but pipe lugs
60 SI 106 H013	S	Sat	Partial (Pipe Insulated)	All but pipe lugs

Diagrams of Inspection

Problem Location or Description

Findings

Support

61 SI 106 H014	S	Sat	Full
62 SI 106 H015	S	Sat	Full
63 SI 106 H016	S	Sat	Full
64 SI 106 H023	S	Sat	Full
65 SI 176 H001	S	Unsat	Full
66 SI 176 H002	S	Sat	Full
67 SI 176 H003	S	Unsat	Full
68 SI 176 H004	SS	Sat	Full

Undimensioned weld on drawing

Undersize fillet weld

Not NF including stress

Legend

S = Support

SS = Railroad (Swag Steel)

SNB = Snubber

VENDOR: HLB

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION



NONCONFORMANCE REPORT

NO. PD. 1227




PAGE 1 OF

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
MOC

62550 10.26.79

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION		1. PAGE 1 OF 1		2. NO. 2508-P		13A. DCN NO. N/A	
 FIELD CHANGE REQUEST JOB NO. 10407		QUALITY CLASS Q		3. MO DAY YR DATE 8 10 78		13B. SCN NO. * N/A	
4. REF DWG OR SPEC 13-PM-204		REV 4		5. TITLE Field Fabrication & Install. of Nuclear Piping Systems			
6. DESIGN ORIGIN. ☒ ENGINEERING ☐ SUPPLIER (IDENTIFY BY NAME)				7. ☒ UNIT 1 ☒ UNIT 3 ☒ UNIT 2 ☒ COMMON			
8. EXISTING CONDITION SECTION 12.3 "ALLOWABLE INSTALLATION TOLERANCES FOR PIPE SUPPORTS" DOES NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO TOLERANCES REQUIRED FOR PIPE RACK PROBLEMS. PARTICULARLY PROBLEMS DUE TO WALLS AND SLABS NOT BEING VERTICAL AND FLAT, BUT WITHIN ALLOWABLE INSTALLATION TOLERANCES FOR CONCRETE.							
9. CHANGE REQUEST/SKETCH ADD SECTION 12.3.14 AS FOLLOWS: 12.3.14 WHERE PIPE SUPPORT OR PIPE RACK BEAMS CANTILEVER OFF OR SPAN BETWEEN INSERT PLATES, THE FIELD MAY ADD A PLATE OR PLATES BETWEEN THE BEAM AND INSERT PLATE PER THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES. 1. PSDFE SHALL DETERMINE THE PROPER PLATE AND WELD SIZE REQUIRED. 2. THE CAPACITY OF THE WELD BETWEEN THE ADDED PLATE AND THE INSERT PLATE SHALL BE EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THE CAPACITY OF THE WELD BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL BEAM AND INSERT PLATE. 3. THE ADDED PLATE SHALL BE A MINIMUM OF 1/2" THICK. 4. PLATE WIDTH AND LENGTH SHALL BE SUCH THAT THE WELD BETWEEN ORIGINAL BEAM AND INSERT PLATE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED. HOWEVER THE PLATE SHALL NOT EXTEND MORE THAN 2" BEYOND THE WELD BETWEEN THE BEAM AND THE ADDED PLATE.							
10. REVIEWED BY:  DISCIPLINE FIELD ENGINEER  DISCIPLINE FIELD ENGINEER				11. PREPARED BY: MARK R. PATTERSON DATE 8/10/78			
12. APPROVAL OF FIELD DISPOSITION  PROJECT FIELD ENGINEER DATE 8/23/78				13. BECHTEL ENGINEERING ☒ APPROVED ☐ DISAPPROVED DATE 8/23/78			
14. GROUP SUPERVISOR  DATE 8/23/78				15. NUCLEAR GROUP SUPERVISOR (IF REQUIRED) NA DATE 8/23/78			
16. PROJECT ENGINEER  DATE 8/23/78				17. QUALITY CLASS Q AND SINGLE LINE DWG (QUALITY CLASS Q AND R SPECS) DATE 8/23/78			
REMARKS: Resubmit at later date for discussion in Eng. Committee. Interface meeting held 8/16/78.							
DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL - PRINT COORDINATOR: COPIES TO: CHENT, SURVEY, DISCIPLINE, AND RESIDENT ENGINEER ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION: ☐ PROJECT PROCUREMENT MANAGER ☐ COST TREND ENGINEER							




