U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366 (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK (1)4 0 LICENSEE CODE CON'T 7 0 0 5 2 4 8 0 8 0 6 0 6 8 50 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE REPORT 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 0 1 (6) SOURCE REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) | During testing, it was discovered that eight of twelve helium circulator seal mal-0 2 function pressure differential switch units tripped outside the limits of LCO 4.4.1, 0 3 Table 4.4-3. Reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specifications AC 7.5.2(b)1 and 0 4 AC 7.5.2(b)2. No affect on public health or safety. Redundant system available and 0 5 operable. Similar reports are RO's 77-47, 78-27, 79-32, 79-56, 80-07, 80-16, and 0 6 80-20. 0 7 0 8 COMP VALVE CODE CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE I N S T R U (14) S (15) Z (16) E (13) E (12) 0 9 B (11 18 REVISION OCCURRENCE REPORT SEQUENTIAL CODE TYPE NO. REPORT NO LER/RO 11 (17) 21 0 3 X REPORT 6 NUMBER 31 32 COMPONENT ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN HOURS (22) FUTURE SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER 10 10 10 Y 23 10 18 10 Y 24 N 25 B 10 (18) X (19 Z (21) (26) (20) X CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECT. VE ACTIONS (27) IITT Barton Model 289 pressure differential switches failed to actuate at trip point 10 due to dirt accumulation in electrical switches. The ITT Barton pressure differential 1 1 indicating switches were replaced with ITT Barton Model 752 pressure transmitters and 1 2 bistable trip modules (Model PT-3D, manufactured by General Atomic Company) via Change 1 3 No further corrective action is anticipated or required. Notice 1110. 1 4 80 METHOD OF FACILIT OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) % POWER C(31) Operability Test 3 (29) N/A E (28) 0 2 1 5 80 CONTENT ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) OF RELEASE N/A N/A 1 6 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER TYPE 0 | 0 | 0 | (37) Z (38) N/A 1 7 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES 8306280272 830606 PDR ADOCK 05000287 DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 0 0 40 1 8 01 N/A PDR 80 OSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION Z (42) N/A 1 9 80 NRC USE ONLY PUBLICITY DESCRIPTION (45) N 44 N/A 2 0 5 0 b O 785-2224 (303)NAME OF PREPARER. PHONE:

REPORT DATE:	June 6, 1983
OCCURRENCE DATE:	May 24, 1980

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FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO 16805 WELD COUNTY ROAD 19 1/2 PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651-9298

REPORT NO. 50-267/80-26/03-X-1

Final

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

During performance of the monthly check of the helium circulator seal malfunction pressure differential switches, it was discovered that eight of twelve switch units tripped outside the limits specified in LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3.

This is reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specifications AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

During normal plant operation, instrument personnel performed the circulator seal malfunction (buffer-mid-buffer) switch operability check. The switches are normally calibrated on an annual basis; however, due to the problems cited in the previous reports as listed on the LER, a check of buffer-mid-buffer trip settings on a monthly basis was undertaken as an interim measure to test operability.

There are twelve buffer-mid-buffer switch units, three per circulator. Each switch unit contains two electrical switches. The range of the sensing element is from (-) 100 inches of water to zero to (+) 100 inches of water. One of the electrical switches in each unit must operate at greater than or equal to (-) 10 inches water (negative buffer-mid-buffer), and the other electrical switch must operate at less than or equal to (+) 80 inches water (positive buffer-mid-buffer) per Table 4.4-3.

The trip settings for the twelve switch units are listed in Table 1.

The switch settings which were found to be less conservative than those established by the Technical Specification did not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of the system.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION:

Dirt buildup and accumulation in the electrical switches prevented them from making proper contact.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The trip settings of the electrical switches were re-adjusted to the proper trip points.

Due to the continuing problems being experienced with the electrical switches, the interim check of the trip settings was conducted on a monthly basis.

The problem was investigated, and the process activated pressure differential switches were replaced with pressure differential transmitters and solid state dual bistable trip modules. The new units eliminate the use of electrical contacts and, therefore, reduce the probability of fouling by dirt and/or corrosion from the working environment. This modification was performed via Public Service Company Change Notice 1110.

No further corrective actions are anticipated or required.

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TABLE 1

		1				
		As Found Inches H ₂ 0		As Left Inches H ₂ 0		
			Decreasing Trip Point			
1A Circulator	PDIS-21149	+77	- 9	+77	-9	
	PDIS-21151	+75	-15 ①	+75	-6	
	PDIS-21153	+74	-19 ①	+74	-5	
1B Circulator	PDIS-21155	+88 ①	-20 ①	+77	-6	
	PDIS-21157	+74	-23 ①	+74	-6	
	PDIS-21159	÷92 ①	- 8	+74	-8	
1C Circulator	PDIS-21150	+76	-13 ①	+76	-6	
	PDIS-21152	+74	-12 ①	+74	-6	
	PDIS-21154	+75	- 5	+75	-5	
1D Circulator	PDIS-21156	+74	-28 ①	+74	-3	
	PDIS-21158	+74	- 7	+74	-7	
	PDIS-21160	+75	- 8	+75	-8	

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Denotes switches which were out of tolerance.

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