



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report Nos.: 50-413/94-20 and 50-414/94-20

Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414

License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52

Facility Name: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: September 26-30 and October 3-7, 1994

Inspector: Lawrence L. Lawyer 10/28/94
for D. Charles Payne Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: L. L. Sherfey, PNL

Approved by: Lawrence L. Lawyer 10/28/94
Lawrence L. Lawyer, Chief Date Signed
Operator Licensing Section
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of the licensed operator requalification (retraining) program during the period September 26 - October 7, 1994. The purpose of the inspection was to (1) verify that the licensee's requalification program for reactor operators (ROs) and senior reactor operators (SROs) ensures safe power plant operation by evaluating how well the individual operators and crews had mastered training objectives; and (2) assess the licensee's effectiveness in ensuring that the individuals who are licensed to operate the facility satisfy the conditions of their licenses as specified in 10 CFR 55.53. In addition, the inspectors performed an audit of medical records against the requirements of 10 CFR 55 Subpart C (Medical Requirements).

Results:

All operators observed during the inspection passed their annual operating examination although one crew and two individual operators failed their examinations during the previous cycle weeks. The examination team concluded that the licensee's requalification program for ROs and SROs was adequate to ensure continued safe power plant operations.

The inspectors noted a weakness in that certain individual oriented control manipulations were not being properly tracked on an individual basis (paragraph 2.b). Weaknesses were also noted in the excessive use of selected Job Performance Measures (JPMs) during the course of the examination cycle and the lack of a licensed operator reactivation procedure that specifies the scope of the plant tour and ensures that SROs become proficient in both the Control SRO and Unit Shift Supervisor positions (paragraphs 2.c and 3.b).

The inspectors noted the presence of a good, qualified and dedicated training staff as a strength (paragraph 2.e). Strengths were also noted in the area of management involvement and the use of a strong feedback program (paragraphs 2.g and 2.h).

The inspectors identified one violation in which the facility failed to perform and retain the results of systematic observations and evaluations of the operators during the active simulator portion of their annual operating tests (paragraph 2.d).

The inspectors identified one non-cited violation for failure to perform a complete medical examination in accordance with 10 CFR 55.21 (paragraph 3.a).

The inspectors identified one unresolved item in the area of medical staff evaluation of license operator eyesight test results (paragraph 3.a).

The inspectors identified one non-cited violation for failure of a plant technician to follow Catawba Nuclear Site Directives (CNSD) and Health Physics procedures while working in a Radiologically Controlled Area (paragraph 4).

The inspectors closed out two Inspector Follow-up Items (IFIs) from Inspection Report 50-413/93-300 (paragraph 5).

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *L. J. Rudy, Regulatory Compliance
- *W. R. McCollum, Station Manager
- *S. R. Frye, Training Manager, Operations
- *D. L. Rehn, Vice President, Catawba Nuclear Station
- *W. H. Miller, Operations Superintendent
- *B. G. Addis, Site Training Manager
- *Z. L. Taylor, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- *B. L. Fagan, Medical Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included instructors, engineers, technicians, operators, and office personnel.

NRC Personnel

- *J. Zeiler, Resident Inspector

*Attended exit interview

2. Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation (71001)

a. Summary

The NRC conducted a routine, announced inspection of the Catawba Nuclear Station licensed operator requalification (retraining) program during the period September 26 - October 7, 1994. The purpose of the inspection was to (1) verify that the licensee's requalification program for reactor operators (ROs) and senior reactor operators (SROs) ensures safe power plant operation by evaluating how well the individual operators and crews had mastered training objectives; and (2) assess the licensee's effectiveness in ensuring that the individuals who are licensed to operate the facility, satisfy the conditions of their licenses as specified in 10 CFR 55.53. Based on a review of records and observation of operating examinations, the requalification examination activities appeared to be satisfactorily conducted. The inspectors identified one violation in the area of individual operator evaluation during the simulator examination.

b. Examination Development

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's requalification operating examinations by comparing them to guidelines provided in the licensee's procedures, Inspection Procedure (IP) 71001 and NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examiner Standards," Revision 7. The Catawba Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) were recently revised and, consequently, the Training Department had not had time to update all their simulator scenarios and Job Performance Measures (JPMs). Despite this complication and a few oversights discussed below, the inspectors found that the licensee-developed examinations were adequate.

