### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

	LIGHNOLD EVENT HET ONT
	CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] [ ] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1 8	P A T M I 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 LICENSE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 5 67 CAT 59
CON'T O : 7 8	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 9 7 1 2 1 9 8 3 8 0 1 2 3 8 4 9  EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2	While in cold shutdown, during telephone circuit rerouting, 2 cable fire seals were
0 3	identified with no seal material inside the conduits. A fire watch was posted within
0 4	1 hour of discovery per T.S. 3.18.7.2. This is considered reportable per T.S.
0 5	[6.9.2.B.2. Public health and safety were unaffected.
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0 7	
08	9 80
0 9	SYSTEM CAUSE CODE SUBCODE SUBC
	LEB/RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO.  17) REPORT   SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. CODE TYPE   NO.    17) REPORT   SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.   O   4   7     O   3     L   O    18)   SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.   O   O   O   O   O    17) REPORT   SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.   O   O   O    18)   SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.   O   O   O   O   O    17) REPORT   TYPE   NO.   O   O   O    18)   SUBMITTED   FORM SUB. SUPPLIER   O   O   O   O    18)   SUBMITTED   FORM SUB. SUPPLIER   O   O   O   O    18)   SUBMITTED   FORM SUB. SUPPLIER   O   O   O   O    18)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O    18)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    18)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    18)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    19)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    10)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    11)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    12)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    13)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    14)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    14)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    15)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O    16)   SUBMITTED   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O   O
10	The conduits were installed with no fire barrier seals inside the conduits. Seal
111	installation and repair procedure MP 1420-FB-1 used for sealing of these conduits
112	provided inadequate guidance. Seal repairs have been completed. Revision 8 to MP
1 3	1420-FB-1 provides adequate guidance for conduit fire seals.
1 4	
7 8	FACILITY STATUS SPOWEH OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 MAINTENANCE SOLVERY DESCRIPTION 32 MAINTENANCE
	ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
	PERSONNEL EXPOSUPES NUMBER O 0 0 37 Z 38 DESCRIPTION 39 N/A
18	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
1 9	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)  TYPE DESCRIPTION N/A  8402080246 840123
20	PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45 PDR ADOCK 05000289 NRC USE ONLY S PDR N/A
	NAME OF PREPARER R. A. Szczech PHONE: (717) 948-8833

# CURRENT ACTIVITIES AT TIME OF OCCURRENCE

TMI-1 was in cold shutdown. Engineering field work for telephone circuit rerouting and improvements was being performed and resulted in the identification.

## II. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO OCCURRENCE

Plant Engineering personnel were identifying telephone circuits for possible rerouting in a dedicated communications tray. Two  $1-\frac{1}{2}$ " conduits, one in seal 16 and one in seal 79 were found with no fire barrier seal material inside the conduits.

#### III. DESCRIPTION

These conduits were installed with no fire barrier seals in place. The seals in the penetrations they pass through were adequate and maintained as part of the installation, however, no seal as required by the TMI-1 Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report for Tech Spec 3.18.7 was installed inside the conduits. Seal 16 is located in the floor of the continuously manned Control Room and seal 79 is located in the north wall of the Relay Room.

# IV. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AS A RESULT OF THE OCCURRENCE

None.

## V. PREVIOUS EVENTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE

LER 83-36 reported an identical condition with a conduit in seal 959.

### VI. ROOT CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

Seal installation and repair procedure M.P. 1420-FB-1 did not give clear instructions that conduits required seals in the first condulet, pull-box, terminal box or open end on <u>each</u> side of a fire rated barrier. This procedure inadequacy resulted in these conduits being left unsealed while the main penetration they passed through was properly resealed. It should be noted that this condition only presented a minor threat to the capability of the rated barrier.

#### VII. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

AP 1044 was implemented and a potentially reportable event form initiated upon discovery. A posted fire-watch was stationed in the Relay Room within 1 hour of discovery in accordance with the LCO of T.S. 3.18.7.2. A priority one job ticket was issued for seal repairs and work was completed that day (12-19-83). Following acceptance of the repairs, the fire-watch was secured.

### VIII. LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

Other telephone circuit conduits were opened and inspected for seals. Several were found with no seals in areas of the plant which are not subject to the Technical Specification due to plant mode (no equipment operability requirements). As a result of the similar incident described in LER 83-36, Revision 8 was made to MP 1420-FB-1 which clearly defines the sealing requirements and should prevent reoccurrence of this type event. However, seals 16 and 19 were made prior to this revision.



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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

January 23, 1984 5211-84-2010

Dr. T. E. Murley Region I, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50
Docket No. 50-289
LER 83-047/03L-0

This letter transmits Licensee Event Report (LER) 83-047/03L-0 which deals with inoperable fire barrier penetration seals. The public health and safety were not affected.

Sincerely,

Director, TMI-1

HDH: RAS: vjf

Enclosure

cc: R. Conte J. Van Vliet

Document Management Branch

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