NRC FOR	
	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
	CONTROL BLOCK:
0 1	C 0 F S V 1 2 0
	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 2 6 7 7 0 2 1 9 8 0 8 0 6 0 6 8 3 9 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
02	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) During testing, it was discovered that two of twelve helium circulator seal mal-
03	function pressure differential switch units tripped outside the limits of LCO 4.4.1,
04	Table 4.4-3. Reactor operation during test interval. Reportable per Fort St. Vrain
0 5	Technical Specifications AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2. No affect on public health or
06	safety. Redundant system available and operable. Similar reports are RO's 77-47,
07	78-27, 79-32, and 79-56.
08	80
7 8 09 7 8	CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCO
	Image: Sequential Report NO. OCCURRENCE REPORT TYPE NO. (17) REPORT 18 10 1 -1 0 0 71 -1 0 3 1 X -1 10
	NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
	TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS (2) SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUPACIONEN (2) SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUPACIONEN (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2)
	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) I ITT Barton Model 289 pressure differential switches failed to actuate at trip point
10	, due to dirt accumulation in electrical switches. The ITT Barton pressure differential
11	, indicating switches were replaced with ITT Barton Model 752 pressure transmitters and
12	
13	bistable trip module (Model PT-3D, m inufactured by General Atomic Company) via Change
14	Notice 1110. No further corrective action is anticipated or required.
7 8	9 FACILITY SPOWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 G (28) 0 0 0 (29) N/A C C 3 Operability Test
R	ACTIVITY CONTENT ELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 80
7 8	2 (33) 2 (34) N/A 9 10 11 44 45 9 10 11 44 45 9 10 11 44 45 9 10 11 44 45 9 NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7 7 8	9 REDSONNEL IN URIES 13 80
18	NUMBER DESCRIPTION (4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 8306280260 820400 80
19	TYPE DESCRIPTION BAR ADDCK 05000267 S PDR ADDCK 05000267 PDR
7 8	BO NRC USE ONLY
20	
	NAME OF PREPARER PHONE: (303) 785-2224

REPORT DATE:June 6, 1983REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-07OCCURRENCE DATE:February 19, 1980Page 1 of 4

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO 16805 WELD COUNTY ROAD 19 1/2 PLATTEVILLE. COLORADO 80651-9298

REPORT NO. 50-267/80-07/03-X-1

Final

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

During performance of the monthly check of the helium circulator seal malfunction pressure differential switches, it was discovered that two of twelve switch units tripped outside the limits specified in LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3.

Since reactor operation had taken place during the test interval, this is reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specifications AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

While the reactor was in a shutdown condition, instrument personnel performed the circulator seal malfunction (buffer-mid-buffer) switch operability check. The switches are normally calibrated on an annual basis; however, due to the problems cited in Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/79-56, Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/79-32, and Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/78-27, a check of buffer-mid-buffer switch trip settings on a monthly basis was undertaken as an interim measure to test operability.

There are twelve buffer-mid-buffer switch units, three per circulator. Each switch unit contains two electrical switches. The range of the sensing element is from (-) 100 inches of water to zero to (+) 100 inches of water. One of the electrical switches in each unit must operate at greater than or equal to (-) 10 inches water (negative buffer-mid-buffer), and the other electrical switch must operate at less than or equal to (+) 80 inches water (positive buffer-mid-buffer) per Table 4.4-3.

The switch settings which were found to be less conservative than those established by the Technical Specification did not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of the system.

The trip settings for the twelve switch units are listed in Table 1.

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-07 ISSUE 1 Page 2 of 4

The 1B circulator switch settings are included only to complete the table since the circulator was removed and not operating during the test interval. See Reportable Occurrence 50-267/80-01.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION:

Dirt buildup and accumulation in the electrical switches prevented them from making proper contact.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The trip settings of the electrical switches were re-adjusted to the proper trip points.

Due to the continuing problems being experienced with the electrical switches, the interim check of the trip settings was conducted on a monthly basis.

The problem was investigated, and the process activated pressure differential switches were replaced with pressure differential transmitters and solid state dual bistable trip modules. The new units eliminate the use of electrical contacts and, therefore, reduce the probability of fouling by dirt and/or corrosion from the working environment. This modification was performed via Public Service Company Change Notice 1110.

No further corrective actions are anticipated or required.

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-07 ISSUE 1 Page 3 of 4

TABLE 1

		As Found Inches H ₂ O		As Left Inches H ₂ O	
			Decreasing		
1A Circulator	PDIS-21149	+75	- 5	+75	-5
	PDIS-21151	+75	- 4	+75	-4
	PDIS-21153	+73	- 5	+73	-5
18 Circulator	PDIS-21155	+71	- 8	+73	-8
	PDIS-21157	+90	- 7	+78	-7
	PDIS-21159	+76	-25	+76	-6
1C Circulator	PDIS-21150	+77	-40 ①	+77	-6
	PDIS-21152	+75	-35 ①	+75	-8
	PDIS-21154	+77	- 5	+77	-5
1D Circulator	PDIS-21156	+73	- 5	+73	-5
	PDIS-21158	+76	- 6	+76	-6
	PDIS-21160	+75	- 8	+75	-8

Denotes switches which were out of tolerance.

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REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-07 ISSUE 1 Page 4 of 4

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