NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	LICENSEE CODE: V A S P S 1 (2)	LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4)	CAT (5)

CON'T 0 1 — REPORT SOURCE: L (6) DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 (7) EVENT DATE: 1 1 2 3 8 2 (8) REPORT DATE: 1 2 1 7 8 2 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On November 23, 1982, with unit No. 1 at 100% power, PT-27 revealed that the amp
0 3 reading for heat tracing Panel 9, circuits 7A was below the acceptance criteria
0 4 stipulated in the PT. Also on November 26, 1982, PT-27 revealed a low amp reading
0 5 for heat tracing Panel 8, circuit 2B. These events are contrary to T.S.3.2.C.5
0 6 and are reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). The redundant heat tracing circuits were
0 7 operable, therefore, the health and safety of the public would not have been
0 8 affected.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	S H (11)	E (12)	Y (13)	H E A T E R (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 2	—	1 0 5	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
C (18)	F (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	L (25)	T 1 8 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The loss of heat tracing was due to excessive heat. The defective heat tracing
1 1 was replaced and tested. A design change has been initiated to change the manner
1 2 by which these borated lines are heat traced and implementation of the design
1 3 change has commenced.
1 4

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	N/A	B (31)	Periodic Test

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0 (40)	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	N/A

8212280140 821217
PDR ADOCK 05000280
S PDR

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N (44)	N/A	

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson PHONE (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 82-105/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 11-23-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: HEAT TRACING FAILURE

1. Description of the Event

On November 23, 1982, with Unit No. 1 at 100% power, PT-27 revealed that the amp reading for heat tracing Panel 9, circuit 7A (#1 filter outlet to blender) was below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the PT. Also, on November 26, PT-27 revealed that the amp reading for heat tracing panel 8, circuit 2B (boric acid transfer pumps suction header) was below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the P.T. These events are contrary to Technical Specification 3.2.C.5 and are reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The heat tracing circuits are intended to maintain a fluid temperature above that needed for flow. The redundant heat tracing circuits were operable, therefore, the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

3. Cause

The loss of heat tracing was due to excessive heat.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action was to verify that the redundant circuits were operable.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The defective heat tracing was replaced and tested within the time span specified by Technical Specifications.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No additional actions were deemed necessary.

7. Generic Implications

A task force has reviewed the total spectrum of the Heat Tracing System and a Design Change has been prepared as a result of the Task Force study. Implementation of the design change has commenced.