



# POLICY ISSUE

(NEGATIVE CONSENT)

January 9, 1992

SECY-92-009

For: The Commissioners

From: James M. Taylor  
Executive Director for Operations

Subject: REVISION OF NRC POLICY STATEMENT FOR ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORTING

Purpose: To inform the Commission of the proposed method for developing new abnormal occurrence reporting criteria for medical misadministrations and to inform the Commission of a change in the completion date for the revision.

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER CURTISS

Date: 1/10/92

Action

Reviewed By: ~~Joe Gray~~ Janet K,  
Coordinated With: ~~Kevin Connaughton~~

Due Date: 1/24/92

Recommend:

Remarks: SECY-92-009: (Negative Consent)  
Revision of NRC Policy Statement for Abnormal Occurrence Reporting

*Revamping of these reporting criteria is long overdue (recall my and Kevin's memo on the subject) Accordingly to staff's schedule, revised criteria should come before the Commission in December (still your term!) I see no reason to object to staff's plan as presented in the paper JPK*

Due to JRC: 1/23/92  
(date)

File:

92-0115/0158 YA

OK per Comm. Curtiss 1/24/92



## POLICY ISSUE

June 22, 1993

(NEGATIVE CONSENT)

SECY-93-175

**FOR:** The Commissioners  
**FROM:** James M. Taylor  
Executive Director for Operations  
**SUBJECT:** LOCATION OF THE BACKUP EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY  
FOR THE ZION NUCLEAR STATION

**PURPOSE:**

To request Commission approval of the proposed relocation of the backup emergency operations facility (EOF) for the Zion Nuclear Station from the Edison Building in Chicago to the Corporate EOF in Downers Grove, Illinois.

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER CURTISS

Date: 6/23/93

Action

Reviewed By: Joe Gray

Due Date: 7/7/93

Coordinated With: Kevin Connaughton

Recommend: *Approve w/o comment - (Neg. Consent)*

Remarks: SECY-93-175: (Neg. Consent) - Location of the backup emergency operations facility for the Zion nuclear station

*OK per Comm. Curtiss  
6/24/93*

Due to JRC: 6/30/93  
(date)

File:

*9306300288*

NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: SAMUEL J. CHILK, SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION  
FROM: COMMISSIONER CURTISS  
SUBJECT: SECY-93-166 - STAFF RECOMMENDATION FOR  
PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES  
AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

APPROVED X/in part      DISAPPROVED X/in part      ABSTAIN \_\_\_\_\_

NOT PARTICIPATING \_\_\_\_\_      REQUEST DISCUSSION \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

See attached comments.

John R. Utin  
SIGNATURE

RELEASE VOTE   X  /

June 28, 1993  
DATE

WITHHOLD VOTE   /  /

ENTERED ON "AS" YES   X   No \_\_\_\_\_

9307080061

Commissioner Curtiss' comments on SECY-93-166:

I approve the staff's proposals to --

1. modify the design basis threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage to include a land vehicle for the transport of personnel, hand-carried equipment and/or explosives;
2. modify 10 CFR 73.55 to reflect the change to the DBT and allow for alternative security measures when establishing standoff distances; and
3. undertake expedited rulemaking to implement these changes.

With regard to the standard to be applied in determining when alternative security measures would be accepted, I do not support the use of the staff's proposed "disproportionate cost" test. In my view, the existing backfit standard contained in 10 CFR 50.109 has generally served us quite well, and I see no reason to depart from that standard here. Adoption of the proposed "disproportionate cost" concept would introduce a separate set of standards and criteria to be applied in the backfit context and needlessly require the development of additional definitions and guidance on the application of the new standard. Rather than invent a new concept for application in the security area, I would recommend that we rely on the normal backfit analysis required by 10 CFR 50.109 to determine whether the "costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria" are justified. In this regard, I would propose that we modify the last sentence of the proposed subsection 73.55(c)(8) to remove the "disproportionate cost" concept and refer to the normal backfit analysis as follows --

The Commission will accept the proposed alternative measures if they provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb, and it is determined by an analysis under 10 CFR 50.109 that the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.



