



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

January 20, 1984


Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-068/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-068/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,


J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

JR:k11 *JSJ*

CC: Distribution

The Energy People

Report Number: 83-068/03L
Report Date: 01-20-84
Occurrence Date: 12-24-83
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Fire Suppression Water Systems - No. 1 Diesel Fire Suppression Pump - Inoperable

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-246

This report documents an occurrence involving the inoperability of one of the diesel fire suppression pumps. The fire suppression water systems are common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2; consequently, both units were affected by the event. This report is being submitted under Unit 1 Docket Number 50-272 in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory requirements.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 1 - Mode 1 - Rx Power 99 % - Unit Load 1130 MWe
Unit 2 - Mode 5 - Rx Power 00 % - Unit Load 0000 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1430 hours, December 24, 1983, a fire alarm for the Turbine Building, 120' Elevation, was received in the control room. The alarm was accompanied by the starting of No. 1 Diesel Fire Pump. The alarm was caused by a slow depressurization of that header, due to one of the leaks caused by the freezing temperatures (those occurrences were documented in LERs 83-066/01P and 83-069/03L). An equipment operator was dispatched to secure the pump. Upon arriving at the pump house, he observed steam issuing from the diesel cooling water expansion tank; jacket water temperature was greater than 200 degrees. The engine was secured, and the pump placed in lockout to prevent operation. No. 1 Diesel Fire Suppression Pump was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.1.a. was entered at 1450 hours. No. 2 Diesel Fire Suppression Pump remained in an operable status.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The ventilation damper (located by No. 1 Fire Suppression Pump), which supplies air in-take for the diesel engine, was open. It apparently did not close upon securing the pump after the previous run. The sub-zero temperatures had frozen the diesel cooling water lines.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The fire suppression system consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinklers, CO₂, and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program. In the event the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measure must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant.

Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.1.a. states:

With one pump and/or one water supply inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to operable status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the plans and procedures to be used to provide for the loss of redundancy in this system.

The redundant fire suppression water pump and fire suppression systems remained operable throughout the occurrence. No. 1 fire suppression water pump was restored to an operable status within the time specified by the action requirement. The occurrence involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public. Due to the loss of redundancy, the event is reportable in accordance with 6.9.1.9.b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The damper was exercised and closed, and the cooling lines were thawed. No. 1 Diesel Fire Suppression Pump was tested. The cooling system operated satisfactorily. Routine pump surveillance was performed, and No. 1 Fire Suppression Pump was declared operable. The ventilation damper operated properly upon securing the diesel. Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.1.a. was terminated at 0124 hours, December 25, 1983.


Inclusion of periodic testing of the ventilation dampers into the fire protection surveillance testing program is under review, and appropriate action will be taken upon completion.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By J. Rupp

SORC Meeting No. 84-007


General Manager -
Salem Operations