

JUL 1 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director
Division of Licensing

FROM: Frank J. Miraglia, Assistant Director
for Safety Assessment,
Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS
MEETING ON JUNE 21, 1983

On June 21, 1983, an Operating Reactor Events meeting was held to brief the Office Director, the Division Directors and their representatives on events which occurred since our last meeting on June 7, 1983. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. In addition, the assignment of follow-up review responsibility was discussed. The assignments made during this meeting and the status of previous assignments are presented in Enclosure 3.

Original Signed By:

Frank J. Miraglia, Assistant Director
for Safety Assessment
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
As stated

cc w/enclosures:

H. Denton	H. Thompson
E. Case	F. Rowsome
R. Mattson	W. Minners
R. Vollmer	L. Shao
T. Speis	D. Collins
C. Michelson	K. Seyfrit
C. Heltemes	K. Wichman
T. Novak	Regional Administrators
F. Miraglia	G. Lainas

8307180123

XA

XA Copy Has Been Sent to PDR

OF	ORAB:DL	ORAB:DL	C:ORAB:DL	AD/SA:DL			
SUR	DPickett:dm	GHolahan	Tippolito	FMiraglia			
DATE	06/17/83	06/28/83	06/28/83	06/21/83			

OPERATING REACTORS EVENT BRIEFING

ATTENDANCE LIST

- | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. H. Denton | 22. D. Fieno |
| 2. E. Case | 23. D. Pickett |
| 3. T. Speis | 24. T. Speis |
| 4. E. Jordan | 25. J. Lyons |
| 5. F. Miraglia | 26. W. Lanning |
| 6. G. Lainas | 27. R. Clark |
| 7. D. Jaffe | 28. J. Rosenthal |
| 8. G. Lanik | 29. D. Ziemann |
| 9. F. Schroeder | 30. S. Schwartz |
| 10. G. Holahan | 31. A. Lakner (SS-1130) |
| 11. E. Goodwin, OPE | |
| . G. Rivenbark | |
| 13. I. Villalva | |
| 14. G. Hammer | |
| 15. D. Muller | |
| 16. D. Wheeler | |
| 17. K. Seyfrit | |
| 18. H. Brown | |
| 19. J. Knight | |
| 20. F. Cherny | |
| 21. C. Trammell | |

OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS BRIEFING

JUNE 21, 1983

UPDATED ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS BRIEFING

- o CALVERT CLIFFS, MAY 27, 1983 - INOPERABLE ECCS PUMP ROOM COOLERS (DAVE JAFFE)
 - BOTH ECCS PUMP ROOM COOLERS INOPERABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE
 - ROOM COOLERS PROTECT REDUNDANT TRAINS OF HPSI LPSI AND CONT. SPRAY
 - LICENSEE EVALUATING IMPORTANCE OF ROOM COOLERS
 - INTERIM MEASURE IS TO ENTER LOO ON ECCS WHEN ROOM COOLER BECOMES INOPERABLE
 - CALCULATIONS PERFORMED BY LICENSEE INDICATE THAT ECCS PUMP ROOM TEMPERATURES WOULD BE 174°F AND 152°F FOR POST-LOCA WITHOUT ROOM COOLERS. THE OPERABILITY OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND MAYBE THE LPSI/HPSI PUMPS IS IN DOUBT ABOVE 150°F.
- o AXIAL POWER PEAKING PROBLEMS IN OPERATING WESTINGHOUSE PLANTS - (DAN FIENO)
 - APPLICABLE WHEN PLANTS ARE OPERATING FOR EXTENDED PERIODS AT LOW POWER (LESS THAN 85%) WITH ALL CONTROL RODS WITHDRAWN
 - UPPER HALF OF CORE TENDS TO BURN AT HIGHER RATES. WHEN PLANTS ARE EVENTUALLY BROUGHT TO FULL POWER, OPERATION AT HIGHER THAN ANALYZED AXIAL PEAKING POWER LEVELS CAN OCCUR IN LOWER HALF OF CORE.
 - W TO DEVELOP AND SEND OPERATING PROCEDURES TO OPERATING PLANTS

