



April 29, 1983
L-83-275

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator, Region II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: St. Lucie Unit 2
Docket 50-389, 10 CFR 50.55(e), 83-010
Agastat Relay Concerns

On March 30, 1983, Florida Power and Light Company notified NRC, Region II of a potential 10CFR50.55(e) condition existing at the site involving Agastat relay failures. This situation has been investigated and has been deemed non-reportable.

The main concern found throughout this potentially reportable incident was the failure of two safety related Agastat relays to time out properly. The two Agastats that timed out improperly controlled the Annunciator for the emergency filtration unit for the control room and the loading of an HVAC fan onto the Diesel Generator. These items were found during a planned inspection at St. Lucie 2.

In another unrelated safety application, the wrong Agastat relay was installed on the Diesel Generator. The situation involving the installation of the Agastat relays with the slightly longer delay time in the Diesel Generator 2B control cabinet would not have caused any significant deficiency because the relay's timing range was nearly identical to the appropriate relay.

The first concern involved the Agastat relay that controlled the annunciator for the emergency filtration unit for the Control Room which would not have impacted that system's automatic initiation. If the Emergency Filtration Unit for the Control Room were required to be actuated, it still would perform its automatic safety function, only the operator would be alerted to its actuation six seconds later than normal, via the annunciator.

The second discrepancy dealt with loading of the 10HP Control Room Emergency Filters (CRECS) onto the diesels at 24 seconds after an accident. The Agastat relay in this situation could not be adjusted to the proper time. If this situation were left uncorrected it could be possible to assume that the CRECS fan would be loaded onto another load block. We have determined that it could not have adversely affected the diesel generators safe operation, based on its small HP requirement. Further, this delay would not have affected the safe operation of the CRECS.

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
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In another unrelated instance, an Agastat relay with a slightly longer delay time was installed in the Diesel Generator 2B control cabinet. This situation would have caused an addition of 0.8 seconds delay for the load shedding relay to function. This time increase is considered insignificant and therefore, not a significant safety hazard.

FPL has also identified three other instances where Agastat relays did not time out properly, however, these are located in non-safety systems. FPL and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations are aware of the potential deficiencies in timing on the Agastat relays. As a result, the NRC and FPL have agreed to the surveillance requirements (Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2d) on the diesel generator sequencing relays and also to investigate the use of solid state relays as replacements (Safety Evaluation Report 8-8). This investigation is still ongoing. We will keep the NRC advised of our findings.

All pertinent material will be maintained on site. If you should have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert E. Uhrig".

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems and Technology