

EXPIRES 4-30-82

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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REPORT
SOURCE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

2

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

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NAME OF PREPARER

C. J. McKinney

PHONE (803) 345-5209

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
LER No. 83-071
Page Two
July 26, 1983

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

At 0710 hours on June 26, 1983, with the Plant in Mode 1, Operations personnel observed that Auxiliary Building Smoke Detector Zone HH was in an alarm state. The discovery was made during an alarm summary review of the Integrated Fire and Security System (IF&S). An hourly fire watch patrol was established at 0730 hours in accordance with Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7.

The alarm was initially received and acknowledged at 1307 hours on June 24, 1983, when a smoke detector was activated by welding in the area. No additional action was initiated at this time since the cause of the alarm was known and a fire watch was already in the area as required by the welding program. Upon completion of the welding activity, the alarm was not reset and Zone HH remained incapable of detecting a potential fire until the zone was reset on June 26, 1983, at 0815 hours.

There were no adverse consequences resulting from the inoperable smoke detector zone. There is a high degree of confidence that a fire in the area would have been detected by fire detection instrumentation in the adjacent rooms or by the plant operator who routinely inspects the area at least once per eight (8) hours.

CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The cause of the inoperable status of Zone HH from June 24 to 26, 1983, is attributed to personnel error. Operations personnel failed to reset the zone upon completion of the welding activity. Upon recognition of the alarm, personnel were directed to reset the zone and perform a fire watch patrol. A fire watch patrol of the area was made at 0730 hours; the zone was then reset and returned to operable status by 0815 hours.

To prevent a future recurrence, and as corrective action, the licensee will revise Station Administrative Procedure (SAP-200), "Conduct of Operations," to include an alarm summary review of the IF&S at least once per eight (8) hours as a part of the shift turnover. This revision is expected to be complete by September 30, 1983.

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

July 26, 1983

83 JUL 29 A9:23

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Thirty Day Written Report
LER 83-071

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #83-071 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, "Fire Detection Instrumentation," on June 26, 1983.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:GWD/mac/fjc
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer
E. H. Crews, Jr.
T. C. Nichols, Jr.,/O. W. Dixon, Jr.
E. C. Roberts
H. N. Cyrus
Group/General Managers
O. S. Bradham
R. B. Clary
C. A. Price
A. R. Koon
D. A. Lavigne

C. L. Ligon (NSRC)
G. J. Braddick
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