NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT #1

NARRATIVE OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE

May 1983

The Station operated during the month of May, 1983, with a monthly availability factor of 0.0% and a net design electrical capacity factor of 0.0%. The Station was shut down March 19, 1982, for a scheduled maintenance outage. The Station remains shut down due to Reactor Recirculation System piping cracks found during Vessel Hydro on March 23, 1982. Preparations for reactor startup are continuing.

CLASS I WORK - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL - MAY 1983

20420 - Rebuild all Control Rod Drive SOVs comp. #117 and #118 (rebuilt same).

11989 - Rebuilt pilot valves on outside MSIVs 01-03, 01-04.

CLASS I WORK - MAINTENANCE - MAY 1983

WR #20447 - Plugged 6 tubes in #121 Containment Spray Heat Exchanger
20447 - Plugged 1 tube in #111 " " " "
20450 - Plugged 3 tubes in #122 " " " "
20449 - Plugged 7 tubes in #112 " " " "
21069 - Placed CRD s/n 71336 in position 18-51.
21055 - Placed CRD s/n 71592 in position 38-39.
21056 - Placed CRD s/n 71494 in position 46-23.
21080 - Placed CRD s/n 71349 in position 38-39.
21047 - Replaced drain valves for 31-01 and 31-02.
20682 - Replaced section of Fire piping at south-east corner of 237'.
18425 - Rebuilt internals and seals on #11 CRD pump.
21063 - Replaced "O" ring on #11 Recirc. pump seal.
21035 - Replaced packing - seat "O" ring - body "O" ring and backup ring in CRD accum. 18-15.
21043 - Replaced packing - seat "O" ring - body "O" ring and backup ring in CRD accum. 14-07.
21041 - Replaced packing - seat "O" ring - body "O" ring and backup ring in CRD accum. 10-23.
21033 - Replaced packing - seat "O" ring - body "O" ring and backup ring in CRD accum. 06-19.
21045 - Replaced packing - seat "O" ring - body "O" ring and backup ring in CRD accum. 06-27.
21116 - Placed CRD s/n 71627 in position 14-11.
21130 - Replaced packing - seat "O" ring - body "O" ring and backing ring in CRD accum. 14-11 and 26-03.
20953 - Replaced "O" rings, gaskets on Reactor head.
20169 - Removed steam line plugs.
21191 - Retorqued bolts on #11 Recirc. pump.
21192 - Retorqued bolts on #12 Recirc. pump.
21193 - Retorqued bolts on #13 Recirc. pump.

CLASS I WORK - MAINTENANCE - MAY 1983

(continued)

WR #21194 - Retorqued bolts on #14 Recirc. pump.
21195 - Retorqued bolts on #15 Recirc. pump.
21186 - Installed shootout steel.
17523 - Replaced 18 nozzles on drywell Containment Spray System.
21284 - Repaired cotterpins on restraint #32-12-H1D
21285 - Repaired cotterpins on restraint #32-12-11 1 B
21283 - Repaired cotterpins on restraint #32-MS-18
21286 - Repaired cotterpins on restraint #32-MS-17
21282 - Repaired cotterpins on restraint #32-H1A
21281 - Repaired cotterpins on restraint #32-15-H1B
19518 - Packed sleeves RW-23 and 27 for fire protection.
20976 - Packed sleeve S-35 for fire protection.
21320 - Replaced packing - seat "O" rings - body "O" ring and backup ring in CRD accum 02-31.
21351 - Replaced seals on equip. hatch and closed up.
21340 - Replaced diaphram in EC valve 39-13.
21383 - Replaced accumulator in CRD #30-15.
21093 - Replaced rubber seals on doors #52 and 53, and installed protective angles.
21499 - #122 containment spray heat exchangers, tightened cover.
21498 - Drywell torus to atmosphere relief valve; tightened studs.
21362 - #15 Reactor Recirc. CLC valve 70-106; replaced spring and lubricated stem.

