

LER 83-012/03L-0
EVENT DATE - March 29, 1983

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1111 hours on March 29, 1983, the Air Intake Tunnel (AIT) Halon System was declared inoperable as a result of the following event:

On March 3, 1983, there was an inadvertent actuation of one of the four zones of the AIT Halon System (see LER 83-09). The halon bottles in this zone were returned to the vendor for recharging, and were reinstalled on March 18, 1983. Maintenance crews recorded the bottle pressure for each bottle as it was installed. The pressure of one of the six bottles, EI-4C, was below the chart provided in Surveillance Procedure 4331-SA1; therefore, by procedure, the plant maintenance contacted plant engineering and requested a calculation of the pressure limit for the bottle EI-4C. Prior to the completion of the calculation, the AIT Halon System was prematurely returned to service. When the calculation was performed on March 29, 1983, it was determined that the bottle pressure for EI-4C was below the limit defined in Technical Specification 3.7.10.3. The AIT Halon System was then declared inoperable.

On March 30, 1983, the Maintenance crew repressurized bottle EI-4C to an acceptable level. The AIT Halon System was then returned to operable status, thus complying with the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10.3.

This event is considered reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10.3.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of this event was due to a breakdown in communications. As mentioned previously, on March 18, 1983, plant maintenance requested from plant engineering a calculation for the pressure limit for the bottle EI-4C. The calculation wasn't performed until March 29, 1983. Since maintenance was not informed of the results of the calculation, the AIT Halon System was prematurely returned to service on March 18, 1983, based on an assumption that the bottle pressure for EI-4C was acceptable.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Short Term

The maintenance crew repressurized bottle EI-4C to an acceptable level.

Long Term

Appropriate plant maintenance and plant engineering personnel were counseled regarding the circumstance and cause of this event; and specifically regarding 1) the importance of completing calculations for pressure limits in a timely manner, and 2) verifying the results of the pressure limit calculations before returning the AIT Halon System to service. Additionally, before the next planned maintenance on the halon bottles scheduled for September 1983, the acceptance criteria temperature/pressure scale of 4331-SA1 will be extended to 100⁰F.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A