

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)																			
01		O H D B S 1				0000000000000000										411111				5									
7 8		9 14				15 25										26 30				57 CAT 58									
CON'T		REPORT SOURCE		L 6		05000346										7		030383		8		031783		9					
7 8		60 61		DOCKET NUMBER										68 69		EVENT DATE		74 75		REPORT DATE		80							
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10																													
02		(NP-32-83-01) On 3/3/83 it was determined that the current operating practice of only																											
03		requiring one Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Room Cooler to be valved into ser-																											
04		vice in each ECCS Room was less conservative than the assumptions in the Safety Analy-																											
05		sis Report (SAR). This occurrence is being reported per T.S. 6.9.1.8.f. There was																											
06		no danger to the public or station personnel. An analysis is presently being con-																											
07		ducted by the architect/engineer to determine the highest service water temperature																											
08		which would provide sufficient cooling in the event of a LOCA with only one ECCS																											
7 8 9		room cooler available. 80																											
09		SYSTEM CODE		S F 11		CAUSE CODE		D 12		CAUSE SUBCODE		Z 13		COMP. SUBCODE		Z 15		VALVE SUBCODE		Z 16									
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17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		8 3		SEQUENCE REPORT NO.		0 1 2		OCCURRENCE CODE		0 1		REPORT TYPE		L		REVISION NO.									
7 8		21 22		23 24		25 26		27 28		29 30		31 32		33 34		35 36		37 38		39 40									
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER		Z 9 9 9											
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33 34		35 36		37 38		39 40		41 42		43 44		45 46		47 48		49 50		51 52											
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27																													
10		The cause is the lack of procedural control to ensure that non-Technical Specification																											
11		equipment which is required by the SAR remains operable. On 3/3/83, ECCS Room Coolers																											
12		1-1 and 1-4 were valved into service. Portions of the SAR are being reviewed with																											
13		station procedures to ensure that the design assumptions contained in the SAR are																											
14		integrated in the appropriate procedures.																											
7 8 9		80																											
15		FACILITY STATUS		E 28		% POWER		1 0 0 29		OTHER STATUS		NA 30		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		A 31		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION		Determined by Station Management 32									
7 8 9		10 11		12 13		14 15		16 17		18 19		20 21		22 23		24 25		26 27		28 29									
16		ACTIVITY CONTENT		RELEASED OF RELEASE		Z 33		Z 34		NA 35		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		NA 36		LOCATION OF RELEASE		NA 37		80									
7 8 9		10 11		12 13		14 15		16 17		18 19		20 21		22 23		24 25		26 27		28 29									
17		PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		0 0 0 37		TYPE		Z 38		DESCRIPTION		NA 39		80		80		80									
7 8 9		10 11		12 13		14 15		16 17		18 19		20 21		22 23		24 25		26 27		28 29									
18		PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		0 0 0 40		DESCRIPTION		NA 41		80		80		80		80		80									
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19		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		Z 42		DESCRIPTION		NA 43		80		80		80		80		80									
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20		PUBLICITY		ISSUED		N 44		DESCRIPTION		NA 45		80		80		80		80		80									
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23		NAME OF PREPARER		Lynn Richter		PHONE		419-259-5000, Ext. 369		80		80		80		80		80		80									
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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-32-83-01

DATE OF EVENT: March 3, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Current operating practice involving the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Room Coolers was less conservative than the assumptions in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR)

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2770 and Load (Gross MWE) = 915.

Description of Occurrence: On March 3, 1983, it was determined that the current operating practice involving the ECCS Room Coolers was less conservative than the assumptions in the SAR. Two room coolers are located in each ECCS Room (Rooms 105 and 115) and one room cooler is located in the Decay Heat Cooler Room 113. Due to service water leaks, the ECCS Room Cooler 1-1 in Room 115 and ECCS Room Cooler 1-4 in Room 105 had previously been isolated, leaving ECCS Room Coolers 1-2 in Room 115, 1-5 in Room 105, and 1-3 in Room 113 in service. On March 3, 1983, when a problem developed in the Decay Heat Room Cooler 1-3, an investigation was begun to determine the effect on plant operability with Decay Heat Room Cooler 1-3 out of service. It was determined at this time that the operating practice of utilizing one room cooler in each ECCS Room was possibly less conservative than the assumptions used in the Single Failure Analysis for the ECCS Room Cooling Units of the SAR (Table 9.4.6). Table 9.4.6 of the SAR states that if the cooling capacity in one room is reduced to 50 percent of design, the standby full capacity ECCS Room Cooling Units are available to maintain a suitable environment for essential equipment in the second ECCS Pump Room.

This occurrence is being reported per Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.f which requires prompt notification and a written followup report within two weeks for personnel errors or procedure inadequacy which prevents, or could prevent by itself, the fulfillments of the functional requirements of systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was the lack of procedural control to ensure the proper operating configurations of systems or equipment not addressed in Technical Specifications, but which are discussed in the SAR. Also contributing to this occurrence was a misinterpretation of the ECCS room cooler requirements as addressed in the SAR which has existed since September 15, 1981 when a similar occurrence was reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-81-70 (81-057). At the time of this occurrence, the Response to Question 6.3.6 of the Question and Answer Section of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was interpreted as requiring only one ECCS room cooler in service in each ECCS room.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The ECC Room Coolers are designed to maintain a suitable environment for the electric motors of the high pressure injection pumps, low pressure injection/decay heat pumps, and the containment spray pumps, as well as other environmentally qualified equipment in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). An analysis is presently being conducted by the architect/engineer to determine the highest service water temperature which would provide sufficient cooling in the event of a worst case LOCA with only one ECCS room cooler available.

Corrective Action: On March 3, 1983, ECCS Room Coolers 1-1 and 1-4 were valved into service.

The appropriate procedure modifications will be made to the Service Water Monthly Test, ST 5075.01, Service Water System Procedure, SP 1104.11, and the LOCA Emergency Procedure, EF 1202.06, to ensure that two ECCS room coolers in each ECCS Room are either operable or can be restored to operable status before ECCS equipment draws suction from the containment emergency sump following a LOCA. In addition, portions of the SAR are currently being distributed with station operating procedures for periodic review to ensure that the design assumptions contained in the SAR can be identified and integrated into the appropriate procedures.

Failure Data: A previous occurrence in which both ECCS Room Coolers in Room 115 were found out of service was reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-81-70 (LER 81-057).

LER #83-012