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NOTE TO: Central Files, P1-37

FROM: James L. Milhoan
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SUBJECT: UPDATED MEDIA BRIEFING BACKGROUND PAPER

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LICENSE RENEWAL

Background:

Nuclear power provides approximately 20 percent of the electric power produced in the United States. The term of the initial operating license for a nuclear power plant is limited to 40 years. The first plant's 40-year operating license will expire in the year 2000 and approximately 20 percent of the rest will expire by the end of the year 2010. The Department of Energy estimates that by the year 2000, significant new electric generating capacity will be needed. The timely renewal of these operating licenses for an additional 20 years, where appropriate to do so, represents an important contribution to ensuring an adequate energy supply for the nation during the first half of the 21st century.

License Renewal:

The Atomic Energy Act limits commercial power reactor licenses to 40 years, but also permits the renewal of such licenses. The technical steps, the procedural steps, and the criteria to determine if regulatory requirements are met for license renewal are established in 10 CFR Part 54 and 10 CFR Part 51.

License renewal is based on two key principles. The first principle is that the regulatory process, continued into the extended period of operation, is adequate to ensure that the licensing basis of all currently operating plants provides an acceptable level of safety, with the exception of age-related degradation unique to license renewal and possibly some few other issues. The second principle is that each plant's current licensing basis is required to be maintained during the renewal term including management of aging of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) needed to ensure safe operation and accident mitigation. In other words, the foundation of license renewal rests on the determination that currently operating plants were initially shown to have adequate levels of safety and this level has been enhanced through evolution of the licensing bases. Additionally, NRC regulatory activities have provided ongoing assurance that the licensing bases continue to provide an acceptable level of safety.

Specifically, a nuclear power plant may apply to the Commission to renew its license for a period of 20 years or less. This application would be subject to public hearings - a formal, adjudicatory process. The Commission expects the initial license renewal review process to take approximately 5 years based on a detailed technical review and hearing process. The Commission estimates that an applicant would need approximately 3 to 5 years to prepare its application. An applicant may apply as early as 20 years before the expiration of its current license.

Regulations:

The decision whether to seek license renewal rests with the licensees. They must make business decisions as to whether they are likely to satisfy NRC requirements and evaluate the costs that will be incurred to do so. NRC's task is to establish a reasonable process and safety standards so that they can make timely decisions whether to seek license renewal.

The Commission's current regulations governing license renewal are contained in 10 CFR Part 54 and require the applicant to describe and justify how they will identify and screen all the SSCs important to license renewal (ITLR). SSCs ITLR include all safety related SSCs, all SSCs whose failure could directly affect safety related functions, and all SSCs subject to operability requirements contained in the facility's technical specifications limiting conditions for operation. Further, the regulations include SSCs relied on to demonstrate compliance with the Commission's regulations for fire protection, environmental qualification, pressurized thermal shock, anticipated transients without scram, and station blackout. From this screening, applicants must identify the structures and components that contribute to the performance of a required function or could, if they fail, prevent an SSC ITLR from performing its required function. For each structure and component identified, applicants must demonstrate that age-related degradation unique to license renewal will be addressed by an effective program or that it need not be addressed by an effective program. Applicants may identify areas in which new or modified programs will need to be developed to assess and manage the effects of age-related degradation.

Current Status:

Since publication of the license renewal rule, a number of issues have been identified including the question of whether the maintenance and license renewal rules can be integrated further and the appropriate interpretation of age-related degradation unique to license renewal. In the spring of 1993, the staff proposed approaches to the Commission to resolve these issues. At the Commission's direction, the staff convened a public workshop on September 30, 1993, to examine the extent to which greater reliance could be placed on the maintenance rule and other existing licensee activities for purposes of license renewal. The staff, in SECY-93-331, "License Renewal Workshop Results and Staff Proposals for Revision to 10 CFR Part 54, 'Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants,'" dated December 7, 1993, summarized the results of the workshop and presented its conclusions and proposals regarding an approach to amend the license renewal rule that allows greater credit for existing licensee programs and maintenance rule requirements in the license renewal process. In a memorandum

dated February 3, 1994, the Commission supported the conceptual approach presented in SECY-93-331 and provided the following direction for revising the rule:

1. Give credit for existing programs and activities.
2. Focus on managing the effects of aging rather than the mechanisms.
3. Specify that the scope of SSCs to be reviewed for license renewal are those that are long-lived "passive" for which the failure results in a loss of system function or with explicit time-limited analyses.
4. Retain the integrated plant assessment process but delete the term "age-related degradation unique to license renewal."
5. Simplify the rule.

A parallel rulemaking effort concerning environmental protection issues related to license renewal is presently in progress. The public comment period for the draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) and the proposed rule revision to 10 CFR Part 51 ended in 1992. This rulemaking is based on the belief that certain environmental issues can be treated generically, rather than in each plant specific licensing review. This approach should result in increased regulatory efficiency and a conservation of licensee and NRC staff resources. The public comments on the draft GEIS and proposed rule have raised concerns related to both procedural aspects of the rule and NRC policy for treatment of environmental issues. The Commission has reached agreement with the Council on Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency concerning procedural concerns and expects to resolve the remaining policy issues in the near future. As directed by the Commission, the staff conducted three public workshops in February 1994 in an effort to openly discuss the commenters' concerns and to formulate resolution of policy issues. The Commission's resolution of the procedural aspects of the rule and a discussion of policy issues were made public in SECY-93-032, "10 CFR Part 51 Rulemaking on Environmental Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses," dated February 9, 1993. The staff published for comment in July 1994 a proposed resolution of these policy issues and completion of the environmental protection rulemaking effort is expected by spring 1995.

Industry Activities:

Currently, several individual industry efforts are underway that have progressed to the stage of interaction with the NRC. The Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) Owners Group, representing seven operating B&W units, has formulated a generic license renewal program and the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) has developed a specific approach for its Calvert Cliffs plant. Both the B&W Owners Group and BG&E have submitted methodologies for screening

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SSCs ITLR which the staff has reviewed and issued draft safety evaluation reports. Virginia Power Company (Surry and North Anna) and the Westinghouse and BWR Owners Groups have also met with the staff to discuss their programs for license renewal. The Nuclear Energy Institute is the lead industry group interacting with the NRC on the license renewal rule and policy issues.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF LICENSE RENEWAL

- Nuclear power provides approximately 20 percent of the electric power produced in the United States.
- License renewal could represent an important contribution to the nation's future energy supply.
- Atomic Energy Act limits initial licenses to 40 years but allows for renewal of the license. Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR Part 54 allows for license renewal up to 20 years and provides procedures and requirements for license renewal applications.
- Application review focused on the effects of age-related degradation of structures, systems, and components important to license renewal.
- Generic Environmental Impact Statement and amendment to 10 CFR Part 51 address environmental issues associated with license renewal of nuclear power plants. Revised rule scheduled to be issued in spring 1995.
- Applicants are encouraged to submit their applications at least 5 years prior to expiration of current license.
- Babcock and Wilcox Owners Group is pursuing generic resolution of license renewal issues affecting the B&W plant design. The Westinghouse and BWR Owners Groups have met with the staff to discuss their license renewal programs.
- Baltimore Gas and Electric Company is currently working with staff to resolve license renewal issues for their Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. Preliminary discussions have occurred with Virginia Power Company concerning license renewal applications for Surry and North Anna.
- In two Commission papers in the spring of 1993, the staff described their proposed approach for implementing the integrated plant assessment without a rule change and discussed significant license renewal issues.
- As directed in the Commission's SRM dated June 28, 1993, the NRC staff held a public workshop on September 30, 1993, to receive industry and public input on how best to resolve license renewal issues.
- In SECY-93-331, the NRC staff presented its conclusions and proposals regarding an approach to license renewal that allows greater credit for existing licensee programs and

maintenance rule provisions in the license renewal process. The staff's proposal emphasizes managing the effects of aging rather than managing aging mechanisms.

- Commission's SRM dated February 3, 1994, directed the staff to revise the rule to give credit for existing programs (especially maintenance rule programs), focus on managing effects of aging, revise the scope of SSCs to be reviewed to long-lived passive and those with explicit time-limited analyses, retain the IPA but delete the term "age-related degradation unique to license renewal," and simplify the rule.
- The staff prepared a revised Part 54 rule package which the Commission approved for publication for comment. Publication is expected in the fall of 1994.

DESIGN CERTIFICATION PROCESS

Background:

The Commission has long sought nuclear power plant standardization and the enhanced safety and licensing reform which standardization could make possible. The Commission has also sought to improve the licensing environment for next-generation nuclear power reactors by minimizing the uncertainty in the regulatory process. To do this, the Commission has promulgated 10 CFR Part 52 which sets out a more predictable and stable licensing process. This process includes certification, through rulemaking, of next-generation reactor designs. The design certification process is the key procedural device in the Commission's regulations for bringing about the goals of enhanced safety and early resolution of licensing issues. Also, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 codified major positions of Part 52.

Design Certification:

The Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal was established, in part, to provide a focal point for design certification reviews. The review process for next-generation reactor designs leading to design certification is specified in Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 52. These reviews are expected to result in the certification of individual designs following the completion of a rulemaking process. Design certifications are issued for a duration of fifteen years.

Regulations:

The Commission's regulations governing the design certification process require an applicant to provide the technical information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the standards set out for construction permits and operating licenses in 10 CFR Parts 20, 50, 73, and 100, as those standards are technically relevant to the design of the proposed facility. Subpart B also sets out the requirements and procedures applicable to Commission issuance of rules granting standard design certification separate from the filing of an application for a construction permit or combined license for such a facility. Applicants for design certification must provide information related to the Three Mile Island Requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.34, the postulated site parameters, the resolution of unresolved and generic safety issues, and a design-specific probabilistic risk assessment. Also, applicants must provide inspection, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) and interface requirements.

Current Status:

The schedules for next-generation reactor design reviews are presented in SECY-94-117, "Revised Review Schedules For The

Design Certification Applications." Specifically:

GE Nuclear Energy (GE) Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR): The final design approval for certification was issued in July, 1994.

ABB-Combustion Engineering System 80+: The final design approval for certification was issued in July, 1994 following the review of the staff's safety evaluation report by the Commission.

Westinghouse AP600: The new features of the design are undergoing an intensive testing and verification process by both Westinghouse and the NRC staff, which will extend into 1995. The staff is conducting the detailed design review and expects to issue a Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER) in 1994. After review of SECY-94-117, an expedited review schedule was proposed by Westinghouse and is being evaluated by the staff.

GE Nuclear Energy Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (SBWR): The staff completed an acceptance review of the application submitted by GE and determined that it was acceptable in May 1993. In response to a request by GE, the NRC review of the design-related portion of the SSAR will be performed in series with completing the test programs, which GE believes will add approximately 10 months to the schedule presented in SECY-94-117.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF DESIGN CERTIFICATION PROCESS

- The Commission has long sought nuclear power plant standardization.
- Standardization will enhance safety.
- Licensing environment improved by minimizing uncertainty.
- Design certification is the key procedural device for bringing about early resolution of safety issues.
- Design certification review process specified in Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 52.
- Applicants must provide information related to Three Mile Island requirements, postulated site parameters, the resolution of unresolved generic safety issues, design-specific probabilistic risk assessment, ITAAC, and the interface requirements.
- Design certification reviews assure compliance with standards set out for construction and operating licenses in 10 CFR Parts 20, 50, 73, and 100.
- 10 CFR Part 52 makes public participation more effective by resolving safety issues prior to initiation of construction.
- The goals and objectives of Part 52 were reaffirmed in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
- GE Nuclear Energy Advanced Boiling Water Reactor final design approval for certification was issued in July, 1994.
- ABB-Combustion Engineering System 80+ final design approval for certification was issued in July, 1994 following the review of the staff's safety evaluation report by the Commission.
- Westinghouse AP600 application was accepted December 1992, and the design certification review process, including an intensive testing program, is on-going.
- GE Nuclear Energy SBWR application was accepted May 1993. At GE's request, the NRC review of the design-related portion of the SSAR will be performed in series with completing the test programs, adding approximately 10 months to the schedule.

BELOW REGULATORY CONCERN

Background:

On July 3, 1990, the Commission published a Below Regulatory Concern (BRC) Policy Statement in the Federal Register. The BRC Policy was intended to guide a broad range of Commission actions, including exemptions from Commission regulations, as well as the development of generic health and safety standards such as those involved in the rulemaking on radiological criteria for decommissioning. Subsequent to the publication of the BRC Policy, the Commission placed an indefinite moratorium on the implementation of the BRC Policy because of the broad public concern expressed over the new Policy. Section 2901 of the recently enacted National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (H.R. 1776) revoked the Commission's July, 1990, BRC Policy Statement. Section 2901 also revoked the Commission's policy statement of August 29, 1986 that established criteria to guide Commission exemption decisions on specific low-level radioactive waste streams. This latter policy was developed in order to comply with Section 10 of the Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The Commission issued a formal withdrawal of these two policy statements in the Federal Register on August 24, 1993 (58 FR 44610).

BRC Policy Statement:

The BRC Policy was intended to provide a framework for making decisions on whether to grant specific exemptions in categories such as: (1) the cleanup or release of sites containing residual radioactivity; (2) the distribution of consumer products containing small amounts of radioactivity; (3) the disposal of certain wastes containing very low levels of radioactivity; or (4) the recycling or reuse of radioactive materials that have very low levels of radioactivity. Materials in the above categories with sufficiently low levels of radiation would be exempt from regulatory controls.

However, the issuance of the BRC Policy resulted in extensive comment and public concern. The public reaction resulted in the introduction of legislation on the national level, as well as by a number of State and local governments, that would prevent the BRC Policy from taking effect.

Current Status:

After the Commission placed the indefinite moratorium on the implementation of the BRC Policy, it decided to initiate rulemaking to address the critical need for generic site cleanup and decommissioning standards for NRC-licensed facilities. The Commission determined that it should proceed with a fresh

approach to the development of these standards that is independent of the now defunct BRC Policy. The Commission intends to enhance the participation of affected interests in the rulemaking by soliciting commentary from these interests on the rulemaking issues before the staff develops the draft proposed rule. The Commission has just completed a series of workshops to solicit commentary from affected interests on the fundamental approaches and issues that must be addressed in establishing the radiological criteria for decommissioning. The workshops were held in various locations throughout the United States beginning in January, 1993 and were open to the public. The NRC staff used the workshop comments in the development of a staff draft proposed rule on the site cleanup criteria for decommissioning which was released for public comment in February, 1994. After consideration of the public comments on the staff draft, the draft proposed rule was then submitted to the Commission for review in May, 1994 (SECY-94-150). The Commission approved publication of the proposed site cleanup rule in a June 30, 1994, Staff Requirements Memorandum. It is anticipated that the proposed rule will be published for public comment at the end of August, 1994.

The proposed rule contains a cleanup standard for unrestricted release of a site. This standard is 15 mrem Total Effective Dose Equivalent to the average member of the critical group, and furthermore must be shown by analysis to be ALARA. The "critical group" is defined as those individuals reasonably expected to be the most highly exposed, given the expected future use by the site. The proposed rule also incorporates the groundwater protection limits set forth in the EPA regulations in 40 CFR Part 141. It also provides for release of a site under restricted use conditions if the licensee can demonstrate that cleanup of the site for unrestricted use would be prohibitively expensive, or would not be technically achievable, or would result in net public or environmental harm. The proposed rule would require a licensee to establish a Site Specific Advisory Board (SSAB) composed of a broad spectrum of local interests to provide advice to the licensee on the development of the decommissioning plan for a site that is proposed to be released under restricted use conditions. The proposed rule also provides for public comment on the decommissioning plan submitted by a licensee to the NRC for any facility. With the proposed rule, the Commission is also publishing for public comment a draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement and a staff draft Regulatory Guide on implementation of the proposed rule. The final rule is anticipated to be promulgated in May, 1995.

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HIGHLIGHTS

- The BRC Policy Statement was an attempt to establish a framework for making decisions on whether to grant specific exemptions from Commission regulations.
- The categories considered for possible specific exemptions were:
 - (1) cleanup or release of sites for residual radioactivity;
 - (2) distribution of consumer products containing small amounts of radioactivity;
 - (3) disposal of slight, contaminated wastes; or
 - (4) recycling or reuse of radioactive materials that have very low levels of radioactivity.
- The BRC Policy Statement was issued on July 3, 1990 in the Federal Register.
- In response to public concern, the Commission declared a moratorium on the implementation of the BRC policy on June 28, 1991.
- With this moratorium, NRC initiated a phased consensus-building process on BRC issues.
- On November 12, 1991, potential representatives of environmental interests informed NRC that it would be unable to represent the environmental community in the BRC consensus process. Due to the inability to bring all affected interests to the table, the Commission decided to abandon its effort to build consensus on the BRC Policy. However, the Commission continued its indefinite moratorium on the implementation of the BRC Policy.
- The Commission issued a Federal Register Notice on August 24, 1993 (58 FR 44610) that formally withdrew the BRC Policy of 1986 and the ERC Policy of 1990 in accordance with the National Energy Policy Act of 1992.
- As an alternate to the consensus process, the Commission initiated an enhanced participatory rulemaking that provided affected interests an opportunity for early comment on the rulemaking issues through a series of workshops held in 1993.
- The Commission will issue a proposed rule on the site cleanup criteria for public comment in August, 1994.

RESIDENT INSPECTOR PROGRAM

Background:

The resident inspection program is an important element of the NRC mission to protect public health and safety. The responsibility for safe operation of a nuclear power plant lies with the licensee. The NRC inspection program is designed to make selective examinations to ensure that this responsibility is being met. The NRC inspection program is oriented toward audits; thus, it does not examine every activity or item, but attempts to verify through carefully selected samples, that the activities are being properly conducted or operated to enhance or ensure safety.

Resident Inspectors:

In 1977, the NRC initiated a program to station resident inspectors at each nuclear power plant under construction and in operation. Since that time, the program has expanded to the point where normally at least two resident inspectors are assigned to each site with a nuclear power plant.

The onsite resident inspectors live in the area of the nuclear power plant. They maintain offices at the plant and are normally available during regular business hours. In addition, resident inspectors spend a portion of their time at the plant during weekends and evenings. By assigning resident inspectors to reactor sites, the NRC was able to significantly increase the amount of time inspectors spend at the plant. This increased time provides a greater opportunity to observe and measure licensee activities, verify licensee compliance with NRC requirements, and respond to operational events at the plant. Since a resident inspector is assigned to a single site, the resident inspector acquires more detailed knowledge of that plant and is able to provide more efficient inspections.

The resident inspector provides a continual inspection and regulatory presence, as well as a direct contact between NRC management and the licensee. The resident inspector is also the key individual in the regional office's determination of what additional inspection activities need to be accomplished at a specific plant. The inspection activities of the resident inspector are supplemented by the efforts of engineers and specialists from the regional office staff who perform inspections in a wide variety of engineering and scientific disciplines ranging from civil and structural engineering to health physics and core physics.

Regulations:

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created by an act of Congress in 1946. In the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the AEC was vested with developmental and regulatory functions related to peaceful uses of atomic energy. In 1974, another law was passed (the Energy Reorganization Act) which abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and created two new organizations, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

The NRC has broad authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act). This authority is reflected in Section 1610 of the Act which provides authority for inspections. This authority has been implemented through the promulgation of regulations, specifically 10 CFR 50.70, which requires nuclear power plant licensees to permit inspections deemed necessary by the NRC.

Current Status:

In Fiscal Year 1994, there were 107 operating nuclear power plants, 2 plants that have been shut down indefinitely, and 7 plants with construction permits. For these plants, NRC budgeted 181 resident inspectors and 188 regional office inspectors.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF RESIDENT INSPECTOR PROGRAM

- Licensee is primarily responsible for all safety, safeguards, and environmental measures necessary to protect the public health and the environment.
- The NRC role is to determine how well the licensee is performing and to ensure that the licensee corrects poor performance whenever identified.
- Section 1610 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides authority for inspections. This authority has been implemented through 10 CFR 50.70, which requires nuclear power plant licensees to permit inspections deemed necessary by the NRC.
- In 1977, the NRC initiated the resident inspection program
- The resident inspection program has provided:
 - Increased NRC knowledge of the conditions at licensed nuclear power plants and a better technical base for regulatory actions.
 - Lessened reliance on the accuracy and completeness of licensee records by improving the inspector's ability to independently verify licensee performance.
 - Additional assurance that licensee management control systems are effective and licensee performance is acceptable.
- As of 1994, there were 107 operating nuclear power plants, 2 plants that have been shut down indefinitely, and 7 plants with construction permits. For these plants, NRC budgeted 181 resident inspectors and 188 regional office inspectors.

ASSISTANCE TO REGULATORY BODIES OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

Background:

The NRC has played a leading role during the last five years in cooperative efforts under the Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCC/CNRS) to improve safety in the former Soviet Union, mainly through bilateral information exchanges, joint technical working groups, exchanges of safety inspectors and, recently, in specific coordinated research.

Following the breakup of the USSR in late 1991, relationships with the former republics were maintained as they had been previously with the Soviet Union. For the NRC, these relationships devolved to Russia and Ukraine inasmuch as they were the only former republics with operating nuclear power reactors. (Lithuania, which has a reactor plant, is considered as part of Eastern Europe for assistance purposes.)

Current Status:

The seriousness of safety concerns for Soviet-designed reactors led to a major international effort to organize assistance to the newly independent states. In May 1992, a major program of US assistance for Russia and Ukraine was announced in Lisbon, Portugal. A significant component of this program was nuclear safety. Most of the nuclear safety projects proposed derived from the previous experience with the JCC/CNRS activities.

The four components of the nuclear safety portion of the Lisbon Initiative are:

- Establishment of two regional training centers, one in Russia and the other in Ukraine;
- Immediate operational safety enhancements for certain reactor types;
- Risk reduction measures for other reactor types; and,
- Regulatory assistance in developing consistent and effective safety standards and procedures, as well as training in their use.

Congress approved \$25 million in FY 92 funds to initiate work on these proposals, with \$3.1 million to support NRC regulatory assistance activities.

In July of 1992, the heads of the US, Russian and Ukrainian regulatory agencies met in the US to reach agreement on the action needed to implement the regulatory assistance component.

Twenty projects were identified to assist in the development of legislative, regulatory and liability frameworks for effective, independent regulatory programs.

In September 1992, the NRC signed an Inter-Agency Agreement with the United States Agency for International Development to provide direct assistance to the Russian and Ukrainian regulatory bodies. The United States DOE signed a similar agreement to provide assistance under the Lisbon Nuclear Safety Initiative for the Newly Independent States. Implementation began in October 1992 and will last for about four years.

In March 1993 at the annual JCC/CNRS meeting in Kiev, Ukraine, the JCC/CNRS organizational structure was formally recognized to include the Lisbon Initiative. This meeting was significant in that it marks the first joint meeting of the US-Russia and US-Ukraine JCC/CNRS. The meeting officially established two separate JCC/CNRS's, meeting annually on a trilateral basis, the designation of Co-Chairmen from each country and the joint participation in cooperative and other selected activities. In addition all parties agreed to extend the Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety for another 5 years.

This year, the second joint meeting of the US-Russian Federation and US-Ukraine Joint Coordinating Committees was held in Moscow, May 16-17. This annual meeting was significant in that it focused on important policy and management issues related to reactor safety issues in Russia and Ukraine.

Currently, activities are in progress to ensure effective and timely implementation of the President's Vancouver Summit Assistance to Russia.

Additional project funding became available with the signing of the FY-93 IAA (\$5 million) in June 1993 and the FY-94 IAA (currently \$5.5 million) to support continuation of the NRC activities with Russia and Ukraine. The United States DOE signed a similar agreements to provide assistance under the Newly Independent States Nuclear Safety Initiative.

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EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

Background:

Following the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reexamined the role of emergency planning for protection of the public in the vicinity of nuclear power plants. The Commission issued regulations requiring that before a plant could be licensed to operate, the NRC must have "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." The regulations set forth 16 emergency planning standards and define the responsibilities of licensees and State and local organizations involved in emergency response.

Emergency Planning and Preparedness:

Emergency planning has been adopted as an added conservatism to the NRC's "defense in depth" safety philosophy. Briefly stated, this philosophy: (1) requires high quality in the design, construction and operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likelihood of malfunctions in the first instance; (2) recognizes that equipment can fail and operators can make mistakes, therefore requiring safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunctions will lead to accidents that release fission products from the fuel; and (3) recognizes that, in spite of these precautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen, therefore requiring containment structures and other safety features to prevent the release of fission products offsite. The added feature of emergency planning to the defense in depth philosophy provides that, even in the unlikely event of an offsite fission product release, there is reasonable assurance that emergency protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants.

Regulations:

For planning purposes the Commission has defined a plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) consisting of an area about 10 miles in radius and an ingestion pathway EPZ about 50 miles in radius around each nuclear power plant. EPZ size and configuration may vary in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.

The Commission's 16 emergency planning standards are contained in 10 CFR Part 50.47. They cover the following topics:

1. Assignment of Responsibility
2. Onsite Emergency Organization
3. Emergency Response Support and Resources
4. Emergency Classification System
5. Notification Methods and Procedures
6. Emergency Communications
7. Public Education and Information
8. Emergency Facility and Equipment
9. Accident Assessment
10. Protective Response
11. Radiological Exposure Control
12. Medical and Public Health Support
13. Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post-Accident Operations
14. Exercises and Drills
15. Radiological Emergency Response Training
16. Responsibility for the Planning Effort: Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans

Detailed information about emergency planning and preparedness is contained in Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50 and in NUREG-0654 (FEMA-REP-1), a joint publication of the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) entitled "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."

Current Status

In the U.S., commercial nuclear power reactors are currently licensed to operate at approximately 70 sites in about 30 states. For each there are onsite and offsite emergency plans to assure that adequate protective measures are taken to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Federal oversight of emergency planning for licensed nuclear power plants is shared by the NRC and FEMA through a memorandum of understanding. The memorandum is responsive to the President's decision of December 7, 1979, that FEMA will take the lead in offsite planning and response, his request that NRC assist FEMA in carrying out this role, and the NRC's continuing statutory responsibility for the radiological health and safety of the public.

Each licensee at each site exercises its emergency plan with offsite authorities so that State and local government emergency plans for each operating reactor site are exercised biennially, with participation of State and local governments, within the plume exposure EPZ.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

- Three Mile Island accident focused attention on emergency planning.
- NRC must have reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
- NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.47 contain 16 emergency planning standards.
- Emergency planning is part of NRC's "defense in depth" safety philosophy.
- The plume exposure planning zone (EPZ) extends about 10 miles in radius around each licensed nuclear power plant.
- The ingestion pathway EPZ extends about 50 miles in radius.
- Details about emergency planning are contained in Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50 and in NUREG-0654.
- The NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) share federal oversight of emergency planning for licensed nuclear power plants through a memorandum of understanding.
- Nuclear power reactor licensees exercise their emergency plans with those of offsite authorities biennially.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM

Background:

As a result of the accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, on March 28, 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and others recognized the need to substantially improve the NRC's ability to acquire accurate and timely data on plant conditions during emergencies. The NRC has taken the position that protective actions should be based upon plant conditions. The NRC's role in the event of an emergency is primarily to monitor the licensee to ensure that appropriate recommendations are made regarding offsite protective actions. The NRC provides the licensee with technical analysis and logistic support, supports offsite authorities (including confirmation of the licensee's recommendations), keeps other Federal agencies informed of the emergency and related NRC actions, and briefs the news media concerning the NRC's knowledge of the event. To fulfill this emergency response role, the NRC requires reliable real-time data on plant conditions.

