

GPU 6037

Designations from the President's Commission Deposition
of Richard E. Kosiba, dated July 3, 1979:

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Kosiba

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A Yes, I did.

Q At that time, did you confer with Mr. Elliott, who was manager of Training Service?

A During that period, yes, I did.

Q Did you confer with others in the Training Service Department, in terms of your review of the role and function of the Training Service Department?

A No, I did not.

Q So your primary contact, then, in assessing and evaluating what the Training Service Department was doing and what its role should and ought to be was with Mr. Elliott?

A Mr. Elliott and Mr. Olds, plus my own background.

Q What did Mr. Elliott tell you with regard to what the Training Department had been doing and what its focus was when you talked to him during this reorganization period?

A His task was to assist utilities in providing training to their operators. He described a variety of services that were available. He described the area in which most activity occurred, namely, the simulator training activity. He discussed potential areas for additional product development in areas that had not heretofore been active, that he was interested in looking to and developing.

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3 Q What were the additional product develop-
4 ments that Mr. Elliott told you about?

5 A Primarily in the area of training to assist in
6 maintenance, and training by the use of developing
7 video devices as training assistance.

8 Q Had the department been using video
9 devices up to that time?

10 A There had been occasional uses of video devices,
11 and the gist of the conversation that I remember is
12 that we have done this once in a while, but there is
13 an opportunity, and there is a need for additional
development of this area of effort.

14 Q I take it your charge from Mr. MacMillan
15 was to take a hard look at the department and assess
16 it and then reorganize it in whatever fashion you
17 felt appropriate after consultations that you wished
18 to undertake?

19 A That is essentially the charge. I don't remember
20 anything about a hard look, but merely to look over
21 the situation and recognize the present-day situation
22 with regard to the operating plants, to provide good
23 coordinated services in support of the operating
plants.

24 In the way of background, obviously the business
25 had developed for us in supplying new plants, and there

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3 was some thought that maybe we had not given adequate
4 attention to how we handled this service in support
5 of operating plants. He charged me to look at it
6 afresh and see if by rearranging and refocusing, we
7 could do a better job of assisting operating plants
8 and give it the emphasis so that there was no connota-
9 tion that the support of operating plants was a, let
10 me say, second fiddle to supplying NSSS; that does
11 not say that was the case, but to look at it afresh
12 and see what we should do to do a good job to assist
the operating plants.

13 Q Did Mr. MacMillan reduce his charge to
14 you to a memorandum outlining roughly what he was
15 asking you to do and what he expected you to end up
16 with in the sense of the process you were going
17 through?

18 A No, I know of no such memorandum. He did make
19 an announcement to be issued on the bulletin boards
20 as a communication to the entire division, but that
21 is a very short announcement which, in effect, provides
22 the basis from which I would be free to discuss the
23 various options with the different managers in the
division.

24 Q Then do I understand correctly that the
25 charge which you were given from Mr. MacMillan was

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3 need for resolution of questions.

4 Q But you have never talked to Mr. Hallman?

5 A No, I have not talked to Mr. Hallman.

6 Q Have you talked to anyone else in the
7 department at any time since the 28th about how that
8 issue was handled other than to Mr. Hallman and
9 Mr. Olds?

10 A I did not talk to Mr. Hallman.

11 Q I am sorry for the misstatement on my part.

12 A I talked to Mr. Olds, yes. I have talked about
13 that memorandum or about that event to one other
14 person, and that was Mr. Wascher, to the effect that the
15 review of the Davis-Besse incident should be added to
16 our work list, and once again be evaluated as to
17 whether there were further actions that should be
18 taken.

19 Q Other than Mr. Olds and Mr. Wascher, have
20 you discussed the issue raised by the Dunn memorandum
21 with anyone in your department between March 28 and
22 today?

23 A I don't recall speaking to anybody else about it.

24 Q Have you ever raised it with Mr. Elliott?

25 A Not the Dunn memo.

Q Have you raised the issues addressed therein?

A I have raised the issue of reviewing operating

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3 events or incidents and having the operations, the
4 training people review and involved in responding to
5 such operating events.

6 Q And that was with Mr. Elliott?

7 A Yes, I have discussed that issue. I can't recall
8 whether it was before the incident or after the
9 incident. I believe we have had more than one conver-
10 sation about the subject of having the training people
11 involved in reviews where operations of the plant was
12 the substantial factor in the way the product performed.
13 In fact, I, thinking further in line with the avail-
14 ability improvement program, I believe in January we
15 had some conversations, and that was before I was
16 involved in the department, which addressed the issue
17 that the input from the training people could be very
18 valuable in understanding and supporting the operation
19 of the plants.