# POLICY ISSUE

(NEGATIVE CONSENT)

SECY-93-160

June 8, 1993

FOR: The Commissioners

FROM: James M. Taylor  
Executive Director  
for Operations

SUBJECT: SECTION 208 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES  
FOR JANUARY-MARCH 1993

PURPOSE: Approval of Final Draft

DISCUSSION:

Enclosure 1 is a proposed draft letter to the Speaker of the House and the

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER CURTISS

Date: 6/14/93

Reviewed By: Kevin Connaughton

Coordinated With:

Recommend: *Approve w/o comment KTC*

Remarks: SECY-93-160 -- Negative Consent

Section 208 Report to the Congress on Abnormal Occurrences  
for January - March 1993

Action  
Due Date: 6/24/93 *60*

*Closed 6/21/93*

Due to JRC: \_\_\_\_\_  
(date)

TO BE MADE AVAILABLE  
WHEN THE BIRTH DATE IS  
AVAILABLE File:

*9306160124*

NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: SAMUEL J. CHILK, SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION  
FROM: COMMISSIONER CURTISS  
SUBJECT: SECY-93-144 - CLARIFICATION OF ASSESSMENT  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SITING CRITERIA AND  
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES-PROPOSED RULEMAKING

APPROVED X/with  
edits      DISAPPROVED \_\_\_\_\_      ABSTAIN \_\_\_\_\_  
NOT PARTICIPATING \_\_\_\_\_      REQUEST DISCUSSION \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

See attached edits.

James R. Utin  
SIGNATURE

RELEASE VOTE   X  /

June 3, 1993  
DATE

WITHHOLD VOTE   /  /

ENTERED ON "AS" YES   X   No \_\_\_\_\_

~~93-0020194~~

## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 60

RIN 3150-AE40

Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes  
in Geologic Repositories

## Investigation and Evaluation of Potentially Adverse Conditions

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: The <sup>Commission's</sup> proposed rule <sup>to</sup> ~~would~~ clarify <sup>its regulations</sup> ~~Commission policy~~ with respect to the consideration of certain defined geologic and other conditions that, if present, are potentially adverse to the ability of a geologic repository to meet the prescribed performance objectives with respect to isolation of high-level radioactive waste. The ~~primary reason for the~~ proposed revisions <sup>Attempt to make clear</sup> ~~is to clarify~~ that the adequacy of a license applicant's investigations and evaluations <sup>will</sup> ~~must~~ be judged in terms of their significance <sup>to compliance with post-closure</sup> ~~of information that has been obtained or might be obtained in relation to these performance objectives.~~ In addition, <sup>g</sup> the provisions that deal with ~~the way~~ <sup>g</sup> information ~~must~~ <sup>be</sup> presented <sup>anon</sup> in the license application would be <sup>completely separated</sup> ~~moved~~ from the technical criteria <sup>and moved</sup> to the section that defines the required contents of the license application.

Each of these terms gives rise to a regulatory uncertainty. Specifically, the issue concerns the standard by which the "adequacy" of the investigation and evaluation is to be measured: Is the proper standard that which is relevant and material to judging whether the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste have been met, or is it some other standard, (and if so, what standard)?<sup>2</sup> In addition, the CNWRA's <sup>ed</sup>interpretation ~~was~~

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<sup>2</sup> The full text of the pertinent regulation, 10 CFR 60.122(a), reads as follows:

(a)(1) A geologic setting shall exhibit an appropriate combination of the conditions specified in paragraph (b) of this section so that, together with the engineered barriers [sic] [barrier] system, the favorable conditions present are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste will be met.

