

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

March 21, 1983

BLRD-50-439/83-18

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - CONSOLIDATED CONTROLS MAIN CONTROL ROOM
SWITCH MODULE INCORRECTLY WIRED - BLRD-50-439/83-18 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
Linda Watson on February 18, 1983 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as
NCR 2243. Enclosed is our final report. We consider 10 CFR Part 21
applicable to this deficiency.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with
R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

D S Kammer

for L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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NRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2
CONSOLIDATED CONTROLS MAIN CONTROL ROOM SWITCH
MODULE INCORRECTLY WIRED

NCR 2243
BLRD-50-439/83-18
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Main Control Room Switch Module 5N3-15B, S/N 2536, in panel 2IM0204, slot 2CM-IHIS-001A, had two station wires connected incorrectly (station A, point 5 connected to station B, point 14, instead of to station B, point 5, and station A, point 6, connected to station B, point 5, instead of to station B, point 14).

These switches were supplied to TVA by the Consolidated Controls Corporation (CCC), Bethel, Connecticut.

TVA considers this deficiency to be a random wiring error on the part of the vendor. TVA believes that the deficient Consolidated Controls QA program was the cause for TVA receiving this defective switch. NCR 1950 was reported earlier by TVA to cover the Consolidated Controls QA program deficiency.

Safety Implications

The subject switch could have been randomly installed in the Main Control Room to control a safety-related system/component. Failure of the switch to provide proper control could adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.

Corrective Action

The Division of Construction has completed rewiring the switch module to fully conform to all TVA and vendor standards and drawings. This rewiring consisted of swapping the station B connection points of two wires, which were in close proximity.

The switch module was manufactured and shipped to TVA prior to the identification of generic QA/QC concerns by TVA in CDRs 438/82-68 and 439/82-61, the NRC audit of the vendor in July 1982, and the TVA audit of the vendor in October 1982. The vendor's responses to the two audits noted above have been approved by both the NRC and TVA.

Completion of actions to prevent recurrence concerning the consolidated controls QA program is contingent upon TVA's approval of the corrective actions proposed by CCC for their QA/QC program and will be provided in TVA's final report on NCR 1950.