NRC FORM 366 (12-81)		E EVENT REPORT	APPROVED BY OMB 3150-0011 EXPIRES 4-30-82
CONTROL BLOCK: 1 1 1 PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)			
O 1 S C N	E E 3 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 E COOR 14	0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 NUMBER 25 26 LICER	1 1 1 1 4 57 CAT 58 5
7 .		68 69 EVENT DATE 74	0 6 1 0 8 3 9
On May 1	3, 1983 while attempting to	replace a cell in the	3PB battery, power was
10 3 lost from the EFDWP Turbine Auxiliary Oil Pump, which lost the automatic initia-			
0 4 tion cap	ability of the TDEFDWP and	caused it to be technic	ally inoperable for 81
[0] 5 seconds. During this period, both the MDEFDWPs were operable and could have			
o 6 supplied	the necessary emergency fe	edwater if needed. Als	o, the TDEFDWP re-
[0] 7 turned to service within the T.S. allowed time period. This incident had no			
ols effect o	n the health and safety of	the public.	80
0 9	CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE C H 11 A 12 C 13 E SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	COMPONENT CODE PUMPXXX 18 OCCURRENCE CODE	DE SUBCODE 15 Z 16
17 REPORT NUMBER	8 3 0 0 0 6	0 3 L	11 0
ACTION FUTL		TURS 22 ATTA CHMENT NPRD-4 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. N 23 N 24 41 42	PRIME COMP. COMPONENT (26) SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER W 3 1 5
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27 This incident was caused by personnel forgetting to perform a step in the sta-			
1 1 tion procedure. He was to have cross-connected the buses prior to isolating			
the 3PB	pattery. The breaker was c	losed, power was restor	ed, and operability of
the TDEFDWP was restored. The person performing the repair was counseled.			
1 4			90
FACILITY STATUS	other status 30 NA	A 31 Operator obser	
ACTIVITY CON	LEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	45 46 LOCATION	OF RELEASE (36)
	L EXPOSURES (20)	45	80
1 7 0 0 0	3) Z 38 NA		16.5/
PERSONNI NUMBER 1 8 0 00	DESCRIPTION (41) NA		XXXX
1 9 Z 42 DE	AGE TO FACILITY (43)	18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Y
2 0 N 44	NA NA		NRC USE ONLY
7 8 9 10 N	ME OF PREPARER Jocelyn C. Pe	tty PHONE:	(704) 373-8270

DUKE POWER COMPANY ANT REGION : P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242
83 JUN 16 P8: 59

HAL B. TUCKER VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE (704) 373-4531

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Oconee Nuclear Station Re: Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/83-06. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

H.B. Tucher 1- KU Hal B. Tucker

JCP/php Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

> INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339

> Mr. J. C. Bryant NFC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station

Mr. John F. Suermann Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

TE 22

Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station

Report Number: RO-287/83-06

Report Date: June 10, 1983

Occurrence Date: May 13, 1983

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Unit 3 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (TDEFDWP) was made inoperable when power was lost to the Auxiliary Oil Pump impairing automatic initiation of the TDEFDWP.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP

Description of Occurrence: On May 13, 1983, at 0547, during a repair attempt to replace a cell in the 3PB battery, the 3PB power battery breaker was opened without first cross-tying the power battery buses. As a result, the 3PB bus, which supplies power to the Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Auxiliary Oil Pump, lost power when the breaker was opened. With no power to this pump, the TDEFDWP will not automatically start upon an initiation signal. Therefore, the TDEFDWP was technically inoperable when the auxiliary oil pump was out of service (see RO-269/82-20 for a similar incident). This constituted a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.4.2.b, which states that one TDEFDWP may be inoperable for a period of up to 72 hours. The TDEFDWP was inoperable for 81 seconds.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this incident was personnel error. The person performing the repair work forgot to perform a procedural step that contained instructions to cross-connect the buses prior to isolating the 3PB battery. The person was qualified to perform this procedure and had previously observed the proper method of isolating a power battery.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the period of inoperability, both of the motor-driven EFDW pumps were operable. Per Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 10.4.7.1 only 500 gpm of emergency feedwater are required as a minimum to enable safe and orderly cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System. If emergency feedwater had been required, the motor-driven pumps could have supplied the water. Also, the TDEFDW pump was returned to service within 2 minutes, well within the time permitted by Technical Specification 3.4.2. Thus, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action: Upon loss of indication to the 3PB bus, Control Room personnel contacted the person performing the repair work, who immediately restored power by closing the 3PB power battery breaker. This was done within 81 seconds, and returned the TDEFDWP to operability.

The person involved has been counseled concerning his failure to follow the correct procedural steps.