In the past, during an emergency, data on plant conditions was transmitted to the NRC by the licensee through the Emergency Notification System (ENS) (voice communication by telephone). The ENS voice-only emergency communications link required excessive amounts of time for routine transmission of data and for verification or correction of data that appeared questionable. Errors were also encountered in transcribing and interpreting voice transmitted data. Therefore, the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was designed to supplement ENS. The ENS can now be better utilized as the vehicle to discuss accident status and other related matters.

Emergency Response Data System (ERDS):

In the event of an emergency at a nuclear power plant, ERDS provides the NRC Operations Center with timely and accurate information from the installed onsite computer systems. Implementation of ERDS required each licensee (except for Big Rock Point) to establish and maintain a computer program designed to transmit a set of 30 selected critical plant parameters. ERDS is activated by the licensee upon the declaration of an Alert, or higher, emergency class. Tests with ERDS indicate that a computer-based transmission system is far more accurate and timely than relaying information on plant conditions via telephone.

ERDS is utilized during (1) emergencies at licensee's facilities, (2) emergency training exercises, and (3) periodic testing of the links with the NRC Operations Center. Licensees activate their ERDS link to begin data transmission as soon as possible (not to

exceed one hour) after declaring an Alert, or higher, emergency class. ERDS data is available for use by personnel involved in responding to an emergency at the NRC's Headquarters Operations Center, at the NRC's Regional Incident Response Centers, and at the NRC's Technical Training Center in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

If a State is in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone of a nuclear plant, ERDS data is also made available to State governments, upon written request, for their use in emergency response. The State must provide its own workstation and enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the NRC governing the use of the ERDS. NRC and the States of Michigan, Washington, Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Arkansas, Kansas, Arizona, Georgia, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Ohio have signed an ERDS MOU and three (3) other States have inquired about similar MOU's with NRC.

Regulations:

ERDS was initially implemented at licensee facilities on a voluntary basis; however, the intent throughout this process has been to ensure industry-wide implementation of ERDS. Consequently, in parallel with the voluntary program, rulemaking was initiated to require the implementation of ERDS by all utilities (except for Big Rock Point). On August 13, 1991 the final ERDS rule was published in the Federal Register.

The ERDS rule, an amendment to 10 CFR Part 50, requires licensees to initiate data transmissions to the NRC ERDS computer no later than one hour after the declaration of an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency. The licensee is required to provide the necessary software to assemble the data and an output port for each reactor unit in its in-plant computer system. The required emergency data is transmitted to the NRC via an NRC furnished modem over NRC furnished FTS-2000 telephone lines.

The data points included in the transmission are those that, to the greatest extent describe specific parameters listed in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section VI. These parameters are required to be transmitted if they are monitored on plant computer systems. If the data for a selected plant parameter exists, but cannot be transmitted electronically from a licensee's system, the licensee is required to provide that data via the existing telephonic Emergency Notification System.

Each licensee must establish and maintain a configuration control program which will ensure that the NRC is notified of any changes to the ERDS on-site hardware or software. Any hardware or software changes that affect the transmitted data points identified in the ERDS Data Point Library must be reported to the NRC within 30 days after changes are completed. Any changes that could affect the transmission format and communication protocol

to the ERDS must also be provided to the NRC at least 30 days prior to the modification.

An operational verification program has been ongoing since April 5, 1993. Every licensee is required to functionally test their ERDS capabilities on a quarterly basis; States are provided the opportunity to participate in the program. To date, the testing program is proceeding as designed. No significant trend data is yet available.

Current Status:

Twenty-two licensee reactor units successfully implemented ERDS under the voluntary program. The remaining licensees, with the exception of Commanche Peak, Unit 1 and Seabrook, who had schedular exemptions, implemented ERDS prior to the February 13, 1993 deadline. Commanche Peak completed ERDS implementation in February 1994. On June 6, 1994, Seabrook completed the installation and testing of its ERDS; therefore, installation of ERDS as required by the rule is now complete.

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM HIGHLIGHTS

- o NRC requires accurate real time data to support its emergency response role.
- o ERDS provides direct electronic transmission of preselected plant data from on-site computers to the NRC.
- o The system is for emergency use only. Activated by the licensee at or above the alert level of emergency classification.
- o Data available to NRC Operations Center, NRC Regional Incident Response Centers, the NRC Technical Training Center, and States within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone.
- o Data provided includes core and coolant data, containment building data, radioactivity release rates, and meteorological data.
- o All plants required by rule (10 CFR Part 50) to implement ERDS prior to February 13, 1993. (Exceptions include Big Rock Point and plants shut down permanently or indefinitely. Scheduling exemptions were granted to Comanche Peak - Unit 1 and Seabrook.) Comanche Peak - Unit 1 completed ERDS implementation in February 1994.
- o ERDS supplements the currently installed ENS.
- o On June 6, 1994, ERDS is installed and tested at the Seabrook Nuclear Station; thus, installation of ERDS as required by the rule is now complete.

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

Background:

The NRC established the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program following the Three Mile Island 2 (TMI-2) accident. Prior to that time, the NRC relied on periodic NRC inspections to identify problems with plant performance. With the SALP process, the NRC developed a routine, systematic approach for the review of all inspection and licensing activities. The NRC uses the SALP process to synthesize its observations of and insights into a licensee's performance and to identify common themes or symptoms. The primary product of the SALP process is the SALP report. The SALP report documents NRC senior management's observations and conclusions regarding licensee performance. The SALP process does not identify nor propose solutions to problems. The licensee is responsible for ensuring plant safety and establishing effective means to measure, monitor, and evaluate the quality of all aspects of plant operations.

The Commission recently approved a number of changes to the SALP program. These changes include: reducing the number of functional areas from seven to four, changing the SALP Board membership to Senior Executive Service (SES) members only, focusing on the assessment of the most significant issues in each functional area, emphasizing recent (within the last 6 months) licensee performance when determining the SALP category ratings, and reducing the report length to promote clearer communications with the licensee and the public. Further, the staff will issue only a single, final version of the report. The staff implemented these program changes for assessment periods ending after July 19, 1993.

Program Objectives:

The SALP program has four objectives. The first objective is to conduct an integrated assessment of a licensee's safety performance. Senior NRC managers meet at the conclusion of the assessment period to assess licensee performance. A review of the results of NRC inspections and other interactions with the licensee form the basis of the assessment. The second objective of the SALP program is to provide a vehicle for meaningful dialogue with the licensee regarding its safety performance based on the insights gained from the synthesis of NRC observations. The SALP process provides a basis for communications between NRC senior management and licensees regarding plant performance. The third objective of the SALP program is to assist NRC management in making sound decisions regarding allocation of NRC resources used to oversee, inspect, and assess licensee performance. Plants with superior performance are considered for reduced

inspection effort while plants with marginal performance will be considered for increased inspection effort. The fourth objective of the SALP program is to provide a method for informing the public of the NRC's assessment of performance. The SALP report is available in the local public document room and the public may attend the SALP meeting with the licensee.

SALP Program Requirements:

The SALP program now has four functional areas, instead of the previous seven, to assess licensee performance. The four functional areas are plant operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. Plant support now includes the previous functional areas of radiation protection, emergency preparedness, and security in addition to chemistry, housekeeping and fire protection. Safety Assessment/Quality Verification issues, which were previously considered within a separate functional area, are now considered in all functional areas and addressed in the cover letter, as appropriate. Additional functional areas may be added if the NRC staff believes it is necessary.

The SALP report assigns a category rating for each of the above functional areas, with emphasis on the last six months of performance. The category ratings are as follows: Category 1 is given for a superior level of safety performance; Category 2 is given for a good level of safety performance; and, Category 3 is given for an acceptable level of performance. It should be noted that the lowest SALP rating, Category 3, represents acceptable performance although the margin to unacceptable performance may be small. The NRC does not rely upon the SALP program to identify unacceptable performance.

SALP Process:

The SALP process starts with the assignment of an assessment period. The normal length of a SALP assessment period is 18 months (plus or minus two months). In addition, the NRC regional offices can adjust the length of the SALP period based on plant performance, with shorter assessment periods for plants that need more frequent monitoring. At the conclusion of the SALP assessment period, a SALP Board convenes in the NRC regional office. The SALP Board membership is comprised of four NRC regional and headquarters managers. NRC regional and headquarters staff members responsible for inspection and review activities at the facility make presentations to the Board. The Board assesses performance and assigns a category rating to each of the four functional areas. The SALP report documents the results of the assessment.

The Regional Administrator approves the SALP report and transmits it with a cover letter to the licensee and the public document room. The licensee is given the opportunity to review the

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report. The NRC and the licensee meet during a special public SALP meeting to discuss the results of the SALP assessment. This SALP management meeting is normally held near the facility.

SALP Results:

The SALP results are utilized by the NRC in the inspection planning process. Those facilities receiving low SALP scores (Category 3) are considered for increased inspection activity, and those facilities with high SALP scores (Category 1) are considered for reduced inspection activity.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF THE
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE PROGRAM

- The NRC developed the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program following the TMI-2 accident to systematically evaluate observations of and insights into a licensee's performance and to identify common themes or symptoms.
- The SALP program has four objectives: (1) to conduct an integrated assessment of licensee safety performance that focuses on the safety significance of the NRC findings and conclusions during the assessment period, (2) to provide a vehicle for meaningful dialogue with the licensee regarding its safety performance based on the insights gained from synthesis of NRC observations, (3) to assist NRC management in making sound decisions regarding allocation of NRC resources used to oversee, inspect, and assess licensee performance, and (4) to provide a method for informing the public of the NRC's assessment of licensee performance.
- A SALP Board, comprised of four NRC Senior Executive Service managers, convenes to assess licensee performance.
- The SALP Board recommends to the regional administrator a numerical rating of the licensee's performance in each of the four functional areas, with emphasis on the last six months of performance. A Category 1 represents superior performance, Category 2 a good level of performance, and Category 3, acceptable performance.
- The regional administrator assigns the category ratings and issues the SALP report.
- The NRC and licensee conduct a public meeting to discuss the results of the SALP report.
- Superior performance (Category 1) can result in longer SALP assessment periods and reduced inspection effort for the licensee, and acceptable performance (Category 3) can result in shorter SALP assessment periods and increased inspection effort by the NRC.

CHERNOBYL STATUS

Background:

On April 26, 1986, a major accident, determined to have been a reactivity accident, occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the former USSR. The accident destroyed the reactor and released massive amounts of radioactivity into the environment. After the accident the area in an 18-mile radius around the plant was closed to residential and other access, except for persons requiring official access to the plant and to the immediate area for evaluating and dealing with the consequences of the accident and operation of the undamaged units. The evacuated population numbered approximately 135,000. Thirty-one people died in the accident and its immediate aftermath, most in fighting the fires that ensued; delayed health effects could be extensive, but there are no generally agreed estimates. To stop the fire and prevent a further criticality accident as well as substantial further release of radioactive fission products, boron and sand were dumped on the reactor from the air. The three other units of the four-unit Chernobyl nuclear power station were subsequently restarted. The damaged unit (No. 4) was entombed in a concrete "sarcophagus," to limit further release of radioactive material. Control measures to reduce the radioactive contamination at and near the plant site included cutting down and burying, with the top yard of soil, a pine forest of approximately 1 square mile. The Soviet nuclear power authorities presented a report on the accident at an International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Vienna, Austria, on August 25-29, 1986.

The Chernobyl reactors are of the RBMK type. These are high-power, pressure-tube reactors, moderated with graphite and cooled with water. Fifteen RBMKs are still in operation in the former USSR. The operating RBMK units incorporate, to an extent not known to us, limited safety improvements developed since the Chernobyl accident, but basic safety concerns remain. U.S. reactors differ in important ways from the RBMKs.

Status at and Around Chernobyl:

There is concern about the long-term safety of the sarcophagus and long-term dependability of the on-site burial set-up for the buried forest and other massive contaminated materials. Among the sarcophagus concerns is that the faster-than-expected deterioration of structures could lead to rearrangement of materials inside, which could cause an additional release of radioactive material, mainly as dust. The Ukrainian authorities are studying options for dealing with the sarcophagus problem and have been seeking ideas and help from the international community. An international competition in late 1992 - early 1993 produced a number of proposals, mainly from European

countries, but there has been no contract award. Design objectives, criteria, and approaches are being studied further by the Ukrainian authorities, with international input.

Studies of longer-term health and environmental consequences of the accident are continuing.

In 1989-90 decisions were taken to evacuate substantial additional nearby areas, in Ukraine and Belarus (and a small area in Russia). About 200,000 people have been relocated so far (including the originally evacuated 135,000). It is not clear at this time to what extent additional relocations will take place.

In an event in October 1991, unrelated to the Chernobyl Unit 4 accident, Unit 2 suffered a fire. There was no significant radioactive material release, but the plant damage was severe. Unit 2 is now shut down; restart, no longer prohibited by Ukrainian law, has been proposed, but the proposal is controversial and its fate uncertain.

Public concern in the areas near Chernobyl, in Ukraine, about the safety of the still operating units led to a Ukrainian government decision to shut them down permanently in 1993. However, in the fall of 1993 that decision was rescinded. In April 1994 Ukraine Vice Prime Minister Shmarov made a "commitment-in-principle" to U.S. Deputy Energy Secretary White to shut down Units 1 and 3 when the energy supplied by these units can be replaced. This is expected to take a number of years.

International Studies:

Soviet and successor-state studies of the condition of the sarcophagus, contamination of land and water bodies, health effects, and other post-accident issues continue with international contributions. In the fall of 1989, the First International Workshop on Severe Accidents and Their Consequences, devoted to the Chernobyl accident, was held in Sochi, USSR, under joint sponsorship of the Soviet Nuclear Society and the American Nuclear Society. In mid-1991 an international advisory committee sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed The International Chernobyl Project: Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures.

A fact-finding team on the state of the sarcophagus, operating under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Nuclear Energy Agency, issued its report in October 1992. An International Symposium "Sarcophagus Safety - 94" was held in Kiev under Ukrainian Government auspices in March 1994.

On April 21-22, 1994, IAEA held an international meeting on Chernobyl in Vienna. Participants received the report of the March 1994 IAEA mission to Chernobyl. Discussions centered around concerns about safety design problems, personnel problems, spare parts problems, economic difficulties, and sarcophagus problems.

A Doctoral Thesis at M.I.T.:

In January 1994, Alexander Sich submitted a doctoral thesis titled "The Chernobyl Accident Revisited: Source Term Analysis and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase" to the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The thesis resulted from 18 months of study by Mr. Sich at the Chernobyl site, where he interacted with Ukrainian and Russian researchers. Along with technical analyses, Mr. Sich's thesis contains extensive political criticism.

The thesis, which received press attention, included the conclusion that the radioactive material release from the accident was about four times as great as that reported by the Soviet authorities at the Vienna conference in 1986. However, review by the NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, confirmed by subsequent further reviews by outside experts, has indicated this conclusion to be incorrect, being due largely to errors in analysis of the radioactive release source term. Correction of these errors would about halve Mr. Sich's estimated total release, bringing it down not too far from a roughly 50% upward revision of the original Soviet estimates that Soviet scientists later recognized as likely to be necessary.

Status of USNRC Follow-up:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's review of the Chernobyl accident was divided into three major phases: determining the facts of the accident, assessing the implications of the accident for safety regulation of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, and conducting specific further studies suggested by that assessment.

The first phase, fact finding, was a coordinated effort among several U.S. Government agencies and some private groups, with the NRC acting as the coordinating agency. The work was essentially completed in January 1987 and updated later that year. The results are reported in NUREG-1250, "Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station."

The second phase, the implications study, was reported in NUREG-1251, "Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United

States," issued after public comment in April 1989. The assessment led to the conclusion that no immediate changes were needed in the NRC's regulations regarding the design or operation of U.S. commercial nuclear reactors.

Plant design, shutdown margin, containment, and operational controls at U.S. reactors protect them against a combination of lapses such as those experienced at Chernobyl. Although the NRC has always acknowledged the possibility of major accidents, its regulatory requirements provide adequate protection, subject to continuing vigilance, including review of new information that may suggest weaknesses. Assessments in the light of Chernobyl have indicated that the causes of the accident have been adequately dealt with in the design of U.S. commercial reactors.

Yet, the assessment went on to conclude, the Chernobyl accident has lessons for us. The most important lesson is that it reminds us of the continuing importance of safe design in both concept and implementation, of operational controls, of competence and motivation of plant management and operating staff to operate in strict compliance with controls, and of backup features of defense in depth against potential accidents.

Although a large nuclear power plant accident somewhere in the United States is unlikely because of design and operational features, we cannot relax the care and vigilance that have made it so. Accordingly, the assessment led to the recommendation that certain issues should receive further consideration, to provide a basis for confirming or changing existing regulations or staff guidance. Those issues include reactivity accidents, accidents at low power or at zero power (when the reactor is shut down), operator training, and emergency planning.

The Chernobyl follow-up studies for U.S. reactors are the third phase of the NRC review. An overview report on this work, NUREG-1422, "Summary of Chernobyl Followup Research Activities," was issued in June 1992. That report closes out the Chernobyl follow-up research program as such, though certain issues will receive continuing attention in the normal course of NRC work. For example, the long-term lessons with regard to contamination control -- decontamination, ingestion pathway, relocation of people -- will continue to be followed. Beyond the recommended specific studies, the NRC assessment recognizes that the Chernobyl experience should remain as part of the information to be taken into account when dealing with reactor safety issues in the future.

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HIGHLIGHTS ON CHERNOBYL STATUS

- The accident that destroyed Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station in the USSR took place on April 26, 1986.
- 31 people died in the accident and its immediate aftermath. Longer-term health effects are being studied.
- 135,000 people were evacuated, from an 18-mile radius exclusion zone around the reactor shortly after the accident. Additional areas are being evacuated. 200,000 people (including the original 135,000) have been relocated to date.
- The damaged Unit 4 reactor is entombed in a "sarcophagus," to prevent further contamination spread. Scientists in Ukraine and other countries are studying the sarcophagus and considering options for dealing with concerns over its continuing stability.
- The NRC, with other U.S. Government agencies and some private groups, conducted a study to determine the facts of the accident. The results were published in 1987. (Report No. NUREG-1250).
- The NRC assessed the implications of the Chernobyl accident for safety regulation of commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S. The results were reported in 1989. (Report No. NUREG-1251). The assessment concluded that no immediate changes were needed in NRC's regulations, because the causes of the accident have been largely anticipated and accommodated in U.S. designs.
- The assessment (NUREG-1251) led to recommendation of certain further studies to provide a basis for confirming or changing regulations. A report on these studies (NUREG-1422) was issued in June 1992.
- The undamaged reactors at Chernobyl continue to operate.

THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 STATUS

Background:

Three Mile Island - Unit 2 (TMI-2) is in a permanently shutdown and defueled state similar to SAFSTOR called Post-Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS). Periodic monitoring and surveillance is conducted by the remaining staff. Since the March 28, 1979, accident, the licensee has conducted a comprehensive cleanup program designed to place the facility in a safe and stable configuration. Following mitigation of the accident and stabilization of the facility, the major licensee efforts over the past 15 years have included partial facility decontamination, removal of fuel from the reactor vessel and other facilities, offsite shipment of substantial quantities of both high and low level radioactive wastes and the removal, treatment and disposal of the accident-generated water. The licensee has proposed keeping the facility in long term storage until Three Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMI-1), also located on the same site as TMI-2, permanently ceases operation, at which time both facilities would be decommissioned.

In February 1993, GPUN notified the NRC staff that their current best estimate of the residual fuel in the reactor vessel is 2040 pounds (925 kilograms) based on the data from fast neutron measurements. This estimate was derived from calculations made by onsite staff and an independent review by an offsite group headed by Dr. Norman Rasmussen of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This estimate was reviewed and confirmed by three additional independent reviewers from national laboratories.

For the balance of the facility external to the reactor vessel, earlier licensee estimates based on measurements, sample analyses, and visual observations indicated that no more than 385 pounds (174.6 kilograms) of residual fuel remains. The NRC staff and their consultants from Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories have performed independent evaluations and made independent measurements of these earlier fuel measurements in the auxiliary and reactor buildings. On July 6, 1993, the staff issued an analysis which concluded that the fuel remaining in the TMI-2 reactor vessel will remain subcritical, with an adequate margin of safety, during PDMS.

Evaporation of the treated accident-generated water began in January 1991 after a prolonged period of system testing, repair, and modification. On August 12, 1993, the decontamination and evaporation of 2.23 million gallons of accident-generated water was completed.

Recent Accomplishments:

On December 28, 1993 the NRC staff issued a license amendment which allowed the licensee to enter the long-term storage period of PDMS. This followed completion of a 71 item punchlist of commitments by the licensee and independent verification by the NRC staff. The NRC staff had previously issued a possession only license on September 14, 1993.

The last meeting of the Advisory Panel for the Decontamination of Three Mile Island, Unit 2 was held on September 23, 1993. The panel was disbanded due to directions from the executive branch to reduce the number of federal advisory panels and the completion of their mission. Commissioner Rogers attended the final panel meeting and thanked the panel members for their years of dedicated service and presented them with plaques.

Post Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS):

In August of 1988, the licensee submitted a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) to document and support their proposal to amend the TMI-2 license to a possession only license and to allow the facility to enter PDMS. The staff issued final supplement 3 to the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the TMI-2 decontamination and cleanup in August of 1989. In February 1992, the staff issued a Safety Evaluation regarding the PDMS license amendment and a Technical Evaluation Report regarding PDMS. These three NRC staff documents form the basis for the staff position on the acceptability of PDMS. On April 25, 1991, the staff published a notice of opportunity for a prior hearing regarding the licensee request to amend its license. A member of the public petitioned to intervene in the license amendment proceedings. The petitioner, the licensee, and the NRC staff reached a settlement agreement on September 25, 1992. The request to intervene was withdrawn and on October 16, 1992, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board dismissed the proceeding.

The licensee completed a 71-item punchlist of commitments to be completed prior to entry into PDMS on December 10, 1993. The NRC staff independently verified the licensee actions and subsequently issued the license amendment allowing the license to implement PDMS on December 28, 1993. The NRC staff had issued the possession only license on September 14, 1993.

Decommissioning Funding:

On July 26, 1990, the licensee submitted to the NRC their Decommissioning Funding Plan. In the plan, the licensee stated that it will deposit \$195 million (1989 dollars) in an escrow account for the radiological decontamination of TMI-2. The value in 1992 dollars is \$229 million. The \$229 million is in excess of the amount required by NRC regulations for a facility the size

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of TMI-2. The licensee is required by regulations to submit a preliminary decommissioning plan containing site-specific decommissioning cost estimates five years before the expiration date of the TMI-2 license. Should the preliminary decommissioning plan identify that there are insufficient funds available for decommissioning, the licensee has the remaining five year period to adjust the rate of contributions to the fund to make up any shortfall.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 STATUS

- Accident occurred at TMI-2 on March 28, 1979.
- Began processing of contaminated water through EPICOR in October 1979.
- Vented 43,000 curies of krypton from the reactor building in July 1980.
- Performed the first manned entry into the reactor building in July 1980.
- Obtained first television pictures of the damaged reactor core in July 1982.
- Removed reactor vessel head and service structure in July 1984.
- Removed the reactor vessel plenum and installed work platform in May 1985.
- Defueling began in October 1985.
- Began core debris offsite shipments in July 1986.
- Completed defueling in April 1990.
- Began evaporation of the accident generated water in January 1991.
- Cost of the cleanup through the end of defueling approximately \$980 million.
- Licensee plans to escrow \$229 million (1992 dollars) for radiological decommissioning.
- Total occupational exposure 6579 person rem as of the end of calendar year 1992.
- Annual exposure less than 0.1 millirem to the maximally exposed member of the public during defueling.
- Accident-generated water processing completed on August 12, 1993 - total of 2.23 million gallons.
- Possession only license issued on September 14, 1993.
- PDMS entered December 28, 1993.

LICENSEE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Background:

As a part of its mission to protect the public health and safety, the environment, and national security, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) monitors the performance of licensees who operate the 109 commercial nuclear power plants currently in operation in the United States. The findings of this monitoring effort are used by the NRC to adjust its plant-specific regulatory programs. The NRC staff has developed several tools as inputs to the monitoring function. One of these tools is a set of performance indicators. Performance indicators are intended to provide ready information concerning nuclear power plant performance trends and to assist NRC management in identifying poor and/or declining safety performance as well as good and/or improving safety performance.

Performance Indicators:

The Performance Indicator (PI) Program is one aspect of the Commission's efforts to monitor the performance of licensees who operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. The program was started in May of 1986, when an interoffice task group began development of the overall NRC program. The first PI Report was published in February of 1987 and contained data on six indicators from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth quarter of 1986. Reports were provided quarterly to NRC management until June of 1993, when the frequency was changed to twice a year.

Under the direction of the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD), the PI program has been improved and expanded since it was first introduced. The program currently monitors industry-wide data on eight PIs and evaluates the data to determine performance trends. The eight PIs are (1) the number of unplanned automatic reactor scrams (trips) while a reactor is critical, (2) the number of selected safety system actuations, (3) the number of significant events, (4) the number of safety system failures, (5) the forced outage rate, (6) the number of equipment-forced outages per 1000 commercial critical hours, (7) the collective radiation exposure, and (8) cause codes. The AEOD staff provides reports twice a year containing plant-specific data for these eight PIs to the Commission and to NRC senior managers. The reports are also placed in the NRC Public Document Room. In addition, the staff provides plant-specific information and industry average data extracted from each PI report to licensee managers.

The PI Program is a single, coordinated, overall NRC program that provides an additional view of operational performance and enhances the NRC's ability to recognize areas of changing safety performance of operating plants. However, it is only a tool that must be used in conjunction with other tools, such as the results of routine and special inspections and the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP), to provide data to NRC managers who must decide whether any plant-specific regulatory programs need adjusting. It should be recognized that PIs have limitations and are subject to misinterpretation. Performance indicators alone do not provide a basis for ranking individual power plants or taking regulatory actions and are not used in communications with licensees as a measure of performance level. The NRC has a sensitivity to pressure which would cause licensee personnel at individual power plants to "manage the indicators" or take any actions that are contrary to plant safety because of performance indicators. The PIs for a given plant, when viewed as a set, provide additional data for assessing changes in plant operational performance. The PIs focus attention on the need to assess and understand underlying causes of identified changes by evaluating other available information.

