U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366 (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 10 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: (1)10 F S V 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 2 0 4 C 0 1 LICENSE NUMBER CON'T L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7 7 1 0 3 0 7 9 8 0 6 0 6 8 3 REPORT 0 1 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) During testing, it was discovered that seven of twelve helium circulator seal mal-0 2 function pressure differential switch units tripped outside the limits of LCO 4.4.1, 03 Table 4.4-3. Reportable per Technical Specifications AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2. 0 4 No affect on public nealth or safety. Redundant system available and operable. 0 5 Similar reports are RO's 77-47, 78-27, and 79-32. 0 6 0 7 0 8 COMP. SUBCODE SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE VALVE COMPONENT CODE CODE CODE U (14 S (15) Ε SITIRI Z (16) CIBI E (13) I NI 0 9 13 18 REVISION OCCURRENCE REPORT SEQUENTIAL CODE NO. YPE REPORT NO. LER/RO 19 (17) 0 15 16 0 3 X 1 REPORT NUMBER COMPONENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. ATTACHMENT EFFECT ON PLANT METHOD TAKEN FUT HOURS (22) N (25) 8 0 (26) Y Y (24) Z (21) 0 0 0 0 23 BI 01 Ζ 0 (18) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) ITT Barton Model 289 pressure differential switches failed to actuate at trip point 10 due to dirt accumulation in electrical switches. The ITT Barton pressure differential, 1 1 indicating switches were replaced with ITT Barton Model 752 pressure transmitters and 1 2 bistable trip modules (Model PT-3D, Manufactured by General Atomic Company) via 1 3 Change Notice 1110. No further corrective action is anticipated or required. 1 4 80 METHOD OF FACILITY OTHER STATUS 30 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) % POWER B (31) Surveillance Test G (28) 10 10 10 (29) 5 80 9 10 ACTIVITY CONTENT LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) OF RELEASE RELEASED Z 34 N/A N/A 2 (33) 6 80 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) TYPE NUMBER (37) Z (38) N/A 01010 7 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER (40) N/A 0 010 1 8 80 8306280246 830606 PDR ADOCK 05000026 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION YPE PDR Z (42) N/A 1 9 80 10 NRC USE ONLY PUBLICITY DESCRIPTICA (45) JED N (44) N/A 2 0 88 69 80 (303) 785-2224 PHONE: NAME OF PREPARER .

REPORT DATE: June 6, 1983 OCCURRENCE DATE: October 30, 1979 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-56 ISSUE 1 Page 1 of 4

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO 16805 WELD COUNTY ROAD 19 1/2 PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651-9298

REPORT NO. 50-267/79-56/03-X-1

Final

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

During performance of the monthly check of the helium circulator seal malfunction pressure differential switches, it was discovered that seven of twelve switch units tripped outside the limits specified in LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3.

This is reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specifications AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

While the reactor was in a shutdown condition, instrument personnel performed the circulator seal malfunction (buffer-mid-buffer) switch operability check. The switches were calibrated and tested under Surveillance Test SR 5.4.1.3.6.c-R. Due to the problems cited in Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/78-27, a check of buffer-mid-buffer switch trip settings on a monthly basis was undertaken as an interim measure to test operability.

There are twelve buffer-mid-buffer switch units, three per circulator. Each switch unit contains two electrical switches. The range of the sensing element is from (-) 100 inches of water to zero to (+) 100 inches of water. One of the electrical switches in each unit must operate at greater than or equal to (-) 10 inches water (negative buffer-mid-buffer), and the other electrical switch must operate at less than or equal to (+) 80 inches water (positive buffer-mid-buffer) per Table 4.4-3.

The switch settings which were found to be less conservative than those established by the Technical Specification did not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of the system.

The trip settings for the twelve switch units are listed in Table 1.

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-56 ISSUE 1 Page 2 of 4

CAUSE DESCRIPTION:

110

Dirt buildup and accumulation in the electrical switches prevented them from making proper contact.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The switches were cleaned, and the trip settings of the electrical switches were re-adjusted to the proper trip points.

The Surveillance Test was successfully completed.

Due to the continuing problems being experienced with the electrical switches, the interim check of the trip settings was conducted on a monthly basis.

The problem was investigated, and the process activated pressure differential switches were replaced with pressure differential transmitters and solid state dual bistable trip modules. The new units eliminate the use of electrical contacts and, therefore, reduce the probability of fouling by dirt and/or corrosion from the working environment. This modification was performed via Public Service Company Change Notice 1110.

No further corrective actions are anticipated or required.

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-56 ISSUE 1 Page 3 of 4

TABLE 1

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		As Found Inches H ₂ O			H ₂ 0	As Left Inches H ₂ 0	
						Increasing	
1A Circulator	PDIS-21149	75		-26	1	75	-7
	PDIS-21151	85	1	-17	1	75	-6
	PDIS-21153	77		-26	1	77	-6
1B Circulator	PDIS-21155	76		-15	1	76	-6
	PDIS-21157	80		-30	1	76	-6.2
	PDIS-21159	80		- 6		75	-6
1C Circulator	PDIS-21150	80		- 9.	.4	75.8	-6.8
	PDIS-21152	81.6	5 ①	-12	1	74.4	-5.9
	PDIS-21154	82.8		- 8.	.4	75.5	-7.0
1D Circulator	PDIS-21156	76.5	5	- 4.	.6	76.5	-5.5
	PDIS-21158	77.3	3	- 4.	.7	74.7	-6.8
	PDIS-21160	76.5	5	- 3.	.5	76.5	-6.8

Indicates switches out of tolerance.

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-56 ISSUE 1 Page 4 of 4

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