CONCURRED WITH:
AL PALAQUIST
HARRY FREDY

SI 100-H010



Linear
Indication
requires
buffing

(707)(L)





POWER DIVISION

LARGE PIPE CONTROL CARD

1511055001

SPOOL TAG NUMBER

SIZE	LENGTH	P&ID NO.	COORD	REV.	PROJ CLASS	AREA
				31218		
MAT'L CLASS	S/U SYSTEM	MRR NO.	STORAGE LOC		VENDOR	
RECEIVED	FPT		INSTALLED		FOREMAN	
	DATE				DATE	

ISOMETRIC DWG NO.	REV.	FCR	DCN
	9	7 NA	NA

TASK NO.	INSPECTION ITEM	AFE	DATE	QCE	DA
1.0	SPOOL NUMBER MARKING VERIFIED	CU	10/4/80	(BPC 115 GCE)	10/4/80
2.0	CONFIGURATION & ORIENTATION PER ENGR DWG	CU	10/4/80	(BPC 115 GCE)	10/4/80
3.0	ORIENTATION OF FLOW ELEMENTS, ETC.	NA		N/A	
4.0	INTERNAL CLEANLINESS INSPECTION LEVEL:	CU	10/4/80	(BPC 115 GCE)	10/4/80
5.0	SURFACES FREE OF INJURIOUS DEFECTS	CU	10/4/80	(BPC 115 GCE)	10/4/80
6.0	RECORD NCR & MCN APPLICABLE TO INSTALLATION	NA		N/A	
7.0	INSTALLATION ACCEPTED Q4.10-1 1-51-105-2001	CU	10/4/80	(BPC 115 GCE)	10/4/80

REMARKS: INFO TRANSFERRED FROM SUPPLEMENTARY SHEET DATED 3/16/79 QCHGA
12/4/80

#8


FORM NPP-1 DATA REPORT FOR FABRICATED NUCLEAR PIPING SUBASSEMBLIES
(As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code Rules)

RR3 MRR NO. 17993
RETENTION TIME 2

1. Fabricated by Pullman Kellogg, Paramount, CA Order No. 2810
(Name and Address of Fabricator)
2. Fabricated for Bechtel Power Corp., Norwalk, CA Order No. 10407-13-PM-201
(Name and Address) 3 miles south of
3. Owner Arizona Public Service Co. 4. Location of Plant Wintersburg, AZ
5. Piping System Identification SAFETY INJECTION & SHUTDOWN COOLING Serial No. N-5031
Bechtel Dwg. R-2 (Brief description of intended use, main coolant etc.)
(a) Drawing No. 13-P-SIF-203 Prepared by Bechtel Power Corp., Norwalk, CA
(b) National Board No. N/A
6. The material, design, construction, and workmanship complies with ASME Code Section III, Class 2
Edition 1974, Addenda Date Summer 1975, Case No. ----
Remarks: Manufacturers' Data Reports properly identified and signed by Commissioned Inspectors have been furnished for
the following items of this report NOT APPLICABLE
(Name of Part - Item number, Manufacturer's name, and identifying stamp)

7. Shop Hydrostatic Test None psi.
8. Description of piping inspected 1-Piping Ass'y. Pc. Mk. 1-SI-105-S-001
(include - mark no. - material spec. - nom. pipe size - schedule or thickness - length)
Fabrication Drawing F-284
(fittings - flanges, etc.)
PIPE: 4" SCH 80S SMLS SA312 TP304
B.W. FTG'S: 4" SCH 80S x 2" SCH 160 SA403 WP304
4" SCH 120 x 2" SCH 160 SA403 WP304

N.D.E: 100% R.T. ALL GIRTH BUTT WELDS
100% L.P. ALL ATTACHMENT WELDS



We certify that the statements made in this report are correct and that the fabrication of the described piping conforms with the requirements of SECTION III of the ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL CODE.

Date 8/30/77 Signed Pullman Kellogg By [Signature]
(Fabricator)
Certificate of Authorization Expires 11/30/77 Certificate of Authorization No. N-776

CERTIFICATE OF SHOP INSPECTION

I, the undersigned, holding a valid commission issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors and/or the State or Province of California and employed by D.I.S. of State of CA have inspected the piping described in this Data Report on 8-31-77, and state that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the Manufacturer has constructed this piping in accordance with the applicable Subsections of ASME Code, Section III.