(2) If any of the potentially adverse conditions specified in paragraph (c) of this section is present, it may compromise the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste. In order to show that a potentially adverse condition does not so compromise the performance of the geologic repository the following must be demonstrated:

(i) The potentially adverse human activity or natural condition has been adequately investigated, including the extent to which the condition may be present and still be undetected taking into account the degree of resolution achieved by the investigations; and

(ii) The effect of the potentially adverse human activity or natural condition has been adequately evaluated using analyses which are sensitive to the potentially human activity or natural condition and assumptions which are not likely to underestimate its effect; and

(iii)(A) The potentially adverse human activity or natural condition is shown by analysis pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section not to affect significantly the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste, or

(B) The effect of the potentially adverse human activity or natural condition is compensated by the presence of a combination of the favorable

to require ~~the~~ analyses of  
 that the effect of each potentially adverse condition on  
 performance was called for by 10 CFR 60.122(a)(2) and therefore,  
 10 CFR 60.122(a)(2) ~~was~~ <sup>constitutes</sup> a separate regulatory requirement  
 independent of the performance objectives in 10 CFR 60.112 and 10  
 CFR 60.113. The CNWRA concluded that even if compliance was  
 demonstrated with 10 CFR 60.112 and 10 CFR 60.113, additional  
 demonstration of compliance would be necessary to address the  
 potentially adverse conditions listed in 10 CFR 60.122(c).

#### Discussion

The Commission believes that its intention has been  
 consistent and manifest throughout the rulemaking process. The  
 Commission has endeavored  
~~fundamental issue has always been~~ to establish a set of  
 regulations that would facilitate the task of making a judgment,  
 in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, of whether the proposed  
 disposal of high-level waste in a geologic repository would  
 create any unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the  
 public. Although certain requirements may be stated in  
 unqualified terms, we have noted that we do not expect that  
 complete assurance that they will be met can be presented. A  
 reasonable assurance, on the basis of the record before the  
 Commission, that the objectives and criteria will be met, is the

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characteristics so that the performance objectives  
 relating to isolation of the waste are met, or  
 (C) The potentially adverse human activity or  
 natural condition can be remedied. (Emphasis added.)

general standard that is required. In particular, proof of the future performance of engineered barrier systems and the geologic setting over time periods of many hundreds or many thousands of years is not to be had, in the ordinary sense of the word, <sup>What is required</sup> ~~we~~

is ~~require~~ <sup>require</sup> reasonable (not complete) assurance that the outcome will

~~The Commission has stated~~ be in conformance with those objectives and criteria.  
 The Commission has stated that <sup>d</sup> demonstration of compliance, ~~we have stated,~~ <sup>g</sup> will <sup>rely on</sup> involve the use of data from accelerated tests and predictive models that are supported by such measures as field and laboratory tests, monitoring data, and natural analog studies. 10 CFR 60.101(a)(2)

~~When we alluded to~~ Reasonable assurance that the outcome will be in conformance with the stated objectives and criteria, <sup>represents</sup> ~~we had in mind~~ a judgment ~~(made with reasonable assurance)~~ that the overall performance of the geologic repository, and the performance of particular subsystems, would achieve specified levels of radionuclide containment and isolation, <sup>coupled with an expectation</sup> ~~and~~ that certain design and quality assurance features would be incorporated so as to enhance confidence that such performance would be achieved. ~~our~~ Concern with potentially adverse conditions was spelled out clearly: it was to assure that they would be "...assessed in order to assure that they will not compromise the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives [relating to isolation of the waste]."  
 (Emphasis added.) 48 FR 28194, 28201, June 21, 1983 (final

rulemaking). This is the test that we had in mind then and that we will continue to apply in the future.

The source of the regulatory uncertainty identified by CNWRA.

