

065

January 3, 1973

All Water Reactors\*

REVIEW OF CONSEQUENCES OF A PIPE FAILURE OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT

AEC/L letters dated December 14, 15, 18, 21 and 22, 1972 ask all utilities that operate nuclear power plants or are planning to build such plants to assess the effects on essential auxiliary systems of a major break of the largest main steam or feedwater line outside of containment. The information requested includes:

1. Protection needed against pipe whip
2. Criteria for piping design
3. Criteria for assumed failures
4. Procedures used to assure structural integrity
5. Design loads, including pressure and temperature transients, for various compartments and structures
6. Assurance of control room habitability
7. Potential for flooding vital equipment
8. Means for leak detection
9. Emergency procedures
10. Description of the method used to demonstrate no adverse effects

No ACRS action appears warranted. The attached material may be discarded upon completion of your review.

*J. C. McKinley*  
 J. C. McKinley  
 Senior Staff Assistant

- \*Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1
- Oconee Units 1, 2, & 3
- Midland Units 1 & 2
- Crystal River Unit 3
- Three Mile Island Unit 2
- Rancho Seco
- Davis Besse
- North Anna Units 1-4
- Hatch Unit 1
- Fermi Unit 2
- Fort St Vrain
- Hanford 2
- Shoreham ✓
- Limerick
- Susquehanna
- Bailly
- Grand Gulf

cc: ACRS Members

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