The NRC will continue its review, evaluation, and revision, as needed, of the PI Program. Development and implementation of risk-based indicators is on-going and will continue. Further program revisions will be made as appropriate.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

- NRC monitors licensee performance to adjust plant-specific regulatory programs
- One monitoring tool is a set of performance indicators (PIs) to identify performance trends
- Quarterly reports provided from 1987 to June 1993, twice a year after that
- Eight indicators evaluated to determine performance trends: (1) automatic scrams while critical, (2) selected safety system actuations, (3) significant events, (4) safety system failures, (5) forced outage rate, (6) equipment forced outages per 1000 commercial critical hours, (7) collective radiation exposure, and (8) cause codes
- Provided to the Commission, NRC senior managers, licensee senior managers, and the public
- PIs have limitations, are subject to misinterpretation, and must be used with other tools to assess regulatory programs
- Not to be used alone for ranking plants, taking regulatory actions, or as a measure of performance level
- Used as a set to focus attention on the need to assess and understand underlying causes
- Review, evaluation, and revision of the PI Program, including risk-based indicators, is on-going

NUCLEAR REACTOR RISK TO THE PUBLIC
(ACCIDENTS)

Background:

The safe operation of a nuclear power plant requires the consideration of various types of possible accidents which may pose a risk to the public. The accidents range in terms of severity and likelihood of occurrence. Risk is considered to be the combination of accident severity (consequences) and the likelihood (frequency) of the accident. The risk due to operation of nuclear power plants can never be zero, just as the risks we face from other sources such as illness and auto accidents can never be zero. Regulatory requirements and attention are necessary to assure that the risk from nuclear power plant operation is very low when compared to all other types of risk that we face every day. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) responsibility is centered around the application and enforcement of the applicable regulatory requirements as described in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The intent is to assure that the risks are maintained at acceptably low levels.

Nuclear Reactor Accident Risks:

Nuclear power plants are designed to confine the fission products which accumulate within the nuclear fuel. Part of the overall risk stems from the possibility of accidental release of the fission products into the environment beyond the plant site boundaries. To assure that this risk is kept at acceptable levels, the concept of "defense-in-depth" is applied to the design, licensing, and operation of nuclear power facilities.

For example, the physical confinement of fission products is implemented by way of multiple barriers such as fuel cladding, reactor coolant system vessel and piping, and a containment building. The need to maintain the integrity of the reactor core (fuel) and avoid damage requires that an adequate supply of water be provided for cooling it. Here again, "defense-in-depth" is implemented by providing diverse and multiple backup systems so that there is an adequate assurance of a supply of water for cooling the core. Due consideration is given to keeping the plant within safe operating limits and conditions (technical specifications). Other safety measures include paying attention to the availability and reliability of plant equipment, plant maintenance, operator training, and plant management in order to minimize the overall risk.

Regulatory reviews, analyses and inspections are used to assure that these measures comply with appropriate NRC regulations and that the estimated risk is acceptably low.

Regulations:

Title 10 of the Federal Code of Regulations (10 CFR) contains the NRC's criteria and requirements for assuring an acceptable level of safety with respect to nuclear power plants. As an adjunct to the regulations, the NRC has developed a set of Regulatory Guides and the Standard Review Plan in order to clarify the regulatory requirements. The NRC also issues various generic communications that address safety related concerns.

None of the regulations relate directly to quantitative risk measures. The regulations are viewed in terms of the use of sound engineering concepts to provide what is judged to be an acceptable level of safety. However, the NRC has issued a policy statement that describes safety goals for the operation of nuclear power plants.

The qualitative safety goals are that nuclear power should pose no significant additional risk to the life and health of individuals and that societal risk should be comparable to other viable competing energy supply technologies with no significant addition to other societal risks.

The quantitative safety goals are that the risk of an individual prompt fatality should not exceed 0.1% of that due to other accidents and that the risk of cancer fatalities to nearby population should not exceed 0.1% of the total cancer risk from all other causes.

Current Status:

Currently, 109 commercial nuclear power units are licensed to operate in the U.S. The NRC believes that by meeting the existing regulations these plants pose an acceptably low level of risk to the public. However, in 1988, the NRC issued a requirement for the utilities licensed to operate nuclear power plants to perform a plant-specific search for vulnerabilities to severe accidents. In this effort, known as the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) program, virtually all licensees have chosen to use probabilistic risk assessment methods. This program is directed towards the identification of possible plant weaknesses with respect to safety that stem from considerations beyond those covered by the existing regulations. The intent is to assure that current risk is as low as previously believed. The first phase of this program is devoted to investigating accidents which could be initiated within nuclear plants (i.e., internal events), such as due to equipment failure or operator error. Seventy of the expected 78 IPE summary reports expected (some reports are for multiple units at a plant site) have been submitted to the NRC to date. The NRC staff plans to complete its review of all IPE internal event submittals by the end of calendar year 1995. Weaknesses identified through this phase of the program are being

addressed by licensees. The second phase of the program will address accidents which could be initiated externally (i.e., external events), such as earthquakes and floods. The second phase was started in 1990 and is expected to be completed in 1998.

In order to improve the means for evaluating risks associated with the operation of nuclear power plants, the NRC is continuing to improve and refine probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods. At the same time, the NRC is monitoring plant operations, equipment failures, operator errors and similar plant performance features in order to identify potential problems before they become serious.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF NUCLEAR REACTOR RISK TO THE PUBLIC

- As a result of the corrective steps taken by the NRC and the nuclear power industry since the Three Mile Island accident, the estimated probability of a nuclear reactor accident has decreased significantly.
- The NRC has issued a policy statement describing the safety goals with respect to nuclear power plants.
- The risks associated with the operation of nuclear power plants that meet existing safety regulations are acceptably low.
- The NRC has implemented the Individual Plant Examination program to identify any weaknesses to events that may exist beyond the design basis of the plant, and to ensure that low risk levels are maintained.

ADVANCED REACTORS PROGRAM

The NRC's "Statement of Policy for Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants (Final Statement)", July 8, 1986, encourages early interaction (prior to license application) between NRC and advanced reactor designers to provide licensing guidance applicable to those designs. In June 1988 the NRC issued NUREG-1226, a report on "Development and Utilization of the NRC Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants". The report provides guidance on the implementation of the policy, and describes the staff approach to be used in the review of advanced reactor concepts under the policy statement. Other important Commission guidance to be used in the early interaction process with sponsors of advanced designs include the Severe Accident Policy Statement (50 FR 32138; August 8, 1985), the Standardization Policy Statement (52 FR 34884; September 15, 1987), and the Safety Goal Policy Statement (51 FR 30028; August 21, 1986).

Thus the staff is prepared to conduct early, interactive reviews of advanced reactor designs including consideration of the Commission's regulations, regulatory guides and other guidelines. These include such established and developing criteria as the defense-in-depth philosophy, standardization, the Commission's safety goal and severe accident policies, and applicable industry codes and standards. NRC early interaction with a potential applicant is in the context of a preapplication review which takes about two years and culminates in a preapplication safety evaluation report. The objectives of the preapplication review are (1) to identify major safety issues that could require Commission policy guidance to the staff, (2) to identify major technical issues that the staff could resolve in the context of existing regulations or Commission policy, and (3) to identify research and development needed to resolve identified issues.

The early reviews discussed here are done prior to formal submittal of an application for a standard design certification pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52 (54 FR 15372; April 18, 1989). This regulation was enacted by the Commission to provide a stable procedural framework for the early resolution of licensing issues and finally, certification of a standardized design by rulemaking.

CANDU 3

The CANDU 3 design is a single-loop pressurized heavy water reactor rated at 450 MWe with two steam generators and two heat transport pumps connected in series. The design utilizes natural uranium fuel, separate heavy water moderator and reactor coolant, computer-controlled operation, and on-line refueling. The reactor has 232 horizontal pressure tubes supported in a

calandria tank filled with the heavy water moderator. The tank also supports the reactivity regulating and safety devices which are inserted between and among the pressure tubes. The CANDU 3 design is an evolution of the CANDU 6 design (600 - 640 MWe). The CANDU 6 has been approved by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), the Canadian government agency responsible for regulating atomic energy in Canada, for operation in Canada. Four CANDU 6 units are currently in operation (two in Canada, one each in Korea and Argentina) and 28 other CANDU-type units have been built around the world, but none in the U.S. The CANDU 3 contains many features and components already in use in the CANDU 6 design.

The CANDU 3 design is being developed by the Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited (AECL), whose design facilities are based in Mississauga, Ontario, and Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada. AECL Technologies, a United States subsidiary of AECL, Incorporated, informed the NRC of its intent to seek design certification of the CANDU 3 design under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 52 in a letter to then-Chairman Lando Zech, dated May 25, 1989. AECL Technologies subsequently submitted a two volume Technical Description and a two volume Conceptual Safety Report describing the CANDU 3. In addition, AECL Technologies has submitted a number of technology transfer reports describing various aspects of the CANDU technology.

The NRC is continuing activities to prepare for a CANDU 3 design certification application by becoming familiar with the design, by maintaining technical progress on key issues, and by working on code development and benchmarking. On April 12, 1994, AECL Technologies filed a letter with NRC stating that a Standard Design Certification application for CANDU 3 will be submitted on or before September 30, 1994. The staff had already identified the resources necessary for carrying out a standard design certification review of the CANDU 3 design based on a March 1994 meeting. These resources were submitted to the Commission on March 24, 1994.

PIUS

PIUS (Process Inherent Ultimate Safety) is a 640 MWe advanced pressurized water reactor (PWR) design, by ABB Atom of Sweden, that utilizes natural physical phenomena to accomplish control and safety functions usually performed by electromechanical devices. The PIUS design consists of a vertical pipe, called a reactor module, which contains the reactor core and is submerged in a large pool of highly borated water. The reactor core is comprised of fuel elements that are similar to current PWR elements. The borated pool water is provided to shutdown the reactor and to cool the core by natural circulation while the reactor is shutdown. The reactor module is open to the borated pool at the bottom and again at the top of the reactor module.

Devices referred to as density locks are provided at these two openings. During normal operation at design power, the density locks prevent the entry of the highly borated pool water into the reactor module due to the pressure balance maintained across the tube bundle. In normal operation, the primary loop reactor water enters the reactor module from the steam generator, flows up through the core, out of the top of the reactor module to the steam generator, and is pumped back into the bottom of the reactor module. Under certain transient conditions, the pressure balance across the density locks is not maintained and the borated pool water flows into the core and shuts down the reactor. Unlike most reactors, PIUS does not use control rods for regulating reactivity. Reactivity is controlled by the boron concentration and temperature of the primary loop reactor water.

The steam generating equipment of the PIUS design is similar to that of a typical U.S. or European pressurized light water reactor plant. One important difference in plant design is the very large, by current standards, prestressed concrete reactor vessel. This vessel holds both the reactor module and the borated pool.

In October 1989, ABB Atom requested the NRC to perform a licensability review of their PIUS Preliminary Safety Information Document (PSID). However, since then, the staff and ABB-CE have agreed that further work on the preapplication review of the PIUS PSID would not be meaningful given the limited resources available. The staff completed its review of the PIUS design in April 1994 (SECY 94-110). Presently there is no date for a design certification application.

MHTGR

The modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) design is a helium-cooled and graphite-moderated thermal power reactor. The fuel is millions of ceramic coated microspheres distributed in cylindrical rods which are inserted in large hexagonal graphite blocks. The blocks are stacked vertically within the reactor vessel through which the pressurized helium coolant is circulated. The plant design consists of four identical reactor modules, each with a thermal output of 350 Mwt, which are coupled with two steam turbine-generator sets to produce a total plant electrical output of 540 MWe, with a power conversion of approximately 40%. This is about half the power output of current single light water reactor units. The design includes passive reactor shutdown and decay heat removal features to minimize required reactor operator actions. The NRC has licensed one high temperature gas reactor, Fort St. Vrain in Colorado, which was permanently shutdown in August 1989.

The advanced MHTGR design, sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE), has been under review at the NRC since 1986, and a draft

Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report (PSER) was issued in March 1989 (NUREG-1338). Important safety matters are fuel design and performance, containment design and performance, reactor cavity cooling system, accident selection and analysis, accident source terms and analysis, role of the operators, design of the control room and remote shutdown area, emergency preparedness, and quality standards for equipment. The current review effort to update the draft report and issue a final PSER is tentatively scheduled for completion in 1995.

PRISM

The design submitted by the Department of Energy (DOE) is a small, modular, pool-type, liquid-sodium cooled reactor producing 471 Mwt. The reactor fuel elements are cylindrical tubes containing pellets of uranium-plutonium-zirconium metal alloy. The reactor size was selected to permit use of passive shutdown and decay heat removal features.

The PRISM standard plant consists of nine reactor modules arranged in power blocks of three reactor modules of 465 MWe. Each power block comprises three reactor modules, each with an individual thermal rating of 471 Mwt. Each module is located in its own below-grade silo and is connected to its own intermediate heat transport system (IHTS) and steam generator system. The steam generator and secondary system hardware are located in a separate building and are connected by a below-grade pipeway. All the reactors on the site share a common control center, reactor maintenance facility, remote shutdown and radwaste facility, and assembly facility. Each reactor module has its own steam generator which is combined with the two other steam generators in each power block by a common header supplying steam to one turbine-generator. The total electrical power output of the standard site would be 1395 MWe.

In general, the PRISM design features have been chosen to prevent core damage events that the previous Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR) designs have traditionally been designed to accommodate.

DOE submitted the conceptual design to NRC for preapplication review in November 1986. The NRC published a draft PSER in September 1989 (NUREG-1368). The staff's preapplication review was prepared to provide guidance to the design's sponsors early in the design process. The review effort has been completed and publication of the final PSER was accomplished in February 1994.

The NRC staff met with the DOE on February 9, 1994, to discuss the changes in the design since their 1990 submission. The DOE presented an overview of the new design titled "Mod-B" which included a discussion of the major enhancements of increased size and power rating of the ALMR design. The staff will continue to maintain interactions with the DOE in an effort to keep informed

of the latest evolutions in the PRISM design.

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HIGHLIGHTS - ALL PROJECTS

CANDU 3 --

- AECL Technologies, a division of AECL, Incorporated, submitted a letter in May 1989 stating intent to seek design certification of the CANDU 3 pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52.
- A number of documents were submitted to NRC for preapplication review between mid-1990 and early 1991.
- Several meetings have been held among the NRC, AECB, AECL, and AECL Technologies to define the scope of the preapplication review and to discuss preliminary technical issues identified by the NRC.
- In a letter dated April 12, 1994, AECL Technologies stated their intent to submit the Standard Design Certification application on or before September 30, 1994.
- The staff preparation for design certification review is ongoing.

PIUS --

- ABB requested a licensability review of the PIUS design in October 1989.
- ABB submitted the PIUS Preliminary Safety Information Document (PSID) for review in May 1990.
- First review of PIUS began in June 1991.
- Status of the review to be documented by April 1994. All other activities stopped until a design certification application is received.

MHTGR --

- Preliminary Safety Information Document (PSID) submitted by DOE in 1986.
- Draft Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report issued by NRC in March 1989.
- DOE submitted PSID Amendments 11 through 13 responding to issues, December 1991, and March and August, 1992.
- NRC tentative schedule for final PSER for the MHTGR design is in 1995.

PRISM --

- Preliminary Safety Information Document (PSID) submitted to NRC in November 1986.
- NRC Draft Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report (PSER) on PRISM (NUREG-1368) released September 1989.
- DOE submitted Amendments 12 and 13 responding to issues, March and May 1990.
- The final PRISM Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report (PSER) was published in February 1994.

HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE BRIEFING UPDATE

Background:

High-level radioactive waste (HLW) means: (1) irradiated (spent) reactor fuel, (2) liquid wastes resulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system, and the concentrated wastes from subsequent extraction cycles, in a facility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuel, and (3) solids into which such liquid wastes have been converted. HLW is primarily in the form of spent fuel from commercial nuclear power plants; it also includes some reprocessed HLW from defense activities, and a small quantity of reprocessed commercial HLW. Current plans for management of HLW call for the development of a monitored retrieval storage (MRS) facility by 1998, and a permanent HLW repository deep beneath the surface of the earth by the year 2010. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has the responsibility for disposing of HLW. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for developing appropriate environmental standards for HLW. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the licensing authority for the disposal and long-term storage of HLW.

High-Level Radioactive Waste:

This country's policies governing the permanent disposal of HLW are defined by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPAA) and the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (NWPAA) of 1987. To provide the long-term permanent isolation required, the NWPAA specifies that HLW will be placed in deep-underground geologic repositories to be built and operated by DOE. To this end, DOE is developing a waste management system consisting, in part, of a geologic repository in which HLW can be permanently isolated deep beneath the surface of the earth, and an MRS in which waste can be stored prior to permanent disposal. NRC has the licensing and related regulatory authority for both the MRS and HLW geologic repository.

An MRS facility is an integral part of the waste management system being proposed by DOE for achieving timely acceptance of spent fuel. NWPAA allows a dual approach to MRS siting: (1) siting by DOE, through a process of survey and evaluation; and (2) siting through the efforts of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator.

Through the NWPAA, Congress designated the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada as the single candidate site for characterization as a potential geologic repository. The Yucca Mountain site has not been selected for a repository; rather, it has been chosen as the

only site to be characterized at this time. Site characterization is a program of exploration and research, both in the laboratory and in the field, undertaken to establish the geologic conditions and the ranges of those parameters at a particular site. Site characterization includes borings, surface excavations, excavation of exploratory shafts or ramps, subsurface lateral excavations and borings, and in situ testing at depth to determine the suitability of the site for a geologic repository.

Regulations:

The NRC's requirements governing the disposal of HLW in a geologic repository are contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 60 (10 CFR Part 60). These regulations govern prelicensing activities, authorization for DOE to begin construction of the facility, authorization for DOE to receive and place the wastes in the facility, and authorization for DOE to close the facility (license termination).

The NRC's requirements governing the storage of HLW in an MRS facility are contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72 (10 CFR Part 72). These regulations establish requirements, procedures, and criteria for the issuance of licenses to receive, transfer, and possess power reactor spent fuel and other radioactive material associated with spent fuel storage.

The EPA's standards for the disposal of HLW in a geologic repository are contained in Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 191 (40 CFR Part 191). These regulations establish generally applicable environmental standards for the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and other HLW. The NRC is responsible for implementing these standards in 10 CFR Part 60.

Current Status:

Currently, the repository program is focused on prelicensing site characterization activities. In the prelicensing phase, one of NRC's primary responsibilities is to review DOE's site characterization plan and associated activities, and to provide comments to DOE identifying any specific concerns. In addition, NRC staff observes various site characterization activities in the field, such as drilling and tunneling, and also observes DOE quality assurance surveillances and audits. All prelicensing consultation activities are open to participation by the State of Nevada, affected Indian Tribes, and affected units of local governments.

On June 3, 1993, NRC and DOE signed the revised Procedural Agreement and the Project-Specific Agreement. The Procedural Agreement was originally signed in 1983, and the Project-Specific

Agreement was originally signed in 1984. Together, these agreements provide the basis for implementing most of the NRC/DOE interactions. The substantive changes that were incorporated into the Procedural Agreement dealt with newly added or revised guidelines for conducting technical exchanges, site visits, licensing and management meetings, and quality assurance audits and surveillances. Similarly, major changes in the Project-Specific Agreement included revised guidelines for preparing interaction reports, maintaining and distributing site characterization data, communications between points of contact from NRC and DOE project offices, acquisition of samples by NRC contractors from DOE during site characterization activities, and specific NRC On-site Licensing Representative responsibilities and authority.

DOE completed its site characterization plan for the Yucca Mountain site in December 1988. The NRC staff completed its review of that document in July 1989, and concluded that overall, it was a usable plan for site characterization. Originally, the staff identified two objections to DOE starting site characterization. One objection concerned the DOE quality assurance (QA) program, and the other was related to the design process for the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF). Additionally, 196 other concerns in the form of comments and questions were raised.

Regarding the QA objection, NRC notified DOE by letter, dated March 2, 1992, that the objection was removed. NRC determined that all organizations participating in site characterization activities had developed, and are implementing, a QA program that meets NRC requirements. NRC continues to monitor QA program implementation through audits and surveillances.

DOE provided information in response to the ESF objection on March 3, 1992. Based on that information, information contained in two DOE reports ("Exploratory Studies Facility Alternatives Study: Final Report" and "Risk/Benefit Analysis of Alternative Strategies for Characterizing the Calico Hills Unit at Yucca Mountain"), and observations of DOE design reviews, the NRC staff determined that the ESF objection should be lifted. In a letter dated November 2, 1992, NRC notified DOE that this objection was lifted. The staff continues to track DOE's activities related to the ESF objection and implementation of the ESF design control process through participation in ESF design reviews, reviews of site characterization Progress Reports, participation in DOE audits of the ESF design review process, and participation in bi-monthly meetings with DOE to discuss ESF design, design control process, and technical inputs to the design.

In 1991, the State of Nevada granted DOE the permits necessary for DOE to proceed with surface based site characterization activities. These activities include the excavation of test pits

and trenches, borehole drilling, and hydrologic monitoring to address technical issues related to volcanism, radionuclide transport, seismicity, and faulting. DOE continues to actively conduct site characterization field work in these areas at the Yucca Mountain Project Site and vicinity.

On November 30, 1992, DOE began work on the site access road to the main portal for the ESF at Yucca Mountain, and work on the portal pad began in April 1993. Initial work on the underground opening used the drill and blast method to excavate a starter tunnel, of approximately 200 feet in length, for the tunnel boring machine (TBM), which will be used to excavate the main ramp-tunnel of the ESF (about 25,000 feet). Excavation of the starter tunnel began in April 1993 and was completed in September 1993. The TBM was delivered to the site in spring 1994 and will be assembled on the portal pad. DOE plans on beginning the start-up phase of the excavation of the north ramp portion of the main ESF tunnel in August 1994, followed by a shakedown phase and a full operation phase.

In a letter of August 20, 1993, NRC notified DOE of concerns related to the design and design control process based on its observations and reviews of DOE activities. The letter cites deficiencies identified by DOE QA and technical personnel during recent QA audits of DOE's Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System Management and Operating Contractor (M&O) and requests that DOE provide a rationale for proceeding with activities related to design and construction while the deficiencies are being investigated and corrected. The deficiencies include inadequate procedures, failure to follow procedures, and inadequate documentation of design bases. In addition, it is not clear that technical information, identified in DOE reports as necessary for ESF design decisions, will be collected in time to provide input to the ESF design. Other items requested in the letter include an action plan for corrective actions for the M&O design deficiencies, a controlled baseline ESF design integrated with a geologic repository operations area conceptual design, and a detailed plan for the process DOE will use to keep the staff informed of future design changes. DOE submitted a formal response to NRC's letter on November 18, 1993, that was reviewed by the NRC staff. Based on its review and other interactions with DOE, the staff determined that DOE has been making progress toward resolution of NRC staff concerns. However, the NRC staff was unable to verify that actions taken by DOE have been properly implemented, and until this verification is accomplished through audits, surveillances, and design reviews, the NRC staff concerns remain unresolved. In its efforts to be responsive to NRC staff concerns DOE now provides design review information to the staff prior to all design reviews and meets with the staff to discuss ESF design status and concerns on a bi-monthly basis. DOE also scheduled audits of the M&O's design activities in June and July 1994. These audits were observed by NRC QA staff.

EPA developed generally applicable environmental standards for a HLW repository that were promulgated as 40 CFR Part 191 in 1985. These standards were remanded in 1987 due to inconsistencies with other EPA standards with respect to individual dose and ground-water protection. Since that time EPA has been working on revising its standard. However, in late 1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (EnPA) of 1992 which required EPA to contract with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study on specific aspects of these standards and issue findings and recommendations. The NAS is completing its review and expects to issue recommendations to EPA by December 1994. Among the issues the Academy must address are: (1) the reasonableness of a health-based standard based on individual dose; (2) the ability of post-closure oversight to prevent an unreasonable risk of breaching the repository's barriers or increasing the exposure of the public to radiation beyond allowable limits; and (3) the capability to make scientifically supportable predictions of the probability of human intrusion for 10,000 years.

The EnPA requires that EPA promulgate, by rule, public health and safety standards for protection of the public from releases from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the repository at the Yucca Mountain site, based upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the NAS. These standards are to be promulgated not later than one year after EPA receives the findings and recommendations of NAS. The EnPA also requires that NRC, within one year of the promulgation of the EPA standards, amend its technical requirements and criteria to conform with these standards.

The NWPA calls for a 1998 date for DOE to accept spent fuel from utilities. Until recently, the DOE approach has been to use the Nuclear Waste Negotiator for the voluntary siting of an MRS that would begin acceptance of spent nuclear fuel by 1998. The Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator was established by the NWPA to find a State or Indian Tribe willing to host a repository or MRS at a technically qualified site.

Interest has been expressed by nine groups in evaluating the feasibility of hosting an MRS (Phase II-A). To date, four Indian Tribes have requested and received Phase II-A grants and two of these Indian Tribes have submitted requests for Phase II-B grants where work will focus on detailed environmental and site feasibility studies. However, the Bingaman Amendment to the 1994 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (P.L. 103-126) precludes the funding of any Phase II-B grants. This Amendment was prompted by concerns from the States and surrounding communities in which the Tribal reservations are located. Meanwhile, DOE has been studying the feasibility of locating an MRS on Federal land. DOE's efforts are proceeding in parallel with those of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator in order to meet the

1998 objective established in the NWPA.

On May 19, 1994, DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) issued a Notice of Inquiry (59 FR 27007, May 25, 1994). The Notice of Inquiry in the "Purpose of Notice" states, "This Notice of Inquiry is intended to implement the Secretary's initiative by eliciting the views of affected parties on (1) the Department's preliminary view that it does not have a statutory obligation to accept spent fuel in 1998 in the absence of an operational repository or other facility constructed under the Act; (2) the need for an interim, away-from-reactor storage facility prior to repository operations; and (3) options for offsetting, through the use of the Nuclear Waste Fund, a portion of the financial burden that may be incurred by utilities in continuing to store spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites beyond 1998." Written submissions are to be sent to OCRWM on or before September 22, 1994.

In October 1992, DOE initiated a study to evaluate the feasibility of using multi-purpose canisters (MPC) in the waste management system. The MPC concept is to use a common container that has different overpacks for transportation, storage, and disposal. The purpose of the MPC is, first, to create a compatible approach for the transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel, and then to consider compatibility with final disposal. DOE completed its MPC study and held workshops in July and November 1993 to obtain input from interested parties in developing the MPC concept. In June 1994, DOE issued a Request for Proposal for MPC designs and held an MPC bidders conference.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE (HLW)

- NWPA (1982) and NWPAA (1987) lay out a national program for disposal of HLW in a deep geologic repository and possible interim storage in an MRS
- NWPAA designated Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for characterization as a potential repository site
- NRC requirements for the interim storage of HLW are contained in 10 CFR Part 72
- NRC requirements for the disposal of HLW are contained in 10 CFR Part 60
- EPA standards for the disposal of HLW are contained in 40 CFR Part 191
- The EnPA requires that: NAS conduct a study on specific aspects of the HLW environmental standards and make recommendations on reasonable standards by December 31, 1993; EPA revise its standards based upon, and consistent with, the NAS findings and recommendations within one year after it receives the NAS findings; and NRC amend its technical requirements and criteria to conform to the EPA standard within one year of the promulgation of EPA's standards
- NRC is currently involved in prelicensing interactions and review of DOE HLW repository site characterization activities
- NRC is currently involved in prelicensing interactions and review of DOE MRS activities
- DOE to submit to NRC a HLW repository license application for construction authorization in 2001
- DOE to begin waste emplacement in a HLW repository in 2010
- All prelicensing consultation activities are open to participation by the State of Nevada, affected Indian Tribes, and units of affected local governments

REMEDICATION OF RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVITY AT NON-ROUTINE CONTAMINATED SITES

Background:

There are about 50 sites contaminated with radioactive material, under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, throughout the country, that are considered to be non-routine decommissioning cases. To compel timely remediation of these sites, NRC initiated the Site Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP) in 1990. NRC emphasis on timely remediation of the sites resulted from former Chairman Carr's August 3, 1989, testimony before the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and National Resources, chaired by Congressman Synar, and from continuing NRC concern about lack of progress at some of these sites.