<sup>It was</sup> our inclusion in the technical criteria of provisions that relate not to the performance of the repository, but to methodology for demonstrating that performance. <sup>that gave rise to</sup> Such matters are ordinarily dealt with in procedural sections of the regulations, and in particular <sup>o</sup> these sections that define the requirements for the content of license applications, and ~~they~~ should have been treated in <sup>like</sup> this manner in 10 CFR Part 60, ~~as well~~. Had this been done, there would be no uncertainty. The rule would then have been <sup>a</sup> straightforward <sup>reflection of the Commission's intent.</sup> DOE would need to demonstrate that the performance objectives would be met, taking into account the presence of potentially adverse conditions. DOE would not have to demonstrate, as well, that there had been an "adequate investigation" or "adequate evaluation" above and beyond what might be needed to show, with reasonable assurance, that the performance objectives related to isolation of the waste would be met. We do, in fact, anticipate that quite thorough investigations will be undertaken and that very sophisticated evaluations will be needed, but the measure to be applied is ~~tied~~ <sup>only</sup> directly to that which is relevant and material to a finding that the performance objectives have been satisfied.

~~We also take this opportunity~~ <sup>It is also appropriate</sup> to clarify our expectation that the evaluation of potentially adverse conditions ~~would~~ <sup>should</sup> take into account the interaction of such conditions. Indeed, it would be inappropriate to attempt to evaluate a condition such as evidence of dissolution (60.122(c)(10)) without considering, as well, the potential for changes in hydrologic conditions resulting from reasonably foreseeable climatic changes (60.122(c)(6)). ~~After all, as indicated above,~~ <sup>The very</sup> reason for requiring consideration of ~~the~~ <sup>g</sup> potentially adverse conditions ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> to ensure that the performance objectives ~~would~~ <sup>will</sup> be met and this ~~could hardly~~ <sup>cannot</sup> be accomplished if combined effects ~~were~~ <sup>are</sup> not taken into account. ~~To be sure,~~ <sup>while</sup> the regulation does refer to evaluating the significance of each of the potentially adverse conditions, ~~this~~ <sup>is</sup> was intended to mean that the evaluation must demonstrate how the potentially adverse condition ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> taken into account in meeting the performance objectives (i.e., the application would need to describe the presence of the condition and consider that condition in the evaluation of performance). ~~However,~~ <sup>The</sup> rule does not and was never intended to exclude the consideration of other conditions, whether favorable or potentially adverse, that would have a bearing upon performance and the sensitivity of such performance to the potentially adverse condition in question. That is exactly what is called for by 10 CFR 60.21(c)(1)(ii)(B), which ~~requires~~ <sup>requires</sup> the applicant's Safety Analysis Report to include an ~~assessment~~ <sup>assessment</sup> that, among other things, analyzes "... the extent to which it contributes or

detracts from isolation." Although we <sup>acknowledge</sup> recognize that the wording of the existing rule <sup>could</sup> might be read to call for a more compartmentalized approach to the analysis of potentially adverse conditions, we view that construction as inappropriate.

The first ~~proposed~~ change that is ~~being~~ proposed, therefore, is to remove from the technical criteria that portion of the text that deals with methodology, as contrasted with the physical characteristics of the site. Section 60.122 will still include a list of favorable conditions and potentially adverse conditions. Section 60.122(a)(1) will continue to require that the geologic setting exhibit an appropriate combination of favorable conditions to provide reasonable assurance that the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste (clarified by incorporating specific reference to 10 CFR 60.112 and 10 CFR 60.113) will be met. However, the treatment of potentially adverse conditions would be modified. Instead of setting out a methodology for demonstrating that a potentially adverse condition does not compromise the geologic repository's ability to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste, this portion of the rule would simply declare that the presence of potentially adverse conditions must not so compromise repository performance. ~~Under § 60.21(c)(1)(ii)(B)~~, the applicant would still be required to carry out the investigations needed to determine whether or not a potentially adverse condition may be present.

NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: SAMUEL J. CHILK, SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION

FROM: COMMISSIONER CURTISS

SUBJECT: SECY-93-136 - UPDATE ON THE RESOLUTION OF  
THE UTAH LAND OWNERSHIP ISSUE

APPROVED  X/with  
comment DISAPPROVED  ABSTAIN   
NOT PARTICIPATING  REQUEST DISCUSSION

COMMENTS:

See attached comments.