The sample plan was comprehensive and incorporated all of the guidelines contained in NUREG 1021, Examiner Standard (ES) 601, Attachment 3.

The simulator scenarios reviewed were challenging and at the appropriate level of difficulty. The inspectors determined that all scenarios reviewed met the criteria defined in IP 71001 with the exception that there is no link readily available to the facility Job Task Analysis (JTA). Discussions with the Operations Training Supervisor found that plans were underway to upgrade the facility JTA over the next fiscal year.

The JPM sets contained an appropriate distribution of tasks and incorporated Alternate Path and Time Critical elements. However, over the five week examination period only 25 total JPMs were used. To accommodate the test schedule and ensure day-to-day examination security, 12 JPMs per week were needed. As a result, 14 of the JPMs were used 3 times each and the other 11 JPMs were each used twice. This was considered a training program weakness and will be tracked as Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 413,414/94-20-01, "Excessive JPM Test Item Overlap."

c. Requalification Program Procedures Review

The inspectors reviewed the procedures governing the administration of the requalification program listed in Enclosure 2, Attachment A. The review found that the procedures, which had been recently revised, were quite comprehensive and appeared to cover the required aspects of a Systems Approach to Training (SAT) based process. The inspectors noted several weaknesses where training management attention is needed.

The inspectors identified that a coordinated review process had not been implemented to ensure that each examination did not contain an excessive amount of test item overlap. As noted in paragraph 2.b above, the JPMs selected for use were too few to ensure a comprehensive, operationally-oriented examination designed to assure examination integrity.

The inspectors also noted that the requalification program procedures listed the required control manipulations that licensed operators must perform during the requalification cycle. This list matched that of corporate requalification guideline ETQS No. 2306 and 10 CFR 50.59(c). The training staff tracked performance of manipulations by using tracking sheets for each operator which documented the type of manipulation and date it was completed. However, the inspectors found that certain "individual operator oriented" manipulations, such as controlling steam generator level in manual and changing reactor power using control rods in manual, were signed off as complete for an entire crew of operators even though only one person actually performed the manipulation. These tasks are performed multiple times

during the course of the requal cycle, but not tracked after their first performance. Therefore, it was possible that each individual operator may have actually performed these particular manipulations during the requal year though documentation was lacking to prove the point. This weakness will be tracked as IFI 50-413,414/94-20-02, "Failure to Properly Track Individual Control Manipulations."

Also, as discussed in paragraph 2.d below, individual operator competency evaluations during the simulator portion of the annual operating test were not required by the site training procedures and were not performed as required by Commission regulations.

d. Examination Administration

The inspectors observed as many examination activities as possible to assess the facility licensee's effectiveness in conducting the annual operating tests. The inspectors focused on the evaluator's use of performance standards, security measures implemented to assure examination integrity, and documentation of examination results. The inspectors concluded that the licensee had significantly improved its requalification program over the past two years. However, the inspectors found that the area of individual operator simulator examination evaluation and documentation of results failed to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59(c)(4) and 10 CFR 55.59(c)(5).

The inspectors observed that the training department staff had developed a good realistic and time effective examination administration schedule. It involved six or seven instructors but minimized the waiting time for the operators. It also eased the burden of examination security as discussed further below. This efficient scheduling combined with well organized evaluators resulted in the annual operating test for 3 crews of 15 operators being completed in 3 days with essentially no long running or late days.

With the exception of the JPM overlap weakness discussed in paragraph 2.b above, the examination was developed and administered with security and prevention of compromise in mind. All examination administration personnel signed ES-601-type security agreements. Operators taking the test reported on site at staggered intervals to minimize the amount of wait time. After arrival on site, they were sequestered during and after taking their examination until the last crew arriving for the day was placed under instructor control. As each operator completed their examination for the day, they were sent home. Different Active Simulator Examinations (ASEs) and JPMs were used each day to space out the examination efficiently while maintaining examination security. Also, the inspectors observed excellent security practices by the evaluators during examination administration.

