

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

J. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

June 20, 1983

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USNRC REGION I
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Thirty Day Written Report
LER 83-049

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #83-049 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.7.4, "Service Water System," on June 6, 1983.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

RJB:OWD/dwf
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer
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IC 22 //

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
LER No. 83-049
Page Two
June 20, 1983

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

At 0600 hours, June 6, 1983, with the Plant in Mode 1, Service Water Booster Pump A discharge check valve, XVC-3135A-SW, was declared inoperable because of failure to close on reverse flow. Technical Specification 3.7.4, "Service Water System," requires two (2) independent service water loops to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The associated Action Statement states, "With only one (1) service water loop operable, restore at least two (2) loops to operable status within 72 hours or be in at least Hot Standby within the next six (6) hours or in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours."

There were no adverse consequences due to this event. Service Water Booster Pump B was available to supply cooling water to Reactor Building cooling units XAA-1B and XAA-2B-AH on receipt of a Safety Injection signal.

CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The cause of failure was due to the hinge being worn. The hinge and key were replaced, and the valve disk was lapped. The valve was reassembled, the applicable surveillance test satisfactorily performed, and the system was declared operable at 1940 hours, June 8, 1983. No additional corrective action is proposed other than required surveillance testing.