NEW EVENTS

- o HATCH UNIT 1 - FAILURE OF SAFETY RELIEF VALVES TO OPEN ON DEMAND; JUNE 15, 1983 (GEORGE RIVENBARK)
 - UNIT 1 REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO LOSS OF VITAL AC BUS

- BUS LOST AS A RESULT OF UNIT 2 AC BUS CHECKOUT WHEN A WORKER OPENED UNIT 1 BATTERY CHARGER BREAKER BY MISTAKE
- LOSS OF EHC, TURBINE TRIP, REACTOR TRIP
- PRIMARY PRESSURE PEAKS AT 1145PSIG WHILE THREE OF ELEVEN SRVs FAIL TO OPEN (SETPOINT 1080 PSIG)

o YANKEE ROWE - LIGHTNING STRIKE PUTS PLANT IN NATURAL CIRCULATION MODE; JUNE 18, 1983 (JIM LYONS)

- WITH PLANT AT 100% POWER LIGHTNING STRIKE CAUSES LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER LINE ACCOMPANIED BY LOSS OF 1 RCP, 1 FW PUMP, BATTERY CHARGER, PROCESS AND VENT STACK RADIATION MONITORS AND NON-ESSENTIAL SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- LOSS OF FEEDWATER PUMP RESULTS IN PLANT TRIP DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL. TWO RCPs, WHICH WERE BEING OPERATED OFF OF STATION AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER, TRIP
- WITH THREE OF FOUR RCPs OUT OF SERVICE, SHIFT SUPERVISOR HAD REMAINING RCP TRIPPED, THUS PUTTING PLANT IN NATURAL CIRCULATION
- GENERIC PROCEDURE GUIDELINES DO NOT ADDRESS SINGLE RCP OPERATION

o NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 - EMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SHOLLY AMENDMENT (GARY HOLAHAN, CHARLES TRAMMELL)

- DIESEL GENERATOR 2J OUT OF SERVICE FOR 72 HOURS. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRE PLANT SHUTDOWN. LICENSEE REQUESTED FOUR DAY EXTENSION.
- NRC STAFF WILL NOT MAKE A "NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARD" CONSIDERATION WITHOUT COMPENSATING FACTORS FROM LICENSEE
- PREVIOUS DIESEL GENERATOR EMERGENCY T/S 1981-1982 CHANGES HAVE INVOLVED MULTI-UNIT SITES WITH SHARED DIESEL GENERATOR CAPABILITY

- NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 COULD NOT SHOW SIMILAR CAPABILITIES OR OFFER COMPENSATING FACTORS
 - SURRY UNITS 1 & 2 BOTH TRIPPED 6/21 DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE, DURING STORM
 - NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN 6/16, RETURNED TO POWER 6/20/83
 - GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF SHOLLY AMENDMENT ON T/S CHANGES (IMPLEMENTING SHOLLY)
 - GENERIC CONCERN OF PLANT SHUTDOWNS WITH INOPERABLE ESF SYSTEMS
- o LOW NEUTRON LEAKAGE FUEL AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION PROBLEMS (IGNACIO VILLALVA)
- RECENT REPEATED EVENTS AT OPERATING PLANTS

OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST

- o ARKANSAS UNIT 1 - PERSONNEL ERROR RESULTS IN FAILURE TO RESET AKZA REACTOR TRIP BREAKER
- PROCEDURES REWRITTEN FOR RESETTING BREAKERS
- o BIG ROCK POINT - 600 GALLONS OF LAKE MICHIGAN WATER INADVERTENTLY PUMPED INTO REACTOR VESSEL.
- PERSONNEL FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES ALLOWS CORE SPRAY VALVES TO OPEN WHILE RETURNING STATION BATTERIES TO SERVICE. PLANT IN COLD SHUTDOWN DURING EVENT.
- o PRAIRIE ISLAND UNIT 2 - PRIMARY LEAKAGE IN STEAM GENERATOR MANWAY LEAKAGE
- BOLTS NOT PROPERLY TORQUED AFTER NEW BOLT LUBRICANT APPLIED DURING RECENT REFUELING OUTAGE.