20 Q As of today, I take it, you are aware that
21 the Dunn memorandum expressed concern and in fairly
22 strong terms about the potential for premature termina-
23 tion of HPI in the Davis-Besse September 1977 accident?

24 A That is correct.

25 Q I take it you are aware that the Michaelson
memorandum had entered this organization sometime in
the spring of 1978 expressing at least in part a

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3 similar concern?

4 A Yes, that is correct.

5 Q I take it you are also aware that a memo-
6 randum by Mr. Novak apparently written sometime in
7 January 1978 had come to B&W before the accident at
8 Three Mile Island?

9 A No, I am not aware of that.

10 Q You are not aware of that today?

11 A No.

12 Q With respect to the Michaelson and Dunn
13 memoranda, has that raised in your mind a question of
14 the ability of your organization to absorb information
and put it to use?

15 A Yes, it raises that question.

16 Q Have you done anything to look into the
17 matter to see whether the structure of the organization
18 is adequate to get that kind of information through to people
19 who need it?

20 I have been addressing that question long before the
21 incident, again, as part of the availability effort,
22 and I had not and do not today recognize any problem
23 in structure that prevents those issues from being
24 addressed because there is a long collection of items
25 concerning things like this which are addressed. I do
feel and have felt for a long time within B&W and in

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3 my past activity that one needs to be continuously
4 pressing to recognize the essence or the substance of
5 various events as opposed to the superficial or
6 symptomatic characteristics of an event. I think that
7 is one of the most interesting parts of the engineering
8 business, and particularly the nuclear business. It
9 sometimes is not subtle in retrospect, but in looking
10 forward it can be quite subtle.

11 MR. EDGAR: Can we go off the record.

12 (Discussion held off the record.)

13 (Continued on following page.)
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3 serious fashion and indicated that it was a question of
4 very serious concern to the writer, and even though
5 apparently a number of people within the B&W organi-
6 zation here in Lynchburg received it and knew about
7 it, and then nothing happened for 15 months; in light
8 of that, you still do not believe that any particular
9 attention is required to the flow of information?

10 A I don't understand your question. Your question
11 implies that I still do not think. I say I have been
12 concerned about the flow of information and had been
13 actively working on it since January, so why do you
14 say I still don't think? Have I said something --

15 Q Do you believe that that incident requires
16 action or requires being addressed in any specific
17 fashion by your department?

18 A I don't understand your question. The incident,
19 when I became aware of it, I asked Mr. Olds, who is
20 the manager in charge of Field Engineering and Service,
21 to look into how that is being handled, and further
22 with respect to the specific event, asked that it be
23 added to the work list to review what was going on.

24 In the generic sense, I had an active project
25 started before the Three Mile Island event to address
all of the elements of obtaining information from
operating plants and digesting it and using it. We

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3 had just added our own experienced resident engineers
4 at each of the sites to help in that process because
5 we were concerned about that concern. I do not be-
6 lieve that is consistent with any tone of still not
7 being concerned, and yet the notion that that task
8 will be fixed by any one memorandum or any one meeting
9 or any one consultant, that is not part of my life;
10 that is going to take a lot of work, and that is a
11 continuing problem for all programs.

12 The naval reactor program had that problem,
13 and the space program had that problem, and the nuclear
14 industry has that problem and will be working on it
for a long time, and I intend to work at it very hard.

15 Q Do you understand the mechanism by which
16 that particular issue got bogged down in your
17 organization?

18 A I do not understand beyond the fact that questions
19 raised by Mr. Hallman, and there were separate dis-
20 cussions between additional parties which were not in
21 agreement as to what action should be taken, and in
that disagreement the item stagnated.

22 Q Has there been any discussion as to whether
23 there ought to be some sort of review group to which
24 issues can be referred which are of a safety nature,
25 and which a person raising the issue feels deserve

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3 programs offered by B&W?

4 A No, I have not.

5 Q What is the role of Customer Service in the
6 review and approval, if any, of utility operating and
7 emergency procedures?

8 A I don't believe we have a role in approving.

9 Q Who would in the organization here at
10 Lynchburg?

11 A I don't believe any would.

12 MR. EDGAR: You may have misspoken. You
13 said "approval."

14 Q Okay. Do you have any role in review?

15 A Within the Service Department I know of no role
16 in review of procedures.

17 Q Who to the best of your knowledge has the
18 role in review of procedures here at the Nuclear Power
19 Generating Division?

20 A I believe we may be. I don't believe we review
21 operating procedures for the plant here in the division.
22 If I could mention that, we do contract service people
23 to assist the utilities, and some of those people, when
24 employed in helping the utility for startup program or
25 later test program, do perform the function of writing
or reviewing procedures.

