

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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March 15, 1983
MP-4783

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes
Regional Administrator, Region 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

Reference: Provisional License DPR-21
Docket No. 50-245
Reportable Occurrence RO 83-08/3L

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO 83-08/3L required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.a. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'E. J. Mroczka'.

E. J. Mroczka
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TST:mo

Attachment: LER RO 83-08/3L

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,
Washington, D. C. (3)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch,
Washington, D. C. 20555

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-08/3L
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NO. DPR-21
DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Engineered safeguard feature instrument setting was found to be less conservative than those established by Technical Specifications when the Isolation Condenser flow switch tripped above its allowable setpoint.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to occurrence the unit was operating at a steady state power level of 100%.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On February 15, 1983, at 1200 hours, while performing Isolation Condenser Isolation Instrument Functional and Calibration Test, pressure switch 1350B tripped at 168 inches of water. Technical Specification, Table 3.2.1 requires automatic isolation of the isolation condenser when a line break on the steam supply reaches a differential pressure measuring greater than 150 inches of water but less than 164 inches.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

Failure of the switch to trip at its desired setpoint is attributable to setpoint drift.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The Isolation Condenser is a standby, high pressure system provided for the removal of fission-product decay heat after a reactor scram. It operates by natural circulation, with steam flowing from the reactor through the condenser tubes, condensing and returning by gravity to the vessel via recirculation loop 'B'.

Instrumentation on the steam supply and condensate return line detect a line break by sensing differential pressure across pipe elbows located inside the drywell. When any one of four pressure switches senses a high differential pressure (above Technical Specification setpoint limits) the Isolation Condenser is automatically isolated.

Failure of the switch to trip at its desired setpoint did not result in a condition that had not been previously analyzed. The remaining switches would have initiated the required isolation of the Isolation Condenser if an actual line break had existed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The pressure switch in question was recalibrated to within its acceptable setpoint range and satisfactorily tested.

The pressure switch is a Barton, Model 288 with a range of 0-250 inches.

Similar occurrences: 82-7/3L and 81-26/3L.