TEXAS UTILITIES SERVICES INC.

2001 BRYAN TOWER DALLAS, TEXAS 75201-3050

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September 13, 1983

Mr. B. J. Youngblood U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 RESPONSE TO HIGH/MODERATE ENERGY PIPE BREAK ANALYSIS CONCERNS

Dear Mr. Youngblood:

In response to NRC concerns documented in Texas Utilities letters TXX-3336 dated June 16, 1981 and TXX-3351 dated June 24, 1981 we provide the following:

- 1. The moderate energy break of the Safeguards Building auxiliary feedwater pipe supplied by the condensate storage tank was analyzed and found to be non-limiting. Flooding from a crack in the safety injection line was found to be more severe. The results of the limiting flooding analysis have been used in the design of protection for essential equipment in the affected area. These protective measures consist of installation of physical barriers and/or relocation of essential equipment.
- The steam generator PORV controls (including pressure transducers) are designed for a pipe crack environment. The environmental qualification of the equipment is currently in progress. See CPSES/EOR Table 5-1 for qualification parameters.
- 3. Steam/feed line break (Super Pipe) in the break exclusion zone outside of containment is discussed in the response to Q010.20. Equipment qualification parameters are presented in CPSES/EQR Tables 5-1 and 5-2. The environmental qualification of affected equipment is currently in progress.
- 4. A discussion of the high energy pipe break analysis is presented in FSAR Section 3.6B. Table 3.6B-1 presents a list of pipes where breaks are postulated and includes line fluid parameters a d type of jet emanating from the break. Table 3.11B presents a list of all Class 1E equipment affected by the break and includes the postulated environment and the equipment qualification parameters.

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- A discussion of the jet impingement analysis is presented in FSAR 5. Section 3.68.2.5.2.
- Analyses of moderate energy and high energy pipe breaks include the 6. affects of flooding on redundant essential equipment. Specifically, flooding between adjacent compartments as a result of floor drain failure is considered, including areas where floor drains are connected to a single header such as the AFW pump rooms and the charging pump rooms.

Should you have additional questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

H. C. Schmidt

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