

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (cont'd)

Thus for a period of less than two hours while filling the Reactor Cavity the "B" RHR pump was run with its suction valve closed. The Auxiliary Operator checked "B" RHR pump and found it warm but no seal leakage. The pump was tested for flow and vibration with conditions found normal.

This is a violation of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1.e.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Cont'd)

4/13/83.

Because the power was off MCC D and the control power fuses to its breakers still in place, when the attempt was made to stroke MOV-704B to see if temporary power had been supplied to this breaker the valve position status lights did not change therefore no entry was made in the Official Log or in PT-2.3. It should be noted that prior to this event the line-ups were in proper conditions.

If the power is not on to a MOV Breaker but its control power fuses are still in place and an attempt is made to close this valve, the valve will not move but the signal to move will still be there even if the switch has been placed in the Open position. When the power is restored to this breaker, the valve will then close. This is what happened to MOV-704B. When the power was restored to MCC D the valve went closed because a close signal was still present. This event went un-noticed by the Operators, therefore, on 5/1/83 at 2109 when the "B" RHR pump was started to flood the refueling cavity, its suction valve was still closed.

A change of procedure has been submitted to O-6.13, "Daily Surveillance Log" to add the valves necessary to RHR operation while at Cold Shutdown to the check sheet and to allow the requirement to perform the valve position status checks performed during operation (step 5.9) to be N/A'd because many of these valves are not in the position called for.

Electrical Foreman has changed procedures M-44.3 and M-44.4 "Isolation of 1C MCC & 1D MCC and Restarting it to Service" respectively, so that after maintenance has been completed and just prior to returning A.C. Power to the motor control center, the D.C. Control Power to the motor control center will be removed and then returned. This will reset all equipment on the MCC to an as is status.



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May 31, 1983

Mr. James M. Allan, Acting Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Subject: LER 83-017/03L, Inoperable Residual Heat Removal Loop.
RHR Suction Valve Closed While RHR Pump In Operation.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Allan:

In accordance with Technical Specification, article 6.9.2.b(3)
"Observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative
or procedural controls which threaten to cause reduction of
degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems
or engineered safety feature systems", the attached Licensee
Event Report LER 83-017/03L-0 is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours,


John E. Maier

JEM/kdg

Att.

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