REACTOR TRIPS

- o 35 TRIPS BETWEEN JUNE 7, 1983 AND JUNE 20, 1983
 - REACTOR TRIPS CAUSED BY PERSONNEL ERRORS - 12
 - REACTOR TRIPS CAUSED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES - 19
 - MANUAL TRIPS - 4



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

MAR 12 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. Denton
J. Carter
D. Eisenhut
R. Purple
DL Assistant Directors
S. Hanauer
R. Vollmer
R. Mattson
H. Thompson
J. Sneizek
T. Ippolito
C. J. Heltemes, AEOD

THRU:

Robert A. Clark, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3, DL

FROM:

Christian C. Nelson, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #3, DL

SUBJECT:

DAILY HIGHLIGHT

MAINE YANKEE

During routine disassembly of a steam generator primary side manway, 6 of the studs failed. There are a total of 20 studs per manway cover. The studs had been exposed to boric acid from a small primary leak and to Furmanite sealing compound applied last autumn to seal this leak. Analysis of the failure mode is underway. Ultrasonic testing of all primary side manway studs has revealed crack indications in five additional studs from the affected manway and no other crack indications. Maine Yankee is a CE three loop design, rated at 2630 Mwt, currently shut down for scheduled maintenance. CE has been notified. IE has lead and no specific NRR assistance has been requested. A Task Interface Agreement is being developed.

Christian C. Nelson

Christian C. Nelson, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

8309220007

Nelson

DCS No: 50309-820310
Date: March 16, 1982

Kar 3/1

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-I-82-23a

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region I staff on this date.

Facility: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station
Wiscasset, Maine
(DN 50-309)

Licensee Emergency Classification:
☐ Notification of Unusual Event
☐ Alert
☐ Site Area Emergency
☐ General Emergency
☒ Not Applicable

Subject: STUD FAILURE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY-BOLTED CLOSURES (Update)

After replacing all studs on the No. 2 steam generator (SG) cold leg manway, a reactor coolant system leak test was performed. No leakage was detected from the manway. Licensee review of nondestructive examination (NDE) results determined that four studs, vice 5 as originally reported, were cracked.

During the leak test, a small leak was detected from the reactor vessel head seal. The licensee plans to remove the reactor vessel head to replace the two head seal O-rings. Reactor vessel head studs wetted by the leakage will be nondestructively examined. The current outage is expected to be extended ten days.

The State of Maine has been informed. No licensee press release is planned. NRC Region I will respond to media inquiries. This information is current as of 9:00 a.m., March 16, 1982.

8203230706

CONTACT: Gallo 488-1234

Brunner 488-1225

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				RI Resident Office	

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

3/22/82

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials	Date
1. DEisenhut	6. VBenaroya		
2. EJordan	7. RBosnak		
3. RVollmer	8. TNovak		
4. GLainas	9. RClark		
5. WHazelton	10. C Nelson		
Action	File	Note and Return	
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation	
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply	
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me	
Comment	Investigate	Signature	
Coordination	Justify		

REMARKS

RE: DEGRADED STEAM GENERATOR MANWAY STUDS

Attached for your information and use is the Combustion Engineering Advisory concerning the Degraded Steam Generator Manway Studs at Maine Yankee.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
<i>Thomas A. Ippolito</i> Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief, ORAB	
	Phone No. 27415

5041-102

GPO : 1981 O - 341-529 (109)

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

8309220009

AN ADVISORY CONCERNING A TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO THE APPLICATION OR OPERATION OF NUCLEAR PLANT EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY COMBUSTION ENGINEERING.

