LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE CODE		LICENSE NUMBER		LICENSE TYPE		CAT	
V A S P S 1	(2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0	(3)	4 1 1 1 1	(4)		(5)

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER		EVENT DATE		REPORT DATE	
L	(6)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	(7)	0 3 0 7 8 3	(8)	0 4 0 4 8 3	(9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On March 7, 1983 with fuel movement in progress, 1-GN-3 (nitrogen purge to 'C' stm. Gen) was removed which resulted in an unisolated path from the containment to the outside atmosphere and thus a violation of refueling containment integrity. This is contrary to T.S.-3.10.A.1 and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b.(2). A CAT I filtering system was maintaining a negative pressure in the containment. The pathway was isolated upon discovery, therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
H B (11)	D (12)	Z (13)	V A L V E X (14)	E (15)	D (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 3	—	0 1 5	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	G (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	V 1 3 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

When repair activities were initiated, the plant was not in a Refueling Shutdown condition. Repair activities were delayed waiting an engineering study for valve replacement. When repair activities were reinitiated the plant mode had changed, i.e. fuel movement. Upon discovery of the violation, the open ended pipe was capped.

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
H (28)	0 0 0 (29)	N/A	A (31)	Maintenance activities

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
0 0 0 (40)	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
Z (42)	N/A

8304130297 830404
PDR ADOCK 05000280
S PDR

PUBLICITY

ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
N (44)		

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson PHONE (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 83-015/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 03-07-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: LOSS OF REFUELING INTEGRITY

1. Description of the Event

While Unit 1 refueling operations were in progress, 1-GN-3, a 2" valve in the nitrogen purge line to "C" steam generator, was removed for maintenance purposes. "C" steam generator secondary hand hole covers had been removed to facilitate sludge lancing operations. Thus, the removal resulted in an unisolated path from containment atmosphere, through the steam generator and 2" nitrogen purge line, to the Main Steam Valve House atmosphere. This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.10.A.1 and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

During refueling operations, containment atmosphere is exhausted through the CAT I filters. Since capacity of the containment exhaust fans is greater than the supply fans, a negative pressure results in containment, and any small leakage is into containment. Therefore, the health and safety of the public was not affected.

3. Cause:

At the time operations personnel authorized the work to be performed, plant conditions were such that repair or replacement of the valve was permissable. When maintenance personnel examined the valve, they determined that it could not be repaired and it had to be replaced. An engineering study was performed to facilitate valve replacement, and commencement of work was delayed. During this time period, refueling operations were initiated and the "C" steam generator hand hole covers were removed. Thus, when the valve was removed, a direct path opened from the Main Steam Valve House atmosphere to containment atmosphere.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

Fuel movement was stopped and the 2" opening was temporarily sealed with a plastic pipe cap and tape. Subsequently, refueling operations were terminated while the new valve was welded in place.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The refueling containment integrity checklist has been reviewed and as result improved guidance, for the identification of indirect paths to the containment atmosphere, will be included.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The action taken in section 5 above should preclude recurrence of this event.

7. Generic Implications

None.