Discussion:

The NRC staff developed the SDMP to identify sites requiring remediation and to provide the Commission with a status report on the actions taken to bring about the remediation of the SDMP sites. In summary, the SDMP contains the following information:

- 1) definition of the project management plan;
- 2) identification of the sites requiring decommissioning;
- 3) schedule and resources necessary to support NRC actions to regulate the remediation of the contaminated sites;
- 4) resolution of policy and Congressional issues for SDMP implementation and minimizing problems with future contaminated sites.

The SDMP not only identifies the sites requiring decommissioning, but also describes:

- 1) the site;
- 2) the wastes and radioactivity remaining on the site;
- 3) the radiological hazard from the remaining wastes;
- 4) the status of decommissioning financial assurance;
- 5) the status of the remediation activities; and
- 6) NRC proposed actions and schedules to ensure timely decommissioning.

SDMP Criteria:

A site is listed in the SDMP if it meets one or more of the following criteria:

- 1) problems with a viable responsible organization (e.g., inability to pay for or unwillingness to perform decommissioning);
- 2) presence of large amounts of soil contamination or unused settling ponds or burial grounds that may be difficult to dispose of;
- 3) long-term presence of contaminated, unused facility buildings;
- 4) license previously terminated; or
- 5) contamination or potential contamination of the groundwater from onsite wastes.

Regulations:

In 1988, NRC promulgated the final decommissioning regulations, under 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 50, 70, and 72. The regulation defines decommissioning as removing a facility from service, reducing the residual radioactivity to a level that will permit release of the facility for unrestricted use, and termination of the license. In summary, the decommissioning regulations prescribes requirements for decommissioning planning, financial assurance, recordkeeping, and license termination.

The Commission initiated an enhanced participatory rulemaking process in 1992 to establish radiological criteria for decommissioning. Representatives of State governments, Tribal governments, local governments, other Federal agencies, environmental groups, citizen groups, and industry groups were invited to participate in the workshops associated with the rulemaking. The workshops began in January 1993 and ended on May 7, 1993. On February 2, 1994, the NRC staff published for public comment, in the Federal Register, a draft document containing residual radioactivity criteria. A proposed rule on "Radiological Criteria for Decommissioning" was sent to the Commission on May 31, 1994, (SECY-94-150) and approved for publication, with comment, on June 30, 1994. The proposed rule is scheduled for publication in the Federal Register in August 1994. Final requirements are scheduled to be promulgated in May 1995.

A proposed rulemaking on the timeliness of decommissioning was published in the Federal Register on January 13, 1993. The final

rule on "Timeliness in Decommissioning of Materials Facilities" was sent to the Commission on May 20, 1994, (SECY-94-135) and approved for publication on June 28, 1994. The final rule was published in the Federal Register in July 1994.

SDMP Action Plan:

The SDMP has been effective in ensuring coordination and resolution of some policy and regulatory issues affecting site decommissioning. From 1990 through 1992, however, progress was slow on actual site remediation. Because of that limited progress, the staff developed the SDMP Action Plan, which was approved by the Commission on April 6, 1992. The Action Plan:

- 1) identifies current criteria to guide remediation of contaminated soils, structures, and equipment and emphasizes site-specific application of the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principle;
- 2) states NRC's position on the finality of decommissioning decisions;
- 3) describes NRC's general expectation that SDMP site remediation will be completed within a 4-year timeframe after operations cease or 3 years after the issuance of an initial decommissioning order;
- 4) identifies currently available guidance on site characterization work in support of decommissioning; and
- 5) describes the process the staff will use to establish and enforce schedules for timely decommissioning on a site-specific basis.

The Action Plan has been effective in communicating, to licensees and the public, the Commission's expectation that SDMP sites will be remediated in a timely and effective manner. Since the release of the Action Plan, licensees have been generally cooperative in establishing reasonable, but firm, decommissioning schedules, and initiating remediation activities, without the need for enforcement action.

Policy Issues Requiring Resolution:

The SDMP contains a series of policy issues, related to the remediation of contaminated materials licensee sites, that need to be resolved. Resolution of these policy issues will provide a regulatory framework for more consistent and efficient licensing actions related to site decommissioning in the future. Two significant issues requiring resolution are: 1) determining the decommissioning strategy for sites containing large volumes of

thorium contaminated soil and slag, and 2) whether NRC should defer to regulations under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), at those sites that are being remediated in accordance with these acts, and also contain material under the jurisdiction of NRC. The decommissioning strategy for the thorium sites should be resolved through the development of an environmental impact statement that has been initiated by NRC. The issue of deferring to CERCLA and RCRA is being explored in a staff paper that should be presented to the Commission in July 1994.

Current Status:

The NRC staff is implementing the SDMP as described in SECY-93-179 dated June 24, 1993. The SDMP was published in October 1993 as NUREG-1444. The following sites have been decommissioned and removed from the SDMP list:

Allied Signal Aerospace - Bendix Division, Teterboro, NJ;
February 28, 1992;
Budd Company, Philadelphia, PA; April 21, 1993;
Old Vic, Cleveland, OH; December 6, 1993;
Amax, Incorporated, Wood County, WV; June 7, 1994; and
Chevron Corporation, Pawling, NY; July 6, 1994.

Site remediation activities have been completed at the UNC Recovery Systems site, in Wood River Junction, RI. The license will be terminated, and the site removed from the SDMP list after pending administrative and jurisdictional issues are resolved. Attached is the current list of SDMP sites.

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HIGHLIGHTS

- About 50 sites contaminated with radioactive material are non-routine decommissioning cases.
- Site Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP) developed in 1990.
- SDMP includes information on identification of sites, schedule, and resources to support NRC actions.
- Decommissioning rule promulgated in 1988 in Parts 30, 40, 50, 70, and 72.
- Decommissioning defined as removing a facility from service, reducing the residual radioactivity to a level that will permit release of the facility for unrestricted use, and termination of the license.
- SDMP Action Plan approved by the Commission on April 6, 1992.
- Policy issues that require resolution:
 - 1) disposition of thorium wastes
 - 2) deferral to EPA

CONTAMINATED SITE LIST¹

Advanced Medical Systems, Inc.; Cleveland, OH
 Aluminum Company of America; Cleveland, OH
 Anne Arundel County/Curtis Bay; Anne Arundel County, MD
 Army, Department of, Aberdeen Proving Ground; Aberdeen, MD
 Babcock & Wilcox; Apollo, PA
 Babcock & Wilcox; Parks Township, PA
 BP Chemicals America, Inc.; Lima, OH
 Cabot Corporation; Boyerton, PA
 Cabot Corporation; Reading, PA
 Cabot Corporation; Revere, PA
 Chemetron Corporation, Bert Avenue; Cleveland, OH
 Chemetron Corporation, Harvard Avenue; Cleveland, OH
 Clevite; Cleveland, OH
 Dow Chemical Company; Bay City and Midland, MI
 Elkem Metals, Inc.; Marietta, OH
 Engelhard Corporation; Plainville, MA
 Fansteel, Inc.; Muskogee, OK
 Hartley and Hartley (Kawkawlin) Landfill; Bay County, MI
 Heritage Minerals; Lakehurst, NJ
 Horizons, Inc.; Cleveland, OH
 Kerr-McGee; Cimarron, OK
 Kerr-McGee; Cushing, OK
 Lake City Army Ammunition Plant (formerly Remington Arms Company); Independence, MO
 Magnesium Elektron; Flemington, NJ
 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3M); Pine County, MN
 Molycorp, Inc.; Washington, PA
 Molycorp, Inc.; York, PA
 Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District/Southerly Plant; Cleveland, OH
 Nuclear Metals, Inc.; Concord, MA
 Permagrain Products; Media, PA
 Pesses Company, METCOA Site; Pulaski, PA
 Pratt and Whitney; Middletown, CT
 RMI Titanium Company; Ashtabula, OH
 RTI, Inc. (formerly Process Technology of North Jersey, Inc.; Rockaway, NJ
 Safety Light Corporation; Bloomsburg, PA
 Schott Glass Technologies; Duryea, PA
 Sequoyah Fuel Company; Gore, OK
 Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corporation; Cambridge, OH
 Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corporation; Newfield, NJ

¹The Allied Signal Aerospace, Bendix Division, in Teterboro, NJ, site, the Budd Company site in Philadelphia, PA, the Old Vic site in Cleveland, Ohio, the AMAX site in Wood County, WV, and the Chevron Corporation site in Pawling, NY, have been decommissioned, and the sites have been removed from the SDMP list.

Contaminated Site List (continued)

Texas Instruments, Inc.; Attleboro, MA
UNC Recovery Systems; Wood River Junction, RI
Watertown Arsenal/Mall; Watertown, MA
Watertown GSA; Watertown, MA
Westinghouse Electric Corporation; Waltz Mill, PA
West Lake Landfill; St. Louis, MO
Whittaker Corporation; Greenville, PA
Wyman-Gordon Company; North Grafton, MA

ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM

Background:

As the federal agency responsible for regulating the civilian uses of nuclear materials, the NRC has an extensive program with many requirements. These requirements are imposed on more than 100 nuclear power plant licensees and approximately 8000 materials licensees. The requirements are stringent and technically demanding. Inevitably, with such an elaborate regulatory program, violations of requirements occur, through oversight, negligence, ignorance, confusion, and, in some instances, willful misconduct. The Commission has developed an enforcement program that seeks to promote and protect the public health and safety by ensuring compliance with the Atomic Energy Act, the Energy Reorganization Act, NRC regulations, and license conditions, obtaining prompt correction of violations and adverse quality conditions that may affect safety, deterring future violations, and encouraging improvement of licensee performance.

Program Operation:

The regional offices and other offices performing inspection activities initiate appropriate enforcement actions after identifying noncompliances, including violations, apparent violations, deviations, and nonconformances. Potential noncompliances may be identified through NRC inspection activity; NRC investigation; licensee identification, such as through internal audits, reviews or employee reports; or through an allegation supported by an NRC inspection or investigation. All violations are subject to civil enforcement action. Violations that are willful may also be subject to criminal enforcement action. These cases are also investigated by the NRC's Office of Investigations (OI) and, if wrongdoing is found, the case is referred to the Department of Justice for consideration and prosecution. Following identification of a potential violation, it is assessed in accordance with the Commission's Enforcement Policy. This Policy has been approved by the Commission and is published as Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 2 of the Commission's regulations. Because it is a policy and not a regulation, the Commission is able to depart from the provisions of the Appendix if circumstances warrant, but in practice, this happens only rarely.

There are three primary enforcement sanctions available: Notices of Violation, civil penalties, and orders. A Notice of Violation (NOV) is a formal written citation setting forth one or more violations of a legally binding requirement. NOVs normally require a licensee response. A civil penalty is a monetary fine that may be imposed under authority of section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act for violations of regulatory requirements. That

section provides for penalties of up to \$100,000 per violation per day. Orders may be issued to modify, suspend, or revoke a license; to require a regulated party to cease and desist from a given practice or activity; or take such other action as may be proper.

In addition to the primary sanctions, the NRC has administrative mechanisms available, including Notices of Deviation, Notices of Nonconformance, Confirmatory Action Letters, Letters of Reprimand, and Demands For Information.

Once the circumstances surrounding a noncompliance are understood, the preliminary safety significance is assessed and the commensurate severity level determined. Safety significance, as used in the enforcement program, involves consideration of three factors: (1) the actual safety consequence (e.g., overexposure, offsite release, loss of safety system), (2) the regulatory significance, and (3) the potential safety consequence of a violation. In other words, consideration is given to the matter as a whole in light of the circumstances surrounding the violation. There may be cases where the actual safety consequence of a violation represents a minor concern but the regulatory significance or the potential safety consequence represents a significant concern. Severity levels range from Severity Level I, for the most significant violations, to Severity Level V for those of minor concern. Eight supplements to the Enforcement Policy provide guidance in determining these severity levels. A higher severity level may be assigned for cases involving a group of violations with the same root cause, repetitive violations, or willful violations.

Enforcement conferences are normally held for violations assessed at Severity Levels I, II, or III, and may be held for violations assessed at Severity Level IV if increased management attention is warranted (e.g., repetitive violations). An enforcement conference is a meeting between the NRC and the licensee to (1) discuss the apparent violations, their significance, the reason for their occurrence, including the apparent root causes, and the licensee's corrective actions, (2) determine whether there were any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and (3) obtain other information that will help the NRC determine the appropriate enforcement action. The decision to hold an enforcement conference does not mean that the agency has determined that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, enforcement conferences are normally closed to the public. However, on July 10, 1992, the Commission implemented a two-year trial program to allow certain enforcement conferences to be open to public observation. (That program is continuing as of July 1994, see further discussion addressed under "Current Developments.")

Following the enforcement conference, the regional office prepares the proposed enforcement action. All Severity Level I and II cases, and some Severity Level III cases are sent to Headquarters for processing and approval. Routine Severity Level III materials cases, and Severity Level IV and V matters are issued directly from the regional office.

In the absence of mitigating circumstances, civil penalties are normally issued for Severity Level III or higher violations and may be issued for violations at Severity Level IV if the violations are repetitive or similar to previous Severity Level IV violations. In addition, a civil penalty may be issued for any willful violation.

If a civil penalty is to be proposed, the base value of the penalty must first be determined. The base value is based on a combination of the type of licensed activity, the type of licensee, and the severity level of the violation. Once the base value is determined, a number of factors are considered that may either escalate or mitigate the amount of the civil penalty, depending on the unique circumstances of the case. These factors are: (1) who identified the violation, (2) the promptness and extensiveness of the corrective action, (3) the licensee's performance, (4) whether the licensee had prior opportunities to identify the violation sooner, such as through industry or NRC notification or internal audits, (5) whether there were multiple examples of the violation, and (6) the duration of the violation.

If a civil penalty is to be proposed, a written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty is issued and the licensee has 30 days to respond in writing, by either paying the penalty or contesting it. The NRC considers the response, and if the penalty is contested, may either mitigate the penalty or impose it by an order. Thereafter, the licensee may pay the civil penalty or request a hearing.

Orders may be issued in lieu of, or in addition to, civil penalties. In addition, the NRC may issue an order to an unlicensed person (including vendors) where the NRC has identified deliberate misconduct. By statute, a licensee or individual may request a hearing upon receiving an order. Orders are normally effective after a licensee or individual has had an opportunity to request a hearing (30 days). Orders can, however, be made immediately effective without prior opportunity for a hearing whenever it is determined that the public health, safety, or interest so requires. Subsequent to the hearing process, a licensee or individual may appeal the administrative hearing decision to the court of appeals. All orders are published in the *Federal Register*. The NRC normally issues press releases for proposed civil penalties and orders.

On September 16, 1991, the Commission implemented a new rule that would allow orders to be issued to individuals. The deliberate misconduct rule applies to: (1) a licensee, (2) an employee of a licensee, and (3) a contractor, subcontractor, or employee of a contractor or subcontractor who knowingly provides to a licensee or contractor, components or any other goods or services that relate to licensed activities. This rule prohibits (1) engaging in deliberate misconduct that causes, or but for detection would have caused, a licensee to be in violation of any NRC requirement, or (2) deliberately submitting to NRC, a licensee, contractor, or subcontractor information known to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC. Deliberate misconduct means an intentional act or omission that the person knows would cause, or is, a violation of a Commission requirement or a procedure, instruction, contract, purchase order, or policy of a licensee or contractor.

An order issued under the deliberate misconduct rule might order the wrongdoer to remain out of licensed activities for a specified period, to notify the NRC before resuming involvement in licensed activities, or to inform any prospective employer of the issuance of the order. The order might require the employer to remove or confirm the removal of an employee from licensed activities, require the employer to advise prospective employers of the existence of the order when they call for reference checks, or require notice to the NRC if a licensee employs or desires to reemploy a wrongdoer in licensed activities.

Current developments:

On July 10, 1992, the Commission implemented a 2-year trial program to allow certain enforcement conferences to be open to public observation. This program is continuing pending the outcome of the current review of the enforcement program. Under the trial program, approximately 25 percent of all eligible enforcement conferences will be open to public observation, at least one conference will be open in each regional office, and open conferences will be conducted with a variety of types of licensees. Conferences that will be open to public observation will be selected on a random basis by selecting every fourth eligible conference involving a commercial operating reactor, hospital, or other type of licensee. In addition, conferences may also be open in cases where there is an ongoing adjudicatory proceeding with one or more intervenors.

Enforcement conferences will not be open to public observation if the enforcement action being contemplated (1) may be taken against an individual or, if the action, though not taken against the individual, turns on whether an individual has committed wrongdoing; (2) involves significant personnel failures where the NRC has requested that the individual(s) involved be present at the conference; (3) is based on the findings of an NRC OI report;

or (4) involves safeguards, Privacy Act, or proprietary information. Enforcement conferences will also be closed if the conference will be conducted by telephone or at a relatively small licensee's facility.

The NRC intends to announce open enforcement conferences to the public normally 10 working days in advance of the conference through the following mechanisms: (1) notices posted in the Public Document Room; (2) toll-free telephone messages; and (3) toll-free electronic bulletin board messages. Pending establishment of the toll-free message systems, the public may call (800) 952-9674 to obtain a recording of upcoming open enforcement conferences.

On May 13, 1994, the Executive Director for Operations directed a reexamination of the NRC enforcement program by a Review Team of senior NRC staff. As part of this review of the Enforcement Policy, the NRC intends to consider the issue of whether the Commission should establish open enforcement conferences as the normal practice. In the interim, the NRC is continuing the open enforcement conference trial program pending the outcome of the Enforcement Policy Review. The Review Team intends to complete its review of the Enforcement Policy in early 1995. As part of its review of the Enforcement Policy, the NRC intends to issue a *Federal Register* notice soliciting public comments to assist the Review Team. This notice will include soliciting comments on the issue of open enforcement conferences.

Contact:

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HIGHLIGHTS OF ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM

- Enforcement program seeks to protect public health and safety by ensuring compliance, correcting violations, deterring future violations, and improving licensee and vendor performance.
- Violations are detected through inspections and investigations.
- Violations are subject to civil enforcement action and may be subject to criminal prosecution.
- Civil enforcement sanctions include: Notices of Violation, civil penalties, and orders.
- Severity level of a violation reflects the significance of the violation and ranges from the most significant, Severity Level I, to the least, Severity Level V.
- Civil penalties are normally issued for Severity Level III or higher violations.
- The amount of a civil penalty assessed varies with type of licensed activity, type of licensee, severity level, and escalation and mitigation factors.
- If a civil penalty is proposed, licensee may respond by paying or contesting the action.
- If licensee protests action, staff considers response, and either mitigates the penalty or imposes it by order.
- Licensee must then pay or request an administrative hearing.
- Orders may be used to modify, suspend, or revoke a license.
- Orders may also address deliberate wrongdoing by individual employees of licensees, contractors, or others who provide goods or services that relate to licensed activities.
- An order to an individual might remove him or her from licensed activity, require NRC notification of the individual's reemployment in licensed activities, or require notification to prospective employers of the existence of an order.
- NRC may use Demands for Information to obtain information when considering enforcement action.

- In a 2-year trial program starting July 10, 1992, one of every four eligible enforcement conferences involving a commercial operating reactor, hospital, or other type of licensee will be open to public observation. (Program extended pending the outcome of the team review as discussed below.)
- A schedule of open enforcement conferences can be obtained by calling (800) 952-9674.
- EDO established Review Team on May 13, 1994 to perform a review of the enforcement program.

INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Background:

The primary safety consideration in the operation of any nuclear reactor is the control and containment of radioactive material, under both normal and accident conditions. Numerous controls and barriers are installed in reactor plants to protect workers and the public from the effects of radiation.

Both the industry and the NRC have roles in providing these protections and in ensuring that they are maintained. The NRC establishes regulations and guides for the construction and operation of nuclear reactors. Organizations licensed by the NRC must abide by these regulations and are directly responsible for designing, constructing, testing, and operating their facilities in a safe manner. The NRC, through its licensing and inspection programs, provides assurance that its licensees are meeting their responsibilities.

Inspection Program:

The responsibility for safe operation of a nuclear power plant lies with the licensee. The NRC inspection program is designed to ensure, through selective examinations, that the licensee identifies and resolves potential safety issues before they result in significant problems that adversely impact safe operations. The NRC inspection program is audit-oriented to verify, through scrutiny of carefully selected samples, that relevant activities are being properly conducted and equipment properly maintained to ensure safe operations. What to sample, sample size, and the frequencies of inspection are all judgments based on the importance of the activity or system to overall safety and on available resources. The inspection process monitors the licensee's activity, provides findings to the licensee's management, and conducts followup to ensure that the licensee has implemented lasting corrective action.

Implementation of the NRC inspection program does not supplant the licensee's programs or attenuate its responsibilities. Rather, the program provides an independent verification of the effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of its programs and a mechanism to feed back the results to the licensee for corrective action, thereby ensuring that the plants are operated safely and in accordance with the associated NRC requirements. Inspections are performed on power reactors under construction, in test conditions, and in operation. The inspections are conducted primarily by region-based and resident inspectors. Resident inspectors are stationed at each reactor under construction and in operation. Region-based inspectors operate out of the four Regional Offices located in or near Philadelphia,

Atlanta, Chicago, and Dallas, and out of a field office near San Francisco. These inspections are supplemented with inspections conducted by special teams comprised of personnel from both NRC Headquarters and Regional Offices.

Inspections are a vital part of the NRC's review of applications for licenses and the NRC's process for issuing construction permits and operating licenses. Inspections continue throughout the operating life of a nuclear facility.

Before construction, the inspection program concentrates on the applicant establishing and implementing a quality assurance program. Inspections cover quality assurance of design, procurement and planning for fabrication, and construction of the facility.

During construction, samples taken across the spectrum of licensee activity are examined to confirm that the requirements of the construction permit issued by the NRC are being followed and that the plant is being built according to the approved design and associated codes and standards. Construction inspectors look for qualified personnel, quality material, conformance to approved design, and a well-formulated and satisfactorily implemented quality assurance program. As construction nears completion, pre-operational testing begins to demonstrate the operational readiness of the plant and its staff. Inspections during this phase seek to determine whether the licensee has developed adequate test plans - both to assure that tests are consistent with NRC requirements and to ascertain whether the plant and its staff are thoroughly prepared for safe operation. Inspections during the pre-operational phase involve (1) reviewing overall test procedures; (2) examining selected test procedures for technical adequacy; and (3) witnessing and assessing selected tests to verify that test objectives have been met and to confirm the consistency of planned and actual tests. Inspectors also review the qualifications of operating personnel and verify that operating procedures and quality assurance plans are properly developed and implemented.

About six months before the operating license is issued, a startup phase begins in preparation for loading fuel and "power ascension." After the NRC issues the operating license, the licensee loads fuel into the reactor and the startup test program begins. As in pre-operational testing, NRC inspections emphasize test procedures and results. The licensee's management system for startup testing is appraised, test procedures are analyzed, tests are witnessed, and licensee evaluations of test results are reviewed. Thereafter, the NRC continues its inspection program for the rest of the operating life of the plant.

The staff is developing a new construction inspection program for reactors to be built under combined construction and operating

licenses issued under 10 CFR Part 52. The new inspection program will continue to verify the safety aspects of a plant's construction and testing, as described above for the current program, and will allow for more systematic inspection planning and documentation of inspection results. Also, the new construction inspection program will be structured to ensure verification of satisfactory completion by licensees of the Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) included in a combined license and required by 10 CFR Part 52.

During plant operation, the NRC assures that the licensee is operating safely through selective inspections. An on-site resident inspector provides a continual inspection and regulatory presence, as well as a direct contact between NRC management and the licensee. The activity of the resident inspector is supplemented by the work of engineers and specialists from the Regional Office staff who perform inspections in a wide variety of engineering and scientific disciplines, ranging from civil and structural engineering to health physics and reactor core physics.

The frequency, scope and depth of the inspection program for operating reactor plants are defined in the NRC Inspection Manual. Detailed inspection procedures provide instructions and guidance for NRC inspectors. The program consists of three major elements: core inspections - the minimum required at all plants; generic safety issue inspections - special inspections to focus on a specific issue; and plant specific regional initiative inspections - those required to resolve safety issues brought to light by other inspections or as a result of plant operational experience. The program is structured to ensure that, among other considerations, the resources available for inspection are used efficiently and effectively, with particular attention accorded those plants where, based on past performance, improvements in the levels of protection and safety-consciousness may be in order.

The inspection program is designed to ensure that nuclear power plants are constructed and operated safely and in compliance with regulatory requirements. Its results are factored into NRC's overall evaluation of licensee performance under the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. When a safety problem or failure to comply with requirements is discovered, the NRC requires prompt corrective action by the licensee, confirmed, if necessary, by appropriate enforcement action.

The NRC periodically assesses the effectiveness of its inspection program for operating reactors. The assessment objectives are to determine if the inspection program 1) is effective in achieving its regulatory objectives, 2) inspects the right areas, 3) devotes resources consistent with industry performance, and 4) is implemented consistently on a national basis. The

assessment process first evaluates the effectiveness and implementation of the inspection program in each of the four regions. Following the assessment of all the regions, the results are integrated to arrive at overall conclusions on the program's effectiveness and implementation and any necessary program improvements.

In February 1989, the Commission announced a policy on cooperation with States which allows States to observe, and in some cases participate in, NRC inspections at reactor facilities.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF INSPECTION PROGRAM

- NRC, through its licensing and inspection programs, ensures licensees are meeting their responsibilities for constructing and operating nuclear reactors in a safe manner.
- The NRC inspection program is designed to ensure, through selective examinations, that the licensee identifies and resolves potential safety issues before they result in significant problems that adversely impact safe operations.
- The inspection process monitors the licensee's activity, provides findings to the licensee's management, and conducts followup to ensure the licensee has implemented lasting corrective action(s).
- Inspections performed by resident, regional, and headquarters inspectors.
- Inspections performed before construction, during construction, during preoperational testing, and continually throughout the plant's operating life.
- Inspection program defined in NRC Inspection Manual and includes detailed inspections procedures for:
 - 1) core inspections - the minimum done at all plants;
 - 2) generic safety issue inspections - special inspections to focus on a specific issue;
 - 3) plant specific regional initiative inspections - those which are required to adequately resolve plant specific safety issues.
- Inspection results factored into the overall evaluation of licensee performance under the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program.
- NRC periodically assesses the inspection program.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Background:

The discharge of radioactive effluents from the routine operation of nuclear power plants can result in environmental impacts. These impacts can be on man, and terrestrial and aquatic biota. In nearly all cases, a Final Environmental Statement (FES) was issued by the NRC which details the potential impacts resulting from the routine operation of each nuclear power plant. The NRC regulation, 10 CFR 50.36a, "Technical Specifications on Effluents from Nuclear Power Reactors," requires that each license authorizing operation of a nuclear power reactor include technical specifications that (1) keep releases of radioactive material to unrestricted areas during normal operation as low as is reasonably achievable, and (2) comply with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 20.106, "Radioactivity in Effluents in Unrestricted Areas" or Subpart D, "Radiation Dose Limits for Individual Members of the Public," of the revised Part 20. These and other NRC regulations require NRC licensees to have in place various effluent and environmental monitoring programs to ensure that the impacts are minimized.

