



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD  
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

DCD/DCB  
(CRIDS)

APR 18 1991

Docket No. 50-254  
Docket No. 50-265

Commonwealth Edison Company  
ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed  
Senior Vice President  
Opus West III  
1400 Opus Place  
Downers Grove, IL 60515

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: LEAKING BATTERY ALLEGATION (RIII-90-A-0002) - QUAD CITIES

Thank you for your letter dated December 14, 1990 in response to our October 31, 1990 letter concerning an allegation associated with the discovery of a leaking battery cell which appeared to have been inadvertently damaged. In our letter, we requested that you review your investigation and submit your results to the NRC.

Your response provided two conclusions:

- (1) the initial investigations were poorly performed and did not identify the root cause;
- (2) there is no evidence that personnel did not cooperate with the investigation.

While your response revised the conclusions of earlier investigations, it failed to reach any conclusions on the root cause(s) regarding the leaking/damaged battery cell. The corrective actions you described deal with improving the conduct of investigations. The earlier investigation did find substantial evidence that something had been dropped onto the battery causing slight damage. We understand that you have revised work procedures to provide cautions regarding work over these batteries.

This matter was also the subject of an investigation performed by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) at your facility. This investigation was also inconclusive regarding the cause for battery cell damage and leakage. Because an event that may have resulted in damage to the battery cell would not have been recognized immediately as significant, the NRC concluded that there was not a sufficient regulatory basis to continue the investigation. A copy of the Synopsis of Investigation Report 03-90-006 is enclosed with this letter. This appears to be an isolated event with no adverse consequence to safety; therefore, we consider this allegation closed.

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
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APR 18 1991

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you may have relative to this letter or the referenced material.

Sincerely,



Edward G. Greenman, Director  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

OI Investigation Report  
03-90-006 Synopsis

cc w/enclosure:

D. Galle, Vice President - BWR  
Operations  
T. Kovach, Nuclear  
Licensing Manager  
R. L. Bax, Station Manager  
DCD/DCB (RIDS)  
OC/LFDCB  
Resident Inspectors LaSalle  
Dresden, Quad Cities  
Richard Hubbard  
J. W. McCaffrey, Chief, Public  
Utilities Division  
L. Olshan, NRR LPM  
Robert Neumann, Office of Public  
Counsel, State of Illinois Center  
D. Funk, EICS  
E. Pawlik, OI, RIII

## SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated based upon a request made by the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III (RIII), on March 9, 1990. That request was predicated on an incident involving unexplained damage which required the replacement of a 250 volt battery cell (No. 69) at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS), Cordova, Illinois. Investigation of the incident by the licensee determined that two separate crews of workers could have been responsible for the damage. One group, a team of contract electricians, made rather vague claims that the other group, QCNPS electrical maintenance workers, dropped a lifting device which may have caused the damage. The QCNPS employees denied in writing that the event occurred, claimed no responsibility for any subsequent damage, and refused to be interviewed by the licensee's investigator.

Since the licensee's investigation failed to resolve the matter, OI was requested to establish whether the responsible individuals had, by allegedly deliberately covering up the incident, failed to fulfill the reporting requirements enunciated in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

The investigation by OI did not identify either the party or parties responsible for the damage. However, OI did determine that the event which ultimately resulted in damage to the battery cell (No. 69) would not have been recognized immediately as "significant" (as stated in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI) since the cell which sustained the brunt of the impact (cell No. 49) remained in service, and the cell which sustained secondary impact (cell No. 69) showed no evidence of damage until approximately 48 hours after the event.

The RIII technical staff reviewed this preliminary information developed during the OI investigation and determined that there was no longer a sufficient regulatory basis under the applicable 10 CFR sections to sustain the staff's original premise in their request for investigation. Lacking a regulatory basis, the case accordingly was closed.