We also have a sort of review in that in

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3 the training simulator work we use the utilities'
4 procedures, but we do not do a review per se of the
5 procedures, but we do see the procedures and have
6 available to us procedures that we look at and use.

7 Q Other than the contract service work that
8 your engineers may do from time to time on utility
9 procedures, to the best of your understanding there is
10 no review within B&W, is that correct?

11 A That is my understanding. I don't believe we are
12 contracted for to do that review. We provide procedures
13 for startup plant, and in certain instances where it is
14 contracted to us, we provide either guideline
procedures or draft procedures at certain operations.

15 MR. EDGAR: Can we define "review" and
16 make sure we have got the term pinned down?
17 Do you have a particular meaning attached to the
18 term?

19 MR. ROCKWELL: In my use of the term
20 "review" I mean does anybody have a chance, here
21 in the organization, have a chance to look at
22 the procedures and have a chance to comment on
them if they wish to to the utility.

23 A In handling the training simulator work, there is
24 a chance to comment on it, but in the context of the
25 procedure being provided to us with the objective of

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3 the utility knows he is not sending the procedure
4 back here for five or six or seven other disciplines
5 to review it, which is the kind of review that I infer
6 from the way your question is asked. They know that
7 that work does not come back here to get reviewed by
8 the instruments and so forth disciplines. They know
9 this man does it at the site. It is perfectly clear
10 to them that he does it there. The time schedule is
11 such that he must do it there.

11 (A brief recess was taken.)

12 Q Mr. Kosiba, what responsibility does B&W
13 feel it has with respect to those operating and
14 emergency procedures in use at its operating utilities
15 which apply to the NSSS systems, with respect to whether
16 they are adequate or not?

17 MR. EDGAR: Technically adequate?

18 MR. ROCKWELL: That is correct.

19 A At any given day, we may not even have the pro-
20 cedures, that is, in the control room. Therefore, a
21 rigorous answer to your question says that we cannot
22 have responsibility. A substantive answer is that
23 we have over a period of time provided information
24 and continue to provide information, such as the
25 site instructions which followed the Three Mile
Island incident, which is a mechanism we use regularly,
and is not unique to Three Mile Island, by which, if

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3 we learned from the experience of any one of our
4 operating plants, or from any one of our analyses or
5 any one of our vendors of any steps that should be taken
6 in the operation of our product, we provide that to
7 the operators. But we do not have the involvement to
8 know that when that information is provided that it
9 is put into the operating program and is really being
10 used. That is not part of our role in the business.

11 So in the rigorous sense, the answer to your
12 question is none. In the practical sense, the answer
13 is that we have substantial responsibility and do
14 exercise that responsibility by providing information
15 to our operating plants as quickly and completely as
16 we are able to do, with the understanding we have of
17 the plant design and operation.

18 Q I take it it would be a fair statement to
19 say that B&W stands in the position of greatest
20 expertise with respect to the designing and theoretical
21 basis for the NSSS systems which it manufactures.

22 A Yes. I would add to that statement that the
23 way in which the interfacing balance of plant systems
24 may be installed or may be modified with time is in a
25 different category with respect to our knowledge of
26 what is happening.

27 In other words, your question was NSSS, but I

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3 an adding to that statement to say that the way the
4 NSSS behaves is influenced by the intervening systems,
5 which are not part of our design, and our knowledge
6 is considerably less, and the currency of our knowledge
7 is subject to considerably more question.

8 Q Do you have any understanding of what
9 kind of contact or communication existed between the
10 Training Department and the Engineering Section or Group
11 before March 28, 1979?

12 A I have casual knowledge, namely, I am aware
13 that there was a practice of, on an occasional basis,
14 taking some plant behavior question, and the Engineering
15 Analysis people would go down with the simulator
16 people and do some checking to see if they could get
17 further understanding of the particular phenomenon.
18 But I cannot tell you whether that happened once in
19 six months or what frequency, but there was a connec-
20 tion there on an occasional problem, particularly those
21 which involved overall plant operations.

22 Q Have you established any policy with
23 respect to the contact and flow of information which
24 you think is necessary between Engineering and Training?

25 A I am working to establish a pattern in concert
26 hopefully with our customers which will assure a
27 building on the start we have made in operating

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3 guidelines, whose essential elements include having
4 the analysis people, the test people and the training
5 people all participate and in concert, in agreement,
6 on the behavior of the plants under certain perturbances.

7 I assume that you know that we prepared such
8 guidelines for the small break in response to the TMI 2
9 event. I am hopeful and believe it will be valuable
10 to the industry to enlarge upon that practice as a
11 means of communicating not only amongst the various
12 operators and ourselves, but also within our own
13 department to assure that the best possible informa-
14 tion is made available to the operator in a manner,
15 in a shape, in a form that is more readily taken
16 aboard and understood by the operator.

