

NRC FORM 366  
(12-81)U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTAPPROVED BY OMR  
3150-0011  
EXPIRES 4-30-82CONTROL BLOCK: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)01 SIC VICS 12000-000000-000341000045  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100CON'T  
01 REPORT SOURCE L 05000395705068380712839  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 At 2100 hours on May 6, 1983, electrical power was lost to Train "B" of the  
03 Radiation Monitoring System (RMS). The Plant was in Mode 5 at the time of the  
04 occurrence, and there were no releases in progress. The Control Room Supply Air  
05 Atmospheric Radiation Monitor (RM-A1) was the only affected monitor required to  
06 be operable at this time. There were no adverse consequences resulting from this  
07 event. Power was restored by 2130 hours on May 6, 1983.

09 SYSTEM CODE BA 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 COMPONENT CODE ELE C Q N 14 COMP. SUBCODE Z 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16  
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 83 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
18 ACTION TAKEN A 19 FUTURE ACTION F 20 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 21 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 22 HOURS 0000 23 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 24 NPED-4 FORM SUB. N 25 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 26 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER N305

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The main power supply fuse was blown when the extender module was installed for a  
11 calibration on RM-A2. The extender module had a short to ground on power lead at  
12 the plug assembly. Power was returned to the train when the fuse was replaced.  
13 The RMS will have additional fuse protection added to prevent a single fault from  
14 de-energizing a train.

15 FACILITY STATUS G 28 % POWER 000 29 OTHER STATUS N/A 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Maintenance Observation

16 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A 36

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 000 37 Z 38 DESCRIPTION N/A 39

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 000 40 DESCRIPTION N/A 41

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION N/A 43

20 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION N 44 8307220252 830712 PDR ADOCK 05000395 S PDR

NAME OF PREPARER

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O. W. DIXON, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

83 JUL 18 AM 11:39

July 12, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, N.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Operating License No. NPF-12  
Thirty Day Written Report  
LER 83-039, Revision 1

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Revision 1 of Licensee Event Report #83-039 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report was previously submitted on June 1, 1983, in compliance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement 29 of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, "Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation," on May 6, 1983. This revision corrects a typographical error on Item 17 of the Licensee Event Report form.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,

  
O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:OWD/mac  
Attachment

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1/1

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
LER No. 83-039, Revision 1  
Page Two  
July 12, 1983

#### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

At 2100 hours on May 6, 1983, the electrical power supply was lost for Train "B" of the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS). The event occurred during the performance of a Channel Calibration of Reactor Building Sample Line Atmospheric Monitor RM-A2. The Instrumentation and Control Technician performing the calibration had removed the ratemeter and was installing an extender module when a short circuit to ground occurred.

The Plant was in Mode 5 at the time of occurrence, and there were no releases in progress. Control Room Supply Air Atmospheric Radiation Monitor RM-A1 was the only affected monitor required to be operable, and Action Statement 29 of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 applied.

There were no adverse consequences resulting from this event. Power was restored to Train "B" of the RMS by 2130 hours on May 6, 1983.

#### CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The loss of power is attributed to a grounded internal power lead in the extender module used during calibration of the radiation monitors. One of the internal wires of the test fixture which is not used had come in contact with the power lead at the plug assembly. The extra wires in the fixture have been removed to preclude a recurrence of this event. The grounded lead caused the main power supply fuse for the train to blow.

The main power supply fuse was replaced and Train "B" of the RMS returned to operable status by 2130 hours upon completion of a satisfactory Source Check of each monitor.

A modification to the Radiation Monitoring System is being processed for the redesign of the power supply protection circuitry. The modification will provide fuse protection, as required, to prevent a single fault from de-energizing either train of the RMS. The modification is expected to be complete by September 1, 1983.