CLASS I WORK - ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE - MAY 1983

WR #14650 - Install GE keylock switch for emergency ventilation valve 202-36.
18431 - FW heater 125 outlet BV - reinstall limit switch
21013 - Containment spray raw water intertie - replace limitorque 93-49.
21014 - Containment spray raw water intertie - replace limitorque 93-50.
20822 - Degraded grid voltage motor rewind (MO 3396) - water chiller #122
20821 - Degraded grid voltage motor rewind (MO 3396) - water chiller #121.
20823 - Degraded grid voltage motor rewind (MO 3396) - Chilled water circ motor #12.
20760 - Clean-up valve 33-02 - Readjust torque switch.
21361 - Rx. Bldg. emergency vent 10 KW heater - check resistance values.
20491 - Relief check valve 68-05 - replaced limit switch actuator arm.
21367 - 13 condensate pump breaker - repaired damage to breaker cover plate.
21492 - Core spray valve 40-30 will not open - Adjusted limitorque.
21490 - Mimic light for valve 39-14 - adjusted limit switch.
21363 - Emergency condenser vent valves 39-11,12,13&14 - Adjusted limit switches.
21497 - Main steam IV 01-02 - Replaced motor and geared limit switch.
21489 - Valve 39-11 annunciator - Adjusted switch alarm contact.
21453 - Valve 39-08 green light - cleaned torque switch.
21525 - 05-01 Mimic light - wiring change.
21527 - 05-04 Mimic light - wiring change
21526 - 05-11 Mimic light - wiring change.
21528 - 05-12 Mimic light - wiring change
21370 - Core spray valves 49-05 and 06 - remove overload heaters.

CLASS I WORK - ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE - MAY 1983

(continued)

N1-MST-M1 - 125 VDC batteries, cell specific gravities and battery voltage.

MO 2998 - Emergency condenser vent valves.
MO 3346 - Degraded grid voltage.
MO 3171 - Isolation valves
MO 3406 - Fire protection.

MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED DURING MAY 1983

Mod. No. N1-80-74
Major Order 2151
Mod. Title: Installation of Torus Temperature RTDs for New Torus Temperature Monitoring

This modification included the installation of a dual channel system. Each channel has 12 active water temperature sensors and 12 passive water temperature sensors (Duel RTDs with one element installed but not wired). One active air temperature sensor and one passive air temperature sensor is included in each channel. The RTDs were added to comply with the requirements of NUREG-0661.

Mod. No. N1-82-70-1
Major Order 3171
Mod. Title: Replacement/Addition of Containment Isolation Valves with Excessive Leakage

Valves were replaced or added to the Raw Water Intertie System, the Containment Spray System and the Core Spray Systems. These valves were replaced or added to assure compliance with the integrated leak rate test acceptance criteria.

Mod. No. N1-82-68
Major Order 3171
Mod. Title: Replacement of Seats and Discs on Allis Chalmers Butterfly Valves

Our letter of January 29, 1982 summarized the modifications that would be performed on various vent and purge valves.

The purpose of this modification was to reduce the amount of leakage around both the vacuum breakers and the containment vent and purge valves.

Mod. No. N1-82-65
Major Order 2998
Mod. Title: Replacement, Relocation and Addition of Emergency Cooling System Vent Isolation Valves

The Emergency Cooling System is provided with a vent system to remove non-condensible gases. Two vent paths are provided for normal operational and accident conditions. The vent system to main steam line removes gases during normal operation. For accident conditions, the vent to torus path is utilized.

This modification involved three separate changes to the Emergency Cooling Vent system. The first change involved the replacement of the air operated isolation valves. This was necessary due to the unavailability of replacement parts for the existing valves and actuators.

The second change involved the relocation of five valves in the vent to torus path. This change was necessary to reduce the length of pipe between the blocking valves and the torus, thus reducing the probability of a pipe break which could compromise torus integrity.

The final change involved the addition of two isolation valves. This was necessary to provide double isolation capability required for the vent line.

Mod. No. N1-78-04
Major Order 1076
Mod. Title: Installation of a Nitrogen Supply to Valves Located in Train 11 of the Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System

The modification consisted of providing a nitrogen supply to actuate valves located in Train 11 of the CAD system. This modification will alleviate the possibility of the CAD system being subject to a single failure of the instrument air system.