John R. Utter  
SIGNATURE

June 22, 1993

DATE

RELEASE VOTE

WITHHOLD VOTE

ENTERED ON "AS" Yes  No

4307080119

Commissioner Curtiss' comments on SECY-93-136:

I agree with the Chairman's comments, as well as with Commissioner de Plaque's recommendation to proceed with an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the issue of applying the Utah decision on a generic basis. In this regard, I would recommend that the advantages and disadvantages of codifying the option for alternatives to government ownership be fully developed in conjunction with the notice and carefully considered by the Commission.

If, as I understand the case to be, the trust fund applies only to the non-mixed low-level wastes, I would suggest that in describing the situation in Utah in the future, staff make this distinction clear, since separate funding arrangements have been made for the mixed waste portions of the site. I also recommend that we suggest that the State consider whether it should require some level of trust fund to support the potential activities contained in the deed covenants after the license is terminated. The plans indicate that the entire remaining trust would be returned to the licensee at the end of the licensed active control period. In my view, such funding would be a reasonable additional level of compensation for government ownership that, while not necessary, would be prudent.

Finally, I commend the staff for defining an acceptable deed instrument and thereby resolving this issue.



May 3, 1993

**POLICY ISSUE**

SECY-93-118

(NEGATIVE CONSENT)

For: The Commissioners

From: James M. Taylor  
Executive Director for Operations

Subject: STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION OF  
EXTERNAL EVENTS (IPEEE)

Purpose:

To inform the Commission of the status of the IPEEE program and the intent to allow a delay in submittals of IPEEEs until 1997.

Background:

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER CURTISS

Date: 5/5/93

Action

Reviewed By: Joe Gray

Due Date: 5/18/93

Coordinated With: Dave Trimble *Kevin C.*

Recommend:

Remarks: SECY-93-118: (Neg. Consent) Status of the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE)

*Approve as-is*

*OK per Comm. Curtiss  
5/6/93  
act*

Due to JRC: 5/17/93  
(date)

File:



# RULEMAKING ISSUE

(NEGATIVE CONSENT)

SECY-93-117

May 3, 1993

FOR:

The Commissioners

FROM:

James M. Taylor  
Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED RULE, 10 CFR 50.54(bb), "NOTIFICATION OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND FUNDING PLANS BY LICENSEES OF PREMATURELY SHUT DOWN POWER REACTORS"

PURPOSE:

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER CURTISS

Date: 5/5/93

Reviewed By: Joe Gray

Coordinated With: Dave Trimble

Recommend:

Remarks:

SECY-93-117: Proposed Rule, 10 CFR 50.54(bb), "Notification of spent fuel management and funding plans by licensees of prematurely shut down power reactors"  
(NEGATIVE CONSENT PAPER)

*Recommend that you not object.*

*Dave*

*OK per Comm Curtiss - 5/18/93  
at*

Due to JRC: 5/17/93  
(date)

File:

NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: SAMUEL J. CHILK, SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION  
FROM: COMMISSIONER CURTISS  
SUBJECT: SECY-93-113 - ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION  
INFORMATION FOR 10 CFR PART 54,  
"REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL OF OPERATING  
LICENSES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS"

APPROVED \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVED \_\_\_\_\_ ABSTAIN \_\_\_\_\_  
NOT PARTICIPATING \_\_\_\_\_ REQUEST DISCUSSION \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

*CLOSED:*

*See note on COMSECY-93-029  
dated 5/20/93*

\_\_\_\_\_  
SIGNATURE

RELEASE VOTE

\_\_\_\_\_  
DATE

WITHHOLD VOTE

ENTERED ON "AS" YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: SAMUEL J. CHILK, SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION  
FROM: COMMISSIONER CURTISS  
SUBJECT: SECY-93-112 - PROPOSED RULEMAKING TO  
ELIMINATE REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR COMMISSION  
APPROVAL FOR A SPECIFIC LICENSE FOR AN ISFSI  
UNDER 10 CFR PART 72

