NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
01	Licensee Code (2)	N J O C P 1
01	License Number (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
01	License Type (4)	4 1 1 1 1
01	Cat (5)	
CON'T 01	Report Source (6)	L
01	Docket Number (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9
01	Event Date (8)	0 3 3 1 8 3
01	Report Date (9)	0 7 0 7 8 3

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On March 31, 1983, during preventive maintenance of the
03 CRD Feed Pump NC08A circuit breaker, it was mechanically
04 closed per procedure. Investigation revealed that it should not
05 have closed since the UV device was de-energized and not gagged to
06 permit breaker closure. This condition would have prevented the UV device
07 from tripping the breaker during load shedding and restart sequence on
08 loss of power. Reportable per Tech. Spec., Paragraph 6.9.2.b.l.

09	System Code (11)	Cause Code (12)	Cause Subcode (13)	Component Code (14)	Comp Subcode (15)	Valve Subcode (16)
	R B	X	Z	C K T B R K	F	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

Event Year		Sequential Report No.		Occurrence Code	Report Type		Revision No.
8 3	—	0 0 4	/	0 3	L	—	0

Action Taken (18)	Future Action (19)	Effect on Plant (20)	Shutdown Method (21)	Hours (22)	Attachment Submitted (23)	NPRD-4 Form Sub. (24)	Prime Comp. Supplier (25)	Component Manufacturer (26)
B	Z	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	N	L	G 0 8 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause is attributed to component failure due to binding of the
11 trip shaft which limited its movement. This condition was due
12 to insufficient and dirty lubrication on the trip shaft bearings.
13 Corrective Action was to clean and lubricate the bearings. Preventive
14 maintenance procedure was also revised.

15	Facility Status (28)	% Power (29)	Other Status (30)	Method of Discovery (31)	Discovery Description (32)
	H	0 0 0	NA	B	Preventive Maintenance Review

16	Activity Released (33)	Content of Release (34)	Amount of Activity (35)	Location of Release (36)
	Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

17	Number (37)	Type (38)	Description (39)
	0 0 0		NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

18	Number (40)	Description (41)
	0 0 0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

19	Type (42)	Description
	Z	NA

PUBLICITY

20	Issued (44)	Description (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N	NA	

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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

July 7, 1983

Regional Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-04/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-04/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

We realize this event was not reported within the 30 day time frame specified in Technical Specifications. The occurrence was not initially recognized as being a reportable event by the personnel performing the preventative maintenance. During a subsequent supervisory review of the preventative maintenance check sheets and recognition that the occurrence was reportable, actions were initiated to prepare this LER.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:jal
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey, 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-04/03L

Report Date

July 7, 1983

Occurrence Date

March 31, 1983

Identification of Occurrence

Failure of the CRD Feed Pump NC08A circuit breaker to operate as designed prevented the associated sequence timer from operating within the time frame listed in Table 3.1.1 (item M-2). This constitutes a violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.1.A.3.

This event is considered to be a Reportable Occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The reactor was shutdown with the mode switch in the refuel position. The vessel is in a defueled condition.

Reactor Coolant Temperature was 69°F.

Description of Occurrence

On March 31, 1983, while performing a preventive maintenance bench test, CRD Feed Pump NC08A circuit breaker was mechanically closed with a hand crank. Investigation revealed that with the undervoltage (UV) device de-energized the trip shaft mechanism should have been in a position to prevent breaker closure; however, inspection of the breaker mechanism indicated that the trip shaft was binding. This prevented free shaft movement and thus permitted breaker closure contrary to the intended design.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence is attributed to binding and friction of the trip shaft bearings which prevented free movement of the trip shaft. A torque check on the shaft measured 32 inch-ounces which exceeds the 24 inch-ounce maximum recommended by manufacturer. This condition was due to oxidized lubricant in the bearings causing inability of the UV device to prevent breaker closure with the breaker de-energized.

Analysis of Occurrence

The CRD Feed Pump NC08A supplies high pressure water to the CRD Hydraulic System. The pump also supplies water to the vessel head spray system during shutdown.

Failure of the circuit breaker to operate as designed may have affected its function to trip the breaker in the event of a postulated loss of offsite power scenario. This would also affect the diesel load sequence in which high horsepower motors are sequentially re-started to prevent overloading the emergency diesel generators. If CRD Feed Pump NC08A was inoperable due to diesel generator overload, the redundant CRD Feed Pump NC08B was available for operation. However, it has been demonstrated, by past experience and diesel cabability curves, that the diesel generators have the ability to pick up approximately rated dead load and would not be affected by starting with some of the high horsepower motor breakers closed.

Given the anticipated ability of the diesel generators to start and feed the bus, as well as the fact that the redundant CRD Feed Pump was operable, if needed, the safety significance of this occurrence is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to clean and lubricate the trip shaft bearings and to perform complete PM on the breaker. The trip shaft torque was measured at 20 inch-ounces after PM completion. The breaker was satisfactorily tested three (3) times before being returned to service on April 4, 1983. The UV device was functionally tested by removing the fuse and verifying that the breaker tripped after 5.5 seconds.

We are currently performing a detailed inspection; i.e., a complete teardown, on all AK-2A breakers in safety related systems. This will include bearing inspections for adequate lubrication; signs of binding, and overall trip shaft movement. The resulting data will then be reviewed to determine whether our existing preventative maintenance schedule should be revised regarding frequency or inspection detail.

Failure Date

General Electric Circuit Breaker

Type: AK-2A-50

S/N: 204A1392-216