

DUKE POWER COMPANY

P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

November 2, 1983

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

83 NOV 7 4 9: 24

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-269, -270, and -287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached a Special 5-Day Report concerning the loss of power on both standby buses with Keowee Unit 1 out of service. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.7.9 and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

H. B. Tucker / BT

Hal B. Tucker

JCP/php

Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. J. C. Bryant
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

Mr. John F. Suermann
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

8311090294 831102
PDR ADOCK 05000269
S PDR

OFFICIAL COPY

TE 22
11

Duke Power Company
Oconee Nuclear Station
Special Report

Lee Steam Station Gas Turbine Tripped
Deenergizing Both Standby Buses
While Keowee Unit 1 Was Out of Service

On October 28, 1983 with Keowee Unit 1 out of service for planned maintenance and Keowee Unit 2 available (returned to service September 25, 1983 at 0355 hours), Lee "6C" Gas Turbine was being used to energize both Oconee 4160V Standby Buses as required by Technical Specification 3.7.4. Lee "6C" tripped off line at 1750 hours on October 28, 1983 thereby deenergizing both standby buses and placing the two operating Oconee units in a degraded mode beyond that allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.4.a. This incident is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.9.

A safety evaluation was performed pursuant to Technical Specification 3.7.9 and the decision was made that continued operation of the units was allowed since power from a Lee gas turbine would be regained in a short period of time. Lee "5C" Gas Turbine was placed on line to the system grid at 1801 hours and Lee "6C" Gas Turbine was restarted and reenergized the standby buses at 1809 hours on October 28, 1983. The total time the standby buses were unavailable was 19 minutes.

The exact cause of the Lee "6C" gas turbine trip cannot be determined at this time. When the trip occurred, an operator was dispatched to the turbine panel to note specific alarms. The five alarms noted were:

- 1) 4500 KVA Main Transformer Trip
- 2) Turbine Overspeed Trip
- 3) Combustion out-of-fire or Recorder off
- 4) Low Lube Oil Pressure
- 5) Loss of AC voltage

Lee Steam Station does not have an event recorder so the order of the alarms could not be determined. No other alarms or protective relay targets were noted. Therefore, this incident is not similar to the September 22, 1983 trip but is similar to the September 29, 1983, and October 26, 1983 incidents (reference the September 27, October 4, and October 31, 1983 H. B. Tucker Special 5-Day Reports).

Since the operating unit supplies its own auxiliaries, any trip would cause a loss of AC voltage which in turn would cause the other four alarms to annunciate. Each alarm was investigated to determine if it could have initiated the trip. The 4500 KVA Main Transformer was checked for problems and none were noted. The turbine overspeed trip mechanism was found to be still set thereby eliminating the possibility of an overspeed trip. However, if the turbine pressure switch failed or malfunctioned, a turbine overspeed trip alarm would annunciate and trip the turbine. The pressure switch was checked and found to be operative.

The combustion out-of-fire and recorder off alarm is a dual alarm. If any of the twelve combustors fail to ignite the unit will trip and cause the alarm. The recorder signal was still blocked as a result of the September 29, 1983 trip so a malfunction or loss of power could not trip the unit. The lube oil pressure to the turbine, the pump, and the supply system appeared good when checked; however, a spurious actuation of the pressure switch could have caused the alarm and trip. Since all five alarms can be explained and the order of the alarms cannot be determined, the direct cause of the trip cannot be determined. An investigation is still underway to determine the cause and the results will be supplied in supplemental correspondence when available.

At the time of the incident, both the Lee "4C" and "5C" gas turbines were available, and the Lee "5C" was immediately placed in startup mode. Lee "5C" became ready for start prior to Lee "6C"; however, it was decided to place Lee "5C" on line to the system grid as a backup so that Lee "6C" could be placed on line to Oconee's 4160 Standby Buses.

While one Keowee unit was out-of-service and the standby buses were not energized by Lee, power was always available from Keowee Unit 2 via the underground feeder circuit required by Technical Specification 3.7.4. Also available was the normal Duke Power Company transmission system to the 230 KV switchyard via at least two 230 KV transmission lines on separate towers as required by Technical Specification 3.7.1.

During this incident both the Lee "4C" and Lee "5C" Gas Turbines were available and could have energized the Standby Buses within one hour. The probability of losing offsite power during this event is very small; therefore, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.