NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Attachment 1
4410-83-L-0055

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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LER 83-005/03L-0
Event Date: February 14, 1983

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1305 hours on February 14, 1983, during the performance of Surveillance Procedure 4303-M10 (Chlorine Detector System), it was discovered that the discharge flow from the Air Intake Tunnel (AIT) Chloring Monitor was restricted due to blockage in the discharge piping. This prevented flow through the monitor and, therefore, resulted in the Chlorine Monitor being declared inoperable. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7.

The Chlorine Monitor was repaired and returned to service on February 15, 1983.

This event is considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b) due to entry into and compliance with the requirements of the Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.3.3.7.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of the blockage in the discharge piping was contributed to the fact the pipe discharges at the floor of the Air Intake Tunnel which was covered with frozen water. The presence of water in the Air Intake Tunnel was due, in part, to damaged fire system deluge pipes (Reference LER 83-04).

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate

The AIT Chlorine Monitor was placed in the "actuation" mode. This placed the monitor in a "fail safe" mode such that the Chlorine Monitor Detection System would still meet the Technical Specification intention (i.e. the Control Room ventilation would automatically switch to recirc mode upon receipt of trip signal from the Control Room Chlorine Monitor).

The discharge pipe was disconnected at a coupling joint which was at an elevation above the frozen water (approximately 2 feet of pipe removed). The Surveillance Procedure 4303-M10 was satisfactorily completed, the monitor was taken out of the "actuation" mode, and the monitor declared operable.

Long-Term

The discharge pipe will be left at the 2 feet shortened length.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Chlorine Monitor Meter Relay Assembly Model No. 158A167403, manufactured by Fisher Porter, Warminster, Pennsylvania.