March 19, 1982

DEGRADED STEAM GENERATOR MANWAY STUDS

Introduction: On March 10, 1982, C-E was informed by Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company that several studs on one steam generator primary manway had been found broken. The failed studs were discovered while removing the manway in preparation for planned maintenance. Further inspection revealed five (5) broken studs and five (5) additional studs with cracks out of a total of twenty (20) studs on the affected manway. Leakage had been noted from this manway during the current cycle and several efforts were made to stem the leakage. This Infobulletin provides details currently known about this event.

Discussion: The steam generator primary manway flange consists of a retaining plate, Flexitallic gasket, and a manway cover fastened with twenty (20) equally spaced SA-540 Grade B24 studs. In-situ inspection of other Maine Yankee SG primary manway studs by UT tests indicates that the problem is restricted to the #2 SG cold leg manway.

Upon identification of the leaking manway cover, attempts to eliminate the leakage were made by increasing the normal operating compression of the joint through torquing the studs to hydrotest levels and later by injecting Furmanite sealant. Normal plant operation continued until the current planned maintenance outage. Technical specification leakage rates were not exceeded at any time. Inspection of the manway by plant personnel suggests that insufficient gasket crush during assembly may have contributed to the flange leakage.


Six studs, including two that had failed, have been received by C-E for metallographic and chemical examination. Initial results indicate the presence of molybdenum and sulfur in the lubricant on the stud threaded surface. The fracture surfaces show an intergranular failure mode with a large number of cracks perpendicular to the fracture plane, indicative of stress corrosion cracking. Further testing is in progress.

Status: Preliminary inspection of steam generator primary manway studs at Maine Yankee indicates that the degradation is limited only to the #2 SG cold leg manway. All twenty studs have been replaced.

Other events concerning manway stud degradation have been reported by the following plants:


<u>Plant</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Description</u>
St. Lucie-1	4/77	SG primary manway	13 of 20 studs showed surface attack due to boric acid corrosion. Deepest indication 1/16 inch.
St. Lucie-1	1/78	Pressurizer manway	5 of 20 studs showed surface attack due to boric acid corrosion. Deepest indication 1/8 inch.
Arkansas-1*	3/78	SG primary manway	2 studs sheared off during re-installation. Metallurgical exams proved inconclusive.
Arkansas-2	10/79	SG primary manway	Misalignment of gasket and retainer plate caused leakage. 3 studs found with unacceptable corrosion.
Oconee-3*	6/80	SG primary manway	12 studs found cracked due to stress corrosion/hydrogen embrittlement.
Arkansas-1*	7/80	SG primary manway	3 studs found cracked due to stress corrosion/hydrogen embrittlement.

* Non-CE NSSS plants.



Recommendation: Leakage through primary system bolted closures should be corrected as soon as practicable. Caution should be exercised to assure that closure studs and fasteners are not subjected to chemical contaminants such as halogens or sulfur bearing compounds. Planned maintenance activities should include cleaning of studs, fasteners and stud holes with stainless steel wire brushes and alcohol or acetone solvents. Consideration should be given to non-destructive examination of studs using methods such as magnetic particle or ultrasonic testing when chemical contaminants or leakage have been present. C-E recommends that graphite and mineral oil (50/50 mixture) be used as a lubricant for SG primary manway studs. Stud torque limitations as specified in the steam generator instruction manuals should be observed. C-E will provide additional information regarding procedures to improve manway joint closure integrity in a later publication.

Applicability: This Infobulletin is applicable to all plants with a C-E designed NSSS.





UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
831 PARK AVENUE
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

12414
243

19 MAR 1982

Docket No. 50-309
CAL 82-12

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
ATTN: Mr. J. P. Randazza
Vice President
83 Edison Drive
Augusta, Maine 04336

Gentlemen:

Subject: Confirmatory Action Letter 82-12

This refers to the telephone conversation between you and Mr. R. W. Starostecki of this office, on March 19, 1982, regarding the stud failures on No. 2 Steam Generator cold leg manway identified on March 10, 1982. During disassembly 6 of 20 studs failed and an additional 4 studs showed cracks during subsequent ultrasonic examinations. We understand that all remaining studs for the No. 2 Steam Generator hot and cold leg manways have been examined by ultrasonic and magnetic particle testing techniques and no additional cracking was identified.