By signing this certificate, neither the Inspector nor his employer make any warranty, expressed or implied, concerning the piping in this Data Report. Furthermore, neither the Inspector nor his employer shall be liable in any manner for any personal injury or property damage or a loss of any kind arising from or connected with this inspection.

Date 8-31-77

#8A

FORM NPP-1 (back)

9. Description of Field Fabrication

10. Field Hydrostatic Test _____ psi.

We certify that the field fabrication of the described piping conforms with the requirements of SECTION III of the ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL CODE, Class _____, Edition _____, Addenda Date _____ Case No. _____

Date _____, 19____ Signed _____ (Fabricator) By _____ (Representative)

Our Certification of Authorization to use the _____ Symbol Expires _____ 19____
Certificate of Authorization No. _____

CERTIFICATE OF FIELD FABRICATION INSPECTION

I, the undersigned, holding a valid commission issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors and/or the State or Province of _____ and employed by _____ of _____ have compared the statements in this Manufacturer's Data Report with the described piping and state that the parts referred to as data items _____, not included in the certificate of shop inspection have been inspected by me and that to the best of my knowledge and belief the manufacturer has constructed this piping in accordance with the applicable section of the ASME CODE SECTION III.

By signing this certificate neither the Inspector nor his employer makes any warranty, expressed or implied, concerning the piping described in this Manufacturer's Data Report. Furthermore, neither the Inspector nor his employer shall be liable in any manner for any personal injury or property damage or a loss of any kind arising from or connected with this inspection.

Date _____ 19____

Inspector Commissions _____ National Board, State, Province and No.

Exit Meeting, 9/30/63

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
J. MARTIN	REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, RI
T. BISHOP	DIVISION DIRECTOR, RI
W. ALBERT	TEAM LEADER, RI
T. YOUNG JR	SECTION CHIEF, RI
P. Narbut	USNRC Inspector
W. J. Wagner	" "
J. F. BURDOIN	" "
L. E. VORDERBRUEGGEN	" "
H. KERCH?	" "
G. Walton	" "
C. J. Crane SA	Consultant to NRC (Electrical)
W. S. MARINI	" "
L. STANLEY	" "
D. J. FOGARTY	SO. CALIF. EDISON
W. J. STUBBLEFIELD	Bechtel Corp
A. Bill Beach	OIE, SR REACTOR ENGINEER
D. R. HAWKINSON	Bechtel
A. C. ROGERS	APS
MARK DE MICHELE	APS
CARL ANDOGNINI	APS
JOHN A. ROEDEL	APS
T. G. WOODS, JR.	APS
W. E. Ide	APS INVO COUST GR/IGC MAN
E. E. Van Brunt, k	APS - VP Nuc. Proj. (#3)

Exit Meeting 3/30/83

Name

Organization

KEITH TURLEY

APS

DAN CANADY

APS

Joe Bynum

APS

John E. Kirby

APS

Dave Bedford

PNM

R.E. York

WEPET

DAN WATERS

ESBOP

Art Gehr

Snell & Wilmer

Tom Novak

NRC

Don Farnacht

ABS Side Coast

Manny Lacetra

NRC

Jim Hanchett

NRC Region V

2001 E. 1st St.

D. J. Fossitt

1000 W. 1st St.

W. J. Fossitt

1000 W. 1st St.

W. J. Fossitt

1000 W. 1st St.

D. R. Fossitt

1000 W. 1st St.

D. R. Fossitt

1000 W. 1st St.

W. J. Fossitt

1000 W. 1st St.

W. J. Fossitt

1000 W. 1st St.

W. J. Fossitt

1000 W. 1st St.

W. J. Fossitt

1000 W. 1st St.

W. J. Fossitt

2001 E. 1st St.

E. E. Van Brunt

Walton

Summary of inspection activities for G. Walton and W. Albert for the period of September 6 through September 14, 1983.

Inspection of structural steel was performed in the following locations.

HPSI Train A Pump Room

Areas Inspected:

Bolted connections and welded connections throughout the pump room

Amount of Inspection:

15 structural joints in the gallery steel

Findings:

In two bolted connections at the 50' level 2 bolts in a 3 bolt connection and 4 bolts in a 6 bolt connection were found loose.