16 Q Have you made any specific changes within
17 the Nuclear Services Department based on the experience
18 with the Dunn memorandum?

19 A No, I have not.

20 Q What efforts or changes that you have
21 made since you became manager of the department do
22 you think can address the issue of moving information
23 through the department and getting it to the place
24 where it needs to go in a timely fashion?

25 A Can I hear that again?

(Previous question was read back.)

A I would like to discuss that for a few seconds to assure myself that I am answering what you were asking me.

My impression of the Dunn memo was that the communication was made to people in responsible positions and that the errors in execution, speed of execution, was a disagreement between several people with knowledge and understanding.

In that regard, the actions I have taken don't address that failure to reach agreement and consummate action. I have taken actions, and actions are still under way step by step to make improvements in the system or information flow between the operating experience at the plant to the division and back out again. But I really don't think those actions address the fundamental failure of the Dunn memo. I think those actions tidy up, make more efficient, make more visible, items that get lost. But I don't think the Dunn memo got lost. I think it was given and known to Dunn, Hallman and several other people, and the disagreement is what caused the problem.

The actions I took on our system per se would not resolve a disagreement between several people on an item. It may have given it more visibility

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3 and indirectly helped a little bit, but I view the
4 actions that I have taken to be to streamline, step
5 by step, the many problems that come in, because we
6 do have many problems ranging in difficulty from
7 trivial instances which have now large follow-on
8 repercussions to complicated problems which have
9 follow-on repercussions. Sifting through that is
10 a process that one keeps watch on and tries to
11 tighten up. Those were the actions that I took.

12 (Continued on Page 47.)
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improving the visibility of these problems that are identified from the site. This particular problem did not come from the site.

In the same tone, we expect to have a continuing involvement of the various parties involved in the operating guidelines to facilitate discussion and transmission of intelligence to the customer. I feel that that is going to be a very positive help, and that were that vehicle or habit in place, it would have facilitated communication of the concern and possible solution.

By the same token, we have a mechanism which concerns itself with preliminary safety concerns, and by the training and example of working with our various managers we would expect that one of these several modes of communicating this kind of problem would be effective, and I believe the strongest part of it is training the habit or persistent attention to detail of question, and that is an effort we are going to make.

Q Is there any internal training or education that you think is useful in accomplishing that?

A I know of no training that has been instituted in response to the Three Mile Island event as of now. I am quite familiar that we have ongoing training

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3 programs on conflict resolution that go back as long
4 as I can remember. There is an ongoing program now
5 on conflict resolution. It is part of the training
6 manual. There are people going through it with the
7 principles of escalation and so forth and so on.

8 With respect to changes in that training from
9 the perspective of the Three Mile Island experience,
10 I am not aware that anything has been done to date.
11 I am aware that I have in the conceptual stage had
12 discussions to establish or reestablish, I should say,
13 training programs for people in the Customer Service
14 Department. Such training I understand was done in
15 the past, but when I assumed responsibility for the
16 department, I became aware that ongoing technical
17 training programs of the service ilk -- and I want to
18 be careful here because technical programs for
19 engineering skills were ongoing and available, but
20 specialized programs for people in the service area
21 were such that I thought we ought to re-start that
22 activity as an ongoing activity.

23 Looking back on what I have just said, I am not
24 quite sure whether that realization was before the
25 incident or after the incident, and I believe the
correct statement for me to make is that it was both,
namely one must provide continuous training to people

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3 because the plants are changing, whether they change
4 physically or whether our understanding of them changes,
5 and one must keep telling people about them. They are
6 not static, and the decision or indecision that the
7 emphasis of training go over to the engineering-
8 technical as opposed to the service-technical, I
9 consider to be part of my charter to give better recog-
10 nation to the total service we supply the customer,
11 as opposed to the service which many people by tradi-
12 tion had in their mind of supplying NSSS.

13 Those are two different markets and two different
14 worlds that people live in.

15 Q I have one other question. Have you ever
16 talked with Mr. Taylor since March 28, 1979 to ask him
17 what understanding he had of the handling of the Dunn
18 memorandum?

19 A I am not sure. He may have been the person that
20 gave me the copy on the night -- it was during the
21 night I was standing watch.

22 Q You are aware that it was addressed to him?

23 A I was aware that it was addressed to him. I
24 don't recall whether he handed it to me or whether
25 immediately after reading it he was present also on
watch, and we exchanged a few words. I did not in the
quiet of the working day go to see Mr. Taylor and talk