During the ASEs, the inspectors noted that three facility evaluators carefully observed and recorded crew performance in accordance with ES-604. After the evaluators observed a crew perform a scenario, the evaluators discussed the strengths and weaknesses associated with crew performance. The evaluators identified weaknesses and asked questions of the operators as needed to obtain clarification of crew actions taken during the examination process. If a major individual weakness was identified or if the crew missed a critical task, then individual competencies were evaluated for the affected operators in accordance with ES-303. While this process conforms to ES-604, it failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59(c)(4) in that a systematic observation and evaluation of the performance and competency of all licensed operators and senior operators, during actual or simulated abnormal and emergency procedures, was not performed. Consequently, all areas in which retraining was needed to upgrade licensed operator and senior operator knowledge were not determined. Also, since the required individual evaluations were not performed, the associated records were not retained as required by 10 CFR 55.59(c)(5). This violation of NRC requirements will be tracked as VIO 50-413,414/94-20-03, "Failure to Perform Operator Competency Evaluations."

e. Examination Results

During the week of September 19, 1994, the facility evaluators failed one crew and two operators based on their performance of not meeting the pass criteria for the active simulator portion their annual operating examination. As required by the program, these operators were removed from licensed duties pending retraining and successful retesting. Though this examination was not observed by the inspectors, the inspectors did review the associated remediation package for completeness and adequacy. The inspectors found that a comprehensive retraining program that focused on the weaknesses observed and mistakes made was developed and well documented. The inspectors concluded that the remediation program was effective and commensurate with the problems observed. The licensee reported that all affected operators passed the subsequent retest on September 30, 1994.

Operator performance during the inspection week was good. Each operator was knowledgeable and skilled on the simulator during ASEs and familiar with the tasks performed as JPMs. The inspectors paid particular attention to operator competence and familiarity with the EOPs during the operating examinations due to their high importance and the fact that they were significantly revised in June 1994. The inspectors observed that the procedures worked well and that the operators had no difficulty in using them. Plant management had placed strong emphasis on the STAR (Stop Think Act Review) process at Catawba which resulted in the operators responding more deliberately in their actions during use of the EOPs. The inspectors concluded that, though the operators responded slower than expected during the

ASEs, plant safety appeared not to be compromised and few operator errors occurred. Other than failure of the crew and two operators discussed above, all operators passed their annual requalification operating test.

The inspectors also reviewed operator performance trends based on Licensee Event Report (LER) and Performance Improvement Program (PIP) reports associated with identified licensed operator related errors. Based on this review, the inspectors concluded that operator error trends are declining and that overall operator performance was improving. Identified errors or weaknesses were analyzed to determine root cause and corrective action was reflected through the training program when appropriate by way of the required reading program, by specialized training or by additional emphasis during requalification cycle training.

The inspectors observed training department evaluator performance during administration of ASEs and JPMs. This performance was judged to be excellent. Each section of the test had a lead evaluator assigned to coordinate examination development and administration. The facility evaluators were well prepared and organized for the examination they were to administer. Each exhibited good evaluation techniques and followed the guidance of ES-603, Attachment 3. After each ASE scenario was complete, when appropriate, operator performance was followed up by questioning to determine the rationale for and operator understanding of actions taken. During walk-through JPMs, verbal and non-verbal cues were appropriate. For the examinations observed by the inspectors, the results the facility documented were correct. The inspectors considered instructor expertise and evaluation capabilities during implementation of the Catawba requalification examinations as a strength.

f. Simulator Fidelity

No simulator fidelity performance problems were identified during the inspection week. The inspectors reviewed licensee actions taken based on all previous NRC Simulator Facility Reports. While no licensee action was required solely in response to these observations, the training department issued a problem report for each comment made in these reports and evaluated each for corrective action. The inspectors found that each issue had been evaluated and resolved in some manner. Most resolutions involved model changes or software modifications. Some problems were non-repeatable or it was determined that the model had actually responded correctly. The inspectors noted that the simulator still did not model the interface between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Service Water systems. The licensee had determined that the cost of this additional capability exceeded the potential benefit that would be obtained (comment from May 1992 examination). However, they are evaluating whether to model the RN (Nuclear Service Water) system on both units. Also, the Operator Aid Computer (OAC) model had been improved but still has occasional problems. A new

simulated system is scheduled to be installed during Spring 1995. Overall, the inspectors determined that the training department had been appropriately responsive to prior NRC simulator concerns.

