

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'TEVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

09		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22				
0	9	S	D	E		X		P	I	P	X	X	A		Z				
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.									
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32				
8	0	—		7	5	6	—	0	3	X	—	1							
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50		
Z	F	Z		Z		0	0	0	0	Y		N		A		X	9	9	9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The leakage of the bellows was due to cracks in the test connection  
1 1 tubing which were apparently caused by the weight of a test connection  
1 2 valve 2T23-F125. The valve was removed & a threaded cap installed on  
1 3 the line. The bellows was retested successfully prior to startup & had  
1 4 an as-left leakage of 0 accm.

7	8	9	FACILITY STATUS										OTHER STATUS										METHOD OF DISCOVERY										DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION									
1	5	H	28	0	0	0	29	NA	30	B	31	Performed LLRT																		32												
7	8	9	ACTIVITY CONTENT										AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY										LOCATION OF RELEASE																			
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36																																	
7	8	9	RELEASED OF RELEASE																																							

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA	

PERSONNEL INJURIES				8304050203 830322	
NUMBER				PDR ADOCK 05000366	
DESCRIPTION				S PDR	
1	2	3	4	5	6
0	0	0	40	NA	

		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)
		TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
1	9	Z	(42) NA	

7	8	9	10	8
PUBLICITY				NRC USE ONLY
ISSUE DESCRIPTION (45)				

ISSUED		DESCRIPTION	
2	0	NA	

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NRC USE ONLY

000007-9265

LER #: 50-366/1980-156, Rev. 1  
Licensee: Georgia Power Company  
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch  
Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report  
for LER 50-366/1980-156, Rev. 1  
Update Report - Previous Report Date 12-11-80

On 11-12-80, with Unit 2 in the refueling mode, a local leak rate test was performed per procedure HNP-2-3952, "PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PERIODIC TYPE B AND TYPE C LEAKAGE TESTS", on the RHR return "A" line inboard and outboard thermal expansion bellows of drywell penetration X13A. On 11-13-80, the LLRT coordinator reviewed the data in which the outboard bellows were found to be leaking at 400 acm, and the inboard bellows' leakage was such that the test volume could not be pressurized. Since the test volume on the inboard bellows could not be pressurized it must be assumed that the .60 Ia overall allowable leakage limit of Tech. Specs. 3.6.1.2.B.1 would have been exceeded. In addition good engineering practices dictate that the 400 acm leakage of the outboard bellows be repaired to prevent the leakage from exceeding specified criteria. Since the leakages were due to cracks in the testline which communicates to the area between the inner and outer ply of the bellows, primary containment was maintained as required by Tech. Specs. 3.6.1.1 by the inner ply of the bellows. The bellows will be retested by LLRT procedure HNP-2-3952 when the test connections are repaired prior to startup to verify that test connections are repaired prior to startup to verify that primary containment integrity had been maintained (also to verify successfulness of modification). This is a repetitive occurrence - see LER 50-366/1980-155. There were no effects on public health or safety due to this event.

The leakage of both expansion bellows was due to cracks in the 1/4" nominal sch 80 carbon steel pipe of the test connection which were probably caused by stresses resulting from the pipe supporting the weight of gate valves which were installed on the test connection piping. The valves on the test connection piping are neither required by any acceptance criteria nor do they serve any purpose; therefore, the valves should be removed from all drywell penetrations where this condition may exist. Drywell penetrations which have a potential for developing cracks due to this arrangement of the test connection are as follow: the main steam line drywell penetrations (X7A, B, C, D), the condensate drain penetration (X8), the 2 feedwater inlet penetrations (X9A, B), the RCIC steam penetration (X10), the HPCI steam penetration (X11), the RHR suction penetration (X12), the 2 RHR return penetrations (X13A, B), the penetration (X12), the 2 RHR return penetrations (X13A, B), the RWCU supply penetration X14, the 2 core spray penetrations (X16, A, B) and the RPV head spray penetration (X17). Test connections on all of the above thermal expansion bellows were retested by LLRT procedure HNP-2-3952 prior to startup and found to be acceptable. Gate valves were removed and threaded caps installed in their place. Similar problems are non-existent on Unit 1.