

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

September 15, 1983

BLRD-50-438/82-51  
BLRD-50-439/82-46

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DEFICIENCY IN UNDERVOLTAGE  
PROTECTION DURING AN ACCIDENT - BLRD-50-438/82-51, BLRD-50-439/82-46 -  
FOURTH INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
R. V. Crlenjak on July 27, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as  
NCR BLN EEB 8205. This was followed by our interim reports dated August 25  
and November 19, 1982 and January 17, 1983. Enclosed is our fourth interim  
report. We expect to submit our next report by April 19, 1984.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with  
R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*L. M. Mills*

L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
DEFICIENCY IN UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION DURING AN ACCIDENT

NCR BLN EEB 8205

BLRD-50-438/82-51, BLRD-50-439/82-46

10 CFR 50.55(e)

FOURTH INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During a design review, it was determined that the present design of the additional level of under- or overvoltage protection does not fully comply with the requirements as stated in Bellefonte Final Safety Analysis Report Question 430.38 and the guidelines in NRC branch technical position PSB-1. Misinterpretation of these requirements by TVA caused the original design not to consider a degraded voltage concurrent with an accident. Because of this misinterpretation, the time delay selected to initiate separation of the Class IE distribution system from the degraded offsite power system will not permit connection to the alternate or emergency power systems soon enough to ensure adequate voltages for the required safety-related motors.

Interim Progress

TVA has completed its analysis to determine the voltage and time delay setpoints as discussed in our previous report. This analysis is currently being reviewed to ensure adequacy. In addition, design and procurement activities associated with Engineering Change Notice (ECN) 1559 are currently in progress.