Environmental Impacts:

Radioactive effluent releases and their associated doses are reported by licensees in Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports (recently changed to an annual report) while radioactivity levels in various environmental media are reported in the Annual Environmental Operating Reports (AEOR). The Radioactive Effluents Release Reports include the amount of liquid and airborne radioactive effluents discharged and the calculated doses for the period of release. Doses which are typically presented for airborne effluents include the beta and gamma air doses from noble gases and the maximum organ dose from radioiodine and particulates. These doses are compared to the design objective doses of Appendix I to 10 CFR 50. For liquid effluents, the total body and maximum organ doses are typically presented and are also compared to the design objective doses of Appendix I.

The AEOR provides the results of an environmental sampling and analysis program which is focused on the radiation exposure pathways specific to the given plant. Typical sampling programs include an inner and outer ring of TLDs (thermoluminescent dosimeters) around the plant; airborne radioiodine and particulate samplers; samples of surface, groundwater, and drinking water and downstream shoreline sediment from existing or potential recreational facilities; and samples of ingestion pathway sources such as milk, fish and invertebrates, and food

products including broad leaf vegetation. The results of the AEOR report are used to supplement the effluent monitoring program to ensure that potential impacts do not go undetected.

Regulations:

The regulations, which are presently in place to limit offsite releases and their associated radiation doses, are much more restrictive than those initially issued and those which the first licensed nuclear power plants (during the period of the 1960s) were required to meet.

On May 5, 1975, the NRC amended regulations 50.34a and 50.36a and added a new Appendix I to Part 50 which provided numerical guides for design objectives and limiting conditions for operation to meet the criteria "as low as is reasonably achievable." The adoption of these regulations meant that the limiting criterion for nuclear power plant effluents was no longer Part 20, but the design objectives of Appendix I.

An additional regulatory requirement was placed on uranium fuel cycle licensees with the provisions of 40 CFR 190, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations," which was promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency on December 1, 1979. These standards established total body, thyroid, and other organ dose limits for all effluents and direct radiation except radon and its daughters. The NRC subsequently incorporated the EPA regulations into 10 CFR Part 20 by reference on March 25, 1981.

Current Status:

In addition to the Annual Effluent Release Reports and the AEOR, the NRC uses other means of verifying that licensees fully evaluate the potential impacts of their operations. The NRC contracts with some 35 states which perform various environmental monitoring programs including environmental sampling and analysis around nuclear power plants. The NRC also has a mobile laboratory which is used during plant inspections to confirm, using split samples, the accuracy of the licensee's radiological effluent monitoring program. Licensees are also required to participate in an Interlaboratory Comparison Program which provides an independent check of the accuracy and the precision of the measurement of radioactive material in environmental samples. The NRC also conducts periodic aerial surveillance of nuclear power plants in which measurements of direct radiation are made.

The NRC documents the results of its independent monitoring and assessment efforts in plant specific inspection reports and in reports such as NUREG/CR-2850, "Dose Commitments Due to

Radioactive Releases from Nuclear Power Plant Sites," and NUREG-0837, "NRC TLD Direct Radiation Monitoring Network." The NRC also compiles licensees' effluent reports and publishes the results in NUREG/CR-2907, "Radioactive Materials Released from Nuclear Power Plants."

With the implementation of the design objective doses of Appendix I and their associated technical specifications, the effluents released from nuclear power plants have decreased significantly. The collective annual radiation dose to the public has decreased from 1300 person-rem in 1975 (the initial year for which such evaluations were published) to 79 person-rem in 1990. When normalized to the electric power generation, collective doses have decreased from 7.6 to 0.14 person-rem/TW-hr (TW=1E+12 watts). Collective dose represents the sum of doses to individuals within 80 km (50 mi) of each facility. A significant contributor to the reduction in airborne effluents has been the addition of the Augmented Offgas Systems to boiling water reactors. Reductions have also resulted from improved fuel performance and licensees' improved effluent control programs.

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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

- ◆ Final Environmental Statements on each plant detail the potential impacts resulting from routine operation.
- ◆ Licensees report releases of radioactive materials, including liquid and airborne, and their associated doses in the Semiannual (recently changed to Annual) Effluent Release Report.
- ◆ Licensees report radioactivity levels from the environmental sampling of air, ground, water, and ingestion pathways in the Annual Environmental Operating Reports.
- ◆ 10 CFR 50.36a requires each license for a nuclear power reactor include technical specifications that not only keep releases of radioactive material to unrestricted areas as low as reasonably achievable, but also comply with 10 CFR 20, Subpart D (old 10 CFR 20.106).
- ◆ 10 CFR 20, Subpart D establishes dose and concentration limits for radioactive materials in effluents in unrestricted areas.
- ◆ The NRC documents licensee's effluent releases and the results of the staff's independent monitoring and assessment effort in NUREG/CR-2907, NUREG/CR-2850, NUREG-0837, and plant specific inspection reports.
- ◆ 40 CFR 190 sets standards for annual doses to a member of the public for uranium fuel cycle licensees. These standards have been incorporated by reference in Subpart D of 10 CFR 20.
- ◆ The staff verifies that licensees evaluate potential radiological impacts through onsite inspections, a mobile lab, state contracts, interlaboratory comparison, and aerial surveillance.
- ◆ 10 CFR 50.34a & Appendix I provide numerical guides for design objectives and limiting conditions for operation to meet as low as is reasonably achievable criteria.
- ◆ Effluent releases result in very small doses to members of the public living around nuclear power plants.

URANIUM MILL TAILINGS

Background:

A lack of orders for new nuclear power plants and the importation of uranium from other countries have now severely eroded the value of uranium and resulted in most U.S. uranium mills shutting down operations or operating on a limited basis.

Many mills are, or will be, conducting reclamation of tailings piles created in the process of extracting source material (in the form of "yellow cake") from uranium-bearing ore. These mill tailings wastes, both from unlicensed inactive mills (formerly used in providing uranium primarily for the weapons program) and from licensed active mills regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Agreement States, pose a long-term hazard to the public health and safety. To provide for the disposal, long-term stabilization, and control of these uranium mill tailings in a safe and environmentally sound manner, Congress enacted the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA).

In terms of health hazard, the most hazardous radioactive constituent in uranium mill tailings is radium, which has a very long half-life. Radium, besides being hazardous itself, produces radon, a radioactive gas whose decay products can cause lung cancer. This makes mill tailings hazardous for thousands of years.

UMTRCA established two programs to protect public health and the environment from uranium mill tailings. The Title I program established a joint Federal/State-funded program for remedial action at abandoned mill tailings sites, with ultimate Federal ownership under license from NRC. Under Title I, NRC must evaluate the Department of Energy's (DOE) designs and concur that DOE's actions for cleanup and remediation of these inactive tailings sites meet standards set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Title II program is directed towards the active mill tailings sites (those sites under license by NRC or Agreement States). Title II provides: (1) NRC authority to control radiological and nonradiological hazards; (2) EPA authority to set generally applicable standards for both radiological and nonradiological hazards; and (3) eventual State or Federal ownership, under license from NRC. For Agreement States, NRC also is required to make a determination that all applicable standards and requirements have been met by uranium mills licensed by Agreement States before termination of their licenses.

Regulations and Standards:

UMTRCA charged the EPA with the responsibility for promulgating standards for control of uranium mill tailings. In 1983, EPA issued standards in 40 CFR Part 192 for both Title I sites (Subparts A, B, and C) and Title II sites (Subparts D and E). The portion of the EPA Title I standards dealing with ground water requirements were remanded by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on September 3, 1985. Based on this court decision, EPA was directed to promulgate new groundwater standards. EPA proposed these standards in the form of revisions to Subparts A-C of 40 CFR Part 192 in September, 1987, and now is in the process of completing action to promulgate the final groundwater standards.

For Title II sites, NRC conformed its standards in 10 CFR Part 40 to be consistent with the applicable EPA standards. NRC's final regulations conforming to EPA's requirements for radiological and nonradiological protection and long-term stabilization of the impoundments for the tailings were published on October 16, 1985. NRC's final regulations addressing EPA's groundwater protection standards were published on November 13, 1987.

EPA, in developing its mill tailings standards, estimated that its standards would significantly reduce radon emissions from tailings and approximately 600 lung cancer deaths per century would be avoided. Since the EPA standards require that the impoundments for the tailings must be designed to be stable for 1,000 years, to the extent practicable, but in no case less than 200 years, it is assumed that the actual engineered structures will degrade slowly over possibly thousands of years. Therefore, the use of the standards and NRC's implementing regulations could result in the avoidance of tens of thousands of calculated radon-related lung cancer deaths.

Current Status:

Title I -- Reclamation Work at Inactive Tailings Sites

DOE is undertaking reclamation at 24 inactive mill tailings piles at 22 sites. These piles range in size from about 60 thousand to 4.6 million cubic yards of material. Except for a site at Canonsburg, PA, the inactive sites are located in the western United States (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming). The DOE surface remediation program is estimated to cost approximately \$1.3 billion and is expected to be completed by 1998. The DOE groundwater cleanup phase was initiated by DOE in 1991. DOE has completed an internal draft of the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for its groundwater remediation phase. The NRC has reviewed and commented on this draft, as part of its cooperating agency status in the PEIS process. The final PEIS

should be released for public comment in the spring of 1995. DOE's initial cost estimates for groundwater remediation were over \$500 million with a completion date of 2020. DOE has completed remedial work, with the exception of groundwater cleanup, at approximately half of the Title I sites. The DOE became a licensee of the NRC under 10 CFR 40.27 with the completion and NRC concurrence of the Long-Term Surveillance Plan for the Spook, Wyoming inactive tailings site. It is anticipated that in 1994, 3 to 5 more completed mill tailings sites will come under the general license in 40.27 for the long-term custodial care by DOE.

Title II -- Licensed Mill Tailings Sites

Of 26 NRC licensed uranium recovery facilities, there are 19 uranium mills; 5 in situ leach facilities; 1 ion-exchange facility and 1 heap leach. None of the uranium mills are operating. Three of the in situ leach facilities are presently operating. There are four mills and two in situ facilities that have standby licenses which would permit these facilities to go into operation in a relatively short time, and applications for two additional in situ leach facilities are currently in licensing review. Most of the NRC licensed uranium mills are either expected to begin, or have already started, reclamation activities to provide long-term stabilization and closure of the tailings impoundments. While NRC has terminated in situ leach facility licenses, it has not, as yet, terminated a license for any uranium mill facility. These NRC-licensed sites are located in Nebraska, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. There also are 10 uranium mills in Agreement States (Colorado, Texas, and Washington) that have similar non-operational tailings impoundments.

In the fall of 1991, NRC, EPA, and the affected mill tailings Agreement States agreed that there was a need to eliminate the dual regulation created by NRC's authority under UMTRCA and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA). This interagency consultation resulted in the execution of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to provide the basis for eliminating the dual regulation by EPA under the CAA. Current activities are addressing the disposal standards in Subpart T of 40 CFR Part 61. The radon flux standards in Subpart T are the same as those implemented by NRC in 10 CFR Part 40. Consequently, the primary focus of the MOU is to ensure that non-operational piles are closed to comply with the radon standards as expeditiously as practicable, with a goal that such closure occur by the end of 1997. The MOU specifies that the schedules for closure be enforceable by NRC or the affected Agreement States. The MOU further provides that the dual regulation of operational sites under Subpart W of Part 61 will be addressed subsequently.

A major milestone identified in the MOU was approval by September 30, 1993 of all detailed licensee reclamation plans to construct final radon barriers. On October 18, 1993, NRC wrote to EPA that it and Agreements States had approved all the plans except that for the Atlas mill site at Moab, Utah whose reclamation plan was the subject of extensive public comment.

As agreed to in the MOU, both NRC and EPA are proceeding to revise their regulations to eliminate the dual regulation that exists as a result of Subpart T. On November 15, 1993 EPA published, in the Federal Register, revisions to its uranium tailings standards in 40 CFR Part 192, that added requirements for timely placement of radon covers on, and monitoring of radon emission from, tailings impoundments. On February 7, 1994, EPA supplemented its earlier proposal to rescind 40 CFR Part 61, subpart T and invited comments. On June 1, 1994 NRC published, in the Federal Register, revisions to its regulations in 10 CFR Part 40 to conform to revised EPA standards in 40 CFR Part 192.

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URANIUM MILL TAILINGS HIGHLIGHTS

- Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) established a comprehensive regulatory framework for all uranium mill tailings for long-term custody and control.
- Title I of UMTRCA established a joint Federal/State-funded program for remedial action at sites designated by Congress as "inactive" as of 1978, with ultimate Federal ownership under license from NRC.
- The 24 Title I tailings piles, except for the site at Canonsburg, PA, are located in the western United States. The DOE surface remediation work is estimated to cost approximately \$1.3 billion and to be completed by 1996. DOE anticipates that all of these sites will be under license from NRC by 1998. The DOE groundwater cleanup phase was initiated in 1991. DOE has completed a draft of a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for this groundwater cleanup phase, which has been reviewed by NRC. The final PEIS should be released for public comment in the spring of 1995. Groundwater cleanup has been estimated by DOE to cost over \$500 million.
- Title II of UMTRCA provided: (1) NRC authority to control radiological and nonradiological hazards; (2) EPA authority to set generally applicable standards for both radiological and nonradiological hazards; and (3) eventual State or Federal ownership under license from NRC.
- There are 26 uranium recovery facilities licensed by NRC under 10 CFR Part 40 in conformance with EPA generally applicable standards in 40 CFR Part 192.
- There are 15 NRC licensed and 8 Agreement State-licensed facilities that have non-operating mill tailings impoundments.
- An NRC-EPA Agreement State MOU of October 1991 provides the basis for eliminating dual regulation by EPA under the Clean Air Act and establishes a schedule for closure of the tailings impoundments at these 23 non-operating sites by the end of 1997. NRC has completed and EPA is in the process of revising their regulations in this regard.

STATE COMPLIANCE WITH 1993 MILESTONE AND 1996
LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE OF THE
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985

Background:

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (LLRWPA) (Pub. L. 99-240) establishes a series of milestones, penalties, and incentives for regional compacts and States to promote progress toward being able to manage their low-level radioactive waste (LLW) by 1993. However, slow progress in developing new LLW disposal facilities has resulted in the storage of LLW at some generator sites, even before January 1, 1993. On June 30, 1994, the LLW disposal facility at Barnwell, South Carolina, closed to generators outside the Southeast Compact. Effective July 1, 1994, LLW generators in 31 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico no longer have access to commercial LLW disposal facilities. This paper includes background information on the LLRWPA and the status of LLW disposal facility development.

LLW Disposal:

Low-level radioactive waste is a general term for a variety of radioactively contaminated wastes generated by nuclear power plants and related industries, hospitals, medical and educational research institutions, private and governmental laboratories, and other commercial activities that use radioactive materials as a part of their normal operations. Approximately 800,000 cubic feet of LLW from these operations were disposed of in 1993. LLW from these sources is currently disposed of using shallow land burial at privately operated facilities located in the States of South Carolina and Washington. In addition, LLW with limited concentrations in radioactivity, normally in bulk form resulting from decommissioning and remediation activities, is accepted for disposal at the Envirocare facility in Clive, Utah.

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act:

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (LLRWPA) made the States responsible for the disposal of commercially generated and certain Federally generated LLW. The LLRWPA encouraged the States to form compacts to dispose of LLW on a regional basis. The LLRWPA also designated January 1, 1986, as the date after which compacts could restrict the use of their disposal facilities by excluding waste generated outside the compact region. However, by 1983, it had become clear that no new disposal facilities would be operational by the 1986 milestone. As a result, in January 1986, the LLRWPA was enacted. The LLRWPA extended the January 1, 1986, deadline by seven years, to

January 1, 1993. By that date, new LLW disposal facilities were expected to be operational, and the rights of the LLW generators, to dispose of their LLW at the three sites then operating, would end.

To help ensure that the States make adequate progress to develop new LLW disposal facilities, the LLRWPA established six milestones by which the States should make decisions and commit to certain actions. The majority of the States met the requirements of the three milestone dates that had passed by January 1990. However, only the Central, Central-Midwest, and Southwestern Compacts met the January 1, 1992, milestone requirement, where their respective host States of Nebraska, Illinois, and California, had license applications submitted for disposal facilities. The State of Texas conformed to this milestone on March 2, 1992, by submitting a disposal facility license application. However, no State had a new LLW disposal facility operational on January 1, 1993, as envisioned by the LLRWPA. The remaining milestone of the LLRWPA, as it was enacted, is:

January 1, 1996 - The States, upon proper notice by the generator or owner, shall take title to and be obligated to take possession of LLW. The State will also be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by the generator or owner if it fails to take possession as soon after January 1, 1996, as the generator or owner notifies the State that the waste is available for shipment.

This section of the LLRWPA requiring the States to take title to, and possession of, the generated waste by January 1, 1996 (often referred to as the "take-title" provision), was held to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court, on June 19, 1992. All other provisions of the law, however, remain intact.

Compact Status:

At present, nine compacts have been formed, representing 42 States. The accompanying figure shows the current arrangements of compacts and unaffiliated States (i.e., those States not in a compact). Legislation to establish the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact (Texas Compact) was enacted by Texas on June 9, 1993. The legislation provides that if either of the other two designated compact member States (Maine and Vermont) ratify the compact, the agreement will be in full force for Texas and the ratifying State. The compact was adopted by the State of Maine in November 1993 and by the State of Vermont in April 1994. The remaining step is for the U.S. Congress to consent to the Texas Compact.

Access to Disposal Facilities:

The LLRWPA required the sited States of Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington to make disposal capacity available to LLW generators until December 31, 1992, subject to certain conditions. Although the Washington facility remains open, serving the Northwest Compact (its compact) and under contract, the Rocky Mountain Compact, the Nevada facility stopped accepting LLW on December 31, 1992. The facility in Barnwell, South Carolina will remain open until January 1, 1996, subject to various conditions. However, the facility closed permanently to out-of-region waste on July 1, 1994. Widespread storage for an extended period is expected in the 33 States (including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) that no longer have access to a disposal facility.

Progress to Develop New LLW Disposal Facilities:

No new facilities are scheduled to be operational by January 1996. LLW disposal facilities in the host States of California, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Texas are forecast to be operational between the period 1996 and 1998. Facilities in the host States of Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York are scheduled for operation in the period 1999 and 2001. There is no firm schedule available for the host State of Ohio, because siting activity cannot begin until the Ohio General Assembly enacts enabling legislation. Recommendations for enabling legislation were submitted to the General Assembly in September 1993. The unaffiliated States of Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have no plans to develop an LLW disposal facility. A number of these States believe that they may be able to fulfill their responsibilities through the contracting and/or compact process. The accompanying table shows the dates by which compact host States and unaffiliated States accomplished, or expect to accomplish, key steps in developing new disposal facilities.

Summary:

Since no new LLW disposal facilities were operational by January 1, 1993, and the compact commissions that control the existing LLW disposal sites have either closed their facility or have stopped accepting LLW from outside their regional compacts, many licensees who generate LLW have been forced to store their LLW on-site, until disposal capacity is available.

Highlights of this media briefing background paper can be found in the attachment.

BP20 (07/94)

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LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMPACT STATUS

JUNE 1994

UNAFFILIATED STATES

- 12% National LLW (10 States)
- NY to host site - 7% National LLW - SLB banned
- MA to host site - 3% National LLW - SLB banned
- ME to compact with TX - <1% National LLW - in storage
- VT to compact with TX - <1% National LLW
- NH, RI, DC, PR each less than 1% National LLW - most in storage
- MI - all LLW in storage

NORTHEAST

- NJ and CT are party States
- NJ and CT selected as host States
- 5% National LLW
- Disposal technology to be determined by host States
- SLB banned in NJ

APPALACHIAN

- PA is host State
- 8% National LLW
- EMAGV, SLB banned

SOUTHEAST

- SC current host State using SLB
- NC selected as next host State
- 35% National LLW
- EMAGV chosen by NC - SLB banned
- License under review

CENTRAL

- NE selected as host State
- 3% National LLW
- EMAGV, SLB banned
- License under review

CENTRAL MIDWEST

- IL is host State
- 8% National LLW
- Disposal technology to be determined
- SLB banned

MIDWEST

- OH selected as host State
- 3% National LLW
- SLB banned

NORTHWEST

- WA is host State
- 19% National LLW
- SLB

TEXAS


- TX to host site
- 1% National LLW
- To compact with ME and VT
- BGCC, SLB banned
- License under review

ROCKY MOUNTAIN

- Northwest Compact accepts LLW from Rocky Mountain Compact
- 5% National LLW

SOUTHWESTERN

- CA is host State
- 4% National LLW
- SLB
- Conditional license issued
- BLM land needs to be transferred



Source: Office of State Programs, NRC

*Operating LLW Disposal Sites

Note: National LLW volume for 1993 = 0.8 million cube feet disposed

SLB = shallow land burial

EMAGV = Earth mounded above grade vault

BGCC = below ground concrete canisters

Actual and Estimated Dates for
 Completing Steps in Facility Development
 (Estimated Dates Obtained from Compacts/States)

<u>Compact/Host State</u>	<u>Select Site</u>	<u>Submit License Application</u>	<u>Operate Facility</u>
Appalachian/Pennsylvania	1995	Early 1997	Mid-1999
Central/Nebraska	Dec 1989	Jul 1990	Sep 1998
Central Midwest/Illinois	Unscheduled	Nov 1997	Jul 2000
Midwest/Ohio	Unscheduled	Unscheduled	Unscheduled
Northeast/Connecticut & New Jersey	Unscheduled	Jul 1997	Dec 1999
	Unscheduled	Jul 1996	Oct 1998
Southeast/North Carolina	Dec 1993	Dec 1993	Early 1996
Southwest/California	Mar 1988	Dec 1989	Mid-1996
<u>Unaffiliated States</u>			
Maine (See Note)			
Massachusetts	Unscheduled	Feb 1998	2000/2001
Michigan	Unscheduled	Unscheduled	Unscheduled
New York	Unscheduled	Jun 1999	Nov 2001
Texas	Aug 1991	Mar 1992	Late 1996
Vermont (See Note)			

Note: Formation of a compact pending with Texas as the host State.

HIGHLIGHTS

STATE COMPLIANCE WITH 1993 MILESTONE AND 1996
LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE OF THE
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985
(LLRWPA)

- LLRWPA established milestones, incentives, and penalties for States to develop new low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities.
 - Milestones were established for 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, and 1996.
 - Waste disposal surcharges, denial of disposal access, and take-title and possession provisions were penalties for failure to comply.
 - Partial rebate of surcharges to States provided incentive in the form of financial assistance.
 - U.S. Supreme Court has held the 1996 take-title provision to be unconstitutional.
- Majority of States met the first three milestones.
- Only four States (California, Illinois, Nebraska, and Texas) met the 1992 milestone; however, no State is scheduled to meet the 1996 legislative objective of the LLRWPA.
- The State of South Carolina and the Southeast Compact Commission allowed the LLW disposal facility at Barnwell, South Carolina, to continue accepting out-of-region waste until June 30, 1994. Effective July 1, 1994, the Barnwell facility no longer accepts LLW for disposal from outside the Southeast Compact
- On-site storage of LLW is expected to be widespread in the 33 States that no longer have access to a disposal facility.

HIGHLIGHTS

STATE COMPLIANCE WITH 1993 MILESTONE AND 1996
LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE OF THE
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY
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- On-site storage of LLW is expected to be widespread in the 33 States that no longer have access to a disposal facility.

INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAMS

Background:

The Incident Investigation Program (IIP) ensures that significant operational events are investigated by the NRC in a systematic, technically sound, and timely manner, to gather information pertaining to the probable root causes of the event, including any NRC contributions or lapses. The investigation of all significant operational events involving non-reactor and reactor activities licensed by the NRC are within the scope of this program. By focusing its efforts on uncovering the causes of operating events and on identifying associated corrective actions, the incident investigation process provides for a more complete technical and regulatory understanding of significant events. This is a major contribution to nuclear safety. Within the program, appropriate feedback is solicited from the NRC, the nuclear industry, and the public regarding the lessons learned from the events.

Incident Investigation Team:

For an event of high safety significance, an Incident Investigation Team (IIT) is established by the EDO. An IIT performs the single NRC incident investigation and reports directly to the EDO. It is composed of headquarters and regional staff and, for events involving power reactors, the team may also include industry representatives. To maintain independence, the team leader and other technical experts are chosen from those who have had no significant involvement with licensing and inspection activities at the facility at which the event occurred.

For an event of less safety significance, the Regional Administrator appoints an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT). This team reports directly to the Regional Administrator. Its members come from the regional staff supplemented by headquarters personnel and, in some cases, by personnel from other regions.

The team investigations are presently governed by two NRC documents:

- (1) Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program," and
- (2) NUREG-1303, "Incident Investigation Manual."

The IIT begins its investigation as soon as practicable after the facility has been placed in a safe, secure, and stable condition. If there is an NRC incident response, the investigation begins after it is deactivated.

For all IITs a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) will be issued as appropriate to the licensee requiring that, within the constraints of plant safety, suspected relevant failed components or systems be quarantined for troubleshooting. The CAL also ensures that the facility is maintained in a safe shutdown condition until concurrence is received from the NRC to restart.

The IIT investigation emphasizes fact-finding and determination of probable causes for the event. As the investigation progresses, the IIT issues interim reports outlining the status and plans, and adds relevant new information related to the investigation. The scope of the investigation is established to ensure that the event is clearly understood, that relevant facts and circumstances are identified and collected, and that probable cause(s) and contributing cause(s) are identified and substantiated by the evidence and information collected. The team also considers whether the licensee and the NRC took timely and adequate action or if they contributed to the cause before or during the event. The team also investigates event precursors, event chronology, systems response, human factors considerations, equipment performance, safety significance, and radiological considerations.

The IIT prepares a final report listing detailed findings and conclusions and sends copies to the Commission and the EDO within about 45 days from the time the team is activated. After receiving the final report, the EDO normally schedules a meeting so the IIT can brief the Commission on the investigation. Information contained in the report is not released to the public until a copy of the report is placed in the Public Document Room (PDR). Following the Commission briefing, a copy of the final report is transmitted to the licensee and NRC staff for their review and comment.

In addition to NRC staff and licensee review and comment on the IIT report, the EDO identifies from the investigation findings generic and plant-specific staff actions for evaluation and resolution as well as actions that are safety significant and that warrant additional attention or action. The EDO assigns these actions to the appropriate NRC office. Office Directors are asked to issue a status report on the disposition of each assigned staff action. AEOD will prepare annual closeout reports to identify and document actions taken to close out each assigned staff action item. In addition, the resolution of each IIT finding is subject to an independent assessment by AEOD of its adequacy and completeness.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAMS

- The Incident Investigation Program (IIP) ensures that NRC investigations of significant events are timely, thorough, well coordinated, and formally administered.
- The scope of the IIP covers the investigation of significant operational events involving non-reactor and reactor activities licensed by the NRC.
- The IIP process contributes to nuclear safety by providing for a more complete technical and regulatory understanding of significant events.
- Appropriate feedback regarding what is learned from the events is provided to the NRC, the industry, and the public.

INCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROGRAM:

- For an event of potentially major significance, an Incident Investigation Team (IIT) is established by the EDO.
- The investigation of less significant operational events may be conducted by an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT).
- The IIT begins its investigation as soon as practicable after the facility has been placed in a safe, secure, and stable condition.
- The IIT issues interim status reports at appropriate intervals.
- The investigation performed by an IIT emphasizes fact-finding and determination of probable causes for a significant operational event.
- The IIT prepares a final report and transmits it to the Commission and the EDO.
- Following NRC staff and licensee review and comment on the IIT report, the EDO identifies and assigns NRC Office responsibility for generic and plant-specific staff actions.
- Each resolution of an IIT finding is subject to independent assessment by AEOD as to its adequacy and completeness.
- The IIT investigation is governed by two NRC Documents:
 - (1) Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program," and
 - (2) NUREG-1303, "Incident Investigation Manual."

ROSEMOUNT TRANSMITTERS

Background:

During the late 1980's several utilities were having problems with Rosemount transmitters failing to calibrate or failing response time testing. A notification pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 was issued and the NRC started an investigation. It was determined that the problem appeared when the transmitters had a very slow leakage of fill oil. This reduced the travel of the diaphragm within the transmitter and led to failure. On April 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-42, "Failure of Rosemount Models 1153 and 1154 Transmitters," to alert the industry to the reported failures of Models 1153 and 1154 pressure and differential pressure transmitters manufactured by Rosemount Inc. Rosemount investigated the cause of the failures and confirmed that the failure mode was a gradual loss of fill-oil from the sealed sensing module of the transmitter. At that time it appeared that the failures were lot-related and that "suspect lots" had a higher failure rate than non-suspect lots. On March 9, 1990, the NRC issued Bulletin 90-01. This Bulletin requested that licensees promptly take corrective actions for Model 1153 Series B, Model 1153 Series D, and Model 1154 transmitters manufactured by Rosemount that were in the suspect lots, and therefore, had the potential for leaking fill-oil.

SUPPLEMENT 1 to BULLETIN NO. 90-01:

Since that time, there has been additional information collected and analyzed, resulting in the writing of an updated supplement to the original Bulletin. During the licensee response period to the original Bulletin, NUMARC surveyed all utilities to collect data on all installed Rosemount Model 1153 and 1154 transmitters, and on Rosemount Model 1151 and 1152 transmitters installed in safety-related systems. The staff, assisted by Brookhaven National Laboratory, reviewed the data collected by NUMARC. The failed transmitters were sorted by operating pressure and time-in-service. In evaluating this issue, the staff confirmed a relationship, as had been previously found by Rosemount and NUMARC, between the likelihood of failure and operating pressure, time-in-service, and the suspect and nonsuspect lot classifications. A high operating pressure was the most dominant factor leading to a loss of fill-oil, with time-in-service also being a significant factor. Transmitters with an operating pressure greater than 1500 psi had the highest failure rate, and those with an operating pressure between 1500 and 500 psi also had an increased failure rate. Second among these factors was time-in-service, with those transmitters that had been in service for less than 60,000 psi-months exhibiting higher failure rates than transmitters that had been in service for more than 60,000 psi-months.

On April 7, 1992, a proposed Supplement 1 to Bulletin 90-01 was published in the Federal Register. Twelve replies to this notice were received. The comments received primarily concerned the scope of coverage for the transmitters to be addressed and clarification of the exact nature of requested actions. On July 23, 1992, a public meeting was held to discuss the comments received and their disposition. On September 8, 1992, the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) reviewed the proposed supplement, including the disposition by the staff of comments received, and recommended changes which the staff incorporated into the supplement. The Bulletin Supplement was issued on December 22, 1992.

The Supplement requests utilities to review the information for applicability to their facilities, perform testing on a transmitter commensurate with its importance to safety and demonstrated failure rate, and modify, as appropriate, their actions and enhanced surveillance programs.

Regulation:

The NRC issued General Design Criterion (GDC) 21, "Protection System Reliability and Testability," in Appendix A to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50) to require the protection system to be designed with high functional reliability and with sufficient capability to allow periodic testing of its functioning when the reactor is operating. The NRC established this requirement to ensure that the licensee can readily detect failures of subcomponents and subsystems within the protection system and can readily detect loss of the required protection system redundancy when it occurs. In 10 CFR 50.55a(h), the NRC requires that protection systems meet the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (IEEE-279). In IEEE-279, it is stated that means shall be provided for checking, with a high degree of confidence, the operational availability of each system input sensor during reactor operation. To achieve a high functional reliability, a transmitter must have a low probability of failing while it is operating. When failures occur, they should be readily detectable, commensurate with the safety function, while the transmitter is operating. Upon reviewing the analyses, evaluations, and historical data on the loss of fill-oil, the staff concluded that actions requested by the previous bulletin were insufficient to ensure the transmitters achieve the desired high functional reliability.

Current Status:

To date, the NRC staff has received responses to Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1 from each licensee. The NRC staff has reviewed and approved approximately half of these responses, and the review of

the remaining responses will continue through 1994. Additionally, the NRC staff has developed an action plan to address implementation of the recommendations resulting from the further assessment of Rosemount transmitter problems performed by the Rosemount Transmitter Review Group (RTRG) as documented in its October 12, 1993 report. The status of these actions is as follows:

1. On March 17, 1994, the NRC staff issued a temporary instruction for conducting an inspection at each licensed nuclear power plant. The inspections will confirm implementation of licensee actions as committed in response to Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, and collect available data on calibration trending and failures of Rosemount transmitters. These inspections, which began May 23, 1994, will be conducted over a 2-year period.
2. On February 17, 1994, the NRC staff held the first of several periodic meetings with Rosemount, Inc., to exchange information on Rosemount transmitter performance. A second meeting is scheduled for September 15, 1994, at the Rosemount, Inc., facility in Eden Prairie, Minnesota. These meetings will continue over a 2-year period.
3. In January 1994, the NRC staff completed its first review of Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) data on Rosemount transmitters. This review indicated a significant decrease in the number of Rosemount transmitter failures since 1990. This finding was consistent with Rosemount, Inc., information on transmitter performance. Additional NPRDS data searches will be conducted periodically over the next 2 years. The second data review will be completed by September 1994.
4. The NRC staff will review EPRI Report TR-102908 dealing with Rosemount transmitter concerns. A draft of the report was issued in April 1994. The final report is expected to be available in mid-1994.

The above actions will provide the NRC with the necessary additional information to ensure that actions taken in response to NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1 are sufficient to resolve the Rosemount transmitter performance concerns.

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HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

Background:

The NRC has responsibility for regulating the operation of approximately 110 nuclear power plants and more than 8,000 materials licensees. The magnitude of the licensed activities is so extensive that the NRC can inspect only a fraction of them. Although the NRC's program for ensuring adequate protection is not structured to be dependent upon allegations of safety deficiencies, the NRC will never have the knowledge possessed by the thousands of employees in the nuclear industry. The NRC, therefore, expects employees in the nuclear industry to be free to raise potential safety issues.

Recognizing that it is not the NRC, but licensees who have the first responsibility for safety, it is not enough for employees to feel free to come directly to the NRC. Employees must feel free to raise potential safety issues to their management. Over the years the NRC, the regulated industry, and the public have benefited from the issues raised by employees of licensees and their contractors. If employees are subjected to retaliation by their employers for reporting safety concerns, there is a potential "chilling effect" for both allegers and co-workers who may have additional safety concerns to report.

The current regulatory process seeks to provide protection against retaliation for employees engaged in protected activities (e.g., raising potential safety concerns to a licensee or the NRC). Discrimination against an employee for engaging in protected activities is prohibited by the Commission's regulations (10 CFR 19.20, 30.7, 40.7, 50.7, 60.9, 61.9, 70.7, and 72.10). Discrimination, for purposes of the Commission's regulations, includes discharge and other actions that relate to compensation or terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. A licensee is subject to enforcement action under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, for violations of these prohibitions by the licensee or its contractors and subcontractors.

The AEA does not give the NRC the authority to provide a personal remedy, such as reinstatement or back pay, to an employee who has been subject to discrimination. The NRC's authority is directed at the licensee. NRC regulations and Federal statutes allow enforcement actions against licensees that could include denying, revoking, or suspending a license; imposing civil penalties; and initiating criminal proceedings.

An employee who believes that discrimination has occurred may seek a personal remedy by filing a complaint within 180 days with

the Department of Labor (DOL) in accordance with Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, as amended. However, the DOL process for providing personal remedies for those retaliated against (and the NRC process for taking enforcement action against the licensees who have retaliated) is time consuming.

Although the NRC can initiate an investigation at any time during the DOL process, the agencies agreed in a 1982 Memorandum of Understanding that the NRC would not normally conduct a parallel investigation. To a large degree, the NRC relies on the DOL for investigating allegations of discrimination. However, the NRC does respond to technical aspects of allegations.

Between October 1988 and April 1993, the NRC received a total of 609 retaliation complaints and initiated full-scale investigations for 44 of them. Of these complaints, 369 were also filed with DOL. Based on the complaints received, seven NRC enforcement actions were taken against licensees during this period and others are pending.

On July 9, 1993, the NRC Inspector General (IG) issued a report that addressed the staff's handling of retaliation complaints received from whistleblowers employed by NRC licensees. The IG, after interviewing various whistleblowers and NRC staff members, concluded that the NRC process for handling allegations of retaliation does not provide an adequate level of protection for whistleblowers.

On July 15, 1993, the NRC testified in a hearing conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation on the NRC's handling of intimidation and harassment allegations by employees within the nuclear industry.

Current Developments:

On July 6, 1993, the Executive Director for Operations established a Review Team to reassess the NRC's program for protecting allegeders against retaliation. The Review Team was tasked with determining whether the Commission has taken sufficient steps within its authority to create an atmosphere within the regulated community where individuals with safety concerns feel free to engage in protected activities without fear of retaliation.

In January 1994, the Review Team issued its report, NUREG-1499, "Reassessment of the NRC's Program for Protecting Allegers Against Retaliation." The Review Team evaluated the current system, and solicited comments from various NRC offices, other Federal agencies, licensees, former allegeders, and the public. This included holding several public meetings to solicit opinions

from licensees, industry employees, industry and alleged attorneys, and members of the public.

The Review Team made numerous recommendations within five categories: (1) encouraging responsible licensee action, (2) improving NRC allegation management, (3) NRC H&I investigations and NRC's involvement in the DOL process, (4) NRC enforcement actions, and (5) treating allegations of actual or potential discrimination outside the NRC investigation and enforcement process. The Review Team's conclusions and a consolidated list of recommendations are included in Sections III.A and III.B of NUREG-1499, respectively.

In summary, the Review Team found that the NRC regulatory approach in this area, focusing on achieving an environment for promptly identifying and resolving concerns, counteracting chilling effect, and taking enforcement action where appropriate, was more extensive than most other Federal agencies, as most agencies only focused on personal remedies. However, the Review Team concluded that the NRC has not taken sufficient steps within its authority to create and promote an environment within the regulated community in which employees feel free to raise concerns without fearing retaliation. The Review Team found that the NRC has established the basic framework to achieve this environment by having an allegation management system, doing inspections and investigations, and taking enforcement actions. However, the Review Team concluded that the NRC can and should do more within its existing authority. By creating a more visible agency emphasis on the importance of the licensee's environment for raising concerns, the Review Team concluded that the NRC will also encourage increased licensee attention in this area.

In addition to recommendations for actions within existing statutory authority, the Review Team also made certain recommendations that may require statutory changes. The Review Team recommended that NRC and DOL authority be increased in specific areas to reinforce the prohibitions on discrimination and further improve the protection available to employees who raise concerns. The Review Team recommended higher NRC civil penalty authority to increase the agency's ability to create a deterrent effect. The Review Team also recommended changing the DOL process to provide personal remedies with less personal cost to the employee to remove a potential impediment for employees being comfortable in raising concerns.

The Review Team noted that adoption of the recommended changes will not necessarily insulate an employee from retaliation, nor will it remove all personal cost should the employee seek a personal remedy. However, the Review Team concluded that if the recommended changes were adopted by licensees, the NRC, the DOL, and Congress, they should provide substantial support to industry employees who raise concerns.

BP23 (07/94)

The staff provided recommendations based on the Review Team's report in SECY-94-089. In an SRM dated June 2, 1994, the Commission, in general, agreed with the staff recommendations provided in SECY-94-089, subject to the comments and additional discussion noted in the SRM. The staff is moving forward to implement the recommendations. A senior allegation manager will be hired, the enforcement and inspection programs will be improved, and the agency is working with the Department of Labor to provide better support for individuals alleging discrimination.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF H & I ISSUES IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

- NRC expects employees in nuclear industry to be free to raise potential safety concerns.
- If employees are subjected to retaliation by their employers for reporting safety concerns, there is a potential "chilling effect" for both whistleblowers and co-workers who may have additional safety concerns to report.
- Discrimination against an employee for engaging in protected activities is prohibited by the Commission's regulations (10 CFR 19.20, 30.7, 40.7, 50.7, 60.9, 61.9, 70.7, and 72.10).
- Discrimination for purposes of the Commission's regulations includes discharge and other actions that relate to compensation or terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
- AEA doesn't give NRC authority to provide personal remedy (reinstatement or back pay). NRC's authority is directed at the licensee--NRC could deny, revoke, or suspend a license; impose civil penalties; and refer to DOJ for criminal proceedings.
- DOL has authority to provide personal remedy, when appropriate--but process has been time consuming.
- In accordance with 1982 MOU with DOL, agencies agreed that NRC would not normally conduct parallel investigation. While NRC responds to technical aspects of allegations, NRC, to a large extent, relies on the DOL for investigating allegations of discrimination.
- NRC IG issued report on July 9, 1993, that concluded that the NRC process for handling allegations of retaliation does not provide an adequate level of protection for whistleblowers.
- NRC testified in hearing on July 15, 1993, to the Senate Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation on the NRC's handling of intimidation and harassment allegations by employees within the nuclear industry.
- EDO established Review Team on July 6, 1993, for reassessment of the NRC program for protecting allegeders against retaliation.
- Review Team issued its report, NUREG-1499, "Reassessment of the NRC's Program for Protecting Allegers Against Retaliation," in January 1994.

BP23 (07/94)

- In summary, Review Team concluded that the NRC can and should do more within its existing authority to create and promote an environment within the regulated community in which employees feel free to raise concerns without fearing retaliation. Report includes recommendations.
- In SRM dated June 2, 1994, the Commission, in general, agreed with the staff recommendations in SECY-94-089.

DECOMMISSIONING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Background:

Recently, several licensees announced their decisions to permanently cease power operation at their nuclear power generating facilities. The reasons for their decisions include both economic and technical considerations. Thus, these facilities and several others entered the decommissioning process earlier than originally anticipated. Recent decommissioning highlights are presented in Table 1 and a status for decommissioning plants is presented in Table 2.

Decommissioning:

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.2 (10 CFR 50.2), defines decommissioning to mean removal of a facility safely from service, reduction of residual radioactivity to a level that permits release of the property for unrestricted use, and termination of the license. Decommissioning can involve three different methods: DECON, SAFSTOR, or ENTOMB. Under DECON, equipment, structures and portions of a facility and site containing radioactive contaminants are removed or decontaminated to a level that permits the property to be released for unrestricted use relatively soon (a few years) after cessation of operations. Under SAFSTOR, often considered "delayed DECON," a nuclear facility is placed and maintained in a condition that allows safe storage for a period of time to allow radioactive decay to reduce radiation levels at the facility. The plant is subsequently decontaminated to levels that permit release of the site for unrestricted use. Under ENTOMB, radioactive contaminants are encased in a structurally long-lived material such as concrete and the entombed structure is appropriately maintained and monitored until the radioactivity decays to a level permitting unrestricted release of the property. To be acceptable, however, the method selected must provide for completion of decommissioning within 60 years and a time beyond 60 years will be considered only when necessary to protect public health and safety, in accordance with NRC regulations.

Regulations:

The procedure for decommissioning a nuclear power plant is set out principally in 10 CFR 50.75, 50.82, 51.53, and 51.95. (An underlying assumption embodied in the current regulations is that decommissioning would occur after the time of expiration of the facility operating license.) The formal process begins with the filing of an application by the licensee, normally after the plant has ceased permanent operations, for authority to decommission the facility. Five years before the licensee expects to end operation of the plant, the licensee is obligated

to submit a preliminary decommissioning plan containing a cost estimate for decommissioning and an up-to-date assessment of the major technical factors that could affect planning for decommissioning. Then, within two years following permanent cessation of operations, but no later than one year prior to expiration of the license, a licensee must submit to the NRC an application for authority to decommission that facility, together with an environmental report covering the proposed decommissioning activities. The application must also be accompanied, or preceded, by a proposed decommissioning plan that includes:

- (1) A description of the decommissioning alternative chosen and activities involved.
- (2) A financial plan showing a cost estimate for decommissioning, the amount of funds currently available for decommissioning, and plans for assuring the availability of adequate funds for completion of decommissioning.

The NRC reviews the decommissioning plan, prepares an environmental impact statement (EIS) or environmental assessment (EA), as appropriate, and gives notice to interested persons. If the NRC finds the proposed decommissioning plan to be satisfactory, the NRC issues a decommissioning order that approves the proposed decommissioning plan and authorizes decommissioning. Upon completion of decommissioning activities, including the completion of a termination radiation survey, the NRC will issue an order that terminates the license.

Prematurely Shutdown Plants:

Subsequent to the publication of the final decommissioning rule six power reactor facilities have been shut down prematurely: the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Station, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, and Trojan Nuclear Plant. Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 also ceased operation following the March 28, 1979, accident. In addition, Indian Point 1 and Dresden 1, which were shutdown in 1974 and 1978, respectively, are also in the decommissioning process.

Current Status:

In 1992, the NRC completed the review efforts necessary to support decommissioning of the Shoreham and Fort St. Vrain facilities. On June 11, 1992, the NRC issued an order to the current Shoreham licensee, Long Island Power Authority, approving the Shoreham decommissioning plan. The Long Island Power Authority is in the process of dismantling that facility. On November 23, 1992, the NRC issued an order approving the Fort St.

Vrain decommissioning plan and dismantlement activities are now ongoing. On June 16, 1993, the NRC staff issued its safety evaluation and environmental assessment on the proposed Rancho Seco decommissioning plan. However, issuance of the decommissioning plan has been delayed due to contentions raised by the Environmental and Resources Conservation Organization (ECO). The matter is now before the Atomic Safety Licensing Board.

In 1992, Yankee Atomic Electric Company and Southern California Edison Company announced their decisions to prematurely shut down and decommission the Yankee-Rowe and San Onofre 1 facilities, respectively. In January 1993, the Portland General Electric Company announced its decision to terminate operations at the Trojan plant. All three of these facilities now have been permanently shut down.

In January 1993, the Commission issued guidance regarding activities which may be permitted prior to approval of a decommissioning plan. Licensees of plants which have possession only licenses or shutdown orders should be allowed to undertake any decommissioning activity that does not (a) foreclose the release of the site for possible unrestricted use, (b) significantly increase decommissioning costs, (c) cause any significant environmental impact not previously reviewed, or (d) violate the terms of the existing license. Also, licensees may be permitted to use their decommissioning funds for approved decommissioning activities, notwithstanding the fact that their decommissioning plans have not yet been approved by the NRC. In accordance with this guidance, Yankee Atomic Electric Company proposed early removal of the four steam generators, the pressurizer, and reactor vessel internals from the Yankee Rowe plant. In a July 15, 1993, letter to Yankee, the staff stated that it had no objection to these activities. The components were shipped from the plant to the low level waste burial site in Barnwell, S.C., between November 16 and December 8, 1993. Yankee Atomic completed further disposal of additional components and contaminated asbestos in June 1994 prior to the closure of Barnwell to non-Southeast compact members on June 30, 1994. Portland General Electric, the licensee for Trojan, is planning the removal and shipment of the Trojan steam generators and pressurizer to the low level waste burial site in Hanford, Washington, in 1995.

On January 25, 1994, Commonwealth Edison workers at the Dresden 1 site discovered a significant quantity of water in the containment building. The source of the estimated 55,000 gallons of water was a service water line which had frozen and ruptured within the unheated containment. The water was pumped from the containment building for processing by the site radwaste system. The NRC responded by conducting a two-week Special Team Inspection composed of Headquarters and Region III staff members

to review and evaluate the circumstances and significance of this event. The inspectors identified a progressively worsening pattern of management neglect at the facility following permanent shutdown of the unit in 1978. Licensee submittals of Decommissioning Plan information to the NRC reflected a significant disconnect between information and commitments provided and actual conditions and configuration of equipment and programs at the facility. In addition, this incident has prompted an NRC review of the likelihood of similar events at other facilities in the decommissioning process; further NRC evaluation and future site inspections to verify facility conditions are scheduled. NRC Bulletin 94-01 was issued on April 14, 1994, to each of the licensees for nuclear power reactors that are permanently shutdown with spent fuel in the spent fuel pool to inform them of the results of the special NRC inspection at Dresden 1 and to request that they take actions to ensure that the cooling and shielding for fuel in the spent fuel pool are not compromised.

On July 7, 1994, SECY-94-179, "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants," was issued in response to a Commission request of June 1993. This publicly available document provides the Commission with two options for consideration. The first option would place no restrictions on what activities could be undertaken by licensees during decommissioning under 10 CFR 50.59. The second option would restrict those activities. The staff and the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) recommended the second option. In addition, the proposed rule would define terminology related to decommissioning, and would require licensees to provide the NRC with early notification of planned decommissioning activities at their facilities. In addition, the rulemaking would explicitly set forth the applicability, or limited applicability, of certain Part 50 requirements to permanently shutdown reactors. It also would provide for an opportunity for a hearing conducted by an administrative officer at the decommissioning plan approval stage. The staff has requested that the Commission approve publication of the proposed rule in the Federal Register for a 90-day public comment period. The Commission is developing guidance for the staff and OGC in response to a presentation of the proposed rulemaking at a Commission meeting held on July 21, 1994.

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TABLE 1

DECOMMISSIONING HIGHLIGHTS

INDIAN POINT 1

- October 31, 1974, plant was permanently shutdown because its emergency core cooling system did not meet current regulatory requirements.
- January 1976, reactor was defueled.
- June 19, 1980, NRC order revoked authority to operate the plant.
- October 17, 1980, licensee submitted proposed decommissioning plan. NRC review has been ongoing since then and has prompted numerous supplemental licensee submittals through October 1993.

DRESDEN 1

- October 31, 1978, plant was shutdown to meet new federal regulations and to perform chemical decontamination of major piping systems.
- January 7, 1986, while still out of service, licensee announced decision to decommission Dresden 1, rather than comply with regulations imposed due to accident at TMI-2 in March 1979.
- July 23, 1986, license was amended to POL.
- September 3, 1993, the decommissioning plan was approved.
- January 25, 1994, licensee personnel discovered a significant quantity of water in the containment building. The source of the estimated 55,000 gallons of water was a service water line which had frozen and ruptured within the unheated containment. The water was pumped from the containment building for processing by the site radwaste system. NRC responded by conducting two-week Special Team Inspection which identified numerous discrepancies which the licensee must address.

FORT ST. VRAIN

- August 18, 1989, plant was permanently shut down because of failure of the control rod drives and degradation of the steam generator ring header.
- May 21, 1991, license was amended to a POL status.
- June 11, 1992, all fuel placed in an onsite independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
- November 23, 1992, the Commission issued an order approving licensee decommissioning plan.
- September 1, 1993, removal of the Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel top head was completed.

- April 1, 1994, all of the graphite reflector blocks had been removed from the reactor vessel and shipped to the low level waste burial site at Hanford, Washington.

SHOREHAM

- June 28, 1989, licensee's shareholders approved an agreement with the New York state to not operate the facility.
- August 24, 1989, reactor vessel defueled.
- June 14, 1991, license was amended to a POL status.
- February 29, 1992, the license was transferred to the Long Island Power Authority for decommissioning.
- June 11, 1992, Commission issued an order approving licensee decommissioning plan.
- July 1, 1994, decommissioning of the facility was 95 percent complete. Final and confirmatory surveys are in progress.
- September 1993, transfer of fuel to Limerick began. Fuel transfer was completed June 1994.

RANCHO SECO

- June 7, 1989, plant shut down as a result of approval by voters of a non-binding referendum prohibiting the licensee from operating the facility.
- December 8, 1989, reactor vessel defueled.
- March 17, 1992, license was amended to a POL status.
- Active intervention on proposed decommissioning plan by Environmental and Resources Conservation Organization (ECO).
- June 3, 1993, U.S. Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) ruled in favor of the NRC in the matter of the issuance of the Rancho Seco POL.
- June 16, 1993, safety evaluation and environmental assessment of proposed decommissioning plan issued by NRC staff.
- November 30, 1993, the ASLB admitted for hearing certain contentions associated with decommissioning funding and costs of the Rancho Seco independent spent fuel storage installation.

YANKEE ROWE

- February 27, 1992, the licensee announced permanent cessation of operations because of inability to address uncertainties associated with the safety margin of the reactor vessel. The vessel was previously defueled.
- August 5, 1992, license was amended to a POL status.
- July 15, 1993, NRC staff stated "no objection to early component removal activities."
- The four steam generators and pressurizer were shipped from the plant to the low level waste burial site in Barnwell, SC, between November 16 and December 8, 1993.

- March 11, 1994, NRC staff stated "no objection" to use of decommissioning trust funds for a proposed second phase of early component removal activities, including reactor coolant pumps, contaminated piping, and asbestos. These activities were completed by June 30, 1994.
- March 31, 1994, the Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) filed a complaint in the Massachusetts District Federal Court claiming the NRC did not follow the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) in its review of the Yankee Atomic early component removal program. The court denied the complaint on jurisdictional grounds, however, CAN is appealing to the First Court of Appeals in Boston.
- The NRC staff has scheduled an informal hearing near the Yankee Rowe site on August 16, 1994, to receive public testimony related to the Decommissioning Plan, which is under NRC staff review.

THREE MILE ISLAND, UNIT 2

- March 28, 1979, accident occurred in the plant that caused permanent cessation of operations.
- January 30, 1990, reactor was defueled.
- August 12, 1993, processing of Accident-Generated Water is completed.
- September 14, 1993, a POL license amendment was issued.
- December 28, 1993, Post-Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS) technical specifications were issued.

SAN ONOFRE, UNIT 1

- November 30, 1992, plant was permanently shut down rather than bring it into compliance with current NRC safety requirements.
- October 23, 1992, a POL license amendment was issued. POL amendment became effective March 9, 1993, when the reactor vessel was certified as completely defueled.
- December 28, 1993, the permanently defueled technical specifications (PDTs) were issued.