g. Management Oversight

The inspectors reviewed written supervisory evaluations and observations of crew performance during simulator training exercises. Management involvement in the systematic observation and evaluation of the performance and competency of licensed operators was notable. The inspectors reviewed feedback forms and interviewed 12 operators, instructors, and supervisors about operations and training management involvement and communication of performance expectations. The general consensus was that operations management had taken "ownership" of the operator training program and that a good working relationship had evolved between the operations and training departments. While improvements were still being sought, the operators expressed a continually improving attitude towards training, the instructors, and the quality of training. Also, it was found that management expectations were verbally communicated to the operators and training department staff. The inspectors concluded that operations and training management involvement, coordination, and commitment to the training process and to excellence in operator performance were a strength of the Catawba requalification program.

h. Feedback Program

The inspectors reviewed the process by which operator and management comments, concerns, performance weaknesses, program improvements, and areas of desired additional training were incorporated into future programs. They found a process in place to track and correct weaknesses and poor operator performance identified in training sessions, by management or by LERs and PIPs. Comments made from training/evaluation sessions were consolidated and trended for common or recurring weaknesses. A data base of individual operator related performance errors was maintained to determine if additional training was required and to determine if the training process had broken down. The inspectors observed that strengths and weaknesses identified from training sessions or examinations were covered in detail with each individual and crew. The inspectors determined, through interviews and review of feedback forms, that operators were routinely asked for program feedback. Comments were tracked, and the operators involved were kept aware of the status of their comments. The inspectors considered Catawba's active implementation and support of the feedback process as a program strength. The Operations Training Supervisor described to the inspectors, plans for development imminent of an upgraded computer-based tracking and trending program. When implemented, this consolidated feedback process should significantly reduce the administrative burden on the instructors while improving management's insights to areas of the training system requiring additional attention.

3. Conformance With Operator License Conditions (71001)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for ensuring the medical fitness of its operators and for reactivating inactive operator licenses. Overall, the inspectors found management oversight of this area as adequate though some individual areas, discussed below, needing improvement were identified. One non-cited violation (NCV) and one unresolved item (URI) were identified in the medical records review.

a. Medical Records Review

10 CFR 55.21 requires that a licensed operator (licensee) "shall have a medical examination by a physician every two years. The physician shall determine that the applicant or licensee meets the requirements of § 55.33(a)(1)."

ANS/ANSI-3.4-1983, section 3.2 requires that the facility forward to the physician a report on each employee referred for a nuclear reactor operator medical examination. This report shall address areas such as work performance, attendance, behavioral changes, incidents of ineptness, poor judgement, and lack of physical or emotional stamina. Catawba called these reports "Supervisory Evaluations". During their review of medical records, the inspectors determined that from May 1987 till March 1991, Supervisory Evaluations were not conducted for the Catawba licensed operators as required by the ANS/ANSI standard. The licensee self-identified this shortcoming in their medical program in March 1991 and has been conducting Supervisory Evaluations since. The inspectors sampled 12 out of 75 medical records and determined that all Supervisory Evaluations had been conducted. This failure to perform a complete medical examination in accordance with 10 CFR 55.21 is an example of NCV 50-413,414/94-20-04, "Failure to perform Biennial Medical Supervisory Evaluations." This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy.