With regard to the matters discussed, we understand that you will take the following actions prior to reactor startup:

1. Hardness test all studs removed from No. 2 steam generator cold leg manway to determine if there is a hardness-failure correlation.
2. Remove the No. 1 and No. 3 steam generator primary manway covers checking retainer plate, gasket fit and gasket compression.
3. Prior to removal of steam generator manway covers measure cover flange clearance and note stud location in flange cover.
4. Identify each No. 1 and No. 3 steam generator manway cover stud with an individual number visible when installed.
5. Inspect all No. 1 and No. 3 steam generator primary manway studs using ultrasonic, magnetic particle and hardness testing.
6. Remove residual lubricant from studs and stud holes prior to reassembly. Apply only thread lubricant approved for use at normal operating temperature.


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19 MAR 1982

7. Replace manways using studs of alternating hardness properties if hardness-failure correlation is evident.
8. After manway installation is complete again check manway cover gap clearance to assure appropriate gasket seating.

If our understanding of your planned actions as described above is not in accordance with the actual plans and actions being implemented, please contact this office immediately.

Sincerely,


Ronald C. Haynes
Ronald C. Haynes
Regional Administrator

cc:

E. Wood, Plant Manager
E. W. Thurlow, President
R. H. Groce, Senior Engineer, Licensing
J. A. Ritsher, Esquire
Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
State of Maine
NRC Resident Inspector

bcc:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
E. Jordan, IE
R. Clark, ORB3-NRR
R. Carlson
D. Eisenhower, DL-NRR

C Nelson

MAR 22 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director
Division of Licensing

FROM: G.C. Lainas, Assistant Director
for Safety Assessment
Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS MEETING
ON MARCH 17, 1982

On March 17, 1982, an Operating Reactor Event meeting was held to brief the Office Director, the Division Directors, and their representatives on events which occurred since the last meeting. The list of meeting attendees is included as Attachment 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Attachment 2. In addition to these events, the assignment of follow-up review responsibility was discussed. The assignments made during this meeting and the status of previous assignments are presented in Attachment 3.

The next Operating Reactor Events meeting is scheduled for March 24, 1982.

G.C. Lainas

G.C. Lainas, Assistant Director
for Safety Assessment
Division of Licensing

Attachments:
As stated

cc w/attachments:
Meeting Attendees
ORAB Members

H. Denton	T. Novak
E. Case	G. Lainas
R. Mattson	R. Tedesco
R. Vollmer	T. Ippolito
S. Hanauer	G. Holahan
T. Murley	H. Thompson
C. Michelson	M. Ernst
C. Heltemes	W. Minners

8310260066

OFFICE	DL:ORAB	DL:ORAB/SL	DL:ORAB	DL:AD/SA			
SURNAME	RFrahm:sh	GHolahan:sh	Tippot:co	GLainas			
DATE	3/17/82	3/19/82	3/21/82	3/22/82			

MEETING ATTENDEES

H. Denton
E. Case
L. Rubenstein
C. Nelson
T. Speis
E. Brown
D. Zukor
M. Chiramal
E. Adensam
A. Pattou
C. Stahle
G. Meyer
M. Williams
A. Dromerick
E. Goodwin
T. Novak
R. Vollmer
R. Birkel
T. Ippolito
J. Kramer
S. Hanauer
P. Polk
G. Laines
R. Frahm

