Washington Public Power Supply System
Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 (206) 482-4428

Docket No. 50-508

August 1, 1983
G03-83-612

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 260
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. D. M. Sternberg, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch No. 1

Subject: POTENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIENCY
MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PENETRATION ANCHORS
(D/N NO. NY-QA-5)

Reference: a) Letter, G03-83-466, R. S. Leddick to D. M. Sternberg, same subject, dated June 9, 1983.

Reference a) transmitted an Interim Report concerning the subject condition. In order to determine the safety significance of this incident, additional analyses must be performed. Attached is a Supply System Interim Report describing the progress of the analyses.

It is anticipated that a final report will be provided to your office by September 15, 1983. Should you have any questions or desire further information, please contact me directly.

D. E. Dobson (760)
Acting Program Director, WNP-3/5

JAV:nj

Attachment

cc: J. Adams - NESCO
D. Smithpeter - BPA
Ebasco - New York
WNP-3 Files - Richland
R. D. Hill - Puget Sound Power & Light Company
P. Inman - Washington Water Power Company
B. D. Withers - Portland General Electric Company
L. D. Weislogel - Pacific Power & Light Company

1/1 IE-27

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 3
(DOCKET NO. 50-508)

POTENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIENCY
INTERIM REPORT

MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PENETRATION
ANCHORS (D/N NO. NY-QA-5)

Description of Deficiency

The stress analyses of the Main Steam and Feedwater lines include an anchor point at the outboard end of the containment penetrations. It is assumed, per Ebasco practice, that the anchoring structure provides a gap (between the flued head trunnion and structural element) of 1/16 inch (maximum). However, during investigation of an as-built discrepancy, it was found that 1/4 inch gaps were provided as specified on two Ebasco drawings. Further investigation disclosed that the Ebasco Civil Group had provided the 1/4 inch gap in order to facilitate installation, but had not obtained approval for this gap magnitude from the Stress Analysis Group. These larger gaps are considered a potential problem because the additional clearances in the anchoring structure may allow stresses in the affected piping to exceed allowable levels.

Corrective Actions

The following actions have been/are being taken to resolve the problem:

1) The Engineer has conducted pipe rupture analysis to determine that all criteria are met with the 1/4 inch gaps at the anchor lugs and seismic analyses to show compliance with the pipe stress criteria.

2) The results of the pipe rupture analyses, as reported by the Engineer, indicate that all criteria will be met with the 1/4 inch gap at the anchor lugs.

3) The results of the seismic analyses, as reported by the Engineer, show compliance with the pipe stress criteria with the exception of a support failure. Additional analysis omitting this support is being performed to show that such a failure will not prevent compliance with pipe stress criteria.

4) Upon receipt of the final report, the Supply System will review the actual results of the analyses and evaluate the Engineer's final report.

Reason Why The Final Report Will Be Delayed

In order to determine safety significance, additional analyses must be performed. Further time is required for their completion and evaluation. It is anticipated that a final report will be provided by September 15, 1983.