TROJAN

- January 4, 1993, the licensee announced permanent cessation of operations.
- January 27, 1993, reactor was defueled.
- May 5, 1993, a POL license amendment was issued.
- Licensee is considering removal and shipment of steam generators and the pressurizer to the low level waste burial site at Hanford, Washington.

TABLE 2

REACTOR DECOMMISSIONING STATUS
SHUTDOWN POWER REACTORS

DOCKET NO. REACTOR	THERMAL POWER	LOCATION	SHUT DOWN	PRESENT STATUS	FUEL ONSITE?
50-3 Indian Point-1 (PWR)	615 MW	Buchanan New York	10/31/74	POL**	Yes
50-10 Dresden 1 (BWR)	700 MW	Morris Illinois	10/31/78	SAFSTOR Approved	Yes
50-16 Fermi 1 (Fast Breeder) *	200 MW	Monroe Co. Michigan	9/22/72	SAFSTOR Approved	No
50-18 GE VBWR (BWR) *	50 MW	Alameda Co. California	12/9/63	SAFSTOR Approved	No
50-29 Yankee Rowe (PWR)	600 MW	Franklin Co. Massachusetts	10/1/91	POL	Yes
50-114 CVTR (Pressure Tube, Heavywater)	65 MW	Parr S. Carolina	Jan. 67	Byproduct Lic. (St.)	No
50-130 Pathfinder (Nuclear Superheat BWR) *	190 MW	Sioux Falls S.D.	9/16/67	LECON NRC Part 30	No
50-133 Humboldt Bay-3 (BWR) *	200 MW	Eureka California	7/2/76	SAFSTOR Approved	Yes
50-171 Peach Bottom 1 (HTGR) *	115 MW	York Co. Pennsylvania	10/31/74	SAFSTOR Approved	No
50-206 San Onofre 1 (PWR)	1347 MW	San Clemente California	11/30/92	POL	Yes
50-267 Fort St. Vrain (HTGR) *	842 MW	Platteville Colorado	8/18/89	DECON Approved	Yes
50-312 Rancho Seco (PWR)	2772 MW	Sacramento California	6/7/89	POL	Yes
50-320 Three Mile Island 2 (PWR)	2772 MW	Middletown Pennsylvania	3/28/79	POL PDMS***	No
50-322 Shoreham (BWR) *	2436 MW	Suffolk Co. New York	6/28/89	DECON Approved	Yes
50-344 Trojan (PWR)	3411 MW	Portland Oregon	11/9/92	POL	Yes
50-409 LaCrosse (BWR) *	165 MW	LaCrosse Wisconsin	4/30/87	SAFSTOR Approved	Yes

* Project management assigned to NMSS

** Possession Only License

*** Post Defueling Monitored Storage (which is similar to SAFSTOR)

BWR WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENT ERRORS DUE TO
NONCONDENSIBLE GAS

Background:

Level anomalies have been observed in reactor vessel water level indication at several boiling water reactors (BWRs) during controlled depressurization while commencing plant outages or following reactor trips. These anomalies consisted of "spiking" or "notching" of level indication, and in one instance, a sustained error in level indication. The root cause of these level indication anomalies has been determined to be the effects of non-condensable gas dissolved in the reference leg of "cold reference leg" type water level instruments. Under rapid depressurization conditions non-condensable gases could cause significant errors in the level indication.

Discussion of Technical Issue:

Cold reference leg water level instruments measure reactor vessel water level by measuring the differential pressure of two columns of water, the variable leg and the constant height reference leg. The reference leg is maintained filled to a constant height of water by the condensate chamber. Steam is condensed in the condensate chamber and keeps the reference leg full. Excess condensate is returned to the vessel through the steam supply line. Non-condensable gases, such as hydrogen and oxygen, formed by radiolysis in the reactor vessel, are present in the steam supplied to the condensate chamber. The gases can collect in the condensate chamber and can accumulate to high partial pressures. The gases then become dissolved in the water at the top of the reference leg, and the dissolved gases can be transported down the reference leg by small leaks in valves and fittings at the bottom of the reference leg, diffusion, and/or thermal convection.

Dissolved gases in the reference leg do not present a problem unless the instrument is depressurized. When depressurized, the gases come out of solution and form bubbles that travel up the reference leg. During slow depressurization, level indication has been seen to temporarily "spike" or "notch" while a bubble moves through the vertical sections of the piping. Significant spiking may automatically actuate such systems as the primary containment isolation system (PCIS); this occurred at the Pilgrim plant. After spiking, which is of short duration, the indicated water level returns to actual level. Level spiking is of lesser safety significance. Bubbling of the gases may eject a significant amount of water from the reference leg. Loss of reference leg inventory will cause level indication to be erroneously high. This occurred during a normal plant cooldown on January 21, 1993 at WNP-2, resulting in a 32 inch error in level indication that gradually recovered over a period of 2

hours. If the reactor is rapidly depressurized, as would occur during a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or opening of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) valves, even larger errors in the level indication could result. However, analyses presented by the industry indicated that significant errors would not be expected until the reactor is depressurized below approximately 450 psi.

The staff has taken several actions to address this problem. The BWR Owners Group (BWROG) Regulatory Response Group (RRG) was activated during July 1992. The staff also issued Information Notice 92-54 in July 1992, Generic Letter 92-04 in August 1992, and Information Notice 93-27 in March 1993 to alert licensees to the potential problem and to request information concerning actions taken or planned by licensees in response to potential errors in level indication. The BWROG conducted a test program to support their efforts to resolve this issue. The results of the BWROG reference leg de-gas test program confirmed that no significant errors in level indication will occur until the reactor is depressurized below 450 psig, and that large errors in level indication are possible once the reactor is depressurized to lower pressures.

The staff received additional information from the BWROG pertaining to reactor vessel water level instrumentation inaccuracies during normal depressurization due to the effects of noncondensable gas. At the staff's request the BWROG submitted a report on May 20, 1993, discussing the impact of level errors on automatic safety system response and operator actions during transients and accidents initiated from reduced pressure conditions during plant cooldown (Mode 3). Based on this information, in addition to the January 21, 1993 WNP-2 event and data from the reference leg de-gas testing that was conducted by the BWROG, the staff concluded that additional short-term actions needed to be taken for protection against potential events occurring during normal cooldown. On May 28, 1993, NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 93-03, "Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation," was issued, in which the staff requested each BWR licensee to implement additional short term compensatory actions, and to implement a hardware modification to resolve this issue at the next cold shutdown after July 30, 1993.

The staff has received responses to NRC Bulletin 93-03 from all licensees. All licensees have completed the short term compensatory actions and have committed to install hardware modifications. Delays in implementation were granted to some licensees to allow sufficient time to complete necessary design and hardware procurement to support the installation of hardware modifications. The majority of licensees have decided to install a backfill modification which would constantly purge the reference leg with a very low flow rate (on the order of 0.008 gpm) of water supplied by the Control Rod Drive (CRD)

system. The constant flow of water up the reference leg would prevent dissolved gases from migrating down the reference leg. At this time, licensees for 24 of 36 affected plants have reported that installation of backfill modifications is complete. Remaining licensees plan to complete modifications during the next planned refueling outage, or if an unplanned shutdown should occur, they plan to install the modification at that time.

Current Status:

On November 26, 1993, the staff issued Information Notice (IN) 93-89, "Potential Problems with BWR Level Instrumentation Backfill Modifications," to alert licensees to potential problems that have been identified involving hardware modifications to the reactor vessel water level instrumentation system. This information involved the potential to pressurize the reference legs of the water level instrumentation if a reference leg backfill system is installed with the injection point on the instrumentation side of the manual isolation valve in the reference leg, and if that valve is closed inadvertently during backfill system operation. Inadvertent closure of this valve could result in a severe plant transient. The consequences would vary significantly with plant specific instrumentation systems. At some plants, as discussed in the IN, valve closure would cause all safety relief valves to open and potentially impact emergency core cooling system response. The Information Notice advised licensees to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. A Temporary Instruction (TI) is being prepared by the staff which will provide guidance for NRC personnel to inspect licensee's modifications.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF BWR WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENT ERRORS DUE TO
NONCONDENSIBLE GAS

- Potential for significant errors in level indication when reactor is rapidly depressurized below approximately 450 psig, and during normal plant depressurization below 450 psig.
- Information Notice 92-54, Generic Letter 92-04, Information Notice 93-27, NRC Bulletin 93-03, and Information Notice 93-89 were issued by the staff.
- Staff has concluded that interim plant operation is acceptable.
- In the long-term, however, the staff expects each licensee to implement hardware modifications to ensure that its level instrumentation system design is of high functional reliability.
- All affected plants have committed to install hardware modifications to resolve this issue.
- As of July 15, 1994, licensees for 24 of the 36 affected BWRs have reported that modifications are complete. Six more plants are currently shutdown and will complete the modification prior to restart. The remaining BWRs will install the modification at the next cold shutdown.

FIRE BARRIER ISSUES

Regulatory Background:

NRC-approved plant fire protection programs as referenced by the Plant Operating License Conditions and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, Section III G.1.a, "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability," require that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control stations to be free from fire damage.

To ensure that electrical cables and components are free from fire damage, Section III G.2 of Appendix R requires that the safe shutdown trains be separated by one of the following:

- (1) separating cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating,
- (2) separating cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazard, or
- (3) enclosing cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. If the licensee chooses to rely on separation or to install a 1-hour barrier, it must also install fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems in the fire area.

Thermo-Lag Fire barriers:

Approximately 80 plants used Thermo-Lag fire barriers to satisfy the NRC's fire protection requirements; the use of Thermo-Lag barriers is an open item at approximately 60 plants today.

Thermo-Lag 330-1 is a proprietary fire barrier material manufactured and supplied by Thermal Science, Incorporated. The vendor manufactures Thermo-Lag in nominal 1/2-inch and 1-inch thicknesses which provide fire endurance ratings of 1 hour and 3 hours, respectively.

Thermo-Lag is a sacrificial subliming material that is consumed when it is exposed to a fire. In a fire, the solid material sublimates, the subliming gases are decomposed by the fire, and the virgin Thermo-Lag material is replaced by a char layer. The sublimation process and the insulating effects of the resulting char layer protect the equipment located within the confines of the fire barrier from the effects of the fire. Conversely, more traditional fire barriers, such as concrete block walls, provide fire endurance by maintaining structural integrity during the fire exposure and limiting heat transfer through the barrier.

Staff Concerns:

The staff has three principal concerns with the Thermo-Lag fire barriers: fire endurance, combustibility, and ampacity derating.

Qualification fire tests of cable tray and conduit barriers conducted by industry and small-scale panel tests performed by the NRC staff at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) demonstrated that Thermo-Lag fire barriers may not provide the fire endurance needed to satisfy the NRC's requirements. The test results led to the issuance of NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-55, NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 92-01, and NRCB 92-01, Supplement 1. The NRC is also concerned that some Thermo-Lag barriers used by some licensees, such as walls and ceilings, have not been qualified as fire barriers by test.

The NRC is also concerned that Thermo-Lag may burn more readily when exposed to fire than originally believed by the NRC and licensees. The staff is concerned about the following possible situations: (1) a licensee has not considered the combustibility of the Thermo-Lag materials in its fire hazards analyses; or (2) a licensee is using Thermo-Lag where a noncombustible material should be used. The NRC issued IN 92-82 on December 15, 1992, to inform the licensees of this issue. The staff is considering long-range actions.

Finally, the NRC is concerned that the ampacity derating factors used by the licensees to derate their power cables may not be great enough to actually account for the insulating effects of the Thermo-Lag material. Therefore, cable temperatures may exceed their temperature ratings, possibly resulting in an accelerated aging of the cable insulation.

While the staff is concerned that Thermo-Lag fire barriers may not, in all cases, meet NRC requirements, it believes the relative safety significance of these concerns is low for several reasons, including:

- (1) In response to generic communications, licensees have established fire watches to compensate for possibly inoperable fire barriers. This measure provides an adequate level of fire protection until licensees develop and implement permanent corrective actions.
- (2) Licensees rely on a defense-in-depth concept where multiple safety measures are incorporated. Automatic fire detection and sprinkler systems are provided in areas which have safe shutdown equipment. Trained fire brigades are required 24 hours per day at all plants. Fuels that can feed a fire and ignition sources to start a fire are controlled. Because of these measures, it is unlikely that a fire significant enough to challenge a fire barrier will occur.

Actions Taken by the Staff:

In June 1991, NRR established a special team to review the safety significance and generic applicability of the technical issues regarding the use of Thermo-Lag. The special review team issued its final report, which identified specific concerns along with their technical bases, in April 1992. Subsequently, the staff prepared an action plan to address the issues associated with Thermo-Lag and the NRC fire protection program. The scope of the action plan includes coordination with industry and testing by the staff. This action plan is updated quarterly.

The staff has issued the following generic communications:

- IN 91-47, "Failure of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material To Pass Fire Endurance Test," August 6, 1991.
- IN 91-79, "Deficiencies in the Procedures for Installing Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Materials," December 6, 1991.
- IN 92-46, "Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material Special Review Team Final Findings, Current Fire Endurance Tests, and Ampacity Calculation Errors," June 23, 1992.
- NRCB 92-01, "Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free From Fire Damage," June 24, 1992, and reviewed licensee responses.
- IN 92-55, "Current Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material," July 27, 1992.
- NRCB 92-01, Supplement 1, "Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Perform its Specified Fire Endurance Function," August 28, 1992.
- Generic Letter 92-08, "Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers," December 11, 1992.
- IN 92-82, "Results of Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Testing," December 15, 1992.
- IN 94-22, "Fire Endurance and Ampacity Derating Test Results for 3-Hour Fire-Rated Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers," March 16, 1994.
- Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement 1, "Fire Endurance Test Acceptance Criteria for Fire Barrier Systems Used to Separate Redundant Safe Shutdown Trains Within the Same Fire Area," March 25, 1994.

- IN 94-34, "Thermo-Lag 330-660 Flexi-Blanket Ampacity Derating Concerns," May 13, 1994.

The criteria of GL 86-10, Supplement 1 will be applicable to all new fire barrier testing.

The staff completed a small-scale fire test program at NIST and a full-scale fire test program at Underwriters Laboratories, Incorporated. The staff also witnessed full-scale fire endurance qualification tests and ampacity derating tests performed by Texas Utilities Electric Company for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station and by the Tennessee Valley Authority for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

During February 1993, the staff completed a reassessment of the NRC fire protection review and inspection programs as part of the Thermo-Lag Action Plan. The staff has prepared a Fire Protection Task Action Plan to implement the recommendations made as a result of the fire protection program reassessment and is working to resolve the tasks in a timely manner. This action plan is also updated quarterly.

The staff also observed the fire endurance tests performed by Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), formerly the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC). Phase 1 included 6 upgraded test configurations which were funded by Thermal Science, Inc. (TSI, the vendor). Phase 2 included six test configurations (existing industry installations and additional upgrades) which were funded by NEI. The staff is reviewing the fire test reports and the draft NEI application guide for industry use in applying the test results to evaluate existing in-plant barriers. The staff expects that the application guide, when finalized, can be used by individual licensees to establish the nominal fire rating of installed barriers and identify those that should be upgraded or replaced to meet NRC fire protection requirements.

Several licensees, such as Florida Power and Light and Florida Power Corporation, have proposed using performance-based approaches to assess the Thermo-Lag fire barriers at their facilities. The staff is considering these approaches.

The staff is reviewing licensee responses to questions that were sent to the licensees that use Thermo-Lag fire barriers during December 1994. The review may lead to identification of additional plant-specific or generic alternatives for achieving a final solution to the Thermo-Lag issues identified in GL 92-08.

The staff is also evaluating fire barriers other than Thermo-Lag. The staff is reviewing the responses to a questions provided by the five vendors, other than TSI, believed to supply fire barriers to commercial nuclear power plants. The staff is also reviewing available vendor and licensee test reports and other

documents in an effort to verify the adequacy of these fire barriers. Additionally, the staff tested these other fire barriers at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

The staff has issued the following generic communication documents on these other fire barriers:

- IN 93-40, "Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics FP-60 Fire Barrier Material," May 26, 1993.
- IN 93-41, "One Hour Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics Kaowool, 3M Company FS-195 and 3M Company Interam E-50 Fire Barrier Systems," May 28, 1993.

Actions Planned by the staff:

The staff will continue to work with NEI and individual licensees to resolve the generic and plant specific technical concerns. The staff will complete its evaluation of the other fire barrier systems used by the licensees to satisfy NRC fire protection requirements. A supplement to Generic Letter 92-08 that will request licensees to address issues relating to other fire barrier systems is under consideration.

On June 27, 1994, the Commission approved a staff recommendation in SECY 94-127 to resolve the Thermo-Lag concerns by requiring compliance with existing NRC requirements and to permit plant-specific exemptions, where justified. In addition, the Commission requested that the staff work with industry in considering possible new exemptions to Appendix R based on State-of-the-Art fire protection methodology and technology and in evaluating the feasibility of developing new guidance for rating fire barriers on the basis of representative plant fire hazards. Finally, the Commission approved the staff recommendation to proceed as planned with the development of a performance-based fire protection rule. The Commission felt that the new rule should not be considered a means to resolve the Thermo-Lag issues.

Contact:

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HIGHLIGHTS OF FIRE BARRIER ISSUES

- Appendix R requires separation of safe shutdown trains by a 3-hour fire barrier or a 1-hour barrier with fire detection and suppression.
- Approximately 80 plants used Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barriers to comply with Appendix R; the use of Thermo-Lag is an open item on approximately 60 plants today.
- NRC staff has concerns regarding the fire endurance, combustibility, and ampacity derating of the Thermo-Lag barriers.
- Applicable generic communications on Thermo-Lag include:
 - IN 91-47 - Failure of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material To Pass Fire Endurance Test (8/6/91)
 - IN 91-79 - Deficiencies in the Procedures for Installing Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Materials (12/6/91)
 - IN 92-46 - Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material Special Review Team Final Findings, Current Fire Endurance Tests, and Ampacity Calculation Errors (6/23/92)
 - NRCB 92-01 - Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free From Fire Damage (6/24/92)
 - IN 92-55 - Current Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material (7/27/92)
 - NRCB 92-01, Sup. 1 - Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Perform its Specified Fire Endurance Function (8/28/92)
 - GL 92-08 - Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers (12/11/92)
 - IN 92-82 - Results of Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Testing (12/15/92)
 - IN 94-22 - Fire Endurance and Ampacity Derating Test Results for 3-Hour Fire-Rated Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers (3/16/94)
 - GL 86-10 - Supplement 1, Fire Endurance Test Acceptance Criteria for Fire Barrier Systems Used to Separate Redundant Safe Shutdown Trains Within the Same Fire Area (3/25/94)

BP26 (07/94)

- NRC staff is reviewing other fire barriers used by licensees to satisfy NRC fire protection requirements. Applicable generic communications include:

IN 93-40 - Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics
FP-60 Fire Barrier Material (5/26/93)

IN 93-41 - One Hour Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal
Ceramics Kaowool, 3M Company FS-195 and 3M Company Interam
E-50 Fire Barrier Systems (5/28/93)

IN 94-34 - Thermo-Lag 330-660 Flexi-Blanket Ampacity
Derating Concerns (5/13/94)

The NRC staff will issue a supplement to GL 92-08 to include fire barriers manufactured by other vendors, if needed.

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE PLUGGING CRITERIA

Background:

The thin-walled tubing of the steam generator (SG) constitutes over 50% of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) for Pressurized Water Reactors. The integrity of this boundary is particularly important in minimizing the release of radioactive fission products to the environment. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has a regulatory program designed to ensure that the structural and leakage integrity of the steam generator tubing is maintained at nuclear power plants in the U.S.

In the early to mid 1970s when phosphate water chemistry was primarily used for secondary water chemistry control, the main reason for removing a SG tube from service (i.e., by plugging or sleeving) was wastage. Wastage is characterized by large area thinning of the tube wall. Therefore, SG tube plugging criteria for most plants were based on uniform thinning of the steam generator tube walls. However, the current dominant degradation mechanism is stress corrosion cracking (SCC).

Tube Plugging Criteria:

Because of the potential consequences of the loss of SG tube integrity, the agency has measures for ensuring that the integrity of the SG tubing is maintained. The traditional tube plugging criteria have typically been based on a minimum wall thickness requirement which assumes that the degradation involves uniform thinning of the tube wall in the axial and circumferential directions. The assumption of uniform thinning conservatively bounds the degrading effects of all flaw types occurring in the field, and is the basis of the standard 40% depth-based plugging limit. However, the 40% plugging limit is very conservative for highly localized flaws such as pits and short cracks. The staff has approved higher depth-based limits, ranging up to 64%, for specific types of flaws at specific plants; for instance, for pitting at Indian Point Unit 3 in the early 1980s.

In recent years, utilities have proposed various flaw-specific plugging limits which do not incorporate a minimum wall thickness requirement. These proposals are often referred to as alternate plugging criteria (APC) since they would be an alternative to the depth-based criterion. Each of these proposals would permit tubes with up to 100% through-wall cracks to remain in service, subject to certain restrictions. These restrictions are intended to ensure adequate structural and leakage integrity. Certain of these proposed limits, known as F* (F-star) and L* (L-star) limits, have been approved by the NRC and have been in use for several years. The F* and L* limits apply to primary water

stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) flaws located within the thickness of the tubesheet for tubes which have been hardroll expanded. Rupture of the tubing within the tubesheet region is precluded by the constraint against tube wall deformation provided by the tubesheet. The specified F* and L* limits have been set to preclude tube pullout from the tubesheet during postulated accidents and to ensure the leaktight integrity between the fully expanded tubing and the tubesheet.

Another type of flaw-specific plugging limit which has been proposed by various utilities involves the use of a bobbin voltage amplitude based limit for predominantly axially oriented outside diameter stress corrosion cracking (ODSCC) confined within the tube support plate (TSP) intersections. This proposal includes commitments to the use of enhanced inspection methods, enhanced sampling plans, and reduced primary-to-secondary leak rate limits. The voltage-based plugging limit is established from a burst pressure/voltage amplitude correlation which is adjusted for allowances in voltage amplitude uncertainty and for projected voltage growth during the next operating cycle. This limit is intended to ensure adequate structural and leakage integrity of the tubing.

Another flaw-specific plugging limit includes length-based limits for PWSCC at roll transition locations, similar to limits currently being implemented in some European countries. As is the case for voltage amplitude based limits, proposals for length-based limits are expected to be programmatic, involving commitments to specific inspection methods, inspection sampling plans, and reduced primary-to-secondary leak rate limits as well as revised plugging limits. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has issued a technical support document to support length-based plugging limit proposals from U.S. utilities.

Current Status:

The NRC staff has approved the use of interim plugging criteria (IPC) which are restricted versions of the voltage-amplitude based limits for axially oriented ODSCC. The restricted versions incorporated much smaller voltage limits than those proposed. The staff has limited the use of IPC to one operating cycle at a time for several plants (Farley Units 1 and 2, D.C. Cook Unit 1, Catawba Unit 1, and Braidwood Unit 1).

The staff is developing a generic letter on voltage-based plugging criteria for ODSCC in steam generator tubes. It is expected that this generic letter should be issued in August for public comment.

The staff is considering a generic approach to defect-specific steam generator inspection and repair criteria. This generic approach would incorporate the results of the staff's evaluation of the technical support documents on defect-specific management which were prepared by the industry. This approach is based on applying repair criteria developed specifically for a particular mode of degradation and uses applicable inspection parameters and improved non-destructive testing technology.

With respect to the other proposals for alternate plugging criteria, all plant-specific APC reviews have been suspended so that the staff can focus its resources on developing generic approaches and criteria. Requests from Farley Unit 2 and Catawba Unit 1 for renewal of their approved interim plugging criteria for a second cycle have been approved. Similar requests from Farley Unit 1 and Cook Unit 1 have also been recently approved. In addition, the staff recently approved implementation of the voltage-based IPC for Braidwood Unit 1.

Contact:

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HIGHLIGHTS OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBE PLUGGING CRITERIA

- . Steam generator (SG) tubing constitutes a large percentage of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) for PWR plants.
- . Traditional plugging criteria developed for uniform thinning (i.e., wastage) resulted in a depth-based limit. Defects extending 40% through-wall require repair/plugging.
- . The 40% depth-based limit applies to all degradation mechanisms, not just wastage.
- . The 40% plugging limit tends to be overconservative for other flaw mechanisms.
- . Certain defect-specific plugging limits have been approved in the past, primarily for degradation within the tubesheet (e.g., F* and L* criteria).
- . The industry is proposing various forms of alternate plugging criteria (APC) to the traditional depth-based limit for plugging/repair of SG tubes. These include voltage-based and length-based limits.
- . A degradation-specific approach to managing steam generator tube integrity has advantages (i.e., it requires using more appropriate inspection and repair criteria for the specific flaw type that is encountered).
- . A voltage-based alternate tube repair limit more conservative than that proposed by the industry has been approved (referred to as the interim plugging criteria or IPC) while review of the industry proposal proceeds.
- . Significant issues being considered in the staff's review include:
 - Maintaining a low probability of SG tube rupture
 - Evaluating the potential for and consequences of increased leakage under postulated accident conditions
- . Implementation of the IPC has actually resulted in more restrictive operating leakage limits.

- . A special task force reviewed the technical bases for the voltage based IPC. The conclusions and recommendations of the Task Group were issued for comment as Draft NUREG-1477, "Voltage-Based Interim Plugging Criteria for Steam Generator Tubes." The public comments were evaluated and will be incorporated in the final report. The staff is developing a generic letter on voltage-based plugging criteria for ODSCC that will be based on NUREG-1477 and some additional recent work.

- . The staff is considering a generic approach to defect-specific steam generator inspection and repair criteria. This generic approach would incorporate the results of the staff's evaluation of the technical support documents on defect-specific management prepared which were prepared by the industry. This approach is based on applying repair criteria using applicable inspection parameters developed for the specific modes of degradation. This approach necessitates the use of improved non-destructive testing technology.

MEDICAL ISSUES

Background:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has statutory authority for the regulation of byproduct material as a result of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. NRC's mandate to protect public health and safety includes the regulation of the medical use of byproduct material in the fields of nuclear medicine, radiation therapy, and research. Consequently, NRC's involvement with, and interest in, this field is not recent, and in fact, the NRC and its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission, have regulated the medical use of radioisotopes since 1946. On February 9, 1979, NRC issued a Medical Policy Statement entitled "Regulation of the Medical Uses of Isotopes; Statement of General Policy" (44FR8242). In it, the Commission stated that it will: (1) continue to regulate the medical uses of radioisotopes as necessary to provide for the radiation safety of workers and the general public; (2) regulate the radiation safety of patients where justified by the risk to patients and where voluntary standards, or compliance with these standards, are inadequate; and (3) minimize its intrusion into medical judgments affecting patients, and into other areas traditionally considered to be a part of the practice of medicine.

Byproduct material or radiation from byproduct material is regulated by either State or Federal laws. Twenty-nine States, known as Agreement States, have entered into an agreement with the NRC to regulate the use of byproduct material (as authorized by section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act). These States issue licenses and currently regulate approximately 4,500 institutions for medical use, that is, university medical centers, hospitals, clinics, and physicians in private practice. The NRC regulates the medical use of byproduct material in 21 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and various territories of the United States and administers approximately 2000 licenses for medical use.

