

GPU 6027

Designations from the President's Commission Deposition
of Bert M. Dunn, dated July 2, 1979:

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MR. ROCKWELL: The record should reflect that we are continuing the deposition of Mr. Bert Dunn which was begun on Saturday, June 30th. Mr. Dunn, you are a witness and you are still under oath.

MR. DUNN: Yes.

B E R T M E R R I T T D U N N, having been previously duly sworn, was recalled as a witness and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. ROCKWELL:

Q With respect to your discussions with Mr. Kelly before Mr. Kelly's writing -- with respect to Mr. Kelly's memo of November 1, 1977--I take it you and he had been discussing this concern that you each had arising out of the September 24, '77 Davis-Besse transient, is that correct?

A That is right. That is my impression.

Q Am I correct in understanding that you testified on Saturday that you had encouraged him or had urged him to write the memorandum, which we marked as Womack Deposition Exhibit 24 (indicating) which you now have in front of you?

A Yes, I believe that that would be correct.

Q Can you tell me how those discussions got

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3 started between you and Mr. Kelly?

4 A If I recall it correctly, following recognition
5 of the events of September 24th at Toledo Edison, I
6 became concerned about the premature termination of
7 high pressure injection, contacted Integration to
8 follow up in the fashion of providing guidance through
9 the operators of nuclear reactors, so that that
10 premature termination would not occur.

11 Q Do you know approximately when you made
12 your first contact with Integration?

13 A I can't recall directly. I would expect it to be
14 within one or two weeks of the September 24th incident,
15 perhaps a month.

16 Q Do you recall who you talked to on that
17 first occasion when you contacted Integration?

18 A No, I don't even recall the first contact
19 expressly.

20 Q Why did you contact Integration?

21 A Well, Integration is at times an organization
22 which handles interface problems. Not being responsible
23 for operating procedures, I felt I could get to the
24 people concerned with operating procedures either through
25 or directly in Integration.

26 Q At that time did you have a clear under-
27 standing as to what part of the organization here at the

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3 loss of coolant accidents.

4 Q And just so I am clear, you are indicating
5 that the Davis-Besse September transient brought the
6 possibility of inappropriate operator action home to
7 you in a way that suggested that something out to be
8 done to look at it and evaluate it?

9 A Brought it home to the point that something ought
10 to be done to consider the operator actions which we
11 could expect following a loss of coolant accident, and
12 if those were in fact as occurred at Toledo, to modify
13 them.

14 Q When you say that you created the capa-
15 bility to understand this phenomenon in the 1971 to
16 1973 time period, are you referring to the time you
17 did the generic ECCS analysis?

18 A Yes, on that time or slightly before that time.
19 It was our first step into multi-note evaluation of
20 small breaks.

21 Q The 1971 to '73 time period?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Would the specific phenomenon of pressurizer
24 level rising when core is voiding have been noted before
25 the Davis-Besse September '77 transient, setting aside
for the moment the possibility of operator inaction?

(Continued on following page.)

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Q Do you have any specific recollection of contact you may have had with Kane with regard to this memorandum?

A No.

Q Would you please refer to the distribution on Page 2 of Exhibit 23 and tell me whether you had contact with any of the other persons listed on that distribution that we have not already discussed; in other words, aside from Swanson, Kelly, Taylor -- obviously, the memorandum was addressed to Taylor -- and Kane, did you have contact with any of the persons on that list?

A As a result of writing this memo?

Q That's right.

A As I mentioned, there was someone from Nuclear Service with whom I was discussing. He doesn't seem to be on this list.

Q Setting aside that person as well, did you have contact with any of the other persons listed on the distribution?

A Subject to memory, I will say no. I wouldn't preclude the possibility.

If there were contacts, they were not strong contacts from which meaningful issues were derived.

Q Just so that we are clear, let me broaden

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3 my question as follows:

4 Regardless of whether you had specific
5 conversations with regard to this memorandum, did you
6 have conversations touching on the subject matter of
7 your concern arising out of the Davis-Besse September 24,
8 1977 accident with anyone other than we have already
9 covered?

