LICENSEE EVENT REPORT Update Report: Previous Report Date: 8-25-83
CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1 N C B E P 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 6 57 CAT 58 5
CON'T  O 1 SOURCE L G O 5 O - O 3 2 5 7 O 8 1 1 1 8 3 8 U 9 1 2 8 3 9  EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10  Following the initial reactor criticality and shutdown after an extended maintenance
and refueling outage, it was discovered that the instrument isolation valves to
1-CAC-PDS-4222 and 4223, which are the differential pressure sensing switches to the
Reactor Ruilding to suppression chamber vacuum breakers were closed. This rendered
the vacuum breakers inonerable. This event did not affect the health and cafety of
the public.
Technical Specifications 3.6.4.2, 6.9.1.8f  7 8 9  SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE  COMP. VALVE
SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBC
17 REPORT NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER    X   18   X   19   Z   20   Z   21   0   0   0   0   Y   23   N   24   Z   25   Z   9   9   9   2
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)  The subject valves were left closed on May 4, 1983, in accordance with the cancellation
of an equipment clearance and had remained closed as they were not covered in system
valve lineups done prior to reactor startup. The subject valves were reopened to
restore the operability of the vacuum breakers. A valve lineup of technical specifi-
cation related instrumentation was done with no additional problems found.
7 8 9  FACILITY STATUS SPOWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32  1 5   X   (28)   O   O   O   (29)   NA   A   (31)   Plant Surveillance
7 8 9 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA NA NA LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
7 8 9 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) NA NA
7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES  NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41  NA
7 8 9 11 12 B309200247 830912 PDR ADDCK 05000325 PDR   NA
7 8 9 10
15\$\footnote{\text{PT}}
NAME OF PREPARER M. J. Pastva, Jr. PHONE: 919-457-9421

Carolina Power & Light Company

B3 SEP 16 P1: 48

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461-0429

September 12, 1983

FILE: B09-13510C SERIAL: BSEP/83-2953

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-325

LICENSE NO. DPR-71

SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-83-34

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.1.8f of the Technical Specifications for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1, the enclosed supplemental Licensee Event Report is submitted. The original report fulfilled the requirement for a written report within fourteen (14) days of a reportable occurrence and both are in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July 1977.

Very truly yours,


0.5

C. R. Dietz, General Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

MJP/mcg/LETCG2

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung
NRC Document Control Desk



## LER ATTACHMENT - RO #1-83-34

Facility: Unit No. 1 Event Date: August 11, 1983

On July 30, 1983, during the performance of corrective maintenance on a drywell pressure transmitter, it was discovered that the respective instrument isolation valves to 1-CAC-PDS-4222 and 4223 were closed. Immediately following the discovery, the subject valves were opened to return each instrument to service.

Switches 1-CAC-PDS-4222 and 4223 each provide an actuation signal to the Reactor Building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers' respective butterfly valves, 1-CAC-V16 and V17. Closure of the subject instrument isolation valves prevented the PDS-4222 and 4223 switches from detecting a pressure differential, thus rendering V16 and V17 inoperable.

On August 11, 1983, it was determined that on May 4, 1983, the subject instrument isolation valves were left closed while canceling an equipment clearance to support acceptance testing on new plant equipment. The clearance involved plant modification work on drywell pressure switches which utilize the same pressure sensing legs as PS-4222 and 4223.

Following acceptance testing of the involved plant modification, there was no reference made back to the clearance form to ensure that the instrument isolation valves to the PS-4222 and 4223 were reopened. In addition, the subject instrument isolation valves were not part of the system valve lineup verifications and, therefore, were not reopened prior to initial criticality of the reactor following completion of the extended refueling maintenance outage.

This event was discovered immediately after plant shutdown following the initial reactor criticality after an extended maintenance and refueling outage. The investigation determined plant operation was limited to approximately four hours and thirty-seven minutes and was maintained in the reactor startup power range during the period of time the subject isolation valves were closed.

As a result of this event, immediate corrective follow-up was performed to verify that proper valve lineups for technical specification-related instrumentation on each unit were in effect. This verification utilized a listing of technical specification-related instrumentation, valve lineups for plant instrumentation, and technical specifications to help ensure the accuracy of the applicable valve lineup lists by performing the following:

- 1. Ensuring that the valves are included in their respective system lineup by means of a system hand-over-hand verification.
- Ensuring that valves are properly identified by use of identification tags.
- Ensuring that valves were properly positioned for those without identification labels or not on the valve lineups.

## LER ATTACHMENT - RO #1-83-34 (Continued)

4. Ensuring that valves associated with the instruments, including root valves, are included in the valve lineup listing.

As a result of a September 30, 1982, reactor scram, which resulted from the isolation of main condenser vacuum switches and was reported in LER 2-82-111 and IE Inspection Report 82-39, a program was initiated in 1982 to correct identified problems by improvement within the following areas:

- 1. Plant operating procedures. A complete rewrite of plant operating procedures was begun to help ensure systems' valves are reflected in the applicable system valve lineups.
- 2. Plant modifications. Review of plant modifications performed on both Unit Nos. 1 and 2 to ensure they have been properly completed and that applicable changes to plant operating procedures and system drawings are performed.
- 3. Plant operating guidelines. Stress, by inclusion in the plant operations standing instructions, that plant valves will have identification tags and that plant system valve lineups cannot be completed unless valves in the lineup are properly tagged for identification. Provide a written general guideline to plant operators on the proper methods for performing plant system valve and electrical lineup verification. This was accomplished by issuance of Operating Instruction 13, Valve and Breaker Alignment.

It must be noted that at the time of this event the subject improvement program was approximately 60% complete. It is felt the program to date indicates that Carolina Power & Light Company's approach to accomplishing the goals of this program is logical and conservative.

As a result of this event, the subject instrument isolation valves were included as part of the system valve position lineup verification listing. In addition, appropriate plant Operations personnel will review this report to ensure their cognizance of the event.