Discussion of Specific Issues:Medical Management Plan:

The staff has developed a five-year management plan to include reassessment of the medical use program, and initiated a number of actions to address the more pressing problems. The medical management plan (MMP) is publicly available and is described in SECY-93-244, issued August 31, 1993. The staff received Commission approval on September 30, 1993, and has implemented the plan.

Two key components of the MMP are: 1) continuation of staff initiatives, not only those previously identified to senior management and the Commission, but others that have emerged as the result of medical events; and 2) continuation of interaction with the regulated community. The current initiatives focus on nine major areas of the medical use regulatory program and include such activities as the development of more comprehensive licensing and inspection guidance, and rulemaking. The MMP also includes oversight of contracts with national laboratories to evaluate the risks associated with the human error component of misadministrations when performing teletherapy, remote afterloading brachytherapy and gamma stereotactic radiosurgery procedures. Work has been completed on a contract for the investigation of certain therapy misadministrations, to evaluate the root cause. The final report identifies seven major contributing factors to misadministrations including the lack of substantial, direct involvement by radiation safety officers and authorized users. Additionally, a change in routine or advent of a unique condition often predisposed misadministrations. The report was published in February 1994, as NUREG/CR-6088, "Summary of 1991-1992 Misadministration Event Analysis Investigations," and will be distributed to all medical licensees.

Additionally, as directed by the Commission, independent audits have or will be conducted of NRC's medical use program, in addition to the staff medical management plan. An external review of the program is being conducted by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The goal of the external review is to develop an assessment of the adequacy and appropriateness of the current framework for medical use of byproduct material. It will include an in-depth review of the basic regulatory rules, policies, practices, and procedures. The NAS final report is expected in early 1996.

Federal Agencies' Review of Activities Related to Research Involving Human Subjects:

On January 15, 1994, President Clinton signed the Executive Order, "Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments" which, among other things, established an advisory committee, instructed the committee to provide advice and recommendations to the government's newly established "Human Radiation Interagency Working Group" and to review human experiments conducted from 1944 to May 30, 1974, and defined "human radiation experiments." The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), a member of the Human Radiation Interagency Working Group, initiated a comprehensive review of DOE files retained from its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which retained the civilian licensing aspects of the AEC, is in possession of some AEC licensing files and records.

NRC is assisting DOE and other government agencies (e.g., the Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Navy, and the Department of the Air Force) with specific requests to locate information in active or retired AEC, NRC, or Agreement States license files. NRC also continues to respond to specific requests by the press, licensees, and members of the general public for information on research involving human subjects. When responding to these specific requests, NRC retrieves the files, reviews them following the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act procedures, and places them in the Public Document Room.

In a memorandum dated February 4, 1994, NRC staff summarized to the Commission: (1) the results of the staff's survey to determine whether readily available Commission and Agreement State files have information about licensees that may have conducted research studies using AEC licensed radioactive materials, or the radiation therefrom, on human subjects; (2) a description of the types of human research currently authorized by NRC materials licenses and the review criteria for those authorizations; and (3) a summary of future actions. This document is available in the public document room.

Currently, some NRC medical licenses participate in human research studies performed to obtain information about metabolism and biodistribution of compounds, monitor patient treatments, or develop screening studies. The licensing criteria for issuing human research authorizations includes a commitment that the licensee has, and uses, an Institutional Review Board, or other appropriate review committees to approve studies based on ethical considerations, scientific merit, and radiation safety considerations. The staff requires confirmation that the committees, as constituted, have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

Non-Human Use of Teletherapy Units:

The June 1993 issue of the NMSS Newsletter discussed publication of a final rule that addresses licensing and radiation safety requirements for large irradiators (10 CFR Part 36). The final rule became effective on July 1, 1993. In January 1994, NRC published, for comment, a licensing guide to support Part 36. The guide is identified as Draft Regulatory Guide DG-0003, "Guide for the Preparation of Applications for Licenses for Non-Self-Contained Irradiators." Copies of the guide were sent to licensees subject to Part 36 requirements for comment. Written comments on the draft guide should be forwarded to NRC by October 1, 1994.

Based on contacts with licensees and results of some inspections, it appears that some academic and medical organizations do not recognize that the requirements of Part 36 apply to their

activities. Specifically, a licensee is subject to the requirements of Part 36 if: the licensee has a teletherapy-type unit whose source is capable of delivering 5 grays (500 rads) per hour at 1 meter (equivalent non-metric unit) from the radioactive sealed source in air, AND the licensee uses the teletherapy-type unit either solely or partially for non-human use (e.g., to irradiate materials or objects such as blood, tissue, cells, animals, or electronic equipment; and to calibrate radiation detection instruments). Licensees authorized to use their teletherapy units to treat patients must also comply with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR Part 35.

Memorandum of Understanding between NRC and FDA:

On August 26, 1993, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the NRC and U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to clarify their respective roles for regulating the safe use of radiopharmaceuticals and sealed sources, or devices containing byproduct material, used in licensed activities. As a result, NRC and FDA have established liaison officers and identified key management and technical personnel for interagency coordination in response to emergencies or specific events of mutual interest. In addition, key NRC and FDA staff conduct routine meetings and senior management representatives will conduct an annual meeting to review the effectiveness of the MOU, and to discuss other issues of mutual interest.

Draft NUREG on Management of Radioactive Material Safety Programs at Medical Facilities:

NRC staff, with input from Agreement States and professional organizations, is developing a NUREG for distribution to all medical use licensees. The NUREG focuses on effective management of radioactive material safety programs at medical facilities by licensee executive management, the radiation safety committee and radiation safety officer. Their respective roles are discussed, as well as the roles of authorized users and supervised individuals such as technologists, physicists, dosimetrists, nurses and consultants or service companies. Guidance is also provided on selecting contractors, resources, conduct of audits, and incident response. The Draft NUREG is currently being revised based on comments received during a recent peer review. It is expected that the NUREG will be published by December 31, 1994.

Implementation of NRC's "Quality Management Program and Misadministrations Rule":

The final rule became effective on January 27, 1992, and required some categories of medical use licensees to submit, for NRC review, "quality management" plans to provide high confidence

that the radiation dose or dosage is delivered as prescribed by the physician authorized user. This requirement only applies to the medical use of byproduct material. A contractor is reviewing the QM plans submitted by licensees to determine whether, as described, the plan appears to meet the five objectives described in the final rule. The contractor's findings are conveyed to licensees by letter from the appropriate NRC regional office. During routine or reactive inspections, NRC inspectors review implementation of a licensee's QM plan. Licensees may modify their plans, but must submit revisions to the regional offices within 30 days of making such modifications. Regulatory Guide 8.33, "Quality Management Program," provides guidance to licensees on developing a QM plan to meet the five objectives.

Clarification on Release Criteria for Patients with Residual Radioactivity:

There has been some concern, in the medical community, that there is an inconsistency between the patient release criteria described in Part 35 and the allowable public dose limits described in revised Part 20. Specifically, if a licensee releases a patient from confinement, under the criteria described in section 35.75, the allowable public dose limits described in section 20.1301(a) may be exceeded as a result of radiation emitted from the patient who has undergone a medical procedure.

As a result, NRC issued Information Notice 94-09 on February 3, 1994, to provide clarification on the applicable patient release criteria. Basically, when Part 35 was revised in 1987, the release criteria was neither tied to, nor designed to implement, the more general Part 20 dose limits that were later revised, effective January 1, 1994. Since a general (Part 20) and specific (Part 35) regulation address the same subject, the staff, in consultation with the Commission, has taken an interim position that the more specific regulation prevails in this case. Therefore, licensees should continue past practices regarding release of patients who have undergone medical procedures and were confined pursuant to 10 CFR 35.75. Furthermore, if a patient is not required to be confined pursuant to section 35.75, licensees are not required to limit the radiation dose to members of the public from a patient to 2 millirem in any one hour as required by 10 CFR 20.1301(a). Adjacent patient waiting or hospital rooms should only be controlled for those patients confined pursuant to 10 CFR 35.75.

NRC noticed a proposed rule for patient release criteria in the Federal Register on June 15, 1994 (59FR30724). The comment period expires August 29, 1994.

ACNP/SNM Petition for Rulemaking:

On June 17, 1993, NRC published a proposed rule (58FR33396) to amend its regulations for the medical use of byproduct material. The proposed rule provides greater flexibility by allowing properly qualified nuclear pharmacists and authorized users, who are physicians, greater discretion to prepare radioactive drugs containing byproduct material for medical use. The proposed rule would also allow research involving human subjects using byproduct material and the medical use of radiolabeled biologics. The comment period expired October 15, 1993, and the staff expects to submit the final rule to the Commission for approval in October 1994, with an effective date of January 1, 1995.

Additionally, NRC published a final rule on July 22, 1993, (58FR39130) to extend the expiration date of the interim final rule related to preparation and therapeutic use of radiopharmaceuticals from August 23, 1993, to December 31, 1994. This action allows licensees to continue to use byproduct material until NRC completes the related rulemaking described above.

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HIGHLIGHTS ON RE-EVALUATION INITIATIVES

- o The five-year staff medical management plan (MMP) was approved by the Commission during September 1993 and was implemented in October 1993. The management plan contains: 1) action items resulting from inspection findings of medical events; 2) items identified in the senior manager review; and 3) items previously identified by the staff and discussed in the staff medical issues paper developed during September 1992. Additionally, an external review is being conducted by the National Academy of Sciences with the final report submitted in early 1996.
- o President Clinton, by Executive Order, established the "Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments" to review experiments involving human subjects that were conducted between 1944 and 1974. NRC is assisting the U.S. Department of Energy and other government agencies to locate information on each active or retired Atomic Energy Commission, NRC or Agreement State license file that may contain information on such experiments. NRC also continues to respond to specific requests by the press, licensees, or members of the general public on this issue.
- o The final rule for 10 CFR Part 36 became effective on July 1, 1993. It addresses licensing and radiation safety requirements of large irradiators. A licensing guide was published in January 1994 for public comment. NRC medical use licensees who utilize a cobalt-60 teletherapy unit for non-human use are subject to the requirements described in Part 36, as well as Part 35.
- o NRC and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration signed a Memorandum of Understanding on August 26, 1993. The purpose of the MOU is to clarify their respective roles for regulating the safe use of radiopharmaceuticals, sealed sources, or devices containing byproduct material. The staff has implemented the MOU.
- o NRC staff, with input from Agreement States and medical professional organizations, have developed a Draft NUREG to provide guidance on effective management of radioactive material safety programs at medical facilities. The Draft is currently being revised based on peer comments and is expected to be published by December 31, 1994.
- o NRC's "Quality Management Program and Misadministrations" rule (QM) became effective January 27, 1992. A contractor is reviewing the QM plans submitted by licensees. The contractor's findings are conveyed to licensees by letter from the appropriate NRC regional office. Inspectors will

review licensee's implementation of their QM plan during inspections.

- o Parts 20 and 35 appear to be inconsistent with respect to allowable public dose and patient release limits. As a result, NRC staff have consulted with the Commission and determined that the more specific requirement (10 CFR 35.75) applies and licensees should continue with their current practices. This interim policy is discussed in Information Notice 94-09, issued February 3, 1994. Additionally, a proposed rule for patient release criteria was noticed in the Federal Register on June 15, 1994 (59FR30724). The comment period expires August 29, 1994.
- o Currently, the staff is considering public comments received in response to the proposed radiopharmacy rule published in the Federal Register on June 17, 1993. The staff expects to submit the final rule to the Commission for approval during October 1994. Additionally, NRC published a final rule on July 22, 1993, which extends the terms of the "interim final rule" from August 23, 1993, to December 31, 1994. This action allows licensees to continue to use byproduct material until NRC completes the related rulemaking described previously.

BWR REACTOR INTERNALS

Background:

Many boiling water reactor (BWR) vessel internals are made of materials susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC), including stainless steel, alloy 600, alloy X750, and alloy 182 weld metal. IGSCC is a time dependent material degradation process, and is known to be accelerated by the presence of crevices, residual stresses, material sensitization, irradiation, cold work and corrosive environments.

Cracking of BWR core shrouds and jet pump hold down beams have been the most significant cracking of BWR internals reported. As operating BWRs begin to age, the number of cracking incidents is expected to increase. The staff has been meeting every year since 1988 with the Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BWROG) and General Electric (GE) to review the generic safety implications of reactor internals potentially susceptible to IGSCC. In a meeting with the BWROG in January 1992, the staff emphasized to the BWROG that a comprehensive program should be developed to proactively address internals cracking and that utilities should adopt an enhanced inspection program. In January 1994, following the discovery of significant circumferential cracking of the core shroud welds at Brunswick Unit 1 plant, the staff identified BWR internals cracking as an emerging technical issue.

Discussion of Technical Issues:

Core Shroud Cracking

Cracking of the core shroud was visually observed in 1991 in an overseas BWR. The core shroud is a stainless steel cylinder which partitions feedwater in the reactor vessel's downcomer annulus region from cooling water flowing through the reactor core. The crack in the overseas BWR was located in the heat affected zone of a circumferential weld in the mid-elevation of the shroud. GE reported the cracking found in the overseas reactor in Rapid Information Communication Services Information Letter (RICSIL) 054.

A number of domestic BWR licensees have recently performed visual examinations of their core shrouds in accordance with the recommendations in GE RICSIL 054 or in GE Services Information Letter (SIL) 572, which was issued in late 1993 to incorporate domestic experience. A summary of the inspection results is provided in Table 1. Core shroud cracking was reported at Brunswick Unit 1 and at Peach Bottom Unit 3 in 1993. Both plants have experienced axial and circumferential cracking of shroud welds located at the core midplane level, and circumferential

cracking at the horizontal weld which fuses the lower shroud to the top guide support ring. Some cracking at welds associated with the upper shroud was also found at Brunswick Unit 1. The crack at the top guide support ring weld (H-3 weld) at Brunswick Unit 1 is of significant size, with a length extending nearly 360° around the shroud and a maximum depth of at least 1.7 inches. Other circumferential and axial cracks were also discovered in the heat affected zones of welds associated with the upper shroud (H-1 and H-2 welds) and welds associated with the mid-shroud (H-4, H-5 and H-6 welds); however, the structural evaluations of these cracks indicate that they are of lesser safety significance than the crack associated with the H-3 weld. Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L, the licensee for the Brunswick Unit 1) modified the Brunswick Unit 1 core shroud by installing a number of mechanical clamps around the degraded H-3 and H-2 welds. The modification was designed to maintain structural integrity around the H-3 and H-2 welds for the remaining life of the unit.

The Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo), the licensee for Peach Bottom Unit 3, performed a flaw evaluation and has determined that the cracking in the core shroud was not significant enough to threaten the structural integrity of the shroud during the next operating cycle. The staff agreed with PECo's conclusion that the modification of the Peach Bottom Unit 3 shroud was not necessary prior to beginning their current operating cycle.

Ultrasonic examinations were performed on the core shroud of Hatch Unit 2 during its Spring 1994 outage. Cracks were found at welds H-1, H-2, H-3 and H-4 of the core shroud. Georgia Power Company (GPC) has evaluated the flaws and determined that the cracking was not significant enough to threaten the structural integrity of the shroud during the next operating cycle and returned the unit to power.

Recently, significant cracking was found near some of the welds in the core shrouds at Dresden Unit 3 and Quad Cities Unit 1 while they were shut down for refueling. Unlike Brunswick, the Dresden and Quad Cities licensee (Commonwealth Edison Company) proposed to run these plants for some period of time while they design and fabricate a permanent repair. To support their conclusion that both of these units can be safely operated, the licensee has submitted a safety evaluation to demonstrate a) that the existing cracks will not propagate through the shroud wall during the next fuel cycle, b) that the existing uncracked ligaments will continue to provide sufficient structural integrity to meet the requirements of the ASME code, and c) that the existing cracks will not compromise the safety function of the shroud under all postulated design basis accident conditions. Based on its evaluation, the licensee concluded that the plants could be operated for their full cycles. The staff performed a

conservative analysis for Dresden Unit 3 and Quad Cities Unit 1. The analysis used an initial crack depth of 1.3 inches, a crack growth rate of 5×10^{-5} in/hr, and gave no credit for the fillet weld. The staff found that the ASME Code margins and, therefore, 10 CFR 50.55a would be satisfied for 15 months of operation.

In light of the extent of cracking observed, the staff evaluated potential safety concerns associated with the possibility of a 360-degree circumferential separation of the shroud following a pipe break. It was postulated that separation of the shroud might either prevent full insertion of the control rods or open a gap in the shroud large enough for the resulting gap leakage to preclude adequate core cooling by the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). The accident scenarios of primary concern are the main steam line break and the recirculation line break, normally referred to as loss-of-coolant-accidents (LOCAs). The more serious event associated with potential through-wall cracks in the upper shroud welds (e.g., H-2, H-3) is the steam line break, since the lifting forces generated may be sufficient to elevate the top guide and potentially cause difficulties with rod insertion. For welds in the upper portion of the shroud, extensive degradation would likely be detected during normal operation by comparison of individual jet pump flow. The more serious event associated with potential through-wall cracks in the lower shroud welds (e.g., H-4, H-5) is the recirculation line break. This is because the recirculation line break could potentially cause a lateral displacement of the shroud or open a crack that could allow enough leakage through the shroud and out the break to prevent adequate cooling of the core. The staff has requested the licensee to submit a more refined analysis of the loads associated with recirculation line breaks in order to verify the consequence evaluation that has been performed.

The staff has performed a preliminary safety assessment of this issue from a probabilistic perspective. In order to even postulate a displacement of the core shroud, it is necessary to assume that a 360-degree through-wall crack already exists and that a large, almost instantaneous rupture of either a steam or recirculation line occurs. All other situations would not generate the loads necessary for such displacement. Even if the core shroud were postulated to move during a low probability LOCA event and there were to exist a 360-degree through-wall crack, this does not mean that the shroud would move in an adverse manner where core cooling could not be achieved. While it is difficult to quantify the overall probability of core damage, we believe that the overall probability of a pipe break leading to a loss of adequate core cooling as a result of core shroud cracks is small and poses little risk.

The staff has completed its evaluation of the information provided by the licensee for the Dresden Unit 3 and Quad Cities Unit 1 plants and made a determination that these reactors may be safely operated for the next 15 months without undue risk to public health and safety. The required safety margins of the ASME code would be maintained, assuring compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a. Satisfying the code margins ensures that the core shroud will remain in place under design conditions. The staff's conclusion considered a bounding critical crack depth and conservative crack growth assumptions in determining that there is a very low likelihood of a through-wall crack at the end of the 15 month period.

Due to the location and the extent of the cracking recently found, the NRC and BWROG agreed that additional attention to this issue is warranted. The BWROG met with the staff on June 28, 1994, to inform the staff that they had formed a BWR Vessel and Internals Project headed by several high level utility executives. The BWROG also committed to provide a revised submittal addressing this issue in time for both staff review and licensee use for the Fall 1994 refueling outages. The submittal will contain an integrated safety assessment of the issue, inspection plans for the reactor internals, an assessment of various mitigation measures, and flaw acceptance and repair criteria.

Supplement 1 to Information Notice 94-42 was issued on July 19, 1994, to provide licensees more information on the core shroud cracking at Dresden Unit 3 and Quad Cities Unit 1.

In addition to the above, the staff has issued a generic letter (GL 94-03, July 25, 1994) requesting schedules for inspection of the core shroud and justification for operation until such inspections are conducted.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF BWR INTERNALS CRACKING ISSUES

CORE SHROUD CRACKING

- Cracking was discovered in the core shrouds of the Brunswick Unit 1 and Peach Bottom Unit 3 reactors in Fall 1993. One of the cracks in the Brunswick Unit 1 shroud was a 360° circumferential crack of the weld which joins the top guide support ring to the mid-shroud shell (H-3 weld). Clamps were installed at Brunswick Unit 1 as a repair of H-3 weld to ensure structural integrity of the weld.
- The Georgia Power Company (GPC) performed an ultrasonic examination on the core shroud of Hatch Unit 2 during its spring 1994 outage. Cracks were found in the core shroud at welds H-1, H-2, H-3, and H-4. GPC has evaluated the flaws and determined that cracking was not significant enough to threaten the structural integrity of the shroud for the next operating cycle and returned the unit to power.
- Northeast Utilities Company has completed its examination of the core shroud at Millstone Unit 1 plant and has found some small cracks on the H-1, H-4, and H-5 welds. Northeast Utilities has evaluated the flaw and determined that cracking was not significant enough to threaten the structural integrity of the shroud for the next operating cycle. The unit has returned to power.
- Commonwealth Edison Company has found significant cracking in some of the core shroud welds at Dresden Unit 3 and Quad Cities Unit 1, while the plants were shut down for refueling. The staff has determined these reactors may be safely operated for the next 15 months without undue risk to the public.
- The staff has issued a generic letter (GL 94-03, July 25, 1994) to obtain commitments from BWR licensees to perform shroud and internals inspections, to obtain plant-specific information on core shroud configurations and fabrication, and to justify continued operation until such inspections are conducted. Supplement 1 to Information Notice 94-42 was issued on July 19, 1994, to provide licensees more information on the core shroud cracking at Dresden Unit 3 and Quad Cities Unit 1.
- The staff evaluation has concluded that the risk from the most serious cracking observed to date is very low.

Table 1 - Summary of Domestic Shroud Cracking Experience

Plant	Type	Date of Operation	Last Inspection	Summary
Brunswick 1	MK 1 BWR 4	03/18/77	10/93	360° circumferential crack at H-3 weld in the top guide support ring - 0.8" to 1.7" deep. Other less-significant circ. and axial cracks at H-1 through H-6. H-2 and H-3 welds repaired by installing 12 through-bolted clamps.
Brunswick 2	MK 1 BWR 4	11/3/75	5/94	Significant cracking observed during VT inspection. Licensee to repair H-2 and H-3 welds similar to Brunswick 1.
Peach Bottom Unit 3	MK 1 BWR 4	12/23/74	11/93	Circ. cracks at lower shroud in stainless steel forging. Axial and circ. cracks at the H-4 weld. No repair for this operating cycle.
Nine Mile Pt. Unit 2	MK 2 BWR 5	3/11/88	11/93	Shroud is low-carbon stainless steel. Plant is outside the scope of GE SIL recommendations (insufficient operating time). Non-comprehensive inspection. No indications.
Vermont Yankee	MK 1 BWR 4	11/30/72	10/93	Inspected H-2, H-3 and H-4 welds in accordance with GE SIL recommendations. No indications.
Millstone 1	MK 1 BWR 3	03/01/71	1/94	Minor circ. cracks at H-3, H-4, and H-5 welds. No repair.
Dresden 3	MK 1 BWR 3	11/16/71	4/94	Inspected H-1 through H-7 welds. 360-degree at weld H-5. Other significant cracking indicated as well. Repairs being investigated.
Hatch 2	MK 1 BWR 4	12/31/75	4/94	Full automated UT inspection of welds. 159" crack at weld H-2. Other minor cracks at welds H-1, H-4, H-3. No repair.
Quad Cities 1	MK 1 BWR 3	2/18/73	4/94	Results similar to Dresden 3

Table 1 - Summary of Domestic Shroud Cracking Experience (Continue)

Plant	Type	Date of Operation	Last Inspection	Summary
Fermi 2	MK-1 BWR-4	1/23/88	6/94	Minor axial indications @ H-2 weld.
Oyster Creek	MK-1 BWR-2	12/1/69	2/93	Limited exam of H-4 and H-6b welds prior to issuance of GE SIL. No indications.
Monticello	MK-1 BWR-3	6/30/71	1993 Outage	ID and OD exam per SIL recommendations. Plant has L-grade shroud and uses hydrogen water chemistry (HWC). No indications.
Duane Arnold	MK-1 BWR-4	2/1/75	9/93	ID exam per SIL recommendations. Plant has L-grade shroud and uses HWC. No indications.
Hope Creek	MK-1 BWR-4	12/20/86	3/94	Limited exam. Plant has L-grade shroud. No indications.
Lasalle 1	MK-2 BWR-5	1/1/84	5/94	Examination per SIL recommendations. Plant has L-grade shroud. No indications.
Perry 1	MK 3 BWR 6	11/18/87	5/94	Shroud is low carbon stainless steel. 4 cells in each of H-3 and H-4 welds inspected from ID using VT-1. 12 additional cells in H-3, H-4, and H-5 welds inspected by VT-3. No indications.
Susquehanna 1	MK 2 BWR 4	2/12/85	12/93	Shroud inspected. No indications of cracking.
WNP-2	MK-2 BWR-5	12/13/84	6/94	Proactive, limited examination. Plant has L-grade shroud. No indications.

Shipment of Plutonium by Sea

Background:

Section 2904 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires that the President, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, conduct a study on the safety of shipments of plutonium by sea, and submit a report to Congress within 60 days (December 23, 1992). The act also requires the President to submit an implementation plan for the study's recommendations not later than 90 days after transmittal of the report.

The act requires that the study consider the following: (1) the safety of the casks containing the plutonium; (2) the safety risks, to States, of such shipments; (3) the adequacy of a State's emergency plan with respect to such shipments (if requested by the State); and (4) the Federal resources needed to assist the States on account of such shipments.

Discussion:

The report, which was transmitted to Congress on February 8, 1994, represents a joint effort by the Departments of State (DOS), Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and Transportation; the Coast Guard; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and NRC.

The report discusses the health and safety risks of shipping plutonium by sea. It concludes that plutonium can be safely shipped, by sea, under current international and domestic requirements and practices. The report did not identify any areas where specific actions would be required to protect public health and safety. The report also discusses the emergency response roles of Federal agencies, and addresses the specific issues raised in Section 2904 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.

The report makes the following recommendations: (1) Executive Branch agencies and NRC should maintain awareness of future plutonium shipments and monitor the need for revising transportation standards, if present circumstances change; (2) the report should be noticed in the Federal Register and distributed to State and international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO); (3) relevant Federal agencies should continue to participate in study groups or working groups organized by the IAEA, IMO, or other international organizations; (4) FEMA should promptly review State emergency plans with respect to plutonium shipments, as already requested by certain States, and should solicit submission of emergency response plans by all coastal States; (5) Federal agencies should take into account the need for additional resources, identified during the

review of State emergency plans, when preparing agency budget submissions for FY94 and beyond; and (6) Federal agencies responsible for maintaining the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) should revise the plan to clearly establish the appropriate level of response for accidents involving transient shipments of radioactive material.

Participating agencies have been asked to concur in the implementation plan, and it is expected that the implementation plan will be issued during September.

DOE is also planning two follow-up studies, one on the adequacy of physical security arrangements approved for the recent France to Japan Shipments, the other on the adequacy of IAEA safety standards for radioactive material packaging. These studies are being planned at the request of several Congressman (Abercrombie, Mink, Underwood, Barcelo, etc.). The NRC, DOT, DOS and Coast Guard have taken a position that such studies are unnecessary, and could actually harm national non-proliferation efforts, by their potential to result in such strict standards for plutonium packages, as to prohibit its shipment.

In a related matter, Congressman Abercrombie has introduced a bill to require that packages used to ship high level wastes by sea be able to withstand a maximum credible accident, and would prohibit packages not meeting such a standard from entering U.S. waters.

The bill which was introduced July 19 as an amendment to the Export Administration Act was ruled out of order because it would amend the Atomic Energy Act.

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