Walton
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others
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appeared
isolated

HPSI Train B Pump Room

Areas Inspected:

Bolted connections and welded connections

Amount of Inspection:

15 structural joints in the gallery steel

Findings:

All items were found acceptable.

Auxiliary Building Elevation 95 Penetration Area; Elevation 87-98 Pipe Chase,
Elevation 51' Pipe Way

Areas Inspected:

Bolted connections and welded connections in the areas of the auxiliary

10

building which contain the suction and discharge lines associated with the HPSI Train A.

Amount of Inspection:

13 bolted connections and 13 welded connections in the 51' elevation,
Pipe Way

94 connections in the Auxiliary building penetration area

40 connections in the Auxiliary building pipe chase. Elevation 87-98.

Findings:

W8 X31 structural members Racks B-79 and B-75 located in Auxiliary building (pipe chase) 13 welds were found to have undersize fillet ^{100%} welds and/or undercut, drawing 13-S-ZAS-536 Rev. 3. The inspector found fillet sizes down to 5/32". The requirements contained in drawing 13-S-ZAS-536 Rev. 3 show a 5/16" fillet weld required. Undercut approximately 1/16" deep was found. Per AWS D1.1 1/32" of undercut is unacceptable.

W 16 X 36 structural members located in the pipe way, elevation 51'6" were found with undersize fillet welds. A total of 6 welds were found with fillet sizes of 1/4", ~~1/4"~~, ~~7/32"~~, ~~1/4"~~, ~~7/32"~~, ~~7/32"~~ with the required fillet size ^{1/2"} ~~5/16"~~ as shown on drawings 13-C-IAS-570 Rev.8 and 13-C-IAS-500 Rev. 10.

On column line A4, elevation 95, at piping penetration 77 a vertical column which support S1-106-H22 connects to, the inspector found 10 - A325 bolts installed without washers. On column line A4, 7' west of AC, elevation 97 in the Auxiliary building the inspector found 10, A325 bolts installed without washers. In accordance with AISC paragraph

omit

1.23.5 "Bolts tightened by means of a calibrated wrench shall be installed with a hardened washer under the nut or bolt head, whichever is the element turned in tightening". Based on the fact that 2 bolts in each connection was required to be torque tested, the washer requirement would apply.

Containment Building

Areas Inspected:

Elevation 86' - 100' at HPSI

Lines A248-BCAA, E176-CCBA, E157-CCBA, A236-CCBA, E218-CCBA

Amount of Inspection:

110 connections, both bolted and welded

Findings:

All inspected items were found acceptable.

Other Items Inspected Associated with Structural Steel

Torque Testing of Bolted Connections

Areas Inspected:

HPSI Pump Room A

AD06 Pipe Way

Containment Building

Amount of Inspection:

Pump Room A 10 bolts

Pipe Way AD06 28 bolts

Containment building 24 bolts

Findings:

Pipe Way - 1 bolt turned 1 flat, 60° rotation. Three bolts turned 1/8 to 1/2 flat. All others were OK.

Pump Room A - 1 bolt turned 1/2 flat (30°). All others were OK.

Containment Building - 1 bolt turned 3/4 of a flat. (45°), 3 bolts turned 1/2 flat (30°), 3 bolts turned 1/4 flat (15°). All others were OK.

Structural Steel Spec. and Proc. Review

Spec 13-CM-320 Rev. 7

Weld Proc. P1-A-LH (structural)

Inspection of Piping Penetrations

Areas Inspected:

Visual Examination of Flued Heads, Record review, including milltest reports, weld checklist, weld procedures and associated procedure qualifications.

Amount of Inspection:

Penetrations 13, 14, 15, 16, 62, 69 and 77

Findings:

All items inspected were found acceptable.

Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolt Installation

Areas Inspected:

HPSI Pump Room A Instrument Sensing Line

Amount Inspected :

1 4 bolt connection

Findings:

Concrete expansion anchor bolt installation:

Instrument sensing line 1J SIN-PT-308

Hilti bolt spacing from adjacent unistrut installed is 2" distance.

In accordance with the requirement specified in work plan procedure No. 24.1 Rev. 6 dated 3/7/83, ^{title} ~~tilted~~ Installation and Testing of

Concrete Expansion Anchors the minimum spacing required is 5".