APPROVED X      DISAPPROVED \_\_\_\_\_      ABSTAIN \_\_\_\_\_  
NOT PARTICIPATING \_\_\_\_\_      REQUEST DISCUSSION \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: *See attached edit.*

*Jim R. Utin*  
SIGNATURE  
5-13-93  
DATE

RELEASE VOTE / X /

WITHHOLD VOTE /    /

ENTERED ON "AS" YES X No \_\_\_\_\_

*436660414*

designed and constructed for interim spent fuel storage, after use of the nuclear fuel as a source of energy in a nuclear power reactor, until its shipment to the U.S. Department of Energy's planned geologic repository for disposal of radioactive waste. Part 72 is limited in scope to the temporary storage (up to 20 years with renewal at the option of the NRC) of spent fuel in an ISFSI. This rulemaking proposes a change to improve the Commission's procedures for the issuance of a specific ISFSI license to a qualified applicant.

#### Discussion

The Commission is proposing to amend the procedures that authorize the NRC Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (or the Director's designee) to issue a specific license for the interim storage of spent fuel in an ISFSI under 10 CFR Part 72, after the NRC completes a comprehensive, documented, public health and safety review; prepares an environmental assessment and determines that issuing the license would conform to all statutory and regulatory requirements; and after an opportunity for a public hearing has been offered and any requested hearing is complete. The amendment would end the current internal practice under which the Director obtained the Commission's express authorization for each ISFSI license, after the NRC review and determination that a license should be issued



**POLICY ISSUE**  
(NEGATIVE CONSENT)

*Staff proposals  
for PIUS (option 2 - 0.3 FTE  
per year) & CANDU  
(option 3 - 1.7 FTE/yr)  
don't seem unreasonable*

April 20, 1993

SECY-93-104

**FOR:** The Commissioners  
**FROM:** James M. Taylor  
Executive Director of Operations  
**SUBJECT:** PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE NUCLEAR  
REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) REVIEWS OF THE ADVANCED REACTOR  
(PRISM, MHTGR, AND PIUS) AND CANDU 3 DESIGNS

PURPOSE:

To provide the Commission with a program analysis and recommendations concerning NRC preapplication reviews of advanced reactor (PRISM, MHTGR, and

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER CURTISS

Date: 4/22/93

Action

Reviewed By: Joe Gray

*J* → *Approve*

Due Date: 5/4/93

Coordinated With: Kevin Connaughton

Recommend:

Remarks: SECY-93-104 (Negative Consent) Program analysis & recommendations concerning the NRC reviews of the advanced reactor (PRISM, MHTGR, and PIUS) and CANDU 3 designs

Due to JRC: 5/3/93  
(date)

File:

*Closed 5/1/93  
no telecom*



**POLICY ISSUE**  
**(Notation Vote)**

April 16, 1993

SECY-93-102

FOR: The Commissioners

FROM: James M. Taylor  
Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: REVIEW AND UPDATE OF OPTIONS TO PROTECT  
AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AND  
RELATED THREAT INFORMATION

PURPOSE:

To provide information regarding the 1985-1988 Commission deliberations on the need to require nuclear power reactors to

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER CURTISS

Date: 4/19/93

Action

Reviewed By: Joe Gray

Due Date: 5/3/93

Coordinated With:

Recommend:

Remarks: SECY-93-102: Review and Update of options to protect against malevolent use of vehicles and related threat information

*Closed -  
No vote  
necessary  
on this.*

Due to JRC: 4/30/93  
(date)

File:

*Gray  
5/14/93*

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER CURTISS

Date: 3/31/93

Action

Reviewed By: Joe Gray

Due Date: 4/1/93

Coordinated With: Janet Kotra

Recommend:

Remarks: SECY-93-076 (negative consent)

"LIST OF APPROVED SPENT FUEL STORAGE CASKS: ADDITIONS:

No objection notified K. Hart 11:50 am 3/31/93 jpk

Due to JRC: 3/31/93 (date)

File:

Attachment: As stated

cc: EDO OGC