10 A Well, you have this person's name already. I
11 have discussed this issue with Don Roy.

12 Q That was at the time the memorandum was
13 circulated or in the weeks thereafter?

14 A It was, I believe previous to this memorandum's
15 circulation, and I feel it was even previous to
16 Mr. Kelly's initial memorandum.

17 Q Would you tell me about the discussions you
18 had with Don Roy indicating how they came to pass?

19 A I believe it was shortly after my initial review
20 of the Toledo incident, and it was in an informative
21 fashion in that I went to Don's office, who at that
22 time was my boss, manager of Plant Design, and informed
23 him that the operators terminated the high pressure
24 injection at what I considered an inappropriate time
25 in the Toledo transient, and I thought it was a very
serious matter, and we should do something to resolve
the issue.

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3 Q What was Roy's response?

4 A I cannot recall specific words, but his response
5 was to support me in that the operator should not be
6 terminating the high pressure injection system, and
7 that we should proceed to create an evaluation as to
8 why it was terminated, and if it was truly inappro-
9 priate, to rectify the condition so that such a
10 termination could not occur during a real or more
11 serious loss of coolant accident.

12 Q Did he indicate how this evaluation should
13 be pursued?

14 A He may have suggested that I pursue it through
15 Integration. That would have been my own usual
16 response or way of pursuing it anyway.

17 I don't remember whether he suggested that or not.

18 Q Did he indicate that he would take any role
19 or responsibility in seeing that this matter was
20 followed up?

21 A Not to my recollection. I believe he delegated
22 that responsibility back to me. It would have been my
23 understanding, leaving that office, that I was to
24 pursue it.

25 Q Did you ever have any further conversations
with Roy about the subject of your concern?

A There would be quite a few possibilities, and

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3 it may have been mentioned from time to time, but there
4 would be no -- there is none specific to this point
5 where the subject of a specific meeting or discussion
6 was this issue that I can recall.

7 Q Do you know whether you ever talked to Roy
8 about your concern that there had been no response to
9 Kelly's memorandum and that the evaluation that you
10 hoped would flow from that wasn't happening?

11 A I may have, but I don't think so.

12 Q You indicated that when you wrote your
13 follow-on memorandum, February 16, 1978, that
14 memorialized your discussion and agreement with whoever
15 it was in Nuclear Services who you had been talking to,
16 is that correct?

17 A You haven't formulated a statement or a question
18 yet, so I don't know whether I should agree.

19 Q Let me restate it.

20 Am I correct in understanding that your
21 February 16, 1978 memorandum was your effort to
22 memorialize and confirm the agreement that you had
23 reached with this person from Nuclear Services in
24 regard to the prescription, the appropriate prescription
25 for the concern arising out of Davis-Besse?

A Yes, I believe that's correct.

Q And if I recall correctly, you indicated

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3 talking to?

4 A Certainly.

5 Q Following the circulation of your February
6 16, 1978 memorandum, do you recall any other discussions
7 or any other contacts relating to the subject matter of
8 your initial memorandum and the follow-up memorandum
9 to Taylor?

10 A I do not recall any up to the time of March 28,
11 1979.

12 Q We reviewed on Saturday Deposition
13 Exhibit 37, which was a memorandum dated August 3, 1978
14 from Hallman to Karrasch?

15 A Yes.

16 Q After having read that memorandum on
17 Saturday, did it ring any bell with you in terms of
18 possibly having seen it before?

19 A Not prior to March 28, 1979, no.

20 Q Had you had any contact with Hallman in
21 reference to your concerns at any time during the
22 writing of these memoranda or at the time when you
23 were actively pursuing your concern about the implica-
24 tions of the Davis-Besse September '77 --

25 A I can only remember that one contact, and that
was shortly after the incident, and considerably prior
to the issuance of the various memos in which I

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3 Can you tell me when you first remember dis-
4 cussing with him after the TMI 2 incident?