Paragraph 8.9.1 of Specification 13-CM-307 Rev. 8 Installation Specification for Design, Installation and Testing of Concrete Anchors states: The minimum distance a new expansion anchor may be located from an unused hole or an unused bolt shall be one-half the minimum specified spacing, unless minimum embedment for the new expansion anchor is obtained beyond the depth of the unused hole. Per discussions with Randy Butler Civil Lead Discipline Engineer for Bechtel, he interpretes the min. distance from an adjacent unistrut to be the one half, or 2½". The inspector found the above support with a hilti bolt installed within 2" of a unistrut.

Paragraph 7.4 "A reduction in the minimum center to center spacing is allowable providing the allowable design load is reduced as shown on the Capacity Reduction Curve of Attachment C. The spacing shall not be less than one-half the spacing given in Attachment A, A-1 and B."

List of Pipe Supports - Norbit

	Hanger	Type	Finding	Problem Description	or Note
1	SI 000 H001	S	Sat.		
2	SI 000 H002	SE	Sat		
3	SI 000 H003	S	Sat		
4	SI 000 H004	SNB		Under wall pipe p ^t identified Clamp on Code Plate	
5	SI 000 H005	S	Sat		
6	SI 000 H006 (Partial Inspection)	S	Open Item	Penetration Seal Material on Side Plate	
7	SI 000 H001	SNB	Sat		
8	SI 000 H002	S	Sat		
9	SI 100 H001	S	—	Partial inspection through penetration seal boot	
10	SI 100 H002	S	Sat		
11	SI-100 H003	S	IONC	① Loose clamp ② excessive angle	
12	SI-100 H004	S	Sat		
13	SI-100 H005	S	IONC	① Location dimension varies more than allowed ② Lack of fill on slanchion to pipe ^{field} weld	
14	SI-100 H006	S	Sat	Partial Insp (Pipe Insulated)	
15	SI 100 H007	SNB	Sat.		
16	SI 100 H008	S	Sat		
17	SI 100 H009	S	Sat	Partial (Pipe Insulated)	
18	SI 100 H010	S			Inspect
19	SI 100 H011	S	Sat		
20	SI 100 H012	S	IONC	Not safety hanger loads not included	

Hanger	Type	Finding	Problem Description or NRC Code
21 SI 100 H013	S	Sat	
22 SI 100 H015	S	IONC	^{field} Lug welds size and configuration
23 SI 100 H016	S	Sat	
24 SI 100 H 017	S	Sat	
25 SI 100 H018	S	Sat	
26 SI 100 H019	S	Sat	
27 SI 100 H020	SNB	Sat	
28 SI 100 H021	S	Sat	
29 SI 100 H022	S	Sat	Inspected for Location/Configuration/Clearances only
30 SI 100 H023	S	Sat	"
31 SI 100 H024	S	Sat	"
32 SI 100 H025	S	Sat	"
33 SI 100 H026	S	Sat	"
34 SI 100 H027	S	Sat	"
35 SI 100 H028	S	Sat	
36 SI 100 H029	S	Sat	Partial (Piping insulated)
37 SI 100 H031	S	Sat	Lug Welds only
38 SI 100 H032	S	Sat	Lug Welds only
39 SI 100 H034	S	IONC	Under size lug weld
40 SI 100 H035	S	Sat	Lug Welds only
41 SI 100 H036	S	IONC	Configuration differs from drawing

Hanger	Type	Finding	Problem Description or IPC action
42 SI 101-H00A Partial Insulation	SS	Open	Loose Locknut
43 SI 102 H00A	S	Sat	
44 SI 102 H00B	S	IONC	Undersize weld, rollover, no end returns
45 SI 105 H00B	S	Sat	
46 SI 105 H00C	S	Sat	
47 SI 105 H00D	S	Sat	
48 SI 105 H00E	S	Sat	
49 SI 106 H001	S	IONC	Lack of Lug Contact area with support member
50 SI 106 H002	S	Sat	
51 SI 106 H003	S	Sat	
52 SI 106 H004	S	Sat	
53 SI 106 H005	S	Sat	
54 SI 106 H006	S	Sat	
55 SI 106 H007	S	Sat	
56 SI 106 H008	SNB	Sat	
56 SI 106 H009	S	Sat	
57 SI 106 H010	S	Sat	Partial (Pipe Insulated)
(58) SI 106 H011			Inspection Required
59 SI 106 H012	S	Sat	Partial (Pipe Insulated)
60 SI 106 H013	S	Sat	Partial (Pipe Insulated)

[illegible]