Also during the medical records review, the inspectors identified one operator whose April 21, 1994, eyesight test results were as follows: right eye - 20/40, left eye - 20/40, both eyes together - 20/70. The ANS/ANSI-3.4-1983 standard for eyesight is "near and distant visual acuity 20/40 in better eye, corrected or uncorrected". Since either eye met the ANS/ANSI standard, this anomalous result for both eyes was apparently not noted by the medical staff. Upon questioning by the inspectors, the medical staff pointed out that the operator normally wore glasses. The inspector noted that the licensee had properly evaluated this operator's previous biennial eyesight test results which had exactly met the 20/40 standard. Retesting by the licensee on September 29, 1994, determined that the operator's eyesight was: right eye - 20/70, left eye - 20/50, both eyes - 20/50. This result exceeds the ANS/ANSI eyesight limit, and the operator must wear corrective lenses while performing future licensed duties. The

licensee submitted a new NRC Form 396 to the Commission requesting a license amendment for the operator to require that glasses be worn while performing licensed duties. The licensee also provided shift records that showed the operator had not performed licensed duties since March 31, 1994. This issue is being tracked as URI 50-413,414/94-20-05, "Anomalous Operator Eyesight Examination Results," and is currently being evaluated by the NRC physician for determination of the acceptability of the original eye examination results.

b. Inactive Operator License Reactivation

The inspector's reviewed the facility licensee's program for reactivation of inactive operator licenses and assessed compliance with 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f). The inspectors also interviewed licensed operators, senior operators, and operations management to determine expectations and actual implementation of the process. The inspectors found that there was no site-specific guidance resulting in the potential for improper license reactivation.

The inspectors noted and the licensee confirmed that a site procedure for license reactivation did not exist. Rather, the site used the corporate procedure for this purpose. While the corporate procedure broadly covered the requirements of 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f), specific implementing details were missing. For example, an on-shift operator holding a SRO license normally rotates between the Control Room SRO position and the Unit Shift Supervisor position after each "off-day" period. The lack of site specific guidance could lead to some operators not rotating between these two positions during the reactivation process since the corporate procedure did not require it. Similarly, the thoroughness of the plant tour was not specified in the corporate procedure (i.e., the safety-significant or otherwise important areas that must be toured to allow license reactivation). This was considered a training program weaknesses and will be tracked as Inspector Follow-up Items (IFI) 50-413, 50-414/94-20-07, "Lack of Site Specific Guidance for License Reactivation". The Operations Training Supervisor informed the inspectors that an Operations Management Procedure (OMP) was currently under development and would address issues similar to those discussed above.

c. Tracking Licensed Operator Special Conditions

The inspectors reviewed the facility's process for tracking special license conditions on operators and senior operators. They found that a formal, but manually maintained, tracking system existed which provided on-shift management with the current status of licensed operator qualifications and license restrictions. This list is revised and reissued on a monthly basis, though pen and ink changes are made whenever operator license conditions change. The inspectors concluded that this area was satisfactory.

4. In Plant Observations (71750)

On October 4, 1994, the inspectors observed an employee who was standing within a roped Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) near the Unit 1 Rx trip breakers, reach over the yellow/magenta rope and use the telephone at a Hear-Here station in the clean area. This individual stretched the telephone receiver into the RCA, spoke for 2-3 minutes then reached back over the rope and hung up the phone. Another employee was also in the RCA yet said nothing to the individual violating the RCA boundary. This act was contrary to Catawba Nuclear Site Directives 3.8.1, "ALARA Program," and 3.8.8, "Radiological Work Practices". The inspector promptly informed senior shift management and the Resident Inspector. Licensee response was aggressive, prompt, and adequate. Corrective actions included moving the RCA boundary to include the Hear-Here booth, disciplinary action, counseling for the individuals involved, alerting other site employees to the problem, and evaluating other RCA boundaries for similar temptations. This failure to follow site Health Physics procedures is being tracked as NCV 50-413,414/94-20-06, "Employee Failure to Follow Proper Site HP Procedures." This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation, met the criteria specified in section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy.

5. Action on Previous Inspection Items (92701)

(Closed) IFI 50-413/93-300-01, "Lack of attention to detail in procedure implementation," identified poor operator practices in procedure implementation during JPMs, and many other procedural steps were either skipped or not performed but did not lead to an unsatisfactory evaluation of the JPM. Based on observation of operator performance on simulator and inplant JPMs (see paragraph 2.e above), the inspectors concluded that additional training emphasis in this area has addressed NRC concerns. This IFI is closed.

(Closed) IFI 50-413/93-300-02, "Borderline performance of the licensed operator requalification training program," identified a trend of marginal operator performance over the last three examinations. Based on facility results and NRC observations since May 1993 (see Examination Report 50-413/93-301 and paragraph 2.e above), operator performance and requalification program administration have significantly improved. This IFI is closed.