5 MR. EDGAR: Can we go off the record
6 for a minute?

7 MR. ROCKWELL: Sure.

8 (Discussion held off the record.)

9 Q What specific recollection do you have
10 of conversations with Taylor on the subject of your
11 February 1978 memoranda since the TMI 2 accident?

12 A To make an attempt, which I hope does not
13 contradict anything I said Saturday, our first dis-
14 cussion probably occurred at the time that we forwarded
15 the guidance to NRC, which they created, I believe,
16 NRC Bulletin 7905-A.

17 By and large, the prescription contained in
18 7905-A is the same as was contained in my February 16
19 memo.

20 Mr. Taylor was involved in that discussion
21 with NRC, and it seems probable, although I don't
22 specifically recall such a conversation, that we
23 talked about the memo.

24 Since then we have been involved in numerous
25 licensing activities together, and the subject has
come up one or two times, I can't really say specifically

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3 when or where.

4 At one time, Mr. Taylor phoned me and said that
5 a similar concern had been raised by Mr. Novak of
6 the NRC staff, and that I should not feel too lonely.

7 I think other than that, in preparation for this
8 testimony, we had a discussion in this room on Wednesday.

9 Q What was the discussion on Wednesday?

10 A The discussion Wednesday was a general discussion
11 of the topics which we felt would be of interest to
12 the Commission.

13 Q Let me sharpen my question: What was
14 your discussion with Taylor on Wednesday with specific
15 reference to the February '78 memorandum?

16 A The discussion surrounded what had occurred
17 because of the memos when the memos went back and
18 forth, what memos were in fact written to go back
19 and forth and how people felt about that mode of
20 communication.

21 Q When you say "how people felt about that
22 mode of communication, what do you mean by that?

23 A Whether we felt that was, at the time, whether
24 that had been sufficient action.

25 Q Was there any explanation in this
Wednesday meeting last week offered as to why the

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A No, I don't believe so.

Q So is it fair to say that the discussion centering around those memoranda had to do primarily with possible explanations as to how it had been handled as it was, and why it was handled as it was?

A Yes.

MR. EDGAR: Off the record.

(Discussion held off the record.)

Q Let me go back. You indicated that the NRC Bulletin 7905A essentially gives the prescription which you had formulated in your February 16 memorandum, is that correct?

A Yes. I believe that to be true.

Q My recollection, and correct me if I am wrong, is that 7905A was issued a relatively short time after the TMI 2 accident, within the order of a week to ten days?

A Yes. I think it was less than that.

Q So that apparently the substance of your February memorandum was retrieved from within the organization here relatively quickly after the TMI 2 accident?

A Yes.

Q In fact, the memorandum itself was

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3 retrieved relatively quickly after the TMI 2 accident?

4 A I secured the two memorandums for my own use
5 almost a day after.

6 Q Was that because you had recalled writing
7 them and went to get them once you heard about the
8 sequence that occurred at TMI 2?

9 A Yes, I pulled them out of my personal communi-
10 cations file and put them in my desk drawer so they
11 would be available.

12 Q Did anyone else remind you of those
13 memoranda before you thought of them yourself?

14 A Not before I thought of them myself, no.

15 Q Going back now to 1978, did you become
16 aware at some point of what has come to be known as
17 the Michaelson Report?

18 A Yes.

19 Q When did you become aware of that?

20 A Sometime in early '78, the second or third month.

21 MR. ROCKWELL: Mark these documents,
22 please.

23 (Documents were marked Dunn Deposition
24 Exhibits 42, 43 and 44, respectively, for
25 identification, this date.)

(A brief recess was taken.)

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Q When Jones briefed you on the substance of the Michaelson report, did you come to any conclusions or any analysis of what its significance was at that time?

A Yes.

Q What were your conclusions?

A The conclusions were that an independent evaluation of small break LOCAs had been performed within TVA, and in their opinion had raised some issues not directly discussed in the LOCA evaluations provided to TVA, and that we would have to respond to TVA showing how their presence at that time evaluation considered the issues within the transmittal letter and the attachment.

