LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

UPDATE REPORT DATE 12/27/93

	PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 12/27/83
	CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1 7 8	G A E I H 2 20 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5 57 CAT 58
O 1 7 8	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 7 1 1 2 9 8 3 8 0 12 0 2 8 4 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2	On 11/29/83, during a control panel walkdown, the "B" H202 analyzer was
0 3	noted inoperable. On 12/04/83, during performance of the "CONSIP DELPHI"
0 4	MODEL K-IV HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN ANALYZER FT&C" procedure (HNP-2-3882),
0 5	the "A" H202 analyzer was noted inoperable. Both events are contrary
06	to the requirements of T.S. Table 3.3.6.4-1, item 9. Plant operation
0 7	was not affected. The health and safety of the public were not affected
08	by this repetitive event as last reported on LER 50-366/1983-089.
0 9	SYSTEM CAUSE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCO
	TO REPORT NUMBER 1 22 23 24 26 27 28 39 30 31 32
	ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER (2) X (2) X (21) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The first event was the result of component failure due to miscellaneous
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ш	The first event was the result of component failure due to miscellaneous failed parts. The second event was due to the system's pump failing and
1 1	The first event was the result of component failure due to miscellaneous failed parts. The second event was due to the system's pump failing and leaking pipe fittings. Analyzers 2P33-R601B (first event) and 2P33-R601A (second event) were repaired, functionally tested satisfactorily per HNP-2-3882, and returned to service on 12/28/83 & 12/15/83 respectively.
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3	The first event was the result of component failure due to miscellaneous failed parts. The second event was due to the system's pump failing and leaking pipe fittings. Analyzers 2P33-R601B (first event) and 2P33-R601A (second event) were repaired, functionally tested satisfactorily per HNP-2-3882, and returned to service on 12/28/83 & 12/15/83 respectively. SACILITY SPOWER OTHER STATUS O
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NARRATIVE REPORT FOR LER 50-366/1983-134, Rev. 1 UPDATE REPORT-PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 12/27/83

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH

DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b due to the events' showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.4-1, item 9.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

On 11/29/83, the plant was in steady state operation at 2430 MWt (approximately 58% pwoer) when the first event occurred.

On 12/04/83, the plant was in steady state operation at 2430 MWt (approximately 100% power) when the second event occurred.

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 11/29/83, during a control panel walkdown, operations personnel noted that the drywell's "B" hydrogen and oxygen analyzer (2P33-R601B) was inoperable. Consequently, the plant could not satisfy the "MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE" requirement for item 9 of Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.4-1.

On 12/04/83, during performance of the "CONSIP DELPHI MODEL K-IV HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN ANALYZER FT&C" procedure (HNP-2-3882), surveillance personnel noted that the drywell's "A" hydrogen and oxygen analyzer (2P33-R601A) was inoperable. Consequently, the plant could not satisfy the "MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE" requirement for item 9 of Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.4-1.

Consequences of the event(s):

Plant operation was not affected by these events. The health and safety of the public were not affected by these events.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

There is no backup system.

Justification for continued operation:

Plant operation was continued under a 30-day LCO permitted by Tech. Specs. section 3.3.6.4, ACTION a. Hydrogen and Oxygen analyzer 2P33-R601A was repaired and returned to service on 12/15/83. Hydrogen and Oxygen analyzer 2P33-R601B was repaired and returned to service on 12/28/83.

Narrative Report for LER 50-366/1983-134, Rev. 1 Page Two

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

The first event is repetitive as last reported on LER 50-366/1983-089.

The second event is repetitive as last reported on LER 50-366/1983-099.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event had no effect on any other Unit 2 system. This event did not affect Unit 1.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

The cause of failure for 2P33-R601B was due to miscellaneous failed parts (i.e., sample pump, R1 and R2 pressure regulators, reagent gas flow controller diaphragm, and hydrogen cell).

The cause of failure for 2P33-R601A (the second event) was due to the hydrogen and oxygen analyzer system's sample pump not pumping sufficiently. Additionally, several leaks were found on the system's pipe fittings.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The "B" hydrogen and oxygen analyzer was repaired by replacing the necessary parts and performing a general overhaul on the system's components. The system was then recalibrated and functionally tested satisfactorily per HNP-2-3882 and returned to service on 12/28/83.

The "A" hydrogen and oxygen anlayzer system's sample pump was repaired by lapping the pump's heads and replacing the pump's diaphragm. The system's pipe fittings were tightened and checked for leaks. The system was then recalibrated and functionally tested satisfactorily per HNP-2-3882 and returned to service on 12/15/83.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

N/A

Scheduled (future) corrective action:


A commercial grade ${\rm O}_2$ analyzer will be installed per DCR 83-44 to relieve post accident monitoring equipment of routine sampling.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

N/A

Georgia Power Company Post Office Box 439 Baxley, Georgia 31513 Telephone 912 367-7781 912 537-9444

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant 1888 69:16



February 2, 1984 GM-84-58

PLANT E. I. HATCH Licensee Event Report Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1983-134, Rev. 1. This report is required by Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.b.

> H. C. Nix General Manager

xc:

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