



Northeast
Nuclear Energy

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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
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The Northeast Utilities System

Donald B. Miller Jr.,
Senior Vice President - Millstone

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)

December 2, 1994

MP-94-656

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65
Docket No. 50-336
Licensee Event Report 94-035-00

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 94-035-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Donald B. Miller, Jr.
Senior Vice President - Millstone Station

DBM/PS:ljs

Attachment: LER 94-035-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator
P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3
G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2

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9412060226 941202
PDR ADDOCK 05000336
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

*(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION
COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING
BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT
BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION
PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000336		PAGE (3) 1 OF 3		
TITLE (4) Failure to Post a Continuous Fire Watch														
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME		DOCKET NUMBER			
11	02	94	94	035	00	12	02	94	FACILITY NAME		DOCKET NUMBER			
											05000			
											05000			
OPERATING MODE (9)		6		THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10)		0		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)				
				20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(c)				
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER				
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)		X 50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)(B)						
				20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)														
NAME Philip J. Lutz, Nuclear Licensing										TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (203) 440-2072				
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)														
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On November 2, 1994, at approximately 0800, the plant was in Mode 6 and fuel offload was being performed. A discovery was made that the type of fire watch established for a breached electrical penetration did not satisfy the Technical Specification requirements. A roving fire watch was established when the requirement was for a continuous fire watch. Upon discovery, a continuous fire watch was established.

EXPIRES: 5/31/95

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	05000336	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	02 OF 03
		94	- 035 -	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. Description of Event

On November 2, 1994, at approximately 0800 with the plant in Mode 6, the discovery was made that the type of fire watch established for a breached electrical penetration between the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) area and the Blowdown Room did not satisfy the Technical Specification requirements. Technical Specification 3.7.10 "Penetration Fire Barriers" requires that "All fire rated assemblies . . . shall be OPERABLE." If inoperable, Operations is required to " . . . establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected fire rated assembly and/or penetration seal . . ." This requirement applies for any size breach for which there is no fire suppression or fire detection equipment on both sides of the wall. The areas involved are the Spent Fuel Pool and the Blowdown Room. Neither of these fire protection areas have fire suppression or fire detection equipment, therefore, a continuous fire watch was required upon receipt of the report of the questionable penetration on February 18, 1994.

The report was made to the Control Room by a maintenance mechanic who discovered a removed junction box cover during performance of the 18 month visual fire barrier surveillance. The junction box cover had been removed by an unknown person, the conduit curves upward into the wall above the junction box making a fire seal impossible to see from the floor. The mechanics have been instructed to report a "questionable penetration" until an evaluation can be made by Technical Support Engineering. The mechanic made the report to the Senior Control Operator (SCO) in addition to submitting his surveillance report for evaluation. The SCO notified the Fire Watch supervisor to add this penetration to the roving fire watch list. The SCO then logged into Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS) 3.7.10.a.1, believing the penetration had the proper suppression or detection equipment on both sides.

The mechanic sought and received a special AWO to remove the conduit cover from the conduit fitting on the SFP side of the wall to determine, if there was a fire seal installed there. There was none.

On February 25, 1994, based on the inspector's report and an engineering evaluation by the Fire Protection engineer, the disposition of the penetration required the installation of a fire seal. Since the fire watch had already been established on February 18, 1994, and repairs would be made, no further action was taken at this time.

On November 2, 1994, Operations established a continuous fire watch on the SFP side of the penetration and entered TSAS 3.7.10.a.2.

There were no automatic or manually initiated safety systems actuated as a result of the event.

II. Cause of Event

The root cause of this event was personnel error. The SCO who received the information that there was a questionable penetration between the Blowdown Room and the SFP entered TSAS 3.7.10.a.1. This was not the appropriate Action Statement for this condition. There are few vital rooms in the plant that do not possess suppression and detection equipment, but these two do not. The proper TSAS for this situation was 3.7.10.a.2.

III. Analysis of Event

This report is being submitted pursuant the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) "any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications."

There were minimal safety consequences for this event based on the limited fire hazard and small amount of safe shutdown related equipment in the effected rooms.

EXPIRES: 5/31/95

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	05000336	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	03 OF 03
		94	— 035 —	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)**IV.** Corrective Action

A continuous fire watch was established on November 2, 1994, in the SFP area. The penetration was repaired by installing a fire seal and closing the junction box. The TSAS was then exited.

The involved SCO has been counseled and other SS and SCOs have been reminded to use proper reference material for fire hazard issues. A Technical Specification Change Request is being processed to remove Fire Protection requirements from the Technical Specifications. When this change occurs, Technical Support Engineering will add a table of rooms that require continuous fire watches to the Technical Requirements Manual.

V. Additional Information

Similar LERs: 84-008-00 — This LER was similar in that it related to fire penetrations being inoperable, but it had different causes and corrective actions.

EIIS Codes: Fire Protection Penetration (no code)