Mod. No. N1-82-70-6
Major Order 3171
Mod. Title: Provide New Vacuum Breaker Valve Shaft Seal Design

The modification consisted of providing a new valve shaft seal design to reduce the amount of leakage from the vacuum breaker valves.

MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED DURING MAY 1983 (Continued)

Mod. No. N1-82-66
Major Order 2440
Mod. Title: Installation of Containment Atmosphere Post LOCA Vent Line

The modifications consisted of installing a new vent line for the containment. This modification was necessary to comply with commitments which were made following an NRC review of the containment atmospheric dilution system and Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations. The commitments consisted of providing improved vent paths with pressure control valves to ensure downstream pressure would not be exceed 0.5 psig.

Mod. No. N1-82-01
Major Order 2731
Mod. Title: Replacement of Motor Operated Feedwater Isolation Valves

Due to leakage during the containment integrated leak rate testing, the inside motor operated valves were replaced with new state-of-the-art (flexible double wedge gate) motor operated isolation valves. These valves are capable of being tested in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J.

Mod. No. N1-82-63
Major Order 3045
Mod. Title: Suppression Chamber Y-Quencher Support and Relief Valve Discharge Line Vent Header Penetration Reinforcing

Two modifications were performed as outlined by the Mark I Containment Program. The first modification involved the removal of the Y-Quencher supports. Analyses have shown that these supports are no longer required. The second modification involved the addition of structural support to the relief valve discharge line penetration at the vent header.

Mod. No. N1-82-80-6
Major Order 3407
Mod. Title: Diesel Fire Pump Intertie to Emergency Service Water Diesel Generator 102 Cooling Water and Diesel Generator 103 Cooling Water and Diesel Fire Pump Room Upgrade

The first modification consisted of installing an intertie between the fire protection system and one emergency service water line and diesel generator 102 and 103 cooling water systems. This modification was required to comply with 10CFR50 Appendix R III.G.2 in the screenhouse.

The second modification consisted of adding directional sprinkler heads above the roof of the diesel fire pump room. The modification was required to comply with 10CFR50 Appendix R. In addition, detection was added above the roof.

Mod. No. N1-82-90-2
Major Order 334
Mod. Title: Poured Concrete Control Room Wall - Modification

The control room walls are reinforced poured concrete (north and west walls) and masonry walls (south and east walls). A re-review of the seismic analysis of the reinforced poured concrete walls indicated the current design could be improved for seismic loads applied. Additional seismic supports were added to the poured concrete walls.

Mod. No. N1-82-80-7
Major Order 3408
Mod. Title: 10CFR50 Appendix R III.G.2 Boundary Separation for the Reactor Building and Reroute of Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 102 Cable 161-63.

The following modifications were required to satisfy the separation criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix R III.G.2 in the Reactor Building:

1. Elevation 237 and 261 - A 20 foot zone free of non-intervening combustibles was established between columns 8 and 9 on the north side for each of these elevations. All cables, on both elevations, in this area were sprayed with fire retardant material (i.e. Flamemastic). Cable 161-63 (diesel generator 102 cooling water pump cable from powerboard 161B) was rerouted out of this 20 foot zone. On elevation 261, the existing suppression was extended ten feet to cover the 20 foot zone.

2. Elevation 281 - A 20 foot zone free of non-intervening combustibles was established between columns 6 and 7 on the north side and between columns 7 and 8 on the south side. The portion of the cable tray 13RA (north side) that passes through this 20 foot zone was sprayed with fire retardant material. Suppression was added to cover the 20 foot zones for both the north and south side. The suppression was provided by extending WP-4116 to cover the required area. Detection (one detector) was added to the south side. Floor penetrations between columns 6 and 9 on the north side were sealed with at least one hour rated seals.

3. Elevation 298 - A 20 foot zone free of non-intervening combustibles was established halfway between columns 7 and 8 to halfway between columns 8 and 9 on the north side and columns 7 and 8 on the south side. Suppression was added to cover the 20 foot zones for both the north and south side. Suppression was provided by extending WP-4237 to cover the required area. Floor penetrations between columns 6 and halfway between 8 and 9 were sealed with one hour rated seals.