Q Did it strike you that at least to some extent Michaelson was raising the same concern that you had had from your analysis of the Davis-Besse September 1977 transient?

A I don't believe it struck me as overwhelmingly significant that he was doing that at the time.

I do believe, however, that that did strike me, or that I was aware that he had raised that in here.

Q Let me try to get back to the focus of my question, which is, in reviewing Michaelson's comments in his report, did he appear to be addressing the same

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3 concern in part, at least, that you had been addressing
4 in your February 1978 memoranda?

5 A Yes, as a small part of the attachment, and
6 perhaps even in the cover memo --

7 Q Let me direct --

8 A -- that issue is brought out.

9 Q Okay. Let me direct your attention speci-
10 fically to Page 2 of Exhibit 41, which you have before
11 you, the last five or six lines on that page. Why
12 don't you take a moment to read it.

13 A Okay.

14 Q Setting aside for a moment the loop seal
15 meanchism, that is essentially the concern you had out
16 of the Davis-Besse accident, is it not?

17 A I believe so.

18 Q When did Babcock & Wilcox first respond to
19 the issues raised in Mr. Patterson's April 27, 1978
20 letter?

21 A I think it would depend on the nature of the
22 response to which the first response of a technical
23 nature in my understanding occurred in January of 1979.

24 Q And would that response be reflected in
25 what I have now handed you as Exhibit 42, which is a
January 23, 1979 letter to Mr. Patterson from Messrs.
Markert and Lightle at B&W?

A Yes, this is the response I was mentioning.

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3 Q And did you receive a copy of that response
4 when it went out?

5 A I may have.

6 Q Do you see on the Exhibit that you have
7 before you a block, which shows you as a blind carbon
8 copy recipient?

9 A Yes, that would indicate I received a copy of
10 this.

11 Q Do you know that you reviewed the response
12 before it went out?

13 A No, it was prepared by one of my personnel, and
14 I did not participate in the review of it.

15 Q What is your practice generally with respect
16 to reviewing materials going out of the ECCS analysis
17 unit?

18 A If these materials are within the established prac-
19 tices or contain results that are normal in terms of
20 our experience, I have requested my supervisors not to
21 bother me with them. If there is something unusual that
22 they feel I should be aware of, then they are to discuss
23 them with me for my review.

24 Q When you first had the report from Jones
25 on the Michaelson document, did you remind him or bring
to his attention at that time the fact that your
February 1972 memorandums, addressed at least in part

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3 the same concerns?

4 A I don't know whether I did at that time or not.
5 I expect Bob would have been equally aware of my memos
6 as I was.

7 Q Even though he is not shown as a recipient
8 of those memos, he would be aware of them as a member
9 of your group?

10 A Yes. He would have also participated in review
11 of the Toledo incident, and we would have undoubtedly
12 had several informal discussions on the subject.

13 Q Would it be also true that all of the
14 members of your unit would have been aware of the
15 concerns you were raising in these February '78
16 memoranda?

17 A No, I would say that not everybody would have been
18 aware of them. I doubt, for example, that the load
19 people would have been aware and that forms over half
20 the unit. As to how many people within Bob's group
21 were aware of it, I am not sure.

22 Q Was it your judgment at the time that Jones
23 briefed you initially on the Michaelson materials that
24 any response he would generate would not require your
25 review?

26 A At the time that we discussed the importance and
27 what to do about the communication from TVA, that would have
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concerns that you had arising out of the Davis-Besse transient?

A No, I do not know.

Q Was there any other communication passed between or among B&W, Toledo Edison and the NRC which brought out your concerns arising out of the Davis-Besse transient?

A There may have been. Not to my knowledge.

Q Was there any formal notification to the NRC of your concerns placed in the context not simply of the Toledo Edison Davis-Besse transient, but with respect to the applicability of your concern to all B&W and SSS systems, to your knowledge?