OPERATING REACTORS EVENT BRIEFING

MARCH 17, 1982

- MCGUIRE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE DEGRADATION, MARCH 8, 1982 (PBIRKEL)
 - EDDY CURRENT TEST SHOW 4 TUBES WITH 20% WALL DEGRADATION IN ONE OF FOUR STEAM GENERATORS
 - W NOTIFICATION FOR SIMILAR STEAM GENERATOR AT RINGHALS WITH 100 TUBES LEAKING IN EACH GENERATOR. RECOMMENDS LOWER FEED FLOW.
 - PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED AT NOVEMBER 12, 1981 EVENTS BRIEFING
- SEQUOYAH UNITS 1 & 2 - TRIP OF BOTH UNITS FOR A SINGLE EVENT, MARCH 11, 1982 (IE)
 - LOSS OF FEED WATER FLOW DUE TO ISOLATION OF FULL FLOW DEMINERALIZERS
 - A BLOWN FUSE IN THE CONDENSATE DEMINERALIZER CONTROL CIRCUIT CAUSED LOSS OF DEMINERALIZER IN BOTH UNITS
- MAINE YANKEE - STEAM GENERATOR PRIMARY SIDE MANWAY STUDS FAILURE, MARCH 11, 1982 (CNELSON)
 - FOUR 1-1/2 x 10 INCH STUDS FAILED DURING ROUTINE DISASSEMBLY
 - STUDS EXPOSED TO BORIC ACID FROM A SMALL PRIMARY LEAK
 - TIA FOLLOW UP IN PROGRESS
- FITZPATRICK - HPCI STEAM LINE ISOLATION SET POINT PROBLEM (UPDATE) MARCH 15, 1982 (ORAB)
 - PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED AT MARCH 3, 1982 EVENTS BRIEFING
 - NUMEROUS SPURIOUS ISOLATIONS
 - NUREG-0737 ITEM II.K.3.15 - FIX (TIME DELAY OR ORIFICE)
 - INFORMATION NOTICE IN PROGRESS

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Items of Interest

March 8, 1982 - March 12, 1982

1. There were no Significant Enforcement Actions imposed during the past week.
2. The following Preliminary Notifications were dispatched during the week:
 - a. PNO-II-82-24c, Duke Power Company (Oconee Unit 2) - Makeup Line Thermal Cracking.
 - b. PNO-II-82-26, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (Erwin) - Reported Inventory Difference.
 - c. PNO-II-82-27, Duke Power Company (Oconee Unit 1) - Outage Greater Than Two Days.
 - d. PNO-II-82-28, Duke Power Company (Oconee Unit 3) - Emergency Drill Exercise.
 - e. PNO-IV-82-08, Public Service Company of Colorado (Fort St. Vrain) - Contamination of Two Plant Workers.
 - f. PNO-IV-82-09, Arkansas Power and Light Company (Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2) - Reactor Trip With Safety Injection System Activation.

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
ITEMS OF INTEREST

March 1, 1982 - March 5, 1982

1. There were no Significant Enforcement Actions imposed during the past week.
2. Preliminary Notifications relating to the following actions were dispatched during the week:
 - a. PNO-I-82-22, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Unit 1) - Potentially Generic Failure Mode of General Electric Type HFA Relays.
 - b. PNO-II-82-22, Potomac Hospital Corporation (Potomac Memorial Hospital) - Possible Theft of MO99/TC-99M Spent Generators From Interstate Commerce.
 - c. PNO-II-82-23, Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah Unit 1) - Shutdown of More Than Two Days.
 - d. PNO-II-82-24, 24A, and 24B Duke Power Company (Oconee Unit 3) - Extended Outage.
 - e. PNO-II-82-25, Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Units A1 and A2, and Yellow Creek Unit 1) - Deferral of TVA Units.
 - f. PNO-III-82-25A and 25B, Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Unit 1) - Hinge Fragments Found in Two Steam Generators, Updates.
 - g. PNO-IV-82-07, Cleveland X-Ray Inspection, Inc. - Building Containing Radioactive Devices Destroyed in Fire.
 - h. PNO-V-82-11, Exxon Nuclear Company - Uranium Hexafluoride Gas Release.
 - i. PNO-TMI-82-04; GPU Nuclear Corporation (Three Mile Island Unit 2) - Reactor Building Basement Water Transfer.