Mod. No. N1-82-80-7 (Continued)

4. Elevation 318 - A 20 foot zone free of non-intervening combustibles was established between columns 6 and 7 on the north side and columns 6 and 7 on the south side. Floor penetrations between columns 6 and 9 on the north side and columns 6 and halfway between 8 and 9 on the south side were sealed with one hour rated seals.

5. Elevation 340 - Floor penetrations within 20 feet both east and west of column 8 line were sealed with one hour rated seals.

6. Reroute of Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 102 Cable 161-63.

   Cable 161-63 was rerouted south from powerboard 161B to the Turbine Building elevations 261 and 291 then down to Turbine Building elevation 250. From elevation 250, the cable proceeds east then north into the screenhouse. The cable then follows its original route to diesel cooling water pump 102.

Mod No. N1-82-80-8
Major Order 3409
Mod. Title: Diesel Generator Alternate DC Feed Separation (Appendix R III.G.2)

This modification was required to comply with 10CFR50 Appendix R. A normally open non-automatic circuit breaker was installed in each alternate (emergency) 125 Volt DC power cable between the two diesel generator exciter control cabinets. These circuit breakers were mounted on the wall near each diesel generator exciter control cabinet. As a result of this modification, the alternate (emergency) DC power supply is normally de-energized.

Mod. No. N1-80-69
Major Order 1852
Mod. Title: Stack Gas Effluent Monitoring System

Post TMI requirements and Regulatory Guide 1.97 requires a more accurate stack flow monitor. This monitor was installed to meet these requirements. The flow measuring equipment consists of analyzer apparatus and an array of pitot tubes which are installed in the existing stack breeching near the point at which is enters the stack.

Mod. No. N1-81-29
Major Order 3443
Mod. Title: Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation Blocking Valve Control Switch and Solenoid Change

As a result of an automatically initiated emergency ventilation blocking valve failing to open when required, a design change was initiated to prevent this type of problem from reoccuring. The modification involves repiping new solenoid valves in a series configuration. In addition, a keylock switch was installed where the present manual switch for the solenoids is employed.

The new configuration of the air piping for the solenoids prevents single failure of the Emergency Ventilation System.

Mod. No. N1-82-69
Major Order 3384
Mod. Title: Feedwater HPCI Control System

A commitment to improve the reliability of the feedwater HPCI system was made to the NRC by letter dated April 1, 1982. The modifications consisted of revising the control circuits and replacing the flow transmitters to provide for more reliable operation.

Mod. No. N1-82-80-9
Major Order 3413
Mod. Title: 10CFR50 Appendix R III.G.2 Boundary Separations for the Turbine Building, Fire Barrier Wrap for Conduits, Reroute of 3" Cross Main for Pre-action WP-2041 System

The following modifications were required to comply with the separation criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix R, III.G.2:

1. Boundary Separations for the Turbine Building

   Diesel Generator 103 Output Cable Way - The conduit containing the cable associated with diesel generator 102 was provided with a one-hour wrap.

   Under Powerboards 102 and 103 - One hour wrap was provided on diesel generator 102 to powerboard 102 conduit. Suppression and detection was also provided in this area.

   Diesel generator 102 missile enclosure - The four conduits containing cables associated with diesel generator 102 were wrapped with a three hour barrier.

   Foam Room - All wall penetrations were sealed with three hour rated seals.

   Above battery board rooms - All cable trays between the redundant battery feeder cables were sprayed with Flamemastic. Suppression is provided on the three level cable tray run tnat lies parallel to the battery board rooms.

Mod. No. N1-82-80-9 (Continued)

2. Fire Barrier Wrap for Conduits

Fire zone T3A - All five conduits (161-65A - 1-1/2", 161-151 - 1-1/2", 161-71 - 1-1/2", 161-66 - 1-1/2" and 161-64A - 1-1/2") were wrapped with a one hour rated fire barrier. The conduits were wrapped from where they enter cable tray 12TJ to a pullbox, a distance of 160 ft. In addition, tray 12TJ was sprayed with a Flamemastic for a distance of 20 ft. east of where the five conduits enter the cable tray (from column row H-11.3 to column row H-12.3).

3. Reroute of Three Inch Cross Main for Pre-action WP-2041 System

This modification consisted of rerouting the cross main approximately six feet from the conduit to allow for conduit to be wrapped with one hour rated fire barrier.