A Can I have the question again?

(Reporter read back question.)

A Not to my knowledge, and I don't believe such a communication was made.

MR. ROCKWELL: For the record, two Exhibits marked as Exhibits 46 and 47 will be, by agreement of counsel, withdrawn, since I do not intend to inquire into them with Mr. Dunn.

MR. EDGAR: Off the record.

(Discussion held off the record.)

Q Showing you, Mr. Dunn, what has been marked as Dunn Deposition Exhibit No. 40, do I correctly

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3 Q Since the fall of 1977 and the Kelly
4 memo that we have already reviewed and your two
5 memoranda of February 1978 which we have reviewed,
6 and up to today, have you had any reason to change
7 the analysis that you made following your review of
8 the Davis-Besse September '77 transient?

9 A The question could be very broad.

10 Q Let me try to restate it. As you sit
11 here today, do you agree with the analysis that you
12 made in 1977, the fall of '77 and early 1978, as a
13 result of your review of the Davis-Besse transient,
14 and do you accept the conclusions that you made at
15 that time as valid today?

16 A Yes, I believe so.

17 Q And there is nothing which has come to
18 your attention since then which has caused you to
19 modify that analysis or reject it or change it, is
20 that correct?

21 A That would be correct.

22 Q I take it that you had reviewed the TMI 2
23 sequence of events, referring to March 28, 1979?

24 A Yes, in various levels of detail at different
25 times.

26 Q In your opinion, taking the TMI 2 sequence
27 of events as you know, and making the following single

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3 change, what would have been the result at TMI 2 with
4 the following single change that HPI is not terminated?

5 A The reactor coolant system would have evolved
6 to a relatively slow void fraction of somewhere between
7 5 and 10 percent, and given that operator had closed
8 the PORV block valve within the approximate time frame
9 that he did, and then proceeded with an orderly cooldown,
10 the events would have been much less consequential or
11 damaging, other than that contained within the reactor
12 prior to the accident, in the form of perhaps a slowly
13 leaking fuel would not have occurred in relation to the
14 environment, would have been limited to those contained
15 in the reactor coolant, which passed the quench tank,
16 and would have been limited to far lower levels.
17 That is as far as the building is concerned.

18 I am not sure whether any of the fission products
19 after the core was damaged were actually released. In
20 short, in a successful termination of a loss of coolant
21 accident.

22 Q In your opinion, would the core have been
23 uncovered at all?

24 A No.

25 Q In your opinion, would there have been
any core damage as a result of the transient?

A No.

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3 (There was discussion off the record.)

4 Q Directing your attention, Mr. Dunn, to
5 January and February 1979, were you aware of a concern
6 raised by the NRC with respect to followup by B&W on
7 the November 29, 1977 Davis-Besse transient, and for
8 your reference, I show you Willse Deposition Exhibits
9 3, 4 and 5?

10 A Not being intimately familiar with these documents,
11 I believe reference is being made to some evaluations
12 concerning the effect of possible overflow of the
13 generators on the pressurizer level at the Toledo plant,
14 for which I was a participant in discussions with the
15 NRC and with the Toledo Corporation on the 14th of
16 February, I guess that is 1979, yes.

17 Q You are familiar generally then with the
18 concern that the NRC had expressed at the meeting
19 that took place as a result of that concern?

20 A Yes. I don't believe I could specify the
21 specific concern as well as I could discuss my role
22 in the problem. I was certainly not a leader in
23 responding to this NRC concern.

24 Q Did you attend a preparation meeting on
25 February 9, 1979, here at the Nuclear Power Generating
26 Division to prepare B&W's position for the meeting
27 that ultimately occurred on February 14, 1979?

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3 A I attended a preparation meeting for the
4 February 14 meeting. As to whether it was on
5 February 9th or not, I can't recall, but I attended
6 that meeting.

