




ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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August 9, 1983

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Mr. W. C. Seidle, Chief
Reactor Project Branch #2
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011



SUBJECT: Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 & 2
Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368
License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Response to Inspection Reports
50-313/83-14 and 50-368/83-14

Gentlemen:

We have reviewed the subject inspection reports. Please find attached our response to the "Notice of Violation" included in the reports.

Very truly yours,

John R. Marshall
John R. Marshall
Manager, Licensing

JRM:RJS:s1

Attachment

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Mr. Norman M. Haller, Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Based on the results of an NRC inspection conducted during the period of June 1-30, 1983, and in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C), 47 FR 9987, dated March 9, 1982, the following violation was identified:

Manual Valve Not Locked

Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that, "Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering... a. The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix 'A' of Regulatory Guide 1.33...."

Plant Operating Procedure 2102.01, "Plant Pre-Heatup and Pre-Critical Checklist," has been established in accordance with this Technical Specification.

Attachment E, "Category E Valve Position Verification," of Plant Operating Procedure 2102.01 requires that manual valve 2SW-36B be locked open for critical plant operations. 2SW-36B is the service water outlet valve to emergency feedwater pump room cooler 2VUC-6B.

Contrary to the above, on June 29, 1983, with the plant operating at approximately 30% power, the NRC inspector found that manual valve 2SW-36B was open as required but was not locked. Specifically, the locking chain for manual valve 2SW-36B was so loosely wound around the valve operating handle that it could be slipped off, making the lock ineffective and allowing the valve to be operated.

This is a Severity Level V Violation. (Supplement I) (368/8314-02)

Response:

Item 368/8314-02 identified that the locking device (chain) installed on the service water outlet valve 2SW-36B (a T-handle valve) could be removed without removal of the installed lock. The chain was of sufficient length to allow it to be slipped over the end of the "T" handle without unlocking the padlock.

The position of 2SW-36B was verified to be correct and the valve secured immediately upon notification by the NRC inspector on June 29, 1983. In addition, plant operating Procedures 1102.01 and 2102.01, Category E Valve Position Verification Checklists, were completed on July 5, 1983, to assure no other similar situation existed. No similar situation to 2SW-36B was found.

Plant Operating Procedure 1015.01, Conduct of Operation, which established controls over Category E manual valves has been revised to clarify the methods used for locking "T-handled" valves. Operations personnel have been advised of the procedure change. We are presently in full compliance.