Mod. No. N1-82-85
Major Order 3443
Mod. Title: Replacement of Reactor Building Air Lock Doors

Due to heavy usage and the air differential pressure, the original standard industrial strength doors required an undesirable amount of maintenance for proper operation. As a result, three doors and frames were replaced; two doors which allow access from the Turbine Building and the third at the track bay extension.

Mod No. N1-81-12
Major Order 3443
Mod. Title: Reactor Building Steel Wall Strut

By letter dated March 25, 1983, Niagara Mohawk committed to install a steel strut in the northeast corner of the Reactor Building. The purpose of the strut is to provide added assurance that Reactor Building integrity is maintained during a seismic event.

Mod. No. N1-83-06
Major Order 3391
Mod. Title: Degraded Grid Voltage - Motor Rewind

Our letter dated September 27, 1982, provided the results of an analysis performed on the station electrical distribution system at Nine Mile Point Unit 1. As indicated therein, several motors required rewinding to assure proper operation during degraded grid conditions.

Mod. No. N1-82-80-5A and 5C
Major Order 3406
Mod. Title: 5A: Revision of Emergency Condenser High Radiation Isolation Logic and Rerouting of Emergency Condenser's Radiation Monitor Output Cable
5C: Emergency Condensers Redundant Auto Initiation

5A: Revision of Emergency Condenser High Radiation Isolation Logic and Rerouting of Emergency Condenser's Radiation Monitor Output Cable:

The cable routing was channelized by system such that a loss of one side of the plant would only result in the spurious isolation of only one emergency condenser. This was accomplished by adding two junction boxes and rewiring both ends.

The initiating logic was made insensitive to gross power failures (e.g. loss of an RPS power supply to the high radiation initiation relay intermediate logic). This was accomplished by making the intermediate logic energize to operate. The detecting logic will remain "de-energize to operate," which means if power is lost anywhere between the detectors in the Reactor Building and the control room, the respective condenser would receive an isolation signal. This change of the intermediate logic to "energize to operate" is consistent with the emergency condenser isolation logic which is also "energize to operate."

The initiating logic was channelized by power supplies. This was accomplished by adding two new relays such that each detector will have its own initiating relays powered from the same power supply channel. These initiating relay signals communicate with the channelized emergency condenser isolation logic, such that the channelization of the initiating logic is consistent with the channelization of isolation logic; thereby ensuring two independent trains of logic for each condenser from the detection of the signal to the isolation logic, each with independent power supplies.

The modification changes the channelization criteria from "by power supply" to "by system." The new configuration places the output cabling from Monitors #3 and #13 in one cable tray and channelizes the cables by system (i.e. EC #11 and #12 are separated).

MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED DURING MAY 1983 (Continued)

Mod. No. N1-82-80-5A and 5C (Continued)

5C: Emergency Condensers Redundant Auto Initiation Logic:

These modifications channelize the initiating logic, the actuation logic and the valve motive power consistently within each of the redundant loops and equipment training.

Interchanged Emergency Condenser 11 Initiating Logic Relay Contacts - This change makes the condenser 11 isolation logic identical to the existing condenser 12 isolation logic. Contacts from the high steam flow detection logic relays K17D (RPS12/1) and K17C (RPS11/2) each activate one of the two isolation logic loops of condenser 11. Contacts K17D and K17C were interchanged.

Changed the two Emergency Condenser Isolation Channels 11 and 12 Relays to the four Valves from One-Out-of-Two to Activate to One-Out-of-Two Energize to Activate - These contacts were added to make each condenser 11 isolation loop meet the single failure criteria. This change to condenser 11's logic makes this portion of the logic one-out-of-two. These changes make condenser 11 isolation logic identical to the condenser 12 isolation logic.

Spare contacts were added to correct the channelization problems in this portion of the condenser 11 logic by making the logic one-out-of-two to each pair of isolation valves. Condenser 12 intermediate logic is presently channelized as required for the one-out-of-one to each pair of isolation valves. However, by adding spare contacts, this portion of the logic becomes one-out-of-two energize to activate to each pair of condenser 12 valves.