7 Q Can you tell me what your understanding
8 of the purpose of the meeting was and what occurred
9 at that meeting?

10 A We had provided Toledo Edison with an evaluation
11 of the pressurizer level.

12 Q Stop a minute. I want to make sure. I
13 am focusing on the preparation meeting, not the
14 February 14th meeting, for the time being. I just
15 want to make sure you are clear about that in
16 responding.

17 MR. EDGAR: This is the internal B&W
18 meeting before the 14th?

19 MR. ROCKWELL: Yes.

20 A The 14th meeting was the one in Lynchburg, though,
21 with the NRC reviewers and the customers, is it not?

22 A Q Yes.

23 A I am still right. I may be wrong, but I think
24 I am right.

25 Q Excuse the interruption. Will you proceed.
(Previous answer was read back.)

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3 Q With reference to that meeting on the 9th,
4 were you an active participant?

5 A Yes, I had part of a presentation prepared to
6 discuss something called "The Bubble Story" and I went
7 over that presentation in the meeting of the 9th.

8 Q Would it be fair to say that part of the
9 concern arising out of the November 1977 Davis-Besse
10 transient related to pressurizer level indication?

11 A I believe that is true.

12 Q At the time of that February 9, 1977
13 meeting did you bring up to the group at the prepara-
14 tion meeting the concerns you had had about pressurizer
15 level with respect to the other Davis-Besse transient
in the fall of 1977, namely the September transient?

16 A No, it was my understanding at the time that
17 these discussions were relative to the pressurizer
18 level going low during an overcooling transient, and
19 were not really related to loss of coolant accident,
20 and I was merely participating as a knowledgeable
21 thermodynamic engineer, rather than as an ECCS
representative.

22 Q Did the possibility occur to you that a
23 meeting devoted to discussing something that related
24 at least in part to pressurizer level, even though it
25 was pressurizer level low or pressurizer level

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indication low, might be a useful forum for raising again your concern about pressurizer level high, with respect to the other Davis-Besse transient?

A No, I don't believe that crossed my mind. I believe at that time I was operating under the assumption that we can resolve the other concern.

Q Were you familiar at that time with what was known as the Creswell memorandum?

A Not intimately familiar with it. I have heard his name repeatedly.

Q Have you ever seen the Creswell memorandum?

A Well, I'm not sure. I suppose I could find out if I saw it again. It doesn't strike a bell.

(Document described below was marked Dunn Deposition Exhibit 46 for identification, this date.)

MR. ROCKWELL: For the record, the court reporter has marked two pages within NuReg 0560 entitled, "Staff Report on the Generic Assessment of Feedwater Transient in Pressurized Water Reactors Designed by the Babcock & Wilcox Company. This is a publication of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and we have marked Deposition Exhibit No. 46, which will consist of two pages, the page where the Exhibit

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3 identification appears and the following page.

4 Q To identify the particular Exhibit, am I
5 correct in stating that it appears to be a part of
6 IE 7905, an excerpt from memorandum entitled, "Conveying
7 New Information to Licensing Board -- Davis-Besse
8 Units 2 and 3 and Midland Units 1 and 2," dated
9 January 8, 1979 from J. S. Creswell to J. F. Streeter.
10 Do you know whether you have ever seen that excerpt of
11 the so-called Creswell memorandum before?

12 A The excerpt would be the paragraphs contained
13 under "Point 3"?

14 Q It would be all of the two pages which you
15 have before you.

16 A I don't believe I have.

17 Q Have you see any part of it before today,
18 do you know?

19 A Not that I recall. It's subject matter may have
20 been described to me.

21 Q Do you know whether anyone here at the
22 Nuclear Power Generating Division had that Creswell
23 memorandum at or about the time of the February 14,
24 1979 meeting with the NRC here in Lynchburg?

25 A I don't have any specific knowledge that said
they did or didn't.

Q Is it fair to state that in the February 14th

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meeting with the NRC no reference was made and no discussion was had with reference to the September '77 Davis-Besse transient?

A In my recollection that is a true statement. I don't recall any direct discussion of that. It is possible there was some indirect discussion, perhaps acting in terms of steam generator performance.

