

December 6, 1994

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-IV-94-060

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region IV staff in Arlington, Texas on this date.

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Licensee Emergency Classification</u>
Entergy Operations, Inc.	Notification of Unusual Event
River Bend 1	Alert
St Francisville, Louisiana	Site Area Emergency
Dockets: 50-458	General Emergency
	X Not Applicable

Subject: NONROUTINE REACTOR TRIP AND SHUTDOWN EXCEEDING 72 HOURS

On December 4, 1994, while the plant was operating at 100 percent power, the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) closed resulting in a reactor trip. The plant responded as expected, and all safety related systems responded as designed. The operators stabilized the plant in Hot Shutdown (Mode 3).

The MSIVs closed as a result of human error during the performance of the containment and drywell manual isolation actuation monthly channel functional surveillance test. Before resetting Channel A, Channel B was placed in the trip condition, causing the MSIVs to close. The reactor tripped on the MSIV closure signal.

After the reactor trip, the licensee performed a drywell inspection to determine the cause of unidentified reactor coolant system leakage that had been slowly increasing to about 1.72 gpm since the plant started up on November 3, 1994. The Technical Specification limit is 5 gpm.

On December 5, the licensee found a hairline crack in control rod drive (CRD) 32-17 insert piping that was leaking about 20 drops per minute. The crack was surrounded by a brown substance, similar to the foreign material that had been found on other CRD pipes on October 10, 1994, which caused trans-granular chloride stress corrosion cracking. The licensee's previous investigation determined that the brown substance was a chloride-bearing adhesive used to install anti-sweat insulation on service water piping during construction. Although the licensee stated that they performed a 100 percent walkdown of the CRD pipes after the October event, this additional contamination was apparently overlooked.

Further inspection revealed 5 other CRD pipes with deposits of the brown substance and resultant cracks. They did not appear to be leaking. The licensee's inspection is ongoing at this time, and so far, they have identified 19 additional brown deposits on the CRD piping that have yet to be tested for crack indication. The licensee intends to replace all 6 sections of piping containing the cracks, and in addition, will remove 2 more sections to gain access to the cracked pipes. The full scope of work is indeterminate pending

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results of the additional testing and inspections to be done. The repairs will require cold shutdown conditions.

Later on December 5, the licensee's unidentified leakage inspection revealed 13 main steam safety relief valve (SRV) vacuum breaker check valves leaking past their seats, and into the drywell. 6 valves were dripping, and 7 valves were steaming to varying degrees. SRV tail pipe temperatures supported the fact that the corresponding SRVs were leaking slightly, which in itself is not a safety concern. SRV leakage typically drains to the suppression pool in containment. As of this reporting, the licensee plans to repair 4 of the check valves that had significant leakage, and to inspect the other 9 for possible repairs or cleaning.

The licensee has indicated an intent to not restart the reactor prior to December 14; however, this is contingent upon the final scope of repairs.

This information has been discussed with the licensee and is current as of 11:20 a.m. (CST) on December 6, 1994.

The licensee issued a press release on December 5, 1994. The state of Louisiana will be informed.

Region IV received notification of this occurrence by telephone from the resident inspector at 8:30 p.m. (CST) on December 4, 1994. Region IV has informed the EDO, NRR, and PAO.

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