Interchange Emergency Condenser 11 and 12 AC Power Supply Channels to Steam Isolation Valves by Rewiring IV 39-09 and IV 39-10 to Opposite Motor Control Centers MCC161B and MCC171B - These changes were necessary for the redundant steam isolation valves to meet the single failure criteria. This method of achieving condenser isolation requires that the steam isolation valves have independent power supplies.

Completion of these power supply channel changes ensures that each isolation valve is powered from a totally separate power than its redundant isolation valve.

New (Local) Redundant Auto-Initiation Logic - For potential fire events in the control complex and/or Turbine Building and the effects of hot shorts, etc., redundant auto initiation logic was added locally in the Reactor Building to enesure auto initiation of the emergency condenser system, independent of existing auto initiation circuitry in the control complex and Turbine Building.

OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-220
DATE 6/2/83
COMPLETED BY TW ROMAN
TELEPHONE (315) 349-2422

OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name: Nine Mile Point Unit #1
2. Reporting Period: 05/01/83 - 05/31/83
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 1850
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 640
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 630
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 620
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 610
8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons:

Notes

9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe):
10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any:

	This Month	Yr.-to-Date	Cumulative
11. Hours In Reporting Period	744.0	3623.0	119,039.0
12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical	0.0	0.0	81,308.5
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours	0.0	0.0	1,204.2
14. Hours Generator On-Line	0.0	0.0	78,562.3
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	0.0	0.0	20.4
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	0	0	129,374,390
17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	0	0	42,743,090
18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	0	0	41,392,651
19. Unit Service Factor	0.0	0.0	66.0
20. Unit Availability Factor	0.0	0.0	66.0
21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net)	0.0	0.0	57.0
22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)	0.0	0.0	56.1
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate	100.0	100.0	18.1

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup: June 3, 1983
26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):

	Forecast	Achieved
INITIAL CRITICALITY		
INITIAL ELECTRICITY		
COMMERCIAL OPERATION		

(9/77)

UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

REPORT MONTH May 1983

DOCKET NO. 50-220
UNIT NAME 9 Mile Pt. #1
DATE 6/2/83
COMPLETED BY TW ROMAN
TELEPHONE (315)349-2422

No.	Date	Type[1]	Duration (Hours)	Reason[2]	Method of Shutting Down Reactor[3]	Licensee Event Report #	System Code[4]	Component Code[5]	Cause & Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence
#1	820323	F	744	A	4	82-009			Replacement of recirc. piping continues.

1
F: Forced
S: Scheduled

2
Reason:
A-Equipment Failure (Explain)
B-Maintenance or Test
C-Refueling
D-Regulatory Restriction
E-Operator Training & License Examination
F-Administrative
G-Operational Error (Explain)
H-Other (Explain)

3
Method:
1-Manual
2-Manual Scram.
3-Automatic Scram.
4-Other (Explain)

4
Exhibit G - Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report (LER) File (NUREG-0161)

5
Exhibit I - Same Source

(9/77)

AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

DOCKET NO. 50-220
UNIT 9 Mile Pt. #1
DATE 6/2/83
COMPLETED BY TW Roman
TELEPHONE (315)349-2422

MONTH May 1983

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)	DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
1	0	17	0
2	0	18	0
3	0	19	0
4	0	20	0
5	0	21	0
6	0	22	0
7	0	23	0
8	0	24	0
9	0	25	0
10	0	26	0
11	0	27	0
12	0	28	0
13	0	29	0
14	0	30	0
15	0	31	0
16	0		

INSTRUCTIONS

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/77)