6. Exit Interview

At the conclusion of the site visit, the inspectors met with representatives of the plant staff listed in paragraph one to discuss the results of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any material provided to, or reviewed by the inspectors. The inspectors further discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. The licensee did not express any dissenting comments.

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Description and Reference</u>
IFI 50-413,414/94-20-01	Open	Excessive JPM Test Item Overlap (paragraph 2.b).
IFI 50-413,414/94-20-02	Open	Failure to properly track control manipulations (paragraph 2.c).
VIO 50-413,414/94-20-03	Open	Failure to perform operator competency evaluations (paragraph 2.d).
NCV 50-413,414/94-20-04	Open	Failure to perform biennial medical supervisory evaluations (paragraph 3.a).
URI 50-413,414/94-20-05	Open	Anomalous operator eyesight exam results (paragraph 3.a).
NCV 50-413,414/94-20-06	Open	Employee failure to follow proper site HP procedures (paragraph 4).
IFI 50-413,414/94-20-07	Open	Lack of site specific guidance for license reactivation (paragraph 3.b).
IFI 50-413/93-300-01	Closed	Lack of attention to detail in procedure implementation (paragraph 5).
IFI 50-413/93-300-02	Closed	Borderline performance of the licensed operator requalification training program (paragraph 5).

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Corporate Level Documents

ETQS #202.0,	Rev. 4	Training and Qualifications System Development Model
ETQS #207.0,	Rev. 3	NRC Application Process
ETQS #302.0,	Rev. 6	Exemption and Bypass Criteria for Trainees with Experience and/or Educational Background
ETQS #401.0,	Rev. 6	Instructor Training, Certification, and Evaluation Program
ETQS #404.0,	Rev. 2	Selection and Training of OJT Trainers and Qualifiers
ETQS #405.0,	Rev. 3	Periodic Training SRO/RO Certified Instructor Continuing Training
ETQS #601.0,	Rev. 1	Needs Analysis
ETQS #603.0,	Rev. 2	Conduct of Job and Task Analysis
ETQS #604.0,	Rev. 5	Training Analysis
ETQS #702.0,	Rev. 1	Objectives
ETQS #703.0,	Rev. 1	Test Development
ETQS #801.0,	Rev. 5	Lesson Plan Format and Revision
ETQS #802.0,	Rev. 1	Simulator Exercise Guide Development and Revision
ETQS #901.0,	Rev. 10	Conduct of On-The-Job Task Training (OJT)
ETQS #903.0,	Rev. 2	Test Administration and Security
ETQS #904.0,	Rev. 4	Evaluation of Trainees
ETQS #1101.0,	Rev. 3	Training Program Evaluation
ETQS #1106.0,	Rev. 5	Selection of Candidates for License Preparatory Training RO/SRO and NRC License Examination RO/SRO
ETQS #2301.0,	Rev. 5	Operations Training and Qualifications Overview
ETQS #2302.1,	Rev. 8	Basic Operations Training Program
ETQS #2303.0,	Rev. 7	License Preparatory Reactor Operator Program
ETQS #2304.0,	Rev. 5	License Preparatory Senior Reactor Operator Program
ETQS #2306.0,	Rev. 6	Periodic Training Licensed Operator Requalification

ETQS #2312.0, Rev. 5 Maintenance of an Active NRC License (RO/SRO)

Site Level Documents

CNSD 3.8.1	Rev. 1	ALARA Program
CNSD 3.8.8	Rev. 3	Radiological Work Practices
OTMP 1.0	Rev. 0	Administration of Operations Training Management Procedures
OTMP 2.0	Rev. 0	Job and Task Analysis
OTMP 3.0	Rev. 0	Design and Development
OTMP 4.0	Rev. 0	Implementation
OTMP 5.0	Rev. 0	Program Evaluations
OTMP 6.0	Rev. 0	Training Programs
OTMP 7.0	Rev. 0	Simulator Configuration Management
	3/15/93	Problem Investigation Process (PIP) User's Manual
	9/94	September Operator Monthly Status Report