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3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T_{avg} GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.2 Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,

b. One OPERABLE Safety Injection pump,

c. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,

d. One OPERABLE RHR pump,

e. One OPERABLE containment recirculation heat exchanger,

f. One OPERABLE containment recirculation pump, and

g. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and capable of automatically stopping the RHR pump and being manually realigned to transfer suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION: Delete and INSERT 'A'

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

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INSERT A

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within the times shown on the following table or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

Subsystem	Time (Hours)
Centrifugal charging pump	72
Safety Injection pump	72
RHR heat exchanger	72
RHR pump	120
Containment recirculation heat exchanger	72
Containment recirculation pump	72
Flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST on an SIS and capable of being manually realigned to transfer suction to the containment sump for the recirculation phase	72

Docket No. 50-423
B14930

Attachment 2

Millstone Unit No. 3

Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications

Residual Heat Removal Pump Outage Time

Retyped Pages

August 1994

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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

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b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.