NIAGARA MOHAWK

313-127 R 2-70X

NUCLEAR STATION

REPORT OF OPERATION FOR 05/01/83 - 05/31/83 PERIOD ENDING 12:00 MN ☐ EST ☒ DST May 1983

		UNIT NO. #1	UNIT NO. 102 Diesel	UNIT NO. 103 Diesel	TOTAL STATION
ELECTRICAL					
1. GENERATION – NET	MWH	0.0			0.0
2. HOUSE SERVICE	MWH	0.0			0.0
3. GENERATION – GROSS	MWH	0.0			0.0
4. MINIMUM HOUR GENERATION – NET	MW				
5. MAXIMUM HOUR GENERATION – NET	MW				
6. DATE & TIME – MAX. HR. LOAD					
7. NOMINAL AVE. HYDROGEN PRESSURE	LBS.				
8. DIESEL GENERATOR	KWH		3,300	3,800	7,100
MECHANICAL					
9. TURBINE – NO. OF STARTS		0			0
10. BACK PRESSURE (NOTE 1)	IN HG				
11. CONDENSATE TEMP. (NOTE 1)	°F				
12. CIRC. WATER ENT. TEMP. (NOTE 1)	°F				
13. REACTOR-NO. OF STARTS		0			0
14. THERMAL POWER	MW DAYS				
15. BURN UP	MWD/TON				
16. BURN UP REMAINING TO REFUEL	MWD/TON	4,167.4			4,167.4
17. DIESEL GEN. NO. OF STARTS			2	2	4
18. DIESEL FUEL BURNED	GAL		170	200	370
RATES					
19. HOUSE SERVICE	%				
20. CAPABILITY FACTOR (NOTE 2)	%				
21. LOAD FACTOR (NOTE 3)	%				
22. HYDROGEN LEAKAGE RATE/DAY	CU FT				
23. WATER RATE – GROSS	LBS/KWH				
24.					
25. HEAT RATE (NOTE 4)	BTU/NET KWH				
26.					
UNIT HOURS					
27. ON LOAD	HRS	0			0
28. AVAILABLE	HRS	0			0
29. UNAVAILABLE	HRS	744.0			744.0
30. TURBINE-CAUSED IDLE. (NOTE 5)	HRS				
31. TURBINE AUX. " " "	HRS				
32. GENERATOR-CAUSED IDLE. "	HRS				
33. GENERATOR AUX. " " "	HRS				
34. REACTOR CAUSED IDLENESS "	HRS				
35. REACT. AUX. " " "	HRS				
36. SYNCHRONOUS CONDENSER OPER.	HRS	744.0F			744.0F
37.					

FUEL SUMMARY KILOGRAMS	TOTAL U	U235	U236	U238	PU239	PU240	PU241	PU242
38. START OF PERIOD								
39. RECEIVED								
40. SHIPPED								
41. SPENT-(PRODUCED)								
42. END OF PERIOD								

NOTES

1. TAKEN AT TIME OF MAX. HR. LOAD.
2. ITEM 1 ÷ (NET RATED CAP. × PERIOD HRS.)
3. ITEM 1 ÷ (ITEM 5 × PERIOD HRS.)
4. [(ITEM 14) × 24 × 3413] ÷ ITEM 1
5. FORCED OUTAGE – F: SCHEDULED OUTAGE – S.

TE LEMPGES
C. PIPER
T. BASSETT
DP DISE
M. SCHLEGAL

W. ARLUKEWICZ
S. WILCZEK
MA SILLIMAN
FACTORY MUTUAL
F. BLESKOSKI

J. HALLENBECK
POWER CONTROL
J. MORRIS
CV MANGAN

SIGNED Thomas W Foran
STATION SUPERINTENDENT

313-127 N 10-69X (BACK)

OUTAGES – UNITS AND AUXILIARIES

MONTH May, YEAR 1983

UNIT NO.	EQUIPMENT	DAY	AVAILABLE ON	TIME	HOURS UNAVAILABLE	PARTIALLY UNAVAILABLE HOURS	PARTIALLY UNAVAILABLE CAP.	REASONS / REPAIRS
#1	Rx.	3/23/83		1430	6754.0 1982 744.0 Jan 672.0 Feb. 744.0 Mar. 719.0 April 744.0 May 10,377.0 TOTAL			

NIAGARA MOHAWK

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

June 13, 1983

Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Document and Control Desk

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 1
Docket No. 220
DPR-63

Dear Sir:

Submitted herewith is the Report of Operating Statistics and Shutdown Experience for May, 1983 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1.

Also included is a Narrative Report of Operating Experience for May 1983.

Sincerely,

cvmangan

C. V. Mangan
Vice President
Nuclear Engineering and Licensing

CVM/djm
Attachments
cc: Director, Office of I&C (10 copies)

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1/1