(Continued on following page.)

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3 Q Any discussion with respect to concern
4 about premature termination of HPI?

5 A I don't think anything that explicit.

6 Q Would there have been any restriction on
7 your bringing that subject up, and by "that subject,"
8 I mean the September 1977 Davis-Besse transient, at
9 the February 14, 1979 meeting here in Lynchburg with
10 the NRC and the various utilities, had you wished to
11 do so?

12 A Restriction imposed by whom?

13 Q The Nuclear Power Generating Division.

14 By way of clarification, had you wanted to
15 bring that subject up, was there any reason that
16 you could not have?

17 A I would say it would probably have been unwise
18 to bring the subject up, because it would have diverted
19 a meeting intended for one purpose, and people respon-
20 sible for reviewing one type of event, into another
21 event.

22 The only prescription provided would be that
23 in general, communications to NRC are supposed to
24 through Licensing and have Licensing's review prior
25 to making that disclosure, or discussions if you will.

26 Q At the time of that February 14th meeting,

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3 you had no information that, in fact, the utilities
4 using B&W NSSS systems had been informed of the con-
5 cerns arising out of the September '77 Davis-Besse
6 transient, is that correct?

7 A Relative to termination of the HPI?

8 Q Yes.

9 A That is correct.

10 MR. EDGAR: But you had no information
11 that they had not been informed, is that right?

12 THE WITNESS: That is also correct.

13 Q Mr. Dunn, have you ever visited a B&W
14 operating reactor when it is critical?

15 A I am not sure. I spent time at the Oconee site
16 in an ACRS discussion and public hearing on Oconee
17 Unit 2. I toured the site during the morning prior
18 to the hearing, and I can't recall whether Unit 1 was
19 critical or not. I believe Unit 1 was critical.

19 Q Did you go into the control room at all?

20 A Again I am not sure. I think we passed through
21 the edge of the control room, through some of the
22 periphery rooms on our way from one installation to
23 another one, and I think I caught a glance of the
24 control room.

25 Q I take it the purpose of the meeting was

1
2 Saturday. I have talked to operators on different
3 subjects prior to coming to Babcock & Wilcox.

4 Q Has there ever been a policy at the
5 Nuclear Power Generating Division requiring or
6 even encouraging design people to get out and talk
7 to utility operators, to your knowledge?

8 A I don't think so. I don't think it has been
9 discouraged at all. It just has not been encouraged.

10 Let me rephrase that. I think it has been
11 treated on a catch-as-catch-can basis, and some of
12 our managers have talked to a considerable extent
13 to operators. I have not.

14 Q Have any managers in the Plant Design
15 Section?

16 A I believe Bruce Karrasch has spent some time
17 with operators.

18 Q Have you ever reviewed any training
19 materials which are related to ECCS, and I am referring
20 to training materials used to train operators?

21 A Not formally.

22 Q How have you done it informally?

23 A I have been party recently to discussions centering
24 around the simulator. A simulator is a tool used
25 to train operators.

26 Q Has that been since March 28?

27 A Yes.

2
3 Q What about before March 28?

4 A Not that I recall.

5 Q You indicated that your group has given,
6 perhaps, small break LOCA lectures, as I understand,
7 in the training program associated with the simulator?

8 A Related to loss of coolant accident on small
9 breaks.

10 Q I stand corrected. Have you ever given
11 that presentation yourself?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Is that done on a theoretical level or on
14 a practical level, if you can draw that distinction?

15 A I would say it is done on a practical level.

16 Q Do you have any of the materials you
17 have used for those lectures today?

18 A No, my lectures have been about six years ago,
19 or maybe five years ago.

20 Yes, I would have that material, but it would not
21 be sorted out. It would not be segregated so that I
22 could identify it. I would have probably used some
23 of the same material that I use when I deal with the
24 NRC view graphs, et cetera.

25 Q Would you be able to identify that material?

A Not the specific material. I could show you the