

CONTROL BLOCK: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)01 | A | L | B | R | F | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CONT

01 | I | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | During refueling, the senior resident NRC inspector found the control arm on
03 | damper FCO 31-152 on unit B of the control room emergency ventilation (CREV)
04 | system to be disconnected. This prevented the design flow of 500 CFM \pm 10-
05 | percent (T.S. 3.7.E.2.c) from being achieved. The CREV would supply control
06 | room air in an emergency situation involving contamination of normal plant ven-
07 | tilation. There was no effect on public health or safety. Redundant unit A was
08 | operable.

09 | S | G | 11 | E | 12 | X | 13 | V | A | L | V | E | X | 14 | L | 15 | G | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
17 | 8 | 3 | 21 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 24 | 0 | 3 | 27 | L | 30 | 0 | 32
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
18 | X | 19 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | L | 25 | X | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRO-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | Investigation showed that the nut that holds the control arm to the damper
11 | (FCO 31-152) had worked loose, causing the control arm to become disconnected.
12 | The control arm was reconnected and the nut tightened. This is considered an
13 | isolated occurrence and no recurrence control is required.

14 |
15 | H | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | NA | 30 | D | 31 | NRC Inspector Discovery | 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE
17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION
18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION
19 | Z | 42 | NA | 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION
20 | N | 44 | NA | 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
PUBLICATION ISSUED DESCRIPTION
21 | N | 44 | NA | 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARED B. R. McPherson

PHONE (205) 729-0834

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 83043 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.E

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2)* Date Due NRC 08/15/83

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was in a maintenance and refueling outage, unit 2 was at 2752 Mw(t) steady state, and unit 3 was at 3225 Mw(t) steady state. The senior resident NRC inspector found the control arm on damper FCO 31-152 on unit B of the control room emergency ventilation (CREV) system to be disconnected. The CREV system is common to units 1, 2, and 3. The control arm links the suction damper to its associated actuator and was disconnected at the damper end. This allowed the damper to remain partially closed and block the flow such that the required flowrate of 500 CFM \pm 10-percent (T.S. 3.7.E.2.c) could not be achieved. This placed the unit in a seven day Limiting Condition of Operation. The CREV system would supply control room air in an emergency situation involving contamination of normal plant ventilation.

Investigation showed that the nut that holds the control arm to the damper had worked loose. The control arm was reconnected to the damper, the nut tightened, and the CREV unit returned to an operation condition. This is considered an isolated event and no recurrence control is required.

There was no danger to the public health or safety. Redundant CREV Unit A was available and operable.

* Previous Similar Events:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: *JRP*

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

83 AUG 17 A8:07

August 12, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BPRO-50-259/83043

The enclosed report provides details concerning a control arm that had become disconnected from the flow control damper of the control room emergency ventilation system. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 1 Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



f H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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