NRC FORM 366 (12-81) 10 CFR 50 US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 3150-0011 CONTROL BLOCK PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION A L B R F 2 3 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 1 CON'T 0 1 ARPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 2 6 0 1 2 2 9 8 3 8 0 1 2 7 8 4 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) During normal operation, while the A3 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water 0 2 (EECW) pump was out of service for strainer repair, the strainer on the C3 0 3 pump became restricted by debris and all flow was lost to the north EECW 0 4 header. T.S. 3.5.C.2 requires a minimum of one EECW pump on each EECW 0 5 header. Per T.S. 3.5.C.6, preparations for shutdown were initiated; however, 0 6 A3 pump was repaired within six hours and power reduction was unnecessary. 0 7 There was no effect on public health and safety. 8 0 CAUSE COMP CODE VALVE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE 0 9 WE X (12) Z (13) Z (15) Z (16) E R (14) 12 1.3 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION ZR/RO CODE TYPE (17 REPORT 8 0 8 0 3 01 24 28 51 30 ACTION EFFECT SHUTDOWN CHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP COMPONEN (22) ER (26) METHOD HOURS SUPPLIER Ly 18 Z Z (20) 21 0 10 23 N 24 0 25 K | 1 | 4 | CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The loss of the C3 EECW pump strainer was caused by debris from the river. 10 The S. P. Kinney 14" model AV-3 strainer was cleaned and the C3 EECW pump was 1 1 returned to operability. The loss of the C3 EECW pump is considered a random 1 2 event and no recurrence control is necessary. 3 1 4 FACILITY METHOD OF DISCOVERY STATUS S POWER (30 OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 1 0 0 29 E (28) NA A (a) Engineer Observation 10 12 13 ACTIVITY CONTENT 80 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) (36 LOCATION OF RELEASE Z O Z O 1 6 NA NA PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 80 NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) 1 7 NA 11 1.2 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) MI 80 0 0 0 0 0 NA 1 8 11 12 OSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 80 Z (2) NA 9 8402080287 840127 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) PDR ADOCK. 05000260 NRC USE ONLY N al 20 NA PDR 8.9 80 NAME OF PREPARER B. R. McPherson (205)729-0834 PHONE

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

January 27, 1984

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Rellly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFR0-50-260/83084

The enclosed report provides details concerning the strainer on the C3 pump which became restricted by debris and all flow was lost to the north emergency equipment cooling water header. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 2 Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. A. Coffey

Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure cc (Enclosure): Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

> Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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Form BF 17 BF 15.2 2/12/82

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 83084 Technical Specification Involved 3.5.C.6 Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2) * Date Due NRC 01/28/84

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 and unit 3 were in refueling outages and unit 2 was at approximately 100-percent power and steady state. While the A3 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pump was out of service for strainer repair, the strainer on the C3 EECW pump became restricted by debris and all flow was lost to the north EECW header. This is contrary to T.S. 3.5.C.2 which requires a minimum of one operable EECW pump for each header. Per T.S. 3.5.C.6, preparations were initiated to place the unit in cold shutdown within 24 hours. However, repair on the A3 pump strainer was completed within six hours and the A3 pump was returned to service before any power reduction was necessary.

The C3 EECW strainer was clogged by debris from the Tennessee River. The S. P. Kinney 14" Model AV-3 strainer was cleaned and returned to service. The loss of the C3 EECW pump is considered a random event and no recurrence control is necessary. There was no effect on the public health and safety. Redundant EECW south header was available and operable.

* Previous Similar Events:

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None

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Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: