

CONTROL BLOCK: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)0 1 P A S E S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 LICENSE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 38

CONT

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 7 0 5 1 5 8 3 8 0 6 1 4 8 3 9
7 8 DOCKET NUMBER 60 61 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 Review of surveillance test data led to an investigation into the reason for an

0 3 apparent low dilution flow condition in the Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage

0 4 Control System (MSIV-LCS). Both the inboard and outboard dilution flow transmitters

0 5 were found to be valved out. There were no adverse consequences in the that the

0 6 conditions under which the MSIV-LCS is required to operate did not arise, and the

0 7 misalignment only affected operability of one subsystem.

0 8

0 9 C D 11 A 12 C 13 Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 Z 15 Z 16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

18 H 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 22 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9 26

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.

ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRO-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The transmitters were valved out due to an I&C technician mistakenly interpreting

1 1 bypass tagging to indicate that maintenance was being performed on the instruments.

1 2 His actions were taken to mitigate a line-up which he believed would damage the

1 3 instruments. A copy of the event report was given to each I&C tech. and discussed

1 4 at the next section meeting.

1 5 G 28 0 0 0 29 NA 30 A 31 Review of surveillance test data 32

1 6 Z 33 Z 34 NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36

1 7 0 0 0 37 38 NA 39

1 8 0 0 0 40 41

1 9 Z 42 NA 43

2 0 N 44 NA 45

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

NAME OF PREPARER L.A. Kuzcynski

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PDR ADDCK 05000387
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TEZZ

NRC USE ONLY



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

Two North Ninth Street • Allentown, PA 18101 • 215 / 770-5151

June 14, 1983

Mr. J.M. Allan
Acting Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-079/03L-0
ER 100450 FILE 841-23
PLA-1713

Dear Mr. Allan:

Attached please find a copy of Licensee Event Report No. 83-079/03L-0. This event was determined to be reportable per Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.c, in that for a period of nineteen days, the Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control System (MSIV-LCS) dilution flow transmitters were valved out of service. This yielded a situation wherein, under actual LOCA conditions, the inboard subsystem of the MSIV-LCS would have tripped off after a time delay.

H.W. Keiser
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

LAK/pjg

attachment

cc: G.G. Rhoads
Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 52
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Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ATTACHMENT

LER # 83-079/03L-0

Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
Docket Number: 50-387

System design is such that indication of a low flow condition resulting from instrument valve isolation would cause the inboard subsystem valves to close, isolating the subsystem. Concurrently, a low flow alarm would annunciate on a main control room panel. The outboard subsystem would continue to operate under indicated low dilution flow conditions, with a low flow alarm annunciated on a main control room panel. Thus, if conditions had arisen which would have caused the operator to initiate the MSIV-LCS, processing of MSIV leakage prior to its release to an area served by the standby gas treatment system would still have occurred. Note that the MSIV-LCS is activated at the operator's discretion following a LOCA. Safe shutdown is not affected by the operability of the system.

Bypass tagging is used for control of temporary adjustments to mechanical systems or electrical circuits. This tagging is completely separate from the safety tagging used for personnel and equipment protection. All tags are clearly differentiated by working and color. The mis-interpretation arose due to the wording of the description on the bypass tag. The surveillance test completed prior to the flow transmitters being valved out was properly completed and independently verified correct.