

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1DOCKET NUMBER (2)  
0 5 0 0 0 2 7 1 5 1 OF 0 1 2

TITLE (4)

INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																				
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)																		
0	1	0	6	8	4	8	4	-	0	0	1	-	0	0	0	2	0	6	8	4			0	5	0	0	0		

OPERATING MODE (9)		5		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	0	0	20.402(b)		20.402(c)		X	80.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)				
				20.405(a)(1)(i)		80.38(a)(1)		80.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)					
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)		80.38(a)(2)		80.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)					
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(i)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)		80.73(a)(2)(ii)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)							
				20.405(a)(1)(v)		80.73(a)(2)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(x)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME  
WILLIAM J. KELLY, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEERTELEPHONE NUMBER  
AREA CODE  
8 0 5 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☐ NO ☒ XEXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)  
MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During installation of test equipment, the AC supply to a Solid State Protection System (SSPS) slave relay circuit was momentarily grounded. This caused a momentary drop in inverter output voltage, which subsequently caused a safety injection signal on one train of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System. The signal caused one centrifugal charging pump and one diesel generator to start. Also, one train of containment Phase 'A' isolation valves actuated. The centrifugal charging pump was in the recirculation mode, so there was no injection of water into the Reactor Coolant System. Corrective action was a memo to operators, instructing them to put the SSPS in the "test" mode (blocking the ESF actuation signal) except when required for ESF testing or operation.

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PDR ADOCK 05000275  
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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 8 4 - 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 2		LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 6, 1984 at 1415 hours, while in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the plant experienced an inadvertent safety injection actuation. This event occurred during the performance of a surveillance test on a SSPS slave relay (RLY, JC) by I&C Maintenance Personnel. While installing test equipment, the 120 volt vital instrument AC supply was grounded. This created a momentary dip in the 120 Volt Vital Instrument A.C. Bus voltage that was of sufficient duration to cause the bistables in Protection Set 1 to trip. The grounding of the AC supply also blew the SSPS output cabinet fuse. Due to calibration activities, Hi Steam Line delta P Channel II Bistables (PDS) for Steam Generators 1-1 and 1-3 (SG) were in the tripped position, satisfying the 2/3 coincidence and actuating safety injection in SSPS Train 'B' (JE). SSPS Train 'A' was not actuated due to the blown fuse. The Train 'B' actuation signal caused one centrifugal charging pump (P, CB) and one diesel generator (DG, EK) to start, and actuated one train of containment Phase 'A' isolation valves (ISV, JM). The charging pump was in the recirculation mode, so no water was injected into the Reactor Coolant System (AB).

The SSPS output cabinet fuse was replaced and proper test equipment installation verified. A memo has been issued to inform operators to place the SSPS in the "test" mode except when required for ESF testing or operation, to reduce the chance of recurrence of this event.

This surveillance test is performed only when in the refueling mode or in cold shutdown, and would not occur during power operation.

# PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

77 BEALE STREET • SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94105 • (415) 781-4211 • TWX 910-372-6587

JAMES D. SHIFFER  
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS  
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

February 6, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-044

Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76  
Diablo Canyon Unit 1  
Licensee Event Report 84-001-00  
Inadvertent Safety Injection Actuation

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning an inadvertent safety injection actuation on